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SUMMARY 
Competition law is widely known as a product of capitalism and the free market. 
Although recent reforms have tended to move forwards capitalism and free markets, 
both China and Vietnam are still mainly socialist. Thus, competition law in both 
countries has been enacted and is enforced in a significantly different economic and 
political environment. One evitable question that should be asked is whether and how 
(if any) this eco-political model has had any impact on the promulgation and 
implementation of competition laws in these countries, and whether they are 
significantly different from other ‘normal’ market economies. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to put competition law within the political, economic, cultural and 
historical background in China and Vietnam and to explain some of the idiosyncrasies 
of the Chinese and Vietnamese system that have a direct bearing on the enactment, 
drafting and enforcement of competition laws in these two socialist countries.  
Three important conclusions have been drawn: 
First, competition law in both China and Vietnam were enacted due to both internal 
and external forces including (i) the two countries’ transition from a planned 
economy into a market economy, (ii) the need to solve monopolistic problems in 
China’s and Vietnam’s domestic market, (iii) the need for the rule of law, and (iv) the 
needs that come from both countries’ opening to the outside world. However, while 
enacting the AML was an active and deliberate move of China rather than a mere 
reaction to foreign pressures, the impact of external conditions, especially the foreign 
pressures during Vietnam’s WTO entry negotiation process, appeared to be a more 
direct and vigorous force behind the adoption of the VCL. 
 vii 
Second, the contemporary competition laws in both countries, to a large extent, have 
been constructed by legal transplantation and the approach of competition law in 
China and Vietnam toward anticompetitive practices largely converges with 
competition law in other ‘normal’ market economies. However, there are still 
important divergences that come from these countries’ specific economic and 
political systems (e.g., competition laws in both countries have specific provisions 
dealing with administrative monopolies, SOEs and trade associations (which are often 
emanations of and work closely with the State) etc.). Further, China’s competition 
regime appears to be better drafted, more detailed and more aligned with mature 
antitrust jurisdictions than the VCL. 
Third, both countries face significant challenges in enforcing their competition laws. 
Both the competition agencies and the court system in China and Vietnam still lack 
the necessary institutional and political independence as well as the expertise to carry 
out their tasks, especially in complex or politically sensitive cases. Further, it is very 
likely that the prohibition of administrative monopolies may not yield many successes 
in the near future and SOEs will be given a de facto exemption from competition law 
for most of the time in both countries. Interestingly, while there appears to emerge a 
pattern of using competition law as a protectionist tool against foreign companies in 
China, this has not been the case in Vietnam. 
 viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Competition policy and law, especially in respect of the anticipated outcomes that 
may flow from adoption of a comprehensive law, cannot be attempted without a 
sound understanding of the context within which the law will operate in a particular 
jurisdiction. This is especially apposite in relation to a country that operates on 
fundamentally different principles to liberal democracies” 1. 
   (Mark Williams, 2005) 
“Law making is more than law drafting. Law making is, in fact, all about 
implementation and public administration. This means that equal attention must be 
paid to the government, legal and commercial cultures within which a new law is 
debated, drafted and brought into effect”2. 
   (William A. W. Neilson, 2007) 
1. Background for the Research Topic Selection 
The 20
th
 century has witnessed a proliferation of competition laws around the globe. 
More than one hundred countries in the world have now adopted competition laws, of 
which approximately two-thirds are less developed and/or transitional economies. 
Many other countries are also in the process of adopting competition laws. In line 
with this trend, both China and Vietnam have recently adopted and started to enforce 
their competition laws: Vietnam enacted its Competition Law in 2004 and China 
                                                 
1
 Mark Williams, ‘Competition Policy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan’, (Cambridge 
University Press, New York: 2005), p.152. 
2
 William A. W. Neilson, ‘Competition Laws for Asian Transitional Economies: Adaptation to Local 
Legal Cultures in Vietnam and Indonesia’ in Tim Lindsey (ed), ‘Law Reform in Developing and 
Transitional States’ (Routledge, London/New York: 2007), p.307. 
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enacted its Anti-monopoly Law in 2007. The end of the 20
th
 century also witnessed a 
wave of economic reforms and opening-up policies in socialist countries including 
China and Vietnam, which was one of the main reasons for adopting competition law 
in these countries. Both countries have declared their determination and aspiration to 
pursue a ‘socialist market economy’. While China pursues a ‘socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics’, Vietnam is building a ‘socialism-oriented 
market economy’, which are essentially the same. Similar to other (former) socialist 
countries, after a long time adopting the socialist economic model, both China and 
Vietnam had suffered from economic stagnation and crises due to the rigid centrally 
planned, command-and-control economic system, which only favored loss-making, 
monopolistic, SOEs. Consequently, the so-called neo-liberal economic reforms took 
place after that with the State’s recognition of the benefits of a free market and 
affirmation of the private sector as potentially more efficient suppliers of goods and 
services and as the new engine of growth. These reforms also gave way to the 
dissolution, restructuring and privatization of many formerly State-owned 
monopolies. They also liberalized both internal and external trade regimes and 
encouraged private domestic as well as foreign investment in the economy. 
Moreover, as a result of the opening-up policies, both China and Vietnam have also 
witnessed the growing impact of international competition on domestic enterprises. It 
was in this special context that competition laws were introduced into these two 
countries. 
What has triggered my interest in doing this research is that competition law is widely 
known as a product of capitalism and the free market. Yet, although recent reforms 
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have tended to move forwards capitalism and free markets, both China and Vietnam 
are still mainly socialist with socialist values characterized by One Party Rule, State 
Power Concentration and State Economic Ownership
3
. Even though some authors 
may call China and Vietnam ‘transitional economies’, it should be noted that often 
the term 'transitional economies' is taken to mean transition from a socialist economic 
system to a market or mixed system where the state will play progressively less of a 
role in the economy in particular by privatizing the majority of SOEs. While clearly a 
matter of degree, the extent of transition of by both China and Vietnam to a market 
economy has been limited, as there has been no substantive change in the political 
ideology of the ruling Communist Parties on ownership. The Parties in both countries 
continue to play an all-pervasive role in the economy and have no intention of 
divesting the state of most SOEs, who continue to dominate large parts of their 
respective economies
4
. Thus, competition law has been enacted and is enforced in an 
economic and political environment that is significantly different from western 
notions of a genuine market economy system where the state plays a more limited 
role in the ownership and control of the economy. One evitable question that should 
be asked is whether and how (if any) these eco-political features of China and 
Vietnam have had any impact on the promulgation and implementation of 
competition laws in these countries, which make them significantly different from 
other ‘normal’ market economies. Moreover, bearing in mind that these two countries 
                                                 
3
 John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson (eds), ‘Asian Socialism and Legal Change: the Dynamics of 
Vietnamese and Chinese Reform’, (Asia Pacific Press, ANU: 2005), p.3 (‘In both countries, socialist 
theory has pragmatically adapted to new economic conditions without necessarily losing sight of 
socialist values, such as Party leadership and state economic ownership’).  
4
 I would like to thank Prof. Mark Williams (Hong Kong Polytechnic University) for clarifying this 
point for me. 
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not only have geographical proximity but also share much common historical, 
political, economic, cultural and social background, one further question is whether 
the promulgation and implementation of competition laws in these two countries will 
be more similar to or different from each other. Therefore, in addition to analyzing 
the antitrust regimes, this thesis will place them in the context of the specific politico-
legal-economic features of China and Vietnam to achieve a thorough understanding 
of the legislative provisions, the enforcement mechanisms and the prospects for an 
effective implementation of competition law in these countries. 
This dissertation hopes to contribute to the knowledge base in competition law in 
several ways: 
First, in terms of scope of research, this dissertation seeks to go beyond the current 
literature which mostly focuses on competition law and policy of only developed 
countries or on either China or Vietnam individually. While most authors focus on 
either China or Vietnam separately, this thesis seeks to provide an in depth account of 
competition law developments in both countries with a comparative analysis.  
Second, so far the most relevant research in the field which has similar scope of 
research is ‘Antitrust law in China, Korea and Vietnam’ written by Dr. Mark Furse5. 
In this research, the learned author described and commented on competition law and 
policy developments in both countries, which was a great contribution to the 
knowledge base of competition law and has triggered my interest in competition laws 
of these two countries. However, this work tends to be more descriptive rather than 
                                                 
5
 Mark Furse, ‘Antitrust law in China, Korea and Vietnam’ (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2009). 
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giving much comparison and analytical insight into the historical, political, economic, 
and cultural background that has had undeniable influence on competition law in 
these countries. Thus, this thesis intends to depart from and go further than this form 
of analysis by using understanding on the historical, political, economic, and cultural 
context of these two countries, apply them while contrasting competition laws of 
China and Vietnam to identify whether promulgation and enforcement of competition 
law in China and Vietnam is different from other ‘normal’ market economies and 
from each other. 
For the purpose of clarification, I will use the term ‘competition law’, ‘anti-monopoly 
law’ and ‘antitrust law’ interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Moreover, 
China refers to the People’s Republic of China and not to Hong Kong or Macau 
Special Administrative Regions or to the Republic of China on Taiwan because these 
other areas apply different legal systems and none of which has ever adopted the 
socialist economic system or rule by the Chinese Communist Party. 
2. Purpose, Research Questions, and Limitations  
Purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to put competition law within the political, 
economic, cultural and historical background in China and Vietnam and to explain 
some of the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese and Vietnamese system that have a direct 
bearing on competition law formation and implementation in these two socialist 
countries. 
The core research question 
  6 
This dissertation analyzes competition law in socialist countries from the experience 
of China and Vietnam and asks whether and how the enactment, drafting and 
enforcement of competition laws in China and Vietnam is different from other 
‘normal’ market economies and different from each other. 
The three main research questions 
(1) How were competition laws enacted in socialist countries like China and 
Vietnam?  
(2) What are the idiosyncrasies of the current competition laws in China and 
Vietnam? 
(3) What are the major challenges in enforcing competition law in China and 
Vietnam? 
Limitations 
From a structural perspective, one key limitation of the research is that the breadth of 
the subject and the limited length of the study may prevent in depth analysis of issues 
beyond comparative analysis of competition law in China and Vietnam. Thus, it 
should be noted that the proposed research only seeks to contrast the development of 
and challenges to competition law in China and Vietnam. The research, while 
incidentally commenting on possible ways of overcoming identified problems is not 
principally concerned with making specific policy recommendations. It is submitted 
that such a topic would need further research in the future with further careful 
analysis and experiments. This research, therefore, is only limited to providing 
academics and policy makers with a rich and insightful set of analysis which will help 
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enhancing the policy making process. It’s also worth noting that this research shall 
only focus on the case of China and Vietnam. Competition law and policy (if any) in 
other socialist countries (like North Korea, Cuba etc.) or transitional economies (like 
Russia, Central and Eastern Europe countries etc.) is outside the ambit of this 
dissertation. Finally, competition law used in this dissertation means provisions on 
the three standard pillars of competition law including anticompetitive agreements, 
abuse of dominance and anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. Although both 
China and Vietnam have regulations on unfair competitive practices, these are also 
outside the ambit of this dissertation. 
3. Contributions to Knowledge  
This dissertation attempts to give insights into competition law in socialist countries 
like China and Vietnam to understand more about their situations as well as to 
identify the challenges to enforcement of their competition laws. It’s submitted that 
by this way the research shall make a significant contribution to legal scholarship as 
well as the policy making process in several ways. First, the thesis will enrich the 
current literature and give a better understanding to academic and legal communities 
worldwide about competition law in socialist countries like China and Vietnam. 
Second, in terms of policy making, although this research may not provide any 
specific recommendation to the problems, it is hoped that a rich and insightful 
analysis can help provoke further thoughts and initiatives in policy making in both 
China and Vietnam as well as constitute a source and resource for future policy 
debates and decision making processes.  
4. Main Contents 
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The three main research questions lead to three main sections of the dissertation as 
follows: 
After this introduction, Section One addresses the development of competition law in 
China and Vietnam and shall be subdivided into two chapters. Each chapter will 
tentatively identify and compare the context and reasons why competition laws were 
enacted in these two socialist countries.  
Section Two addresses the current competition law in both countries and is also 
subdivided into two chapters, each will analyze, evaluate and compare the current 
competition law of China and Vietnam with the most important cases analyzed for 
illustrations.  
Section Three aims at analyzing and comparing the challenges faced by these two 
socialist countries in enforcing their newly enacted competition laws with two 
chapters addressing China and Vietnam respectively.  
Finally, the salient points of the thesis are summarized in a conclusion. 
5. Methodology and Materials 
This dissertation uses four major research methods, namely the Comparative, the 
Analytical, the Synthesis and the Descriptive. 
The foundation for this research will be created on several pillars, one in law, one in 
economics and the others in political, cultural, social and historical understanding. 
The primary and most important sources of material used for this study are the 
published books, monographs and scholarly articles in English and Vietnamese. A 
variety of newspapers and materials available on the internet websites from a range of 
  9 
providers also served as indispensable sources. Other important sources include 
Chinese and Vietnamese legal documents related to the topic, especially China’s and 
Vietnam’s competition laws and their guidelines. In addition, a considerable number 
of China’s and Vietnam’s case-studies and policy statements were collected and 
contributed for discussion. Relevant legal documents and cases in more mature 
antitrust jurisdictions such as the US and the EU were also accessed for the purpose 
of comparison in this study. Finally, the author carried out a series of unofficial 
interviews with various Chinese, Vietnamese and Western prominent scholars, legal 
practitioners, governmental officials, economists, political scientists, sociologists etc. 
in Vietnam, China and Singapore at different times between 2008 and 2012.  
  10 
SECTION I – THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 
AND VIETNAM  
Chapter 1 – The Development of the Anti-monopoly Law in China 
This chapter analyses the major driving forces behind the enactment of the AML in 
2007. Admittedly, such a search into the ‘original intent’ of Chinese decision makers 
faces at least two difficulties. First, ‘the internal workings of legal and political 
decision processes in China are far from transparent, especially for those viewing the 
situation from outside China’6 thus, there is often little information available for use 
in assessing the dynamics of those processes. Second, ‘there is a shortage of having 
access to documentation of behind-the-scenes deliberations that eventually led to the 
consensus within the government on the need for a formal anti-monopoly law’7. 
However, one can still find important clues from publicly available information about 
the AML’s drafting process and fortunately, much information has been published 
before and after the enactment of the AML due to the potential impact of the world 
largest trading nation’s competition law8 and several authors also have written on this 
topic
9
. In any event, such a search is worthwhile since it has the potential value of 
providing ‘a means of identifying the incentives facing Chinese decision makers’ 
                                                 
6
 David J. Gerber, ‘Economics, Law & Institutions: The Shaping of Chinese Competition Law’, (2008) 
26 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 271, p.272. 
7
 Wentong Zheng, ‘Transplanting Antitrust Law in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and 
State Control’, (2010) 32:2 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 643, p.716. 
8
 For detailed analysis on the AML history and draft, see H. Stephen Harris Jr., ‘The Making of an 
Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China’, (2006) 7 
Chicago Journal of International Law 169.   
9
 E.g., Williams, supra note 1; Furse, supra note 5; Gerber, supra note 6, p.272; Yong Huang, 
‘Pursuing the Second Best: The History, Momentum, and Remaining Issues of China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law’, (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 117; Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, ‘China’s 
Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond’, (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 
231; Wang Xiaoye, ‘Necessity of and Conditions for an Anti-monopoly Law in China’, Institute of 
European Studies – Chinese Academy of Social Science Studies, Working Paper, on 8 July 2001 etc. 
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which will allow us ‘to gain insight into the decisional field that Chinese officials 
have faced in moving toward and shaping a Chinese competition law’ as well as 
‘identifying the influences that are likely to shape the decision of Chinese 
enforcement officials in the future’10. To comprehend the driving forces in the 
legislative process and the mission of the Chinese AML, one has ‘to stand in the 
shoes of the Chinese and possess a deep understanding about the political and 
economical reality of the country's past and present, as well as specific characteristics 
of the Chinese marketplace’11.  
1.1. China’s Transition from a Centrally Planned Economy to a Market 
Economy 
After 30 years of economic stagnation under the planned economy
12
, China made a 
historical transition toward a market economy in late 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous words “whether a cat is black or white makes no difference, as long as it 
catches mice, it is a good cat”13. The pressure which stimulated the earliest reforms of 
                                                 
10
 Gerber, supra note 6, p.299. 
11
 Huang, supra note 9, pp.117-118. 
12
 China established a centrally planned economy modelled on that of the Soviet Union a few years 
after the Communists came to power in 1949. Despite impressive gains in industrialization, the system 
soon developed the characteristic problems of the planned economy: shortage of consumer goods, 
inefficiency, waste of human and natural resources, slow technological progress and low labour 
morale, see Wei-Wei Zhang, ‘Transforming China: Economic Reform and its Political Implications’ 
(Macmillan Press Ltd, London: 2000), pp.6-7. 
13
 For a comprehensive study of the Chinese economics reform, see Barry Naughton, ‘Growing out of 
the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-93’, (Cambridge University Press: 1995) (examining the 
Chinese approach to economic transition, which is based on maintaining elements of the planned 
economy while concentrating on economic growth in the market-oriented segments of the economy 
outside the government plan. Based on Chinese experience, Naughton argued that gradual change 
away from a command economy is feasible), see also Gary H. Jefferson, ‘How Has China’s Economic 
Emergence Contributed to the Field of Economics?’, (2008) 50:2 Comparative Economic Studies 167-
209. 
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the post-1978 era was the threat of economic crisis
14
. After the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) China was on the verge of collapse under the planned economy system, 
most of the top leaders and the masses realized that the planned system was no longer 
a viable option
15
. The economic reform started officially with the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11
th
 Central Committee of the CCP held in late 1978
16
. Since China’s 
inefficient planned economy came from (1) low allocative efficiency, due to a failure 
of China’s industrial structure to match the structure dictated by its economic 
comparative advantages, and (2) low productive or technical efficiency, resulting 
from managers’ and workers’ low incentives to work17, the goals of the reform in late 
1978 were to rectify the structural imbalance and to improve incentives
18
. Later, Deng 
Xiaoping put forward his idea of ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in 
1982, which later became the synonym of his doctrine
19
. In 1992, China significantly 
                                                 
14
 Derek Headey, Ravi Kanbur & Xiaobo Zhang, ‘China’s Growth Strategies’ in Ravi Kanbur &  
Xiaobo Zhang (ed), ‘Governing Rapid Growth in China: Equity and Institutions’ (Routledge: London 
and New York, 2009), p.9. 
15
 Headey, Kanbur & Zhang, ibid., p.10. 
16
 Pursuant to this policy, the State Council - the head of the nation’s executive and the issuer of orders 
enforceable as law - set forth various sets of provisional regulations aimed at incorporating competition 
concerns into these reforms, e.g., the Provisional Regulations on Promoting Economic Coalition 1980 
which endorsed the right of enterprises to handle their own affairs and condemned unreasonable 
administrative interference, the Provisional Regulations on Developing and Protecting Socialist 
Competition 1980 which nominally prohibited monopolistic acts, including those against 
administrative monopolies, and emphasized that China would benefit from the breakdown of trade 
barriers between regions and industry segments and the Notice on Breaking Local Market Blockades 
and Further Activating Commodity Circulation 1990 which stated that all regions and branches should 
prohibit and rectify local blockades. 
17
 Justin Yifu Lin, Fang Cai & Zhou Li, ‘The Lessons of China’s Transition to a Market Economy’, in 
Ravi Kanbur &  Xiaobo Zhang (ed), Governing Rapid Growth in China: Equity and Institutions 
(Routledge: London and New York, 2009), p.330. 
18
 Lin, Cai & Li, ibid., p.331. 
19
 There is no official definition of this concept, historically, while China’s focus was still on the 
reform experience of East European socialist countries in 1977-78, Chinese reformers began to search 
for a wider range of different models for faster development. Research groups were sent to many parts 
of the world to study development experience ranging from processing-zones and export-oriented 
strategies to overall marketization of the economy. Those studies all suggested that China should not 
copy any particular foreign experience, not even that of other socialist countries. A consensus was 
reached among the reformers that there was no fixed model for China’s reform and development. It 
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accelerated its pace of economic reform after an inspection tour of the southern 
regions by its paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. In the fall of 1992, the Fourteenth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party officially declared that the central goal of 
China's economic reform is to establish a "socialist market economy"
20
 and, in 1993, 
the People’s Republic of China amended its Constitution by declaring that it now will 
practice a ‘socialist market economy’21. 
Even though there was initially neither unified strategy nor detailed blueprint for 
carrying out such reform, the reform has grown in a largely market orientation
22
. 
Specifically, the reforms have focused on increasing incentives, mobility, price 
flexibility, and competition, which have unleashed market forces and driven the 
country’s rapid economic growth23. ‘Although the degree of emphasis on market 
forces varies among Chinese government institutions and over time within the same 
institutions, market imperatives are now recognized as of major importance’24. 
Today, after thirty years of economic reforms in 1978, China's economic structures 
have undergone dramatic changes. One of the most significant changes is the relative 
decline of SOEs and other State-controlled enterprises and the emergence of the 
private sector, which is a remarkable contrast with 1978, when all enterprises were 
State-owned
25. Further, ‘China has reached the point where not only may private 
                                                                                                                                           
was in this context that Deng Xiaoping put forward his idea of ‘building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ in 1982, see (Zhang, 2000), p.36. 
20
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.239. 
21
 The Constitution of China 1988 (amended March 14, 2004) pmbl & Article 11, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited March 2011). 
22
 Zhang, supra note 12, pp.6-7. 
23
 See Loren Brandt & Thomas G. Rawski, ‘China’s Great Economic Transformation’, China Business 
Review, November-December 2008, p.31. 
24
 Randall A. Peerenboom, ‘Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or 
Paradigm?’, (2005) 19 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 185, p.225.  
25
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.239. 
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foreign-invested enterprises freely pursue profit maximization, but certain SOEs 
increasingly may also operate in the market largely free from government 
interference with specific transactions or management decisions’26. Reform has also 
pushed China’s economy toward extraordinary high levels of competition27, which is 
in contrast with the situation under the command economy where competition was 
suppressed and state enterprises were like puppets having no autonomy in their 
business activities
28
. Wang noted that under the centrally planned economy, the term 
“competition” even had a pejorative ideological meaning and was regarded as a 
capitalist monster29. In other words, a market economy has almost completely been 
established. As Berring remarked, ‘[c]all the current economy ‘market socialism’ if 
you wish, but it bears no relation to communist or socialist theory’30.  
With all these changes, Chinese decision makers recognized the need for a legal 
foundation for the market economy, including a formalized and institutionalized 
competition law
31
. As Huang puts it, 
                                                 
26
 See Salil K Merah and Meng Yanbei, ‘Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s 
Antimonopoly Law’, (2009) 49:2 Virginia Journal of International Law 379, p389. 
27
 See Brandt & Rawski, supra note 23, p.33. 
28
 Lin, Cai & Li, supra note 17, p.329 (‘competition was suppressed and profits ceased to be the 
measure of an enterprise’s efficiency, [t]he state enterprises were like puppets having no autonomy in 
the employment of workers, the use of profits, the plan of production, the supplies of inputs, or the 
marketing of their products’). 
29
 Wang Xiaoye, ‘The New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in Progress’, (2009) 
54:3 The Antitrust Bulletin 579, p.580 (explaining that under the centrally planned economy, ‘the term 
“competition” had a pejorative ideological meaning and was regarded as a capitalist monster’). 
30
 Robert C. Berring, ‘Chinese Law, Trade and the New Century’, (2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 425, pp.436-444; see also Yasheng Huang, ‘Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State’ (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2008) 
(arguing that although the CCP and Government have given China’s development policy the label of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” is probably a more 
realistic description). 
31
 Under a centrally planned economic system, SOEs dominated the economy, were subordinated to 
governmental organs and undertook production in accordance with administrative directives. 
“Competition” was an unfamiliar concept, thus, naturally, there was no need for policy or law to 
regulate market competition as such.  
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‘Although "socialist market economy" is a politically sensitive phrase, it is still a "market 
economy". A "market economy" requires that China abolish the old legal framework that 
was designed for a command economy and establish a new one that can foster 
competition because competition is the only mechanism that the market uses to correct 
itself’32.  
Thus, China has been making efforts to build itself into a country under laws that fit 
into the global market and especially important among these laws are those that 
protect competition
33
. In fact, the AML is not the first effort of Chinese government 
to deal with competition. Prior to the AML, China had adopted ‘a piecemeal 
approach, passing laws and regulations dealing with isolated competition issues as 
they arose’34. For example, China has promulgated the Law against Unfair 
Competition (1993), the Pricing Law (1998), the Law on Bidding (1999), the Foreign 
Trade Law (1994, updated in 2004) as well as several administrative rules such as the 
Tentative Provision of Acts of Price Monopolization (2003) and the Provision on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (2006)
35
. 
However, only after competition issues became increasingly prominent did China 
recognize the importance of having a comprehensive competition law
36
. In deed, the 
Minister of the NDRC, Ma Kai, has underscored the contextual importance of 
China’s transformation and transition in the development of the AML. The Minister 
                                                 
32
 Huang, supra note 9, p.121; see also Wang, supra note 9, p.2 (‘It is obvious that, the socialist market 
economy must be regulated, restrained and safeguarded by a set of laws that are adapted to the market 
economy. Especially important among these laws are those that protect fair competition because, under 
the market economy, the producers must put their products on the market to accept the examination 
and appraisals by the consumers’). 
33
 Wang Xiaoye, ‘Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law’, (2008) Antitrust Law Journal 133, 
p. 133 
34
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.232.  
35
 For a detailed analysis of these laws and regulations, see Merah & Meng, supra note 26, pp.391-396. 
36
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.232. 
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noted on July 12, 2005 that China had essentially completed the transition to a 
socialist market economy from a highly centralized planned economy ‘after 26 years’ 
endeavor on reform’ and asserted that China had successfully established the 
fundamental basis of an economic system in which public ownership of the economy 
plays the ‘leading role and co-exists and shares opportunities with the economy in 
various other ownerships’37. Similarly, in his submission to the NPC, Mr. Cao 
Kangtai, Director of the Legislative Office under the State Council, listed three 
reasons in urging the passage of the bill: (1) abuse of dominance and cartel practices 
are so prevalent that they jeopardize the interests of consumers and other competitors, 
and stand in the way of building a national common market; (2) mergers and 
reorganization transactions have been very active, and they need to be guided by a 
law to avoid restrictive effects; and (3) as a market economy, China needs to establish 
a clear competition law framework so as to give business an open, transparent, and 
predictable expectation of the legal environment
38
. Foreign cognitive influence, as 
pointed out by Gerber, also tended to support the AML’s enactment39. Further, the 
experience of massive transplantation of laws that regulate market activities from 
Western countries in the past decade in China ‘has led Chinese legislators and 
scholars to reach a consensus… that proven economic rules and principles in the 
                                                 
37
 ‘China has Socialist Market Economy in Place’, People’s Daily Online on July 13, 2005, cited in 
Mark S. Blodgett, Richard J. Hunter, Jr. and Robert M. Hayden, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Trade and 
China’s Competition Law’, (2009) 37:2 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 201, p.202. 
38
 Cao Kangtai, ‘Notes to the Draft PRC Anti-monopoly Law’, this note is an official instrument 
submitted to the NPC by the State Council, serving as the formal annotation of the draft AML, cited in 
Huang, supra note 9, p.119. 
39
 Gerber, supra note 6, p.282 (‘Chinese leaders are aware that most developed countries have 
competition laws and that there is a widespread belief that these laws contribute to economic 
development. They also know that a competition law is now generally considered to be an all but 
necessary part of the legal framework supporting such an economy’). 
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West also work well in China despite the fact that China has a different political 
system’40.  
The AML was finally passed after more than a decade of discussions, debates, and 
drafting
41. This prolonged process reflects ‘a painful transition from command 
economy to market orientation’42 and it is also consistent with the gradual and 
incremental approach of the Chinese reform. Nonetheless, the AML’s promulgation 
‘represents a milestone for the establishment of a Chinese comprehensive legal 
system because it demonstrates both the achievement of Chinese economic reform 
and that the allocation of resources in China is committed to market mechanisms and 
competition’ and ‘suggests that the Chinese economic system has been basically 
transformed from a command economy into a market economy’43. 
1.2. China’s Effort to Solve Serious Problems in Its Internal Market and to 
Promote Competition 
The need to deal with administrative monopolies 
                                                 
40
 Huang, supra note 9, p.121. Examples of transplanted laws in China include Company Law 1993, 
Consumer Protection Law 1993, Law on Negotiable Instruments 1995, Insurance Law 1995, Law on 
Commercial Banks 1995, Law on Partneship Enterprises 1997, Law of Individuals’ Solely-owned 
Enterprises 1999, Securities Law 1998, Law of Contract 1999, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006, etc., 
see Albert H. Y. Chen, ‘Legal Thought and Legal Development in the People’s Republic of China 
1949-2008’, in John Gillespie & Albert H. Y. Chen (eds), ‘Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A 
Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes’ (Routledge, London/New York: 2010), pp.60-62.  
41
 Huang noted that the prolonged process of the AML enactment was ‘very rare in China's legislative 
activities, if not previously unseen’ and was the result of a fierce debate around the crucial issue of 
whether an AML might be far from necessary at this moment. ‘Despite a tendency toward 
concentration in certain Chinese industries, enterprises overall in China are still small and scattered, 
and could never match those in developed countries. Particularly, in a world of globalization, when 
Chinese companies are facing intense international competition, Chinese legislators and scholars seem 
to be more concerned about fighting the powerful multinationals instead. Consequently, one has to 
think twice about the question of whether China needs an AML and ask what the benefit would be of 
having this law’, see Huang, supra note 9, p.118. 
42
 Huang, supra note 9. 
43
 Wang, supra note 33, p. 134. 
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The AML was drafted within the context of a principal concern relating to the 
restrictive or monopolistic nature of competition by the State within the Chinese 
market, namely, administrative monopolies, and the desire to contain excessive state 
power in markets. As Varady has pointed out, ‘the single most important 
differentiating factor influencing competition policies in ‘Western’ and in former 
socialist countries respectively, is their economic heritage’44. One such heritage in 
China today is pervasive State control and intervention in the market including abuses 
of administrative power to restrict or distort competition by State agencies45. 
‘Despite market-oriented reforms, China has not totally rejected its old political 
system, nor has it started a program that is totally against its political heritage’46. 
China has managed to preserve an active role of the State in the economy and ‘the 
central government is itself an important player in the economic picture’47. Many 
large companies are still owned by the State
48
. Further, as a result of incomplete 
transition of many industry sectors to market-based competition, the Chinese 
government still is required to rely on administrative means to regulate the economy, 
                                                 
44
 Tibor Varady, ‘The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries’, (1999) 47 
American Journal of Comparative Law 229, p.252&258; see also K. X. Li & Ming Du, ‘Does China 
Need Competition Law?’, (2007) Journal of Business Law 182, p.199 (explaining that administrative 
monopolies are ‘a special legacy of socialist countries such as China, a relic of a centrally planned 
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 Williams, supra note 1, p.215-216 (‘The major competition problems that the Chinese economy 
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46
 Zhang, supra note 12, p.53 (adding that Chinese reformers’ assumptions involve the pursuit of 
extensive reforms under the leadership of a pro-reform party and the building of a prosperous country). 
47
 Gerber, supra note 6, p.277. 
48
 For historical reasons, the state has been the controlling shareholder in most listed companies in 
China, holding about two-thirds of all shares in the Chinese securities market, see Hui Huang, ‘China’s 
Takeover Law: A Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform’, (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of 
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and intrusion into companies’ freedom to operate and compete independently and 
effectively remain commonplace
49
. Chinese government bodies also influence many 
forms of economic conduct through mechanisms such as regulatory regimes, 
licensing, controls on credit, and various other requirements for governmental 
approval
50




As explained by Owen, Sun and Zheng, administrative monopolies in China manifest 
themselves in many kinds of governmental actions. First, administrative monopolies 
result from governmental measures that are intended to restrict competition in a 
particular industry or from governmental measures that compel certain 
anticompetitive conduct
52
. Second, administrative monopolies also result from 
governmental measures that mandate the use of products or services by certain 
producers that usually are "affiliate companies" of the government agencies. Those 
affiliate companies are in most cases SOEs or former SOEs currently or previously 
controlled by the government agencies in question. Third and most important, 
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 Xue Zheng Wang, ‘Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving Greater 
Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition’ (OECD: 2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf (last visited 11 September 2011) 
50
 Gerber, supra note 6, p.277. 
51
 John O. Haley, ‘Competition Policy for East Asia’, (2004) 3 Washington University Global Study 
Law Review 277, p. 281 (“For China and other socialist-market economies in East Asia, the problem of 
anticompetitive state action is obviously even greater than pre- or postwar Japan or Germany. For 
China as a socialist-market economy, the state still remains the dominant economic actor. Without an 
extraordinarily strong commitment by the state to the creation of conditions for competition, exercises 
of monopoly power by state actors as well as the enforcement of regulatory regimes that enable or 
promote effective exercise of monopoly power seem inevitable.”). 
52
 For instance, in June 1998, the National Bureau of Building Materials under the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC), inconjunction with the then State Development and Planning 
Commission, issued a regulation prohibiting sales of plate glass at below-cost prices. What is 
noteworthy is that the regulation authorized the National Bureau of Building Materials to periodically 
calculate and publish a “social cost of production” for each type of plate glass, and ordered 
manufaturers to price above those costs. Thus, inessence, a kind of “price floor” was imposed by the 
government, see Zheng, supra note 7, pp.687-688. 
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administrative monopolies also result from governmental actions that restrict market 
entry. This problem is more serious at the local level, where the local governments 
are notoriously known for creating various barriers to firms from other localities
53
. 
Of course, not only China, but most countries, faces the problem of administrative 
monopolies
54, yet, ‘due to the fact that more companies are owned, controlled, or 
regulated by the Chinese government than by some governments in other countries 
with a longer free-market tradition, this issue will likely dominate much of the 
evolution of the AML and its enforcement over the coming years’55. The widespread 
and intractable existence of administrative monopolies in the Chinese economic 
system stems from two factors: the first is ‘the tradition, hundreds of years old, that 
"state power comes first"… a tradition that state power controls every single aspect of 
the society's economic life’56. The second is the current political and economic 
structure, which has closely linked monopoly enterprises to the government since the 
1949 revolution
57
. Thus, although administrative monopolies are not a problem 
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 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, pp.254-255. 
54
 J. Robert Robertson, ‘Editor’s Note’, (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal p.69 (‘many commentators 
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unique to China, they are particularly problematic in China
58
. A Chinese high-ranking 
official admitted that: 
‘with the deepening of the economic system reform and the establishment of the 
socialist market economy system, the situation where administrative monopoly was 
prevalent at the beginning of the reform and open-up policy has been changed, 
although administrative monopoly do exist to a various degrees in certain regions and 
certain industries’59. 
Abuses of administrative power to distort market functioning even worsen with the 
existence of guanxi (personal relations) and corruption in China. As explained by 
Zhao, ‘without an opposition party to keep watch on privileged state officials, a 
combination of authoritarian politics and the market economy has produced corrupt 
crony capitalism in which power and money are closely connected’60. Zheng also 
pointed out that political interference and personal relations (guanxi) are the two 
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 Wentong Zheng, ‘China’s Antimonopoly Law – One Year Down, Part 7- “The Emperor is Far 
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Traditional Chinese culture privileges guanxi and de-emphasizes law
62
. Guanxi 
may be used to find solutions to problems that might otherwise be dealt with by 
impersonal law and law-related processes, or even to bypass or violate the 
requirements of the law
63
. The guanxi, which often also includes politicians and 
public-sector administrators, partly compensates for deficiencies in the “rule of 
law” in the country64. As explained by Potter, ‘[i]nformal relations represent a 
coping mechanism that substitutes for the norms and processes associated with 
formal institutions’65. However, the guanxi is a mixed blessing66. It contributes to 
an insider-outsider division of the business community and it keeps the doors 
open to corruption
67
.  The corruption of law enforcement officials in China today 
is alarming
68
. It had grown to such an extent that President Jiang warned in 1997 
that corruption could ruin the party itself if it were not speedily checked
69
. Yet 
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despite repeated anti-corruption campaigns, there is no clear sign that corruption 
is being or even can be controlled
70
. 
The problems of corruption and abuses of administrative power to distort competition 
have been recognized in the White Paper on China’s Efforts and Achievements in 
Promoting the Rule of Law which stated that: 
“China’s legal construction is still facing some problems… local protectionism, 
departmental protectionism, and difficulties in law enforcement occur from time to time; 
some government functionaries take bribes and bend the law, abuse their power when 
executing the law, abuse their authority to override the law, and substitute their words for 
the law, thus bringing damage to the socialist rule of law…’71. 
At the time of enactment of the AML, it was broadly agreed that ‘entrenched 
government monopolies and local and regional protectionism have hampered any 
wholesale transition to market competition’72, and thus, ‘eliminating administrative 
monopoly is the most important precondition for the realization of fair competition 
and equal treatment between different business ownership’73. 
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In fact, the inclusion of the prohibition of administrative monopolies in the AML has 
a tortuous history
74
. Throughout the drafting and reviewing of the AML, there has 
always been disagreement on whether the AML should regulate administrative 
monopoly: one opinion holds that even though administrative monopoly still exists in 
China, the nature of such practices is essentially the misuse of administrative power 
and this problem cannot be solved by the AML alone
75
. Another view is that the 
AML is a very important and fundamental law that protects competition, so it must 
solve the key problems affecting competition (including competition problems caused 
by administrative power) in China
76
. In the end, the legislative authority concluded 
that  
‘even though in theory administrative monopoly is not a problem to be solved by the 
AML and in practice it will indeed be very hard for the AML to solve this problem, it is 
nonetheless necessary to have clear and specific regulations on administrative monopoly 
in the AML, which is a specific and fundamental law to protect competition’77.  
                                                                                                                                           
Chinese Antitrust’, (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 195, pp.209-210 (‘the AML's provisions aimed at 
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This approach is similar to transitional economies like the countries in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
78
 and Vietnam, but such provisions do not have 
their counterparts in US or EC antitrust law
79
. Not only China but transitional 
economies have also found it particularly necessary to address public and private 
restraints in tandem. 
The need to deal with a fragmented domestic market 
As aforementioned, at the heart of administrative monopoly lies the problem of 
regionalism (regional monopolies enjoying local or regional government protection). 
The rise of regionalism or ‘local protectionism’ (‘difang baohu zhuyi’) in China was a 
major consequence of market-oriented reforms: with economic and fiscal 
decentralization
80
, interests too become localised. As explained by Headey, Kanbur 
and Zhang, [s]ince local governments can keep a significant portion of the increased 
local revenues, they face stronger incentives to increase local revenue’81. Further, 
since 1978 until 2007 ‘local economic performance is a factor in obtaining 
promotions’82 and  ‘provincial governors were evaluated on their performance based 
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on the economic growth of their province’83. ‘This creates tremendous pressure for 
local government personnel to compete with each other through superior regional 
performance’84.  
Decentralization has caused enormous waste, for instance, all localities desire to 
establish their own comprehensive range of industries which resulted in overlapping 
industrial structures and excessive oversupply
85
. As local interests compete with each 
other in an imperfect market, China is now faced with serious local protectionism
86
. 
There were even ‘commodity wars’87 between provinces which have caused many to 
see that in protectionist wars, ‘everybody lost out’88. Further, limited transport 
facilities, local protectionism, and other barriers to geographic integration allow 
enterprises to exercise monopoly power in local markets to a degree that is not 
apparent in national concentration ratios
89
. As observed by the World Bank, 
‘individual provinces are tending to behave like independent countries, with an 
increase in external (overseas) trade and a relative decline in trade flows with each 
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other’90. An OECD’s study in 2002 also pointed out that the important engines that 
have driven China’s growth in the past are losing their dynamism and the main reason 
is that China’s economy has become badly fragmented and segmented91; this lack of 
integration among China’s regions is becoming an impediment to other development 
goals and is likely to become a greater obstacle overtime if not addressed
92
. Thus, the 
OECD suggested that China needed to develop a comprehensive regional 
development strategy, one of the objectives should be to ensure that common 
framework conditions for competition, property rights, business establishment, and 
taxation apply to all regions and localities
93
. After China’s WTO accession, the 
problem became even more acute because ‘[t]he magnitude of regional integration in 
China and the transformation of the country into a unified, fair and regulated market 
as it joins the WTO take on particular importance, since China’s international 
opening can only be effective if free access and free movement of goods are granted 
between provinces’94. In recognition of the perils of local protectionism, the Chinese 
government has made efforts to deal with this issue, as proven by the State Council 
No.303 Order entitled Regulation on Prohibiting the Exercise of Regional Blockade 
in Market Economy Activities issued in 2001.  
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More importantly, localism has also resulted in alarmingly growing regional gap 
between the relatively richer coast and the poorer hinterland
95
. A 2006 report 
described China as "European cities with an African countryside," though this 
perhaps exaggerates both the level of development in the cities and the level of 
poverty in the country
96
. Indeed, ‘growth has been most rapid in the coastal 
provinces, followed by provinces in the central region, and least rapidly in the 
western regions’97. ‘Some coastal provinces have developed more interactions with 
the outside world than with the interior provinces in terms of trade and economic 
cooperation
98
. The OECD also warned that ‘[w]ithout further policy efforts, income 
inequalities among regions are expected to grow, and could even accelerate with trade 
and investment liberalization’99. In this context, the enactment of the AML to deal 
with localism also has the potential to improve the distribution of wealth in China. 
President Hu Jintao has repeatedly emphasized the government’s support for 
‘spreading wealth’ within Chinese society100 and ‘the enactment of a competition law 
is consistent with the government acting on that promise, because improving the 
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competitiveness process may lead to greater opportunities for individuals and 
enterprises throughout the country and the society’101. As noted by Huang,  
‘The population’s demands for a fair share of benefits generated by the growth of the 
economy have been met by the Chinese Communist Party's vow to build "a society in 
harmony". To build a society in harmony, the government has to narrow the wealth 
gap. Interestingly, there is a popular belief in China that in order to narrow the gap, 
monopoly has to be eliminated and replaced by an equal and free market, so that 
average Chinese consumer will have more choices for employment and investment. 
Even though there is no sound evidence to support such a belief, the fact is that many 
Chinese support the bill purely based on this wishful thinking’102. 
The need to subject SOEs to market discipline 
Despite market-oriented reforms in China, SOEs still own large tracks of the Chinese 
economy and dominate many key sectors
103
. Although administrative monopolies and 
SOEs are different, there is a relationship between the two, with administrative 
monopolies being used in some cases to support or protect SOEs
104
. For example, in 
strategic and monopolistic industries, there are various entry restrictions on non-state 
actors
105. Even in some “non-strategic” industries, such as media and publishing, the 
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state has insisted an absolute control
106. ‘SOEs also receive the bulk of funds 
allocated by the formal financial system… and non-commercial considerations, such 
as the need to sustain loss-making SOEs, continue to influence bank lending’107. 
‘Competition is distorted because the different ownership classes are subject to 
distinct legal and regulatory frameworks’108. On the other hand, there is no clear 
separation of government administration of SOEs from competition management, and 
‘it is still quite popular for line ministries to intervene in the business management of 
relevant SOEs’109. In fact, this comes from the all pervasive coordinating role of the 
Chinese Communist Party in economic management in China. As explained by 
McGregor, the Party’s control over SOEs is exercised by the Party’s Organization 
Departments which have the right to hire and fire the executives who manage these 
SOEs
110
. As such, ‘[t]he Party’s control over personnel was at the heart of its ability 
to overhaul state companies, without losing leverage over them at the same time’111.  
Despite all the protection and privileges granted by the State, SOEs with 
administrative monopolies in China have been well-known for their abusive conducts 
and lack of efficiency. For example, Wu noted that ‘these SOEs often use their 
                                                 
106
 Leng, ibid., p.242. 
107
 OECD, supra note 89, p.18. 
108
 OECD, ibid., p.16 (‘Differences in treatment – among smaller versus larger enterprises, among 
enterprises in competitive versus sheltered sectors, and among enterprises that receive backing from 
central or local governments versus those that do not – remain and in some cases have increased’). 
109
 Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun & Wentong Zheng, ‘Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive 
Compatibility’, (2005) 1:1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 123, p.126 (‘Even though 
China has made great effort to separate government administration from enterprise management during 
the last decades, it is still quite popular for line ministries to intervene in the business management of 
relevant SOEs. Enterprises in China today remains, if not state-owned, under the active influence of 
the state’); Leng, supra note 105, p.242 (‘[t]he prevailing system in which government regulators are 
trained and dispatched does not systematically distinguish between “economic technocrats” and “party 
bureaucrats” – for example, one may well find a provincial government or party chief asked to assume 
the chairmanship of a large state bank or enterprise, and vice versa’). 
110
 Richard McGregor, ‘The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers’ (Allen Lane: 
2010), p.42 & 89. 
111
 Ibid., p.69. 
  31 
dominant positions to charge monopolistic high prices; the staff compensation 
packages in some of these industries are too high, and the income gap between 
employees of such industries and the general public is significant and unfair; the 
operations of some of these companies are not tightly regulated, and their attitudes 
and service quality are both very poor’112. Wang also noted that due to different 
treatments given to different enterprises, ‘low-efficiency enterprises are not 
eliminated and many high-efficiency enterprises are not the winners in the market 
competition’113. Thus, starting by the mid-1980s, lawmakers and scholars engaged in 
serious discussions about the enactment of a competition law, which was viewed as 
an essential element for transforming the SOEs that had dominated China's economy 
into private enterprises with the ability to compete effectively
114
. More specifically, 
the enactment of the AML comes from the desire to prohibit abuses of dominant 
market positions by SOEs
115
. Moreover, ‘as these enterprises lack the competitive 
motivation of market mechanisms themselves and can easily suffer from low 
production and operation efficiency… the development of the AML shall… deepen 
the reform in monopolistic industries, introduce competitive mechanism, and perform 
effective supervision of the operators’116.  
The need to control trade associations 
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Prior to the enactment of the AML, trade associations were frequently cited as 
facilitators of collusion and other anticompetitive conduct by their members
117
. Trade 
association is a broad term in China that includes any social corporate entity 
established by undertakings in the same industry for the benefit of its members
118
. 
Although trade associations are not governmental bodies, in China they are 
emanations of the State and work closely with the State in carrying out sectoral 
government policies
119
. In other words, they are not independent producer 
associations as is common in Western developed economies
120
. Historically, trade 
associations in China were converted from government ministries and played 
important roles in carrying out the so called ‘industrial self-discipline’ to stabilize the 
market
121. In fact, the concept of ‘industrial self-discipline’ originated from the 
perception of the ‘excessive competition’ problem in most industries in China122. Yet, 
‘[n]o matter how it is explained, ‘industrial self-discipline’ should have always taken 
as price coordination encouraged by the government and as synonym for 
administrative intervention in price competition among the enterprises’123. This was a 
kind of compulsory cartel because enterprises were forced to sell their products 
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according to the so-called ‘coordinated prices’, which were set without their prior 
consent
124
. Thus, trade associations have been notorious in abusing their power to 
restrict competition in their relevant industries and harming consumers
125
. This reality 
required that trade associations should be regulated by a competition law and the 
AML ‘seeks to strike a balance between allowing legitimate activities of the trade 
associations and limiting the anticompetitive aspects of those activities’126. 
1.3. The Need for a ‘Socialist Rule of Law’ 
A very important driving force to enact the AML in 2007 was the Chinese 
government’s growing ideological commitment to the ‘rule of law’ because ‘in the 
process of transforming into a market economy, the legal system would play and 
important, perhaps critical, role’127. Interestingly, Huang has noted that  
‘[a]nother reason that has rarely been noticed by observers is that the Chinese legislature 
had promised to establish a fairly comprehensive legal system to regulate the socialist 
market economy by 2010. The then administration term finished in 2007 and so it was no 
surprise that the government wanted to have the AML as a political legacy’128.  
As noted by the World Bank, ‘the transition from a command economy into a market-
oriented economy makes legal rules matter’ and ‘direct government control over 
economic decisions is replaced by the rule of law that is necessary to protect private 
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property and contract rights’129. ‘This represented a major change in the CCP’s 
approach to governance because for the first thirty years of the PRC’s existence, the 
Party had ruled without any legal codes and with little regard for law at all’130.  
Driven by market-oriented economic reforms in late 1978, Chinese reformers 
initiated a number of experiments in establishing what was called “small government 
and big society”131. The philosophy was ‘[a]s market reforms entail a reinvention of 
state, the government has to move from doing many things badly to doing its fewer 
core tasks well’132. Subsequently, China’s state has undergone and is still undergoing, 
however faultily, a process of self-transformation - from an anti-market totalitarian 
institution into a largely pro-business authoritarian institution – but with a mixed 
record of efficiency
133
. Many party cadres have become staunchly pro-market 
officials, while many others have turned themselves into new entrepreneurs and 
industrialists
134
. However, these political reforms were still insufficient in terms of 
tackling China’s multiplying problems, especially that of corruption135. A new 
consensus seems to be emerging among Chinese leaders and think tanks: there should 
be a more substantial political reform so as (a) to make the state more accountable to 
outside institutions like people’s congresses; and (b) to limit the power of 
                                                 
129
 Asian Development Bank, PRC Private Sector Assessment, People’s Republic of China 23 (2003) 
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/PSA/PRC/PRC_PSA.pdf . The Asian 
Development Bank defines the rule of law as (i) general, abstract rules that are prospective, never 
retrospective, in their effect; (ii) rules that are known and certain; (iii) rules that are equal in that they 
do not discriminate based on irrelevant distinctions; and (iv) a separation between regulators and the 
regulated
129
. In the context of China’s transitional economy, the rule of law in the business 
environment is expected to guarantee transparency, predictability, and consistency. 
130
 Stanley Lubman, ‘Looking for Law in China’, (2006) 20:1 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, p.7. 
131
 Zhang, supra note 12, p.153. 
132
 Zhang, ibid.. 
133
 Zhang, ibid., p.157. 
134
 Zhang, ibid. 
135
 Zhang, ibid., p.160. 
  35 
bureaucrats
136
. Thus, ‘carrying out the rule of law became the basic consensus’137. In 
their discussion concerning the commodity economy and the merits of the market, 
Chinese economists have already in fact raised the task of constructing a modern rule 
of law order as an important item of their development agenda
138
. In the end, Chinese 
scholars succeeded in persuading the authorities that the “socialist rule of law state” 
should be preferred as a concept, phrase, and slogan to the “socialist state based on a 
legal system” (known as the Chinese ‘rule by law’)139. This was highly significant 
because whereas the latter term connotes the use of law as an instrument of rule by 
the state, the former term may be taken to imply that the state itself is subject to and 
governed by law, which stands above the state
140
. As a result, the Constitution 1982 
of China
141
 emphasises the principle of legality and provides, inter alia, that “all 
states organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all 
enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and the law” and “no 
organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution and the law”142. 
These constitutional provisions are noteworthy, at least because they create 
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‘incentives to take actions that are likely to be interpreted as consistent with these 
ideological claims’143.   
Consequently, since 1990s, China's legislature has passed a large number of rights-
protective laws focusing on economic activities, most notably laws on contract, 
bankruptcy, corporations, foreign investment, securities, and the like
144
. This 
phenomenon has been regarded as a “legislative explosion” or “legislative miracle” in 
China
145
. The AML, thus, is ‘another example of China's efforts to guide economic 
behavior by reliance on well defined rules of law’ since ‘[a] competition law signals 
that the government intends to support the centrality of the market as a means of 
allocating resources within the society and that, therefore, the economy is governed 
by laws rather than by the government bureaucracy’146.  
1.4. China’s Opening to the Outside World  
The end of the Cultural Revolution brought about an acute awareness among the 
Chinese leadership that China’s gap both with the developed countries and some of 
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the developing countries had widened even further
147
. There emerged a broad 
consensus that China could not develop itself in isolation and that it must import 
foreign science, technology, capital and management skills if its modernization 
programme was to succeed
148
. Thus, since late 1978, China has moved from a closed-
door policy towards an open-door policy, which broke dramatically with the Maoist 
introverted development strategy emphasizing planning, autarky, and regional self-
sufficiency
149
. The reform of China’s trade regime promoted the country’s foreign 
trade and prompted Chinese decision-makers to seek a seat for China in the WTO
150
. 
As China’s integration with the outside world grows, the WTO seems able to provide 
an indispensable institutional basis for expanding China’s trade with other countries 
within the multilateral trade rules
151
.  
 Legal reforms to meet international standards  
As observed by Zhang, 
‘by applying for WTO membership, Chinese decision-makers virtually agreed to accept 
the international (or capitalist) norms of business as the goal of their market-oriented 
reforms.  The prevailing slogans in the 1990s of ‘pushing Chinese enterprises to compete 
in the international market’ and ‘making Chinese standards compatible with international 
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standards’ reflected reformers’ commitment  to building a market economy and joining 
the trend of globalization’152.  
More specifically, ‘foreign institutional pressure has played a significant role in 
inducing Chinese officials to enact a competition law, and one major factor has been 
China’s entry into the WTO’153.  
After 15 arduous years as a candidate, China’s application for membership in the 
WTO was accepted at the WTO’s Doha ministerial meeting in November 2001, 
which marked an important milestone along the reform path China has been 
following for more than twenty years. In fact, China had concluded negotiations with 
the WTO since September 2001 concerning China’s terms of membership. Two most 
important commitments undertaken by China were (i) China will provide non-
discriminatory treatment to all WTO Members and (ii) China will revise its existing 




As China acceded to membership in the WTO, ‘many of China’s potential trading 
partners were quite skeptical that China would be able to abandon practices that 
discriminated in its own favor, or would be able to enact comprehensive legislation 
aligning the Chinese legal system with global trade rules and norms’155. In contrast to 
this skepticism, after its accession, ‘China has unleashed a massive process of 
reforming the laws covering trade issues with the result that many reforms go beyond 
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those narrowly required by the WTO accession agreements’156. As of September 
2002, as a part of its accession to the WTO, 2,300 of China’s laws and government 
regulations that were deemed potentially incompatible with WTO requirements were 
carefully reviewed and either amended or repealed
157
. China further announced that if 
there were a conflict between domestic law and China’s obligations to the WTO, the 
latter would prevail – as an indication that the Chinese Government was committed to 
the adaptation of the WTO rules-based regime
158. In this sense, China’s accession to 
the WTO was a defining moment for China since it ‘necessarily moves the process of 
trade reform in China away from an incremental approach to one incorporating quite 
detailed rules for trade policy’159. In terms of competition law, after China's accession 
to the WTO in 2002, the National People's Congress Standing Committee announced 
that China would draft an antitrust law in preparation for entry into the WTO
160
 (even 
though this is not a condition for joining the WTO). 
It has been argued that ‘China’s policy-makers see China’s WTO accession 
agreement as a means to fulfilling broader goals’, one of which is ‘to facilitate the 
peaceful emergence of China as a great trading nation’ and another is ‘to accelerate 
the process of domestic reform with the WTO acting as a wrecking ball for what 
remains of the earlier closed economy’161. Indeed, China’s enactment of the AML 
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went beyond its obligations under WTO accession agreements because (i) China 
enacted its AML five years after its accession and (ii) at the time of accession there 
was no specific requirement that China must have a comprehensive competition law 
in place. It is important to add, however, that although the WTO membership does 
not specifically create an obligation on members to enact a competition law, it does 
create general obligations to avoid distortions to market competition, and competition 
law can serve as a proxy for a country’s willingness to take seriously that obligation 




Foreign institutions also played an important role in encouraging China to perfect its 
legal system. For example, the OECD remarked in 2002 that China’s present 
competition law framework
163
 does ‘not constitute a comprehensive legal framework 
for competition’ and that ‘the current prohibitions on anti-competitive practices by 
government agencies lack sanctions and have had little if any practical effect’164. 
Thus the OECD suggested that:  
‘the key objective is to establish a national competition framework to ensure that laws 
and regulations support rather than interfere with market competition. Adoption of such a 
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framework is particularly important since incentives to engage in anti-competitive 
practices are likely to increase with trade and investment liberalisation’165.  
Given that the Chinese have no experience with a general competition law, they have 
had little choice but to refer to foreign experience and to look at foreign models in the 
drafting process
166
. At the same time, given its strong economy and growing 
population, China can greatly influence the global economy, thus, it was not 
surprising that the drafting process of the AML had attracted much attention as well 
as technical assistance from the international community, especially from the EU and 
the US
167. The promulgation of the Chinese AML could be regarded as ‘a great 
achievement of international cooperation’ with Chinese competition enforcement 
agencies hosting many conferences with foreign legal and economic experts including 
the U.S Department of Justice, the U.S Federal Trade Commission, and the European 
Commission
168
. As a result, many good provisions from other well-established 
antitrust laws have been incorporated in the Chinese AML such as the ‘domestic 
effects doctrine’, ‘consent decrees’, and a ‘leniency policy’ from the U.S experience, 
the block exemptions for certain agreements, factors considered for determination of 
the existence of dominant market position, and the rebuttable presumption of 
dominant position from the European experience
169
. Nevertheless, Chinese officials 
have not viewed the shaping of the statute as a process of pure “borrowing” and have 
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emphasized the need to create a competition law that is specifically adapted to the 
Chinese political and economic context
170
. 
 China’s perception of the threat to its economic security by foreign competitors  
One of the major driving forces in the adoption of the AML is the desire to protect 
national security
171
. With China’s accession to the WTO, China had to implement its 
commitments of abolishing non-tariff barriers, reducing tariffs and opening service 
sectors. The direct outcomes of these WTO commitments are enhanced access to the 
Chinese market by foreign companies, from both within and without China. Chinese 
firms are to an increasing degree facing direct competition from multinational 
corporations, which are generally considered in China to be stronger competitors 
because of their advantages in financial resources, technologies, and management 
skills
172
. Many Chinese companies were losing out to foreign multinationals, and 
were urging the government to ‘protect and save China’s national industries’173. 
China’s negotiators for acceding to the WTO were even called ‘traitors’ by many 
people, including officials from some government ministries
174
. 
More specifically, “a main motive for the legislation had been the high rate of foreign 
acquisition of Chinese firms, including SOEs, which had raised concerns in China 
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about its economic security”175. In deed, Xu Jialu, Vice-Chairman of the NPC, once 
stated that: 
‘Western multinationals have now reached out to seize China’s leading manufacturing 
enterprises… These large state-owned enterprises have much proprietary intellectual 
property and represent China’s leading-edge manufacturing technology. Control by 
foreign countries will pose a big obstacle to our future innovation’176. 
In the years following China's WTO accession, ‘an increasing number of mergers and 
acquisitions by foreign companies heightened China's concerns that its industries 
might be dominated, or even controlled, by foreign companies’177. Further, as 
explained by Huang, 
‘when the consumer product market opened up, several domestic household brands were 
eliminated because their SOE owners could not compete effectively with foreign giants 
like Procter & Gamble. Recognizing that the rule of "survival of the fittest" will not help 
these SOEs, some Chinese now argue that the Chinese brands are, in fact, assets owned 
by the State, where the national interest lies; so their failure for lack of competitiveness is 
not acceptable’178.  
These concerns were well-grounded since it was noted that multinationals were 
dominating several areas of the Chinese economy
179
. Thus, ‘a growing sentiment 
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among the average Chinese, and even lawmakers, is that excessive foreign investment 
will ultimately compromise the Chinese government's control over the domestic 
economy’180.  
In response, China had imposed many ad hoc limitations on mergers and acquisitions 
by foreign companies, which are part of China's broader efforts to scale back foreign 
investment in certain sensitive sectors
181
. Further, although China has more or less 
fulfilled its market access commitments since its accession to the WTO, it has also 
revoked some of the preferential treatments previously accorded to foreign investors 
and, in some cases, has put in place some new restrictions
182
. In this context, ‘one will 
not be surprised that pressure built up to use the drafting of the AML as another 
weapon to fight against unwanted foreign buyers’183 and ‘[u]nlike all of the 
controversial topics surrounding the debates on the AML, the necessity of limiting 
entry by foreign companies in key sectors is one of the few concepts on which 
China's policymakers have a near consensus’184. Some proposed that ‘the AML 
should guard the country's national interest by setting up merger and acquisition 
barriers against certain overseas companies, and that it is only a reciprocation of what 
the developed countries have done to Chinese companies’185. Huang has noted that 
‘although this type of argument is without sound legal basis, and although protective 
measures against foreign purchasers of domestic assets are not in the national interest, 
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these misconceptions have been widely accepted throughout the country’186. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to suspect that it was the national security concerns that had 
pushed for the AML’s enactment, and indeed, the AML as enacted subjects foreign 
acquisitions of Chinese companies to stringent checks to ensure that the acquisitions 
do not harm China's economic security
187
 (Chapter 3). 
Zheng further asserted that the domestic incentives certainly had not been ‘strong 
enough to make the idea of enacting a formal antitrust law a quick sell’188. In fact, the 
first draft of the AML was vetoed by the government after investigations by the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and SAIC into China’s market conditions 
led to the conclusion that ‘monopoly issues were neither typical nor widespread’189. 
In 1994, the antimonopoly law was placed on the government’s legislative agenda 
and a new drafting team was assembled again
190
. The team did produce a single, joint 
draft of the antimonopoly law but for various reasons it had never been introduced in 
the National People’s Congress191. The drafting process for the AML then 
‘languished for a decade’, and it was not until 2004 that the drafting efforts were 
‘suddenly revived and expedited’192. What happened was, based on Chinese media 
reports, a 2003 incident involving alleged anticompetitive practices of a foreign 
company in China that led to the sudden acceleration of the drafting process for the 
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AML
193
. In 2003, Tetra Pak, a Swedish company specializing in aseptic packaging 
equipment and supplies for dairy and beverage products, was accused of tying the 
sale of packaging equipment to the sale of packing supplies in China. After receiving 
complaints from domestic firms competing with Tetra Pak for packaging supplies, 
SAIC and MOFCOM conducted a series of investigations into anticompetitive 
conduct by foreign companies in China. In April 2004, SAIC reported the findings of 
its investigations in an internal publication in which SAIC gave detailed data on 
market shares of foreign companies in China in seven product groups or industries 
(including software, photosensitive materials, personal computers, cell phones, 
cameras, tires, soft drink packaging, retails, and beverages)
194
. The report was 
essentially a warning that foreign business groups were beginning to establish 
monopolies in China due to significant advances in technology, skills, and capital. 
These advances have allowed foreign companies to achieve competitive advantages 
and monopoly power—to the possible detriment of local companies and consumers. 
The report concluded that the State Council should proceed without further delay to 
approve the enactment of the new anti-monopoly law
195
. After the issuance of the 
2004 SAIC report, the drafting process of the AML accelerated
196
. The US Chamber 
of Commerce also noted that China’s efforts to establish an antitrust regime 
accelerated significantly following the failed bid of CNOOC for Unocal, which was 
blocked after a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
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States
197
. Certain members of the Chinese administration saw the AML as an 
opportunity to invoke similar regulatory procedures to block foreign acquisitions of 




However, it should be borne in mind that ‘in the post-WTO era, China could not 
enact an antitrust law that would apply to foreign firms only, but subjecting domestic 
firms, particularly SOEs, to the new antitrust law would pose numerous conceptual 
and policy challenges’199. In other words, ‘China’s dilemma lies in phrasing and 
interpreting the provisions of the AML to strike the right balance between fostering 
its domestic firms while avoiding imposing undesirable consequences on domestic 
activity by foreign firms and investors’200. Thus, in the last three years of the AML’s 
drafting process, ‘efforts appeared to have been made to draft a law that would at 
least nominally conform to antitrust principles but would at the same time 
accommodate the status quo, rather than a law that would require the status quo to 
conform to antitrust principles’201. This move, of course, couldn’t reduce the concern 
of the international community that the AML would be used as an instrument of 
protectionism
202
. When drafts of the AML were being discussed, many multinational 
corporations feared that they would become the law's first targets
203
. This fear was 
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reinforced when a Chinese court in early 2007 started to hear antitrust claims filed by 
Tsum, a local Chinese company, against Sony, a prominent multinational company. 
Although the court decided the case in favor of Sony, it left the door open for Tsum to 
re-file the suit once the AML becomes effective
204
.  
To conclude, one very important reason for the enactment of the AML was ‘to 
prevent transnational corporations from monopolizing Chinese market’ and ‘the AML 
will become an important tool for China to check the influence of the transnational 
corporations’205. However, some authors have cautioned that the degree of 
monopolization by foreign companies is often exaggerated by the Chinese media and 
is far less than the degree of monopolization in the industries controlled by SOEs
206
. 
Thus, to focus the AML on foreign companies, or to enforce strictly the AML only 
against foreign companies, would lead to missed opportunities to address a major 




The AML in China was enacted due to both internal and external forces including (i) 
China’s transition from a planned economy into a market economy, (ii) the need to 
solve monopolistic problems in the Chinese domestic market, (iii) the need for the 
rule of law, and (iv) the needs that come from China’s opening to the outside world. 
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Of these major driving forces behind the AML’s enactment, it seems that the most 
direct and important driving force was China’s desire to protect its national interests 
(or ‘economic security’) in the face of international competition as a result of its 
policy of opening up its economy to international competition208. More specifically, 
after a nearly thirteen-year drafting and discussing process, the enactment of the 
AML was finally accelerated due to the concerns of the high rate of foreign 
acquisition of Chinese firms (including SOEs) and the emergence of monopoly power 
of foreign business groups in China. Enacting the AML, therefore, was an active and 
deliberate move of China rather than a mere reaction to foreign pressures. This 
characteristic makes China’s adoption of anti-monopoly law different from Vietnam’s 
competition law, which was enacted mainly under the pressure of foreign institutions 
in its effort to join the WTO (see Chapter 2). 
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Chapter 2 – The Development of Competition Law in Vietnam 
This chapter analyses the major driving forces behind the enactment of the VCL in 
2004 and compares them to the development of China’s AML in 2007. Similar to 
China, Vietnam enacted its competition law under the influence of both internal and 
external factors, the most important forces include (i) the transition from a planned 
economy into a market economy, (ii) the need to solve monopolistic problems in the 
domestic market, (iii) the need for the rule of law, and (iv) the needs that come from 
Vietnam’s opening to the outside world. 




 of April 1975 marked the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of the 
construction of the socialist economy in the whole country. During the period of 
1975-1986, Vietnam shared with China a number of characteristics of a socialist 
economy, including (1) public ownership of the means of production; (2) the 
existence of markets for consumption goods; (3) centralized control of the rate of 
accumulation and the direction of economic growth; and (4) a drastically reduced role 
for prices as informational signals such as prices and price limits for all goods sold 
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Similar to China, Vietnam’s endeavours to build a Soviet-style economy led to 
desperate failures rather than success during the pre-reform process
210
. As explained 
by Le and Liu, 
‘The central planning mechanism made enormous mistakes in arranging the economic 
and investment structures which resulted in the waste of the already scarce capital 
resources and led to hard-to-repair socio-economic problems. Further, the goal of 
egalitarianism in the distribution of wealth and income reduced motivations for economic 
development, driving the economy into sluggishness and unproductiveness. Lastly, the 
subsidy regime in favor of the State-operated economic sector – the backbone of the 
central planning mechanism made the sector passive, reliant on others and led to its 
production and business activities using administrative rather than business models of 
organization’211.  
Eventually, the country faced an economic recession and then a crisis. The VCP 
leaders feared that unless Vietnam rapidly expanded its industrial and technological 
sectors the economy would fall further behind those of its neighbors, ultimately 
compromising VCP legitimacy and national sovereignty
212
. Consequently, after more 
than 10 years of economic stagnation and crisis under the planned economy, Vietnam 
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made a historical decision to carry out a comprehensive and thoroughgoing reform 
widely known as Doi Moi (‘Renovation’)213.  
In fact, the major revolutionary cornerstones for the strategic reorientation of 
economic reasoning forming the first viewpoints on ‘reform’ can be traced back to 
the year of 1981
214
, however, it was not until 1986 that the economic reform program 
officially began with regulations passed at the Sixth National Communist Party 
Congress in December 1986 (eight years after China’s economic reforms). The aims 
of the new policies were to move from a centrally planned economic system towards 
a multi-sectoral economic system with a socialist orientation, known as a ‘socialist-
oriented market economy’ (nen kinh te thi truong dinh huong xa hoi chu nghia). The 
reform included reducing the role of the State bureaucracy, liberalizing the economic 
system, breaking down the monopoly of SOEs and collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs) by removing many of the constraints on the operation of private enterprises, 
and establishing a legal framework which would allow the economic system to 
respond freely to market forces
215
.  
In short, the Vietnamese transitional model combines both the centrally planned and 
market-oriented models. The intention of Vietnamese policy makers was to create not 
a capitalist market but a socialist-oriented market in which the Communist Party’s 
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leadership remains in place and public-sector ownership is still a priority
216
. The 
Vietnamese reform, thus, follows the ‘Third Way’, between capitalist and socialist 
market economies: 
‘It has a market orientation and encourages private-sector activity, with open policies 
towards foreign investment, but as the same time SOEs still play a dominant role in the 
economic system and one-party leadership still maintains its power to make decisions for 
all economic sectors’217. 
Vietnam and China shared many similarities in their reform process but which 
differed from the economic reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
218
. The 
basic similarity is that in both countries, the process of transition has been one of 
gradualism beginning with micro-economic reform then followed by macro-
economic reforms but with limited political reform
219
. Further, both countries began 
their transition in the south, particularly in the coastal provinces, because sea ports 
and coastal provinces provided easy access to world markets
220
. Transition in these 
places stimulated transition in more remote areas, leading to a transition 
nationwide
221
. In other words, reforms in both countries were taking place in a 
“bottom to top” and “bit by bit” progress rather than through a shock therapy222. 
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However, there are also many differences such as the sequence of reforms and the 
more prominent role of foreign investment and aid in Vietnam
223
. Even though both 
countries followed the principle of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”, in 
China, the principle began with theory and the country only put it to practice when it 
had managed to solve parts of its theoretical issues
224
. Basing itself on practice, China 
then continued to solve other theoretical issues
225
. In contrast, Vietnam began with 
practice, in this way, it was able to create more effective policies and guidelines and 
draw conclusions on related theories
226
. 
On balance, the similarity in the reform process in China and Vietnam seem to 
outweigh the differences. This can be attributed to the influence of China’s economic 
reform in the reform process in Vietnam. Chinese influence occurred despite the fact 
that China-Vietnamese relations have not been normalized before the reforms. 
Observers note some important reasons for this influence
227
: 
First, the economic reform in China began approximately one decade earlier than the 
reforms in Vietnam and Vietnamese policy scientists couldn’t ignore the various 
reports about the impact that economic reforms had in the giant neighboring country 
given that Vietnam shared similar political institutions
228
;  
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Second, the two countries were still related to each other under their shared ideology, 
each under the leadership of only one party, such similarity could well facilitate the 
inspiration of sharing experience with each other even in an unofficial manner
229
;  
Third, the two countries were both peasant states with a high population density and 
agricultural production accounting for a large proportion of the economy, which is 
different from the USSR and other socialist countries in Eastern Europe which had a 
low population density, fully-developed labor market and made use of their labor
230
; 
Fourth, China and Vietnam are Asian countries, bearing cultural identities unique to 
the Orient
231. The historical and cultural traditions form a “Oriental civilization” 
different from “Western civilization” with some characteristics that scholars have 
identified such as “wet rice civilization”, “chopstick eating habit”, “Confucian 
culture”, or “Han culture circle”, including Japan, Korea, China and Vietnam232, 
which put emphasis on consensus, social order and a harmonious society where an 
individual’s interests have to yield to the community’s interests etc.  
Thus, according to simple logic, the similarity in economic, social, political and 
cultural development levels would give rise to problems of similar levels, and 
therefore the solutions to these problems should be quite similar
233
. Moreover, over 
the past decade, China and Vietnam have exchanged numerous visits and meetings 
between their leaders and policy makers and regular scientific workshops have been 
organized for scholars to share experiences, especially when the two countries 
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normalized their relationship in 1991
234
. For example, a seminar named `China's 




As a result of the Doi Moi policy in 1986, the Vietnamese economy has survived the 
economic crisis and has made encouraging improvements in the economy
236
. 
Moreover, hand in hand with the recognition of a multi-sectoral economy has been 
the recognition of the freedom to conduct business and competition by the State. 
Competition, previously unacceptable in the planned economy, has become 
recognized in the new market economy. The state also recognized that ‘shifting the 
economy into the market direction forces us to continuously renovate our 
management structures as well as our legal system to regulate economic activities 
including competition’237. Thus, the promulgation of competition law in Vietnam was 
seen as essential to regulate the market economy as well as to limit the negative 
impact of the market economy
238
. Further, in the eyes of many economists and 
commercial lawyers, ‘[h]aving an effective competition/antitrust law is becoming 
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recognized as a critical element in strengthening market forces’239, complementing 
deregulation and privatization initiatives in transitional states
240
. Several scholars 
have also pointed out that the future growth of Vietnam’s market economy is 
dependent on further reforms especially in corporate governance to improve 
transparency and to reduce corruption and so increase efficiency in the allocation of 
scarce resources
241
. Towards this end, the introduction of competition policy and the 
formulation of a comprehensive competition law was seen as an essential ingredient 
in Vietnam’s future growth strategies242. Thus, the CPV, at its Eight National 
Congress, stated the need to  
‘…establish cooperation and a healthy competitive environment in production and trade; 
develop state-owned monopolies in some certain industries and sectors of strategic 
significance to the country; eliminate monopolies in other commercial activities, and 
prevent abuses of monopolistic positions aimed at maintaining privileges, individual 
benefits and distorting competition in the market’243. 
Relying on this political declaration, the legal framework for economic competition in 
Vietnam was established gradually
244
.  
Further, with the emergence of a multi-sectoral economy and a more competitive 
business environment, anticompetitive practices also occurred, which led to the calls 
for the adoption of a comprehensive competition law. The most important part of the 
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reform in Vietnam was the rebirth of a multi-sectoral economy with the development 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic private enterprises
245
. The number of 
the two old types of business, i.e., SOEs and collective-owned enterprises, has 
decreased sharply throughout the reform process. The two newly emerging types, 
domestic private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises, have risen substantially 
in number thanks to changes in government policy. These new kinds of organizations 
have played a crucial role in employment and job creation as well as making a major 
contribution to the state budget
246. Since as early as 1990, after the State’s economic 
reforms, the number of enterprises increased significantly. As of 2003, according to 
statistics of the Ministry of Planning and Investment, there were 120,000 private 
enterprises, 5000 SOEs, 3000 FDI enterprises and 2.5 million households
247
. With the 
increase of enterprises in terms of both number and scale, competition has become 
more and more vigorous, which is in contrast with the situation under the command 
economy. The first index to show that there has been an increase in competition is the 
decrease in economic concentration. Both the Concentration Ratios (CR) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) show that in 7 years from 2000 to 2006, the 
market became less concentrated with the average CR4 fell from 37.22% to 29.41% 
and the average HHI decreased from 1.151 to 470
248
. Beside a few sectors with an 
increase in economic concentration such as cigarettes and textiles, almost all other 
sectors witnessed a significant decrease, which can be regarded as evidence of a 
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The down-side of a more vigorous competition in the market is that anti-competitive 
practices also started to occur, for example competitors agreeing to prevent other 
enterprises from entering the market, to expand their operation, to apply new 
technology, or agreeing on fixing the output, boycotting and refusing to trade
250
. For 
example, in 2003, the Vietnam Floating Glass Company, which held 60% of market 
share, decided to destroy over one million m2 of their product while there was a 
shortage of glass products for construction, which can be regarded as output 
restriction conduct
251
. In the same year, eight sugar manufacturers stopped supplying 
sugar into the market from 1 June 2003, which resulted in a significant price increase 
after just a few days
252
. The price of some goods such as gold, foreign currencies and 
technical appliances were also manipulated in some periods of time by collusion 
between traders even though these agreements were normally tacit
253
. Similarly, bid-
rigging is considered to be a very popular practice in infrastructure construction 
projects, especially those using the State budget or Official Development Aid
254
. In 
short, almost all kinds of anticompetitive practices were present in Vietnam
255
. In this 
context, competition law was regarded as a necessary instrument of the Government 
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to promote a fair and equitable business environment
256
. Thus it was stated by the 
Government in its First Reading of the Competition Bill that: 
‘The Constitution 1992 has officially confirmed the existence of different economic 
sectors, laying the foundation for competition among enterprises in Vietnam. Since 
competition was recognized, anticompetitive practices have also occurred more 
frequently and have adversely affected the competition environment. Public opinion and 




2.2. Vietnam’s Effort to Solve Serious Problems in Its Internal Market and to 
Promote Competition 
The need to control administrative monopolies  
Administrative monopolies in Vietnam, as well as in China, originated from the 
establishment of a market economy without privatization of production material 
resource
258
. Similar to China, despite economic reforms over the past two decades, 
the Vietnamese State has retained control of enterprises and business operations in the 
“commanding heights” of the economy, which has resulted in a situation in which the 
state plays a dual role as “both a regulator and a participant in the market”259. Thus, 
‘the context in which the market economy is being built has created conditions in 
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which the Government and law do not intervene in anticompetitive practices but let 
them prosper’260. 
In practice, Vietnamese administrative bodies (especially at the central level) are well 
known for their interference in market activities by deterring market entry (through 
the license and permit system) and dividing markets (by issuing decisions or using 
trade associations to divide markets, or allocate suppliers or distributors) etc
261
. Line 
ministries are well known for participating in a race to protect their sectoral 
interests
262
. For example, it was reported that the enterprises winning a bid were 
always the enterprises belonging to the line ministries or enterprises under a line 




Similar to China, there is a close relationship between administrative monopolies and 
SOEs in Vietnam. ‘A level playing field was not properly established and abuse of 
economic and administrative power by SOEs was still prevalent’264. Facilitated by the 
assistance efforts of international institutions like the UNDP, the World Bank and the 
IMF, it was recognized that after many years of reforms, there remained several flaws 
in the regulatory infrastructure system for commercial activities and there was severe 
discrimination between state and private sector
265
. SOEs, especially the largest ones, 
continue to receive much credit and implement most of public investment projects 
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regardless of the fact that basing on objective criteria, these enterprises are not 
efficient at all
266
. Yet, the domestic private sector, though being the main source of 
providing employment and also an important motivation for export growth, is being 
stifled by recent difficulties
267
. This is a very basic conflict in a dualistic economy
268
. 
As Pham puts it, ‘[t]he equality before the law and fair competition among enterprises 
will not be possible if numerous priorities and incentives are still given to SOEs and 
their monopoly in certain industries are still strictly protected by the State’269. In the 
First Reading of the Competition Bill before the National Assembly, the Vietnamese 
Government had also admitted that:  
‘Although the Constitution 1992 has officially confirmed the existence of different 
economic sectors and the equality among them, many State administrative bodies did not 
really comply with this requirement. The discrimination among different economic 
sectors, especially between SOEs and private enterprises, are relatively rampant’270. 
Further, similar to the situation in China, abuses of administrative power to distort 
market functioning even worsen due to the existence of personal relations and 
corruption. Vietnamese enterprises have an age-old tradition of relying on personal 
connections and social networks (quan he), largely involving corruption, to do 
business
271
. As stated in the official Public Administration Reform Newsletter, ‘the 
tradition of “first close relatives, second acquaintances” (nhat than, nhi quen) is still 
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the favourite solution for people to solve administrative procedures’272. One 
consequence of this reliance on contacts is that ‘citizens do not have rights when they 
are most needed, in these circumstances, they readily consider using corrupt methods 
to get what they want – and not necessarily as a last resort’273. According to a survey 
in 2005, more than 50 per cent of the people surveyed were prepared to admit that 
they bribed officials
274
. Further, excessive regulation and cumbersome administrative 
procedures lead to opportunities for abuse of power and corruption by state 
officials
275
. Generally speaking, Vietnam is perceived to be a highly corrupt country, 
and that it is not really improving (though it is not deteriorating either)
276
. Similar to 
China, the combination of social networks and corruption in Vietnam brings arbitrary 
decisions and undermine transparency and fairness: 
‘Favoritism and nepotism are still persuasive arguments to help the representatives of the 
state to make decisions… in many cases the social network helps to speed up procedures 
or even bypass official regulation’277.  
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In fact, the Vietnamese Party and state have officially recognized the problem of 
corruption and abuses of administrative power. By the mid-1990s, with the 
Government’s Resolution No.38/CP of May 4, 1994 on the Reform of Administrative 
Procedures in Dealing with People’s and Organisations’ Affairs, the Vietnamese 
state has defined public administration reform as a pressing need and central task in 
Vietnam’s development process. The main objectives of such a reform were defined 
as ‘the development of a competent, clean, and transparent administration that does 
not abuse its power and manages the affairs of the state effectively and efficiently’278. 
The master plan for the 2001-2010 public administration reforms is guided by a 
recognized need to decrease unnecessary bureaucracy (“red-tape”) and corruption, 
make the legal and regulatory framework more effective and efficient and increase 
transparency in the operation of state agencies
279
. The seriousness of corruption has 
been officially emphasized by the authorities in Vietnam since the beginning of the 
2000s. The enactment of the Law on Anti-corruption in 2005 symbolised the 
importance of this problem. In reality, corruption and other forms of abuse of power, 
including those committed by high-level officials, have been met with severe 
penalties, including death penalty, serving partly as a deterrent measure
280
. However, 
the effectiveness of these measures is debated in Vietnam
281
. 
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In this context, and similar to many transitional economies, it is particularly necessary 
for Vietnam to have clear and specific regulations eliminating administrative 
monopoly and to promote a fair and equitable business environment.  
The need to deal with a fragmented domestic market 
Similar to the situation in China, fiscal reform, decentralization and the race between 
provinces results in local governments using their legislative and administrative 
power to create and protect the privileges of their own enterprises and distorted 
competition within Vietnamese market (this phenomenon was called ‘provincialism’). 
In practice, Vietnamese regional administrative bodies are well known for their 
interference in market activities by deterring market entry and dividing markets
282
. 
For instance, some local governments prevented enterprises from other localities 
operating in their regions by refusing or restricting to grant licenses for them to open 
branches or representative offices
283
. Various types of (normally high) fees imposed 
by local governments also contributed to the fragmentation of local markets in the 
country
284
. Moreover, Vietnamese enterprises themselves were also involved in 
geographic market sharing, which created a fragmentation of the national market
285
. 
In the First Reading of the Competition Bill before the National Assembly, the 
Vietnamese Government admitted that:  
‘… due to provincial interests, some State administrative bodies have directly interfered, 
by their administrative decisions, in business activities and created advantages for certain 
enterprises. Trade barriers have been created in the domestic market in such ways as 
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‘only allowed to buy cement produced in this province for construction purpose’, ‘only 
allowed to consume beer produced in this province’ or enforcing organizations and 
agencies in one province to buy goods from certain enterprises. All of these practices 
have distorted equal competition among enterprises and have harmed consumers and the 
whole economy’286. 
Similar to China, there is considerable inconsistency and conflict between legal 
norms, particularly between superior legislation and subordinate rules in Vietnam
287
. 
This suggests that lower-level organs and officials involved in local rule-making have 
not yet developed a culture of respect for and compliance with higher level legal 
norms
288
. Some studies also found that large enterprises in Vietnam (including a 
small number of domestic, foreign, state-owned large enterprises) use every possible 
informal channel to convince state officials to change specific regulatory norms and 
practices
289. Informal exchanges may also persuade regulators to “break the fence” 
(xe rao) and directly violate central laws, which most commonly occurs at local 
administrative levels
290
. For example, after Vietnam introduced the Enterprise Law in 
1999 to deregulate market access by abolishing licensing gateways used by local 
authorities, many local officials responded by creating new licenses and permits to 
replace those abrogated by the Law. The licensing culture (with its considerable 
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potential for harassment and corruption) remains firmly in place, judging by the 
results of a recent survey by Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2000. 
Operating permits and supplementary ‘business conditions’ continue to undermine 
the Law’s policy of licence deregulation. The overall effect of these measures is to 
deter market entry, increase compliance costs and limit the growth of ‘healthy 
competition’ in the domestic marketplace291. 
It’s noteworthy that although regionalism exists in both China and Vietnam, ‘regional 
blockage in Vietnam was not as bad as that in China’292. As Pham puts it, ‘[w]hile the 
existence of provincial enterprises and the close relationship between provincial 
authorities and private enterprises result in provincialism and regional blockage in 
China, administrative monopolies in Vietnam fall in the hands of State-owned 
corporations and Ministries’ or provinces’ enterprises’293. The reason, possibly, is the 
significant difference ‘in geographic and population sizes and notably in levels of 
social and economic development’294 in the two countries. Further, ‘[i]n contrast to 
China, a country which has greatly decentralized its legislative power to various 
provinces, since Vietnam is a small country, the legislative power of provinces in 
Vietnam is very limited’295. Nevertheless, regionalism does exist in Vietnam and is 
harmful to the unity of the national market, thus, specific rules to deal with this 
problem is perceived to be necessary.   
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The need to subject SOEs to market discipline  
As a result of Vietnam’s ‘gradualist’ approach to reforms, there are still many 
remaining issues in Vietnam’s economy to be solved, one of which is to regulate 
competition in the state sectors
296
. In fact, many threats to economic welfare are 
arising in State-owned sectors due to a lack of competition because of continuing 
monopoly, market domination and weak internal management effectiveness
297
. 
Similar to China, the course of economic reform in Vietnam took the State-owned 
sector as the decisive force with the State controlling important industries and 
essential economic areas to ensure and maintain socialist nature
298
. In both countries, 
the issue of State industry remains largely unresolved and in fact, State industry still 
plays a key role because it is the only sector that still runs essential areas of the 
national economy such as oil and gas; power; and the manufacture of major 
machinery, cement and steel
299
. There have recently been plans to equitize (not 
privatise) these sectors in which the State shall hold the majority of shares
300
.   
The VCL was enacted in the context where ‘all monopolies in Vietnam are State 
monopolies which are protected by the State, there is no private or foreign-invested 
monopolies’301. According to the studies of some projects such as the UNDP project 
on perfecting the business environment carried out by the CIEM, competition in 
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Vietnamese economy was still restricted by State’s regulations, the abuses of 
monopolistic/dominant positions and unfair competition practices by some 
enterprises
302
. Monopolies in Vietnam included both administrative monopolies and 
natural monopolies (both are regulated by the State)
303
. Both single monopolies and 
group monopolies existed and all monopolistic or dominant enterprises are SOEs - 
there were no private or FDI monopolies or dominant enterprises yet
304
. Before the 
enactment of the VCL, mergers and acquisitions in Vietnam (as of 2002) only 
occurred on the basis of state decisions, i.e., the establishment of General 
Corporations (GCs)
305
 and joint ventures between SOEs and foreign companies
306
. 
‘These mergers and acquisitions only resulted in enhancing the 
monopolistic/dominant positions of these SOEs and made the market even more 
concentrated’307.  
Unfortunately, SOEs, especially monopolistic or dominant GCs, were often involved 
in anti-competitive practices to maintain their monopolistic/dominant positions
308
. In 
practice, some GCs have institutionalized their monopolistic privileges and created 
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disadvantageous provisions to their competitors
309. Generally, SOEs’ abusive 
practices related to prices by either imposing very low buying prices or very high 
selling prices. Moreover, these enterprises were also involved in predatory pricing 
and discriminating practices
310
. For example, price discrimination of the same goods 
or service among different customers also occurred, e.g., the dual-pricing system in 
electricity, water supply, air ticket and train ticket etc. applied to foreign and 
Vietnamese customers
311
 with the result that foreign customers were asked to pay 
more. Tying practices frequently occurred in the areas of insurance and transportation 
as well as in farming products
312
. Monopolistic enterprises were also reported to 
refuse trading with competitors or consumers, especially in service industries
313
. 
Further, state monopolistic enterprises were notorious for high prices and low quality 
products and services
314
. According to a study by CIEM, monopolistic prices in 
Vietnam were much higher than the actual cost of production and higher than the 
prices in other countries, even developed countries
315
. For example, according to a 
CIEM report in 2001, the prices of telecommunication services in Vietnam were of 
the highest in the world
316
. Further, 90 per cent of customers’ calls were disconnected 
no more than three times in three months and 45 per cent of customers had to wait 
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more than 10 days for their telephone to be installed
317
. So, these monopolistic GCs 
earned gigantic profits despite the poor quality of the services that they provided. The 
reason was the lack of antitrust legislation and government control over monopoly 
prices had been insufficient
318
.  
Thus, a competition law was needed to control these state monopolies, as stated by a 
Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Trade:  
‘During the transition process, the impact of the state sectors on the market is still very 
big, however, due to a low starting point and some inherent social and economic features 
of Vietnam, in the coming time, some sectors still maintain state monopoly. The 
provision of a competition law will provide the Government with a mechanism to control 
those monopolies, to avoid the authoritarian abuse of monopolistic position to create bad 
impact for society’319. 
The need to control trade associations 
Trade associations in Vietnam are established and operate on the ground of Decree 
45/2010/ND-CP which provides for organization, activities and State administration 
of associations. Trade associations are voluntary associations but the establishment of 
these associations must be approved by either the Chairman of People’s Committee of 
the relevant City or Province (for provincial associations) or the Minister of Internal 
Affairs (for national associations), the establishment of certain associations must be 
approved by the Prime Minister.  
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Similar to the situation in China, Vietnamese trade associations operating in key 
industries (such as textile, footwear, seafood, coffee and tea) are often dominated by 
SOEs and enjoy close political connections with the supervising ministries (bo chu 
quan) that determine regulatory policies within their economic sector
320
. It is also 
common practice to appoint retired governmental officials to chair the boards of 
business associations. Further, trade associations often play a very active role in 
assisting members to reach anticompetitive agreements. Collusion among members of 
trade associations was easy to perceive since they were normally expressed in official 
agreements
321
. Collusion in these associations normally related to price-fixing, which 
resulted in high price for consumers
322
. For example, it was widely reported by the 
media that in July 2004, under the auspice of Vietnam Association of Banks, five 
biggest State-owned banks in Vietnam (which accounted for 70% of market share in 
the banking market) convened and reached an agreement on a ceiling for interest rates 
of VND deposit
323
. This type of agreement was perceived as anticompetitive and 




For this reason, a scholar has opined that ‘[d]ue to Vietnam’s special circumstances… 
we strongly support the inclusion of trade associations in the scope of application of 
                                                 
320
 Nam Nguyen, ‘Role of Vietnamese Business Associations in the Context of Global Integration’, 
Radio Free Asia website, available at  http://www.rfa.org (accessed 10 September 2007). 
321
 CIEM, supra note 250, p.84. 
322
 CIEM, ibid., p.84. 
323
 ‘State-owned Banks Shaking Hands on Stabilizing Interest Rates’, VnExpress on 14 July 2004. 
324
 See a good discussion of this case in Nguyen Thanh Tu, ‘Agreement on Interest Rate among Banks 
and Competition Law’, (2005) 2 Journal on Legislative Studies 56 (in Vietnamese). 
  73 
the Competition Bill’325. This view was supported by the Vietnamese government, as 
stated by the Vice Minister of Trade: 
‘A trade association is a forum where enterprises of similar characteristics would 
convene, thus it is very likely that a trade association will create favorable conditions for 
anticompetitive agreements among its members. A trade association’s decisions, which 
include anticompetitive agreements, will adversely affect the business environment. 
Therefore, trade associations must be included in the provision on application entities’326.  
2.3. The Effort to Build a ‘Law-based’ State  
As in China, Vietnam’s transition from a centrally-planned economy into a market 
economy required a legal infrastructure to assist this transition period as well as 
create good conditions for market forces to operate. As part of the general reform 
process since the introduction of Doi Moi, Vietnam has been trying to transform into 
a society based on a rule of law
327
. At the 6
th
 National Party Congress, the then 
Secretary-General Truong Chinh stated in the introduction to the Party’s Political 
Report: 
‘The management of the country should be performed by law instead of simply by moral 
concepts. The law is the institutionalization of party lines and policies and a 
manifestation of the people’s will; and it must be applied uniformly throughout the 
country. To observe the law is to implement party lines and policies. Management by law 
requires attention to be paid to lawmaking. It is necessary to step-by-step supplement and 
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perfect the legal system so as to ensure that the state machinery be organized and 
operated in accordance with the law’328. 
This move toward the rule of law is also consistent with the experiences of other 
Asian countries which have shown that a transparent, consistent and effective legal 
system is a key factor to ensure a sustainable economic development
329
. Since 1991, 
Vietnam has introduced the ideal of nha nuoc phap quyen (‘law-based’ state)330, a 
Vietnamese adaptation of Soviet’s pravovoe gosudarstvo (law-based state) or 
German’s Rechtsstaat (state-law principles)331. Nha nuoc phap quyen required stable, 
authoritative and compulsory law; equality before the law; and the use of law to 
constrain and supervise the enforcement and administration of law
332
. This ideal was 
then confirmed in the 1992 Constitution which for the first time stated that “all Party 
organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution and the law”333. This 
was an important change in the Constitution because in the past there had been no 
commitment that the Communist Party would be bound by law. The ideal of building 
a law-based state is also consistent with Vietnam’s pursuing of economic growth. 
Development experts and international development donors, such as the World Bank, 
have claimed that ‘good governance’ and ‘rule of law’ are essential to economic 
                                                 
328
 Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam Documents, cited in Thayer & Marr, 
ibid., p.5. 
329
 See Katharinal Pistor, Philip A. Wellons et al, ‘The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian 
Economic Development 1960-1995’ (Asian Development Bank, Hong Kong: 1998), pp.1-4. 
330
 At the Seventh Party Congress, the CPV adopted the policy and goal of nha nuoc phap quyen, 
variously translated as ‘State-legal-rights’ or ‘law-based state’. 
331
 Gillespie, supra note 212, pp.87-88. 
332
 See Nguyen Van Tai, ‘On the State Ruled by Law and a Multipartisan Regime’, (1996) 1 Vietnam 
Social Science 3, p.7 (in Vietnamese). 
333
 Constitution of Vietnam 1992 (amended in 2001), Article 4.  
  75 
growth and development
334
. Both are essential for free markets to operate; and free 
markets create economic incentives that lead to higher productivity, more 
employment, economic efficiency and social development
335
. Despite the open 
question whether the Vietnamese government only intends to use law as a tool to 
promote economic development or to develop a society governed by the rule of law, 
building up an efficient legal system is indispensable to modernize the country
336
. 
In pursuance of the ideal of a law-based state, Vietnam has taken steps to fill in the 
legal details of a rights-based market system with a proliferation of law-making in 
every sphere of public policy, a substantial restructuring of the court system, and the 
introduction of economic and administrative courts as well as increasing 
professionalism of the judiciary with a requirement for all judges to have law 
degrees
337
. The transformation of the legal landscape in Vietnam has been striking, 
albeit less dramatic than in China (i.e. more gradually)
338
. Vietnam’s move toward a 
‘rule-based’ state can be characterized as a careful and cautious process of “legal 
gradualism”. In this process, Vietnam first promulgated a favourable legal framework 
for the attraction and protection of foreign direct investment, linking capital and 
technology influence to favoured state companies
339. Vietnam’s FDI reforms are 
located in the earlier phases of ‘reform sequencing’, which puts Vietnam in the 
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Chinese camp of gradualist reformers, that is, ‘liberalizing inward capital flows 
before establishing a domestic market-oriented institutional framework of property 
rights, contracts, company law, and legislation regulating (or deregulating) factors 
markets’340. The first major piece of Doi Moi legislation was the Law on Foreign 
Investment in Vietnam 1987 which provides conditions favourable to FDI by offering 
generous tax incentives, import privileges and by not imposing a minimum capital 
requirement
341
. In fact, the 1987 Law was considered as “one of the most liberal in 
Southeast Asia”, more comprehensive and liberal than that of China342.  
Following the promulgation of the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam in 1987, 
the Vietnamese legal framework has changed dramatically
343
, especially after the 
promulgation of the Constitution of 1992, which created the legal basis for the new, 
reformed economic system by providing legal protection for private business 
activities
344
. The 1992 Constitution stipulates a set of elementary principles, which on 
the one hand ensure the development of a multi-sector economy and safeguard the 
freedom to run a business, and on the other hand ensure the “socialist orientation” of 
the economic development
345
. Within the 10 years from 1988 to 1998, the 
government of Vietnam set up, almost from nothing, a legal system that promotes a 
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multi-sector economy
346
. A number of most important laws and regulations were 
issued in various fields to respond to changing circumstances which were inevitable 
due to the rapid growth of the economy
347
. What is noteworthy is that similar to 
China, this legal reform in Vietnam was against the backdrop of legal globalization 
where socialist transforming states were attempting to use laws and institutions to 
engineer rapid economic development, rather than waiting decades to distil 
commercial law from internal practices, they had decided to borrow Western 
commercial law
348
. The result of the legal reform during this period was a gradually 
established comprehensive legal framework for doing business in Vietnam. At the 
same time, along with the commitment to reforming the administrative structure and 
procedure, this legal framework has been enforced with increasing consistency, 
fairness and transparency
349
 even though there was still criticism about the legal 
infrastructure
350
. In this context, the enactment of a competition law was also 
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expected to complement the overall market-friendly law reforms of the decade of 
1990s.  
In fact, prior to the VCL in 2004, competition in the market was regulated by a 
number of Laws, Decrees and Circulars
351
. However, most of their provisions focused 
on regulating price and supply volume, and licenses and little attention was paid to 
define and regulate anti-competitive practices in accordance with international 
standards
352
. For example, these laws did not deal with abuse of dominant position or 
mergers and acquisitions or cartels. Further, there was little enforcement of these 
laws, for example, although Vietnam had enacted its Decree on Price Regulation 
since 1992, there was no case handled by the courts despite many unofficial 
allegations of violations
353
. Therefore, a comprehensive competition law with the 
establishment of a competition authority to enforce it was perceived to be necessary 
to regulate competition in the market. 
2.4. Vietnam’s Opening to the Outside World 
Vietnam carried out the open-door policy in foreign affairs after the 6
th
 Party 
Congress in 1986. In the Closing Remarks at the 6
th
 Congress, Party General 
Secretary Nguyen Van Linh stated “we are deeply aware that in a situation of 
economic internationalization, if a country applies a closed, self-sufficient policy, 
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without economic exchanges with foreign countries, that country will not survive and 
develop”354. Before Doi Moi, international trade relations were largely performed 
with socialist countries entirely in State-to-State trade agreements, protocols on 
exchange of goods and payments, agreements on loans and aids
355
. Since the end of 
the 1980s, Vietnam has adjusted its foreign policy, carrying out a comprehensive 
diplomatic policy. In June 1996, the 8
th
 Party Congress specified “Vietnam wants to 
be friends with all countries in the international community”356. One scholar 
commented that international economic integration would bring both opportunities 
and challenges to Vietnam, ‘but it is hoped that opportunities will prevail since so far 
no country has ever decided to exit ASEAN, APEC or WTO because of any 
disadvantages’357. Despite the late implementation of its open-door policy, on the 
issues of foreign trade, attraction of foreign investment, and development of 
international tourism, Vietnam has achieved much
358
. 
The participation in ASEAN (in 1997), APEC (in 1998), Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (in 2000), and especially the WTO (in 2007) has affected directly 
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Vietnam’s legal development, especially laws concerning business activities359. As 
commented by Pham,  
‘together with ODA, investment prospects and market access promises was the pressure 
on Vietnam to enact a wide range of Western-styled laws, these pressures were either 
gentle such as the donors’ suggestions/recommendations or vigorous like the bargaining 
during the US-Vietnam BTA negotiation and implementation process’360.  
This trend was even enhanced during the first decade of the twenty-first century when 
Vietnam prepared to accede to WTO and integrated more proactively into the global 
market
361
. In fact, Vietnam’s opening policy has had significant impacts on its 
economy and regulatory structure system for commercial activities. 
First, the integration process has ‘changed basically the role that competition plays in 
the economy’362. It was well understood that international commitments (especially 
the commitment of equal treatment) would increase the competition pressure on 
domestic enterprises with the increase of imports and foreign competitors operating 
inside and outside the territory of Vietnam
363
. For example, in anticipation of 
Vietnam’s capacity to cope with its 2006 AFTA duty-free obligations, Vietnam also 
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had to consider a law-based competition policy
364
. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam 
joined the AFTA and committed to reduce tariff to 0-5% until 2006
365. ‘These 
commitments focused uncomfortable attention on the capacity of its domestic 
enterprises, particularly SOEs, to become regionally competitive, as tariff protection 
and non-tariff barriers are reduced in stages over the next five years’366. Thus, ‘in 
order to make domestic enterprises prepared before jumping into the vigorous 
international competition, the State must build a competition policy to create and 
maintain a positive competition environment… with the specific goals of… 
regulating competitive practices of enterprises by law…’367. 
Moreover, there emerged the problem of power asymmetry between foreign 
companies and, most often transnational corporations (TNCs) and domestic 
enterprises
368
 (e.g., differences in capital, technology, management capacity, business 
experience etc.). Since Vietnam opened its market, companies from economic powers 
like the US, EU and Japan etc. have been competing vigorously with Vietnamese 
enterprises right in the Vietnamese market and there was a real concern that ‘[w]ith 
experience and powerful economic potential, they do not hesitate to adopt all 
competition tactics to get customers and expand market’ including anticompetitive 
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measures and ‘[l]ike any other transition economies, Vietnam is facing the challenge 
that foreign enterprises will take advantage of trade liberalization to impose their own 
restrictions like price-fixing, predatory pricing, other abuses to distort fair 
competition on the market’369. Thus it was perceived that a competition law was 
needed to protect domestic enterprises from their foreign counterparts’ anti-
competitive practices
370
. This concern was emphasized in the Government’s First 
Reading on the Competition Bill to the National Assembly, which stated that: 
‘As a result of market opening due to bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, 
multinational corporations have entered, and will enter more and more, to Vietnam. With 
their economic power, these MNCs have the capability of establishing monopolistic and 
dominant positions, in such a context, certain Vietnamese enterprises with restricted 
capacity, have been eliminated from business activities. Exclusionary conducts have 
occurred, for example, a firm has given away tons of their products or was involved in 
predatory pricing so that no domestic enterprise was able to compete’371. 
Second, Vietnam’s regulatory structure system for commercial activities also 
witnessed dramatic changes. International organizations play an important role in 
pushing legal reforms in general and the adoption of a competition law in particular. 
For example, international organizations such as the World Bank have conditioned 
aid on the adoption of new domestic legislations, often including a competition and 
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investment element
372
. The fact that Vietnam receives approximately 5% of its GDP 
in aid from developed capitalist states and international capitalist organizations such 
as the IMF and the World Bank, together with Vietnam’s heavy trading relationship 
with the US renders Vietnam more susceptible to external pressure than its 
communist leaders would care to admit
373
. Further, these organizations have also 
given support to Vietnam to fulfill its tasks in legal reform. According to UNDP, 
sixteen multinational and bilateral donors have provided legislative support to 
Vietnam
374
. During this process, international agencies, working with like-minded 
state officials and local consultants, were slowly eroding decades of socialist 
antipathy toward private legal rights
375
. Nguyen even noted that ‘international donor 
agencies, especially the UNDP, ADB, and bilateral agencies play a central role in 
advocating law reform in Vietnam’376. 
Finally, and most importantly, the negotiations to become a member of the largest 
world trading system (WTO) helped accelerate Vietnam’s legal reform during the 
period 2001-2006 including the adoption of a comprehensive competition law
377
. 
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Vietnam’s process to WTO membership started in 1995 with Hanoi’s application378. 
As explained by Mazyrin,  
‘Acceding to the WTO is an important step on Vietnam’s way toward full integration of 
its economy into the international business community and may be considered as the final 
act by Hanoi leadership in adopting the general “rules of the game” in business, rules that 
are largely exogenous for this transitional country and obligatory for members of the 
WTO’379.  
One incentive for Vietnam to entry into the WTO is to promote national interests. 
Vietnam’s decision to join the WTO is based first and foremost on pragmatic 
concerns as it was expected that Vietnam’s WTO membership would help it employ 
its comparative advantage to increase exports, provide Vietnam with fair terms in 
trade, give it access to international financial resources and modern technology, and 
enable it to have a voice in global trade regulation
380
. This is increasingly important 
after China’s entry into WTO in 2001381. Growth of trade competition with China 
helped to stimulate Hanoi’s efforts to restore the price advantages of Vietnamese 
commodities in external market
382
. Further, China’s experience has proven fruitful for 
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its southern neighbor, and has helped Hanoi to better organize, prepare, and negotiate 
its accession. In other words, China ‘serves as a model of market reforms for Hanoi 
and a training field for WTO entry’383. Finally, ‘Vietnam had sought to enter the 
WTO before the end of the Doha round of multilateral negotiations, for after this 
round it was thought the rules governing the WTO accession package could be again 
tightened’384. In short, domestic as well as external factors helped push Vietnam 
toward joining the WTO.  
All WTO newcomers have to pay a rather high price for better opportunities in 
international trade, and this was the price that Vietnam’s government agreed to pay 
for entering this global trading club. Specifically, entry into the WTO demanded that 
Vietnamese authorities accept common principles in external and domestic economic 
policies already long institutionalized by the industrialized countries
385
. Taylor 
explained that ‘both membership of multilateral trade polities such as the WTO, the 
EU and NAFTA as well as the approval of the US as the surviving superpower, are 
conditioned on the adoption of a fully functioning legal system’386. It’s noteworthy 
that both the US and the EU have specifically required countries to adopt competition 
provisions as a condition of preferential trading access
387
. ‘Vietnam, not being a 
world power with the capacity to insist on such beneficial terms of access as China or 
Russia, sought to achieve its strategic goal through tactical maneuvers’388 and had to 
‘accept concessions aimed at obtaining the consent of the WTO Working Group 
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members on Vietnam’s accession as well as yielding to their pressure in many areas 
to weaken trade protectionism’389. ‘Lessons drawn from recent WTO membership 
winners show that how soon a country can join the organisation depends very much 
on how seriously it implements the action plans and legal development agendas’390.  
As a country proposing to accede to WTO, since the very first phase, WTO rules have 
influenced Vietnam’s current economic laws and policies, directing Vietnamese 
lawmakers and policymakers to respect the standard rules of the international trade 
system including law and policy to control monopoly and to guarantee competition
391
. 
If so considered, ‘Vietnam’s business law is no more an absolute sovereign area of 
legislation, but to an increasingly extent is now subject to the influence of the WTO 
rules’392. ‘These are really deep changes in a country like Vietnam where the society 
was and to some extent still governed not primarily by law but by other rules and 
policies’393 set by the VCP.  
In 2001, the Politburo
394
 issued Resolution No.7 on International Economic 
Integration, in which the Politburo emphasized the need to accelerate the negotiation 
for Vietnam to accede to WTO, and required the Government to issue a specific 
action plan on international economic integration including increasing economic 
efficiency and national competitiveness as well as amending and perfecting the 
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current legal system
395
. This Resolution dissolved the opposition by conservative 
ministries to imported neoliberal legality
396
. To implement Resolution No.7, the 
Prime Minister of Vietnam signed a Decision on the Government’s Action Plan in 
which the Prime Minister required the Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with all 
relevant Ministries, Provincial People’s Committees and Legislative agencies to 
review the current legal system, and to make recommendations on amendment or 
drafting of new laws and regulations in the area of commerce and economics in 
accordance with WTO rules and international treaties to which Vietnam was a 
member
397
. In 2002, the Legal Needs Assessment sponsored by the Ministry of 
Justice concluded that ‘the concept of proactive international economic integration 
must be instilled in the development and completion of the legal system of Vietnam 
in all fields, from law making and implementation, to legal education and 
dissemination’398. Further, the report confirmed that treaty accession rules place 
Vietnam lawmakers under pressure not only to harmonize substantive law, but also 
develop a procedural ‘rule of law’ that makes private commercial rights credible399. 
The law making agenda from this time has overwhelmingly reflected the legislative 
harmonization required for BTA and WTO membership
400
. Tran commented that 
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even though legal borrowing from Western countries began soon after the Sixth Party 
Congress in 1986, it was not until the Vietnamese government began preparing for 
WTO entry in 1995 that the initial caution gave way to large-scale importation
401
. 
This trend has become clearest since 2001 with the drafting and renewed 
implementation of legislation directly relating to the market economy and 
international trade, including competition and antimonopoly law, and by the end of 
2005, Vietnam had adopted or revised over 94 statutes and 265 legal acts
402
. A 
Competition Bill was promised by the Government, originally for the National 
Assembly’s November session403, the first draft was produced in May 2001 and a 
second draft was circulated for comment by the Ministry of Trade five months later in 
November 2001. The Competition Law was passed by the 10
th
 Congress of National 
Assembly on 9 November 2004. 
Lastly, we should not forget to mention the persuasive relevance of the then Chinese 
competition law experience. Even though explicit reference to Chinese precedents is 
rarely acknowledged in Vietnamese policymaking, for obvious historical reasons, the 
relevance of Chinese reformist experience is nonetheless patently instructive for 
Vietnam in their common acceptance of gradual approach to reform in order to 
maintain a balance between market reforms and social stability
404
. Hence, Neilson 
had speculated that ‘while foreign competition law models have been assiduously 
researched, the latest efforts at legislative reform taken by China will likely to have 
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more influence on the ultimate form and implementation of the forthcoming 
Vietnamese Law’405.  
2.5. Conclusion 
Similar to China, the enactment of the Competition Law in Vietnam in 2004 was 
under the influence of both internal and external factors, namely (i) the transition 
from a planned economy into a market economy, (ii) the need to solve monopolistic 
problems in the domestic market, (iii) the need for the rule of law, and (iv) the needs 
that come from Vietnam’s opening to the outside world. However, in contrast to 
China, the impact of external conditions, especially the pressures during Vietnam’s 
WTO entry negotiation process, on legal reforms in general and the adoption of 
competition law in particular appeared to be the most direct and vigorous force. Put it 
simply, ‘the promulgation of Competition Law is the last step to be done by 
Vietnamese government to fully qualify for being a member of WTO’406. This was 
understandable because of the diferrence in international stature of China and 
Vietnam.  China is a large country and a standing member of the United Nations 
Security Council. So, China has a special standing in the life of the international 
community. In contrast, smaller than China, Vietnam cannot have a similar 
international influence
407
. Thus, while Vietnam had to enact a competition law right 
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before its WTO entry, China only enacted its antimonopoly law six years after its 
WTO accession and so had more time to witness the impact of international 
competition on domestic enterprises and to consult more widely. This finding is 
important in the sense that it may help explain the difference in the drafting and 
enforcing competition law in these two countries (see the next chapters). Another 
interesting difference is that unlike the drafting process in China, and in fact in most 
other countries, the Vietnamese Competition Bill was drafted by the competition 
agency, i.e. the competition agency was established even before the enactment of the 
law (Chapter 6). 
  
  91 
SECTION II – CURRENT COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA AND VIETNAM 
Chapter 3 – The Anti-monopoly Law in China408 
3.1. Structure and Scope of Application of the AML  
The AML’s structure 
The AML has eight chapters
409
 and focuses on the standard three pillars of 
competition law namely anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant market 
positions and anti-competitive concentrations (all of these are named as ‘monopolistic 
conducts’ in the AML)410. Overall, the majority of the AML’s fifty-seven articles are 
similar to the provisions of competition laws in typical market-oriented economies 
except for certain provisions that were tailored to be ‘appropriate to China’s specific 
characteristics, actual conditions of economic growth, and market conditions’411. 
These are provisions regarding SOEs in important economic sectors, trade 
associations, and administrative monopolies. 
It’s noteworthy that previous antitrust-related laws and regulations, such as the AUCL 
1993, the Price Law 1988, the Contract Law 1999, the Bidding Law 2000, the 
Foreign Trade Law 2004, the Technology Import and Export Regulations 2002 etc., 
                                                 
408
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all remain applicable and in force alongside the AML
412
. However, it has also been 
explained that, in case of inconsistency, in China's legal culture, more recent and 




Scope of application 
The AML applies to ‘business operators’ (jingyingzhe)414 which mean natural 
persons, legal persons, or any other organization engaged in the production or 
business of commodities, or which provides a service
415
. This broad definition of 
‘business operators’ seems to be similar to the EU law.  
One interesting question that has arisen is whether the AML applies to SOEs. On the 
one hand, Article 7 provides that:  
‘with respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the 
lifeline of national economy and national security or the industries implementing 
exclusive operation and sales according to law, the state protects the lawful business 
operations conducted by the business operators therein. The state also lawfully regulates 
and controls their business operations and the prices of their commodities and 
services’416. 
On the other hand, Article 7 sets forth the following requirements for these SOEs: (1) 
to conduct business operations lawfully; (2) to be honest and faithful; (3) to be strictly 
self-disciplined and accept social supervision; and (4) to abstain from abusing their 
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authority to damage the interests of consumers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has 
remarked that the AML’s provisions addressing SOEs ‘at best… are ambiguous, and 
at worst… appear to exempt the strict application of competition policy to SOEs’417. 
In fact, many commentators have expressed their suspicion that Article 7 creates an 
exemption of SOEs from the jurisdiction of the AML
418
. 
In theory, however, interpretation by the National People’s Congress and agencies 
involved in the drafting process suggested that only lawful activities of the SOEs 
were protected, while abusive conduct by SOEs is not only subject to the AML, but 
also subject to other applicable laws
419
. Further, despite historical disagreement about 
whether the AML should or does cover SOEs, in practice, there is increasing 
evidence that the AMEAs and PRC courts are applying the AML to SOEs in some 
cases
420
. Within the first two years of the AML several civil lawsuits have been filed 
under the AML against major SOEs such as China Mobile, China Netcom, Sinochem, 
and many of these cases actually have been “accepted” by the PRC courts, indicating 
that, at least in the judiciary view, the AML does apply to SOEs
421
. 
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The application of the AML to regulated sectors of the economy is also unclear. 
Although Wang suggested that the AML applies to almost all industries
422
, the AML 
as enacted is silent on whether the AML prevails over other laws or whether sectoral 
regulators should cede jurisdiction to anti-monopoly authorities, leaving these issues 
to be worked out in future enforcement practice
423
. 
Finally, Article 56 acts as a general exemption and provides that this Law does not 
govern the ally or concerted actions of agricultural producers and rural economic 
organizations in the economic activities such as production, processing, sales, 
transportation and storage of agricultural products. In other words, these ‘business 
operators’ are exempted from the monopolistic agreement provisions. This exemption 
may be driven by the policy goal of protecting the domestic agriculture industry. 
Extra-territorial application 
In response to the growing concern of the impacts of global trade on the domestic 
market, many countries have introduced an extraterritorial application of their 
competition law to foreign conduct that affects domestic commerce
424
. However, it 
should be noted that the extraterritorial application of competition law is often limited 
by the principle of international comity (sometimes labeled the ‘non interference’ 
principle) which requires, in the context of competition law, competition authorities 
                                                 
422
 Wang Xiaoye noted that ‘[a]n earlier draft provision of the AML which immunized utility 
enterprises in the sectors of postal services, railroads, electricity, gas, and tap water was deleted, thus, 
the final version of the AML applies to almost every industries’, see Wang, supra note 33, p.135. 
423
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p26. 
424
 For instance, the US applies the so-called ‘effects doctrine’ which means that US antitrust law 
applies to any foreign conduct that have direct substantial foreseeable effects in the United States (US v 
Alcoa , 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945)). Similarly, anticompetitive practices of non-European firms may 
fall within the reach of EC competition law to the extent that they have an impact within the EC, more 
specifically, the EC relies on the so-called ‘implementation doctrine’ which means a conduct must be 
implemented in the EC in order to be condemned under EC competition law, see Alström Osakeyhtio 
and Others v Commission (Woodpulp) ECR [1988] 5193. 
  95 




China accepts the effects doctrine. The AML expressly governs both conducts within 
China and conducts outside China that either restrict or eliminate competition in any 
domestic market within China. Article 2 of the AML states that  
‘This Law is applicable to monopolistic conducts outside the territory of the PRC if they 
eliminate or have a restrictive effect on competition in the domestic market of the PRC’ 
[emphasis added].  
What is worrisome is that Article 2 of the AML does not require that the 
anticompetitive effect in China be direct, substantial, or foreseeable for the PRC to 
assert its jurisdiction under the AML. Furse, however, suggested that it is unlikely 
that China will take an expansionist approach to the assertion of antitrust jurisdiction 
and the extraterritorial provision should be seen as a mere political statement
426
. The 
reason is because at present the institutions charged with enforcing the law do not 
have the resources to undertake substantial investigations, particularly in respect of 
conduct taking place outside the territory of China with an effect in China.
427
. 
3.2. Goals of the Chinese Anti-monopoly Law  
Article 1 of the AML states that  
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‘This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic 
conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, 
safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public interest, promoting the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy’[emphasis added]. 
As such, beside the usual objectives found in competition law of most competition 
jurisdictions, i.e. enhancing economic efficiency
428
 and consumer welfare, the AML 
refers to other objectives such as ‘fair competition’, ‘social public interest’ and 
‘development of the socialist market economy’429. Many commentators have pointed 
out the possible conflicts among these goals. First, the objective of ‘enhancing 
economic efficiency’ may not work well with the objective of ‘promoting the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy’. Although virtually all Chinese law 
includes the concept of a “socialist market economy” without defining what it is430, 
the inclusion of the term in Article 1 is worrisome since ‘its meaning is unknown and 
so flexible as to present agencies and courts with a tool for applying the law in ways 
inconsistent with generally accepted competition policy’431. For example, SOEs as the 
plank of a ‘socialist market economy’ may be treated with more tolerance for their 
anti-competitive conducts. Second, the goal of ‘fair competition’ may conflict with 
the goals of economic efficiency and consumer welfare since ‘[e]xisting conditions 
will create strong pressure to protect the small, local enterprise, even (or especially) 
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against the competitor that offers greater efficiency and innovation’432, in other 
words, ‘[i]t is unrealistic to expect that Chinese antitrust will not be guided by the 
desire for stability and therefore not include a strong element of protection of 
threatened competitors, even at the expense of competition’433. Third, as argued by 
Wang, consumer interest and public interest may not be parallel and the goals to 
protect consumers and to protect the public interest could, thus, easily conflict with 
each other
434. Wang also noted that the “public interests” provision in this article is a 
controversial concept and some might consider the public interest as a consumer 
interest; other may consider it a national interest
435
.  
In fact, the diversity in the goals of the AML originated from the different concerns of 
Chinese officials and scholars, as explained by Bush: 
‘Some embrace the growing international consensus that antitrust policy should promote 
consumer welfare and economic efficiency through vigorous competition. Many 
reformers also tout the AML as a weapon against ‘administrative monopoly’ – the misuse 
of official power by local authorities and industry regulators to protect or promote 
favoured firms. Other policy makers, however, view the AML as a means of shielding the 
proverbial ‘little guy’ from larger, more efficient rivals. More worrisome for foreign-
invested enterprises are calls to use the AML as an instrument of industrial policy, 
whether to protect vulnerable domestic firms from foreign rivals or to cultivate world-
class ‘national champions’ in strategic sectors’436. 
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Unfortunately, the AML has not set out any mechanism to reconcile the potential 
conflicts between these different objectives. As a matter of practice, tension between 
these often irreconcilable goals will ultimately be resolved by the enforcement 
authorities on a case-by-case basis
437
. This is where real concerns are raised because 
the Chinese Anti-Monopoly authorities may lack the necessary level of independence 
to balance these goals (Chapter 5). For example, the Authority may find it difficult to 
balance its role, on the one hand, to protect consumers from “monopolistic conduct” 
and “safeguard fair market competition” with, on the other hand, its role to protect the 
public interest of monopolistic SOEs
438
. Thus, ‘[t]he many open-ended ‘catch-all’ 
clauses and ‘public interest’ exceptions might be exploited to block pro-competitive 
conduct or to excuse gravely anticompetitive behavior’439.  
3.3. Market Definition  
Consistent with other major competition jurisdictions, China considers the relevant 
market definition as the starting point for conducting an analysis of competitive 
behavior and an important step in competition law enforcement
440
. The purpose of 
defining the relevant market definition is ‘to define the market scope within which the 
business operators compete with each other’441. 
Article 12 of the AML states that: 
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"Relevant market" refers to the commodity scope or territorial scope within which the 
business operators compete against each other during a certain period of time for specific 
commodities or services (hereinafter generally referred to as "commodities"). 
As such, in line with prevailing established competition jurisdictions, the relevant 
market is defined upon defining the relevant product market and the relevant 
geographic market. Relevant product market is a market comprised of a group or a 
category of products that are considered by the consumers to have a relatively close 
substitution relationship based on factors such as characteristics, uses and prices of 
the products
442
. Relevant geographic market is a geographic area within which the 
consumers acquire the products that have relatively strong substitution 
relationships
443




In order to determine the relevant market, Chinese competition agencies will use 
following analytical framework, which, overall, is well within the mainstream of 
international antitrust practice: 
Demand Substitution:  generally, AMEAs will examine demand substitution as the 
first part of its analysis
445
. AMEAs shall consider the following factors: evidence 
showing consumers shift to or consider a shift to purchasing other products due to a 
change of the products’ price or change of other competitive factors; products’ overall 
characteristics and uses; products’ price variance; products’ distribution channel; and 
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other important factors such as the consumers’ preference for or reliance on the 
products; barriers, risks and costs associated with a large number of consumers 
switching to substitutes; and whether differential pricing exists
446
.  
Similarly, to define the relevant geographic market, factors to be considered include 
evidence showing consumers shift to or consider a shift to other geographic areas to 
purchase products; products’ transportation cost and transportation characteristics; the 
actual regions where the majority of consumers choose their products and the product 
distribution locations of the main business operators; trade barriers among geographic 
areas (e.g., tariffs, local regulations, environmental factors, technological factors); 
and other factors such as consumers’ preference in a particular area or the amount of 
products transported into/out of this geographic area
447
. 
Supply Substitution:  AMEAs will also consider supply side response in defining 
product and geographic markets when necessary
448
. This approach is a key 
divergence from the US (which only considers the supply substitution in the later 
stage of determining market power), but is in line with the approach adopted in the 
EU. To examine supply substitution, AMEAs shall consider the following factors: 
evidence showing other business operators’ reactions over competitive factor changes 
such as a price change, the business operators’ production process and crafts, 
difficulties in relation to a production switch, the time required for a production 
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switch, extra costs and risks in relation to a production switch, the competitiveness of 
the products supplied after a switch, the marketing channels, etc
449
. 
To define the relevant geographic market, factors to be considered include evidence 
showing other business operators’ reactions over a competitive factor change such as 
a price change; instantaneity and feasibility of supply or distribution of the relevant 
product by the business operators in other geographic areas (e.g., switching costs 
etc.). 
The Hypothetical Monopolist Test:  if the market scope for competitive business 
operators is ‘unclear or hard to determine’, the relevant market can be defined by 
using the hypothetical monopolist test
450
 (which means that the hypothetical 
monopolistic test is not compulsory in all cases, which is similar to Vietnam’s 
regime). Under this test, AMEAs shall employ economic analysis to determine 
whether a hypothetical monopolist is able to maintain a price increase of the target 
product at a small scale (normally 5 to 10 per cent) continuously (normally one year), 
provided that the sales conditions of other products remain the same
451
. Subsequent to 
the increase of the target product price, if the hypothetical monopolist is still able to 
gain a profit after experiencing a sales reduction, the target product constitutes the 
relevant product market
452
. It should be noted that for the hypothetical monopolistic 
test, the benchmark price selected to define the relevant market is the current price. 
However, in cases of concentration of business operators where there is abuse of 
dominant market position, collusion and already existent collusion, if the current 
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price departs notably from the competitive price, AMEAs will make an adjustment to 
the current price to select a price that is more competitive
453
.  
Finally, and interestingly, China appears to adopt the concept of “technology 
markets”454. It is stipulated that ‘in the anti-monopoly enforcement of technology 
trade, license agreements or others involving intellectual property rights, the relevant 
technology market may need to be defined with influences of factors such as 
intellectual property rights and innovation being taken into account’455.  
Overall, China’s approach in defining the relevant market is well in line with the 
approaches of more mature antitrust jurisdictions although the EU’s approach appears 
to be more influential with the supply substitution considered in the market definition 
stage instead of in the later stage of determining market power as in the US. 
3.4. Monopoly Agreements 
The AML’s provisions on monopoly agreements appear to be largely modeled on EU 
law though there are certain differences. For instance, the AML makes a clear 
distinction between monopoly agreements among competing business operators 
(horizontal agreements) in Article 13 and agreements among business operators and 
their trading partners (vertical agreements) in Article 14.  
‘Monopoly agreements’ mean agreements, decisions or other concerted actions 
reached among undertakings or organized by industry association which eliminate or 
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restrict competition
456
. Interestingly, there is no requirement that to constitute a 
prohibited monopolistic agreement, an agreement must have a ‘substantial’ or 
‘material’ adverse effect on competition. However, it has been suggested that the 
requirement of Article 15 for most exemptions that an agreement must not 
substantially restrict competition in the relevant market
457
 implies that the 
substantiality requirement will be read into Articles 13-14
458
. There is also no 
distinction between “naked” price fixing, output restricting, or market allocation 
agreements and agreements that are ancillary to a legitimate business purpose
459
, 
although the efficiency defence in Article 15 may be used in these circumstances
460
. 
Further, there seems to be no consideration of the ‘intent’ of the agreement, thus only 
agreements that actually eliminate or restrict competition would be condemned under 
the AML. Yet, it has been noted that for naked cartels, recent enforcement by NDRC 
does not appear to require proof of effect on competition
461
. 
An agreement or decision may take written and oral forms; and concerted practice 
means colluded coordination in practice between undertakings without express oral or 
written agreements or decisions
462
. It remains unclear, however, whether tacit 
                                                 
456
 Article 13 of the AML, Article 2 of SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements, effective 
as of February 1, 2011, Article 5 of NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly, effective as of 
1 February 2011. Wang noted that this definition is similar to that found in Article 1 of the German Act 
Against Restraints of Competition (1999), see Wang, supra note 33, p.136. 
457
 Article 15 requires that to qualify for most exemptions, an agreement must not substantially restrict 
competition in the relevant market, see Article 15, AML. 
458
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, pp.66-67. 
459
 Such as an efficiency-enhancing joint venture. 
460
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.70-71. 
461
 Ibid., p.70. 
462
 Article 2, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. For non-price anti-monopoly 
agreements, SAIC will define concerted practice upon considering the following factors: the 
uniformity of the conduct; the intention of contact or information exchange among the undertakings; 
the reasonable justification for the uniformity of conduct; the market structure, competitive conditions, 
changes in the market, industry condition, etc, see Article 3, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements. For price-related agreements, NDRC will define a concerted act upon considering the 
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collusion
463
 and intra-enterprise conspiracy
464
 would constitute a monopolistic 
agreement and whether tacit acquiescence
465
 in vertical relationship would amount to 
an agreement or concerted practice under the AML
466
. 
Although the AML does not state that these monopoly agreements are automatically 
void as in the EU law, the Chinese Contract Law provides that contracts are void if 
they infringe a legislative prohibition
467
, thus these prohibited monopoly 
arrangements would be void, too.  
3.4.1. Horizontal agreements 
Article 13 of the AML provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited horizontal 
agreements among competing business operators
468
, including:  
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities
469
.  
                                                                                                                                           
following factors: the consistency among business operators’ pricing acts; communication of intention 
among business operators; the market structure and market changes, see Article 6 of NDRC 
Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
463
 Tacit collusion is a common course of action arrived at without any expression or communication 
through independent decision-making by each party’s taking into account its expectation of the other 
party’s continuing in that course of action. 
464
 An agreement between parties that are related as affiliates or parent and subsidiary. 
465
 Vertical restraints imposed by the supplier and in which the purchaser acquiesces. 
466
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, pp.63-66. 
467
 Article 52 of China’s Contract Law 1999. 
468
 It remains unclear whether potential competitors are considered as competing business operators. 
The AML provides no guidance on this notion, see Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 
119, pp.68-69. 
469
 Unlawful price fixing agreements need not constitute an agreement upon a specific price but may 
take one of many forms of arrangements that affect price. Examples of these agreements are (a) fixing 
or changing the prices of commodities and services (hereinafter referred to as Commodities); (b) fixing 
or changing price-change volume; (c) fixing or changing a commission, discount or the other fees that 
has impact on prices; (d) applying an agreed price as the basis to transact with a third party; (e) 
agreeing to apply a standard formula as the basis of calculating prices; (f) agreeing that a price shall 
not be changed without the consent of other business operator(s) that is a party to the agreement; (g) 
using other method to fix or change price in a disguised way, see Article 7, NDRC Regulations for 
Prohibiting Price Monopoly. It should be noted that price fixing is also prohibited under the Price Law 
and in fact the first punishment of price fixing case after the AML became affective - the Guangxi rice 
noodle cartel case 2010 - was handled pursuant to the Price Law and the Regulations on 
Administrative Penalties for Price Related Violations. For more details of the case, see Nathan Bush, 
‘China: Antimonopoly Law’, (2010) The Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review, available at 
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(2) limiting the output or sales of commodities
470
; 
(3) dividing the sales market or the raw material procurement market
471
; 
 (4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the development of 
new technology or new products
472
; 
 (5) making joint boycott transactions
473
; 
 Finally, there is a catch-all provision that prohibits ‘other monopoly agreements as 
determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council’. This provision 
has raised some concerns amongst foreign lawyers, particularly amongst common law 




 These agreements are understood as (1) Agreements that restrict output of products or certain types 
or models of a product by curtailing production, fixed production, stop production or otherwise; and 
(2) agreements that restrict sales volume of products, or certain types or models of a product by 
refusing to supply, restricting the products supply or otherwise, see Article 4, SAIC Rules on 
Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. 
471
 Although this provision is similar to Article 81(1)(c) EC, it is a peculiarity that it applies only to 
‘raw materials’. Lorenz suggested that ‘there is nothing to indicate that this is a limitation and it is 
more likely that the division of the demand side market in its entirety is intended to be outlawed, see 
Moritz Lorenz, ‘The New Chinese Competition Act’ (2008) European Competition Law Review 257, 
p.258. However, “it is not clear from the text of the AML that this interpretation is supported’, see 
Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.02. Agreements of this type include: (1) agreements that split market by 
territory, customer or product type and volume; (2) agreements that split purchasing market of raw 
material, semi-finished products, parts, components, relevant equipments and other raw materials by 
territory, type and volume; and (3) agreements that split suppliers of raw material, semi-finished 
products, parts, components, relevant equipments and other raw materials, see Article 5, SAIC Rules 
on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. 
472
 These agreements include: (1) agreements that restrict purchasing and using new technologies, new 
processes; (2) agreements that restrict purchasing, leasing or using new equipments; (3) agreements 
that restrict investing in and developing new technologies, new process, or new products; (4) 
agreements that refuse to use new technologies, new process, or new equipments; and (5) agreements 
that refuse to adopt new technical standards, see  Article 6, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly 
Agreements. ‘Although this provision is not inconsistent with international practice in antitrust law 
some concern has been expressed that this may act against the interests of foreign importers of 
technology who wish to license this to selected parties only, or who seek to impose exclusivity clauses 
in IP licenses. It has already been held by the Chinese courts that it may be an illegal use of monopoly 
power to include restrictions on the use of competing technology in licenses and the fear has been 
expressed that licensees may seek to rely on this provision to restrict the obligations which may be 
lawfully imposed on them’, see Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.02. 
473
 These agreements include (1) concerted refusal to supply or sell products to a specific undertaking; 
(2) concerted refusal to purchase or sell products of a specific undertaking; and (3) concerted restraint 
on a specific undertaking from dealing with a competing undertaking, see SAIC Rules on Prohibition 
of Monopoly Agreements, Article 7. It appears that the prohibition only applies to transactions, and not 
organizations or joint activities, see Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.74. 
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lawyers who expect statutes to precisely set out the boundaries of the prohibitions
474
. 
However, it has been explained that in the context of China, as in other civil law 
jurisdictions, catch-all provisions are not unusual. In civil law countries, ‘statutes are 
general statements of legal principles rather than precise and narrowly read 
restrictions on freedoms’475 and lawmakers will later elaborate on the general 
principles through regulation or judicial decisions. Bush opined that such catch-all 
provisions in the AML are not only acceptable but also ‘allow accretion of new 
principles to keep pace with foreign antitrust trends’476. 
Although bid-rigging is not expressly condemned in the AML, it is prohibited in other 
laws such as the Law against Unfair Competition 1993
477
 and the Bidding Law 
2000
478
 (as well as the Criminal Law 1997).  
3.4.2. Vertical agreements 
                                                 
474
 Jones, supra note 83, p.5. 
475
 Jones, ibid., p.6, adding that in other regulations China has used the term ‘etc.’ to indicate that the 
requirements listed are not exhaustive, this has not found much favor with foreign commentators from 
common law jurisdictions and phrases similar to those used in Article 13(6) have been used instead. 
476
 Bush, supra note 408, p.13. 
477
 Article 15 of the AUCL states that: ‘Bidding parties shall not submit bids in collusion with each 
other to force the bidding price up or down. A bidder shall not conspire with the party who invites bids 
in order to exclude competitors from fair competition’. 
478
 The Bidding Law of the PRC was adopted on 30 August 1999 and became effective on 1 January 
2000. This Law is ‘applicable to the bidding activities within the territory of the [PRC]’ (Article 2). 
Prior to the enactment of the Bidding Law, in 1998 the SAIC enacted the Interim Provision 
Concerning the Banning of Conspiracies in Bid- Rigging, making it unlawful to engage in conspiracies 
between parties on both sides of the bidding process. Article 32 of the Bidding Law states in part that: 
[bidders] shall not collude with each other in setting bidding prices, nor shall they exclude other 
bidders from fair competition and harm the lawful rights and interests of the bid inviter and other 
bidders. Bidders shall not collude with the bid inviter in injuring the interests of the State, general 
public and other people. The Bidding Law also states that in the event that the bid winner wins the bid 
by conspiring with other bidders or with the bid inviter or paying bribes to the bid inviter or members 
of the bid evaluation committee, the bid shall be invalid, and the bid winner shall be subject to a fine of 
not less than 0.5% but not more than 1% of the total value of the bidding project (Article 53). Illegal 
gains may be confiscated, and the person directly in charge of the bid may also face criminal penalties 
(Article 53). 
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Similar to the EU model, China’s AML has strict prohibition against resale price 
maintenance (RPM)
479
. Article 14 prohibits two modes of RPM:  
(1) fixing the price of commodities for resale to a third party; and  
(2) restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party
480
. 
Moreover, similar to the case of horizontal agreements, there is a catch-all provision 
that prohibits ‘other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council’481.  
There are three remarks here: 
First, RPM is prohibited per se in the AML unless they qualify for one of the 
exemptions provided in Article 15 of the AML. This strict attitude toward RPM in 
China is drawn from the experience of other countries, as explained by Wu, ‘[s]ince 
many vertical agreements, except for the very few that involves prices, would not 
eliminate or restrict competition, many countries in practice adopt a “rule of reason” 
analysis for most vertical agreements while adopting the principle of per se 
prohibition of vertical agreements that do involve prices’482. However, whether RPM 
should be condemned in a modern antitrust regime is still a controversial issue
483
.  
                                                 
479
 Although there is no express prohibition against RPM between entities in a vertical relationship 
within the European competition law, Article 101(1)(a) of the European competition law, which 
prohibits price-fixing between entities, may be applied to entities in a horizontal or vertical 
relationship. Thus, agreements amounting to RPM may be caught by Article 101(1)(a). Further, RPM 
is listed as a "hardcore" prohibition pursuant to the European Commission's Vertical Restraints Block 
Exemption which came into effect on 1 June 2010 and will stay in force till 31 May 2022.  
480
 Note that these prohibition are repeated in Article 8 of the NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price 
Monopoly . 
481
 Article 14(3) of the AML. 
482
 Wu, supra note 75, p.81. 
483
 OECD, Competition Committee, ‘Policy Roundtable on Resale Price Maintenance’, DAF/COMP 
(2008) p.37, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/63/43835526.pdf. Some jurisdiction, such 
as the US, has changed from a per se rule to a rule of reason to examine RPM practices. 
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Second, whether practices such as recommended resale price or the economic 
incentivizing (rather than direct imposition) of RPM is prohibited remains to be seen. 
Furse, however, suggested that although recommended resale prices would not be 
prohibited under Article 14(1), unless it could be shown that these were backed up by 
some form of covert enforcement mechanism, minimum recommended prices might 
face condemnation under Article 14(2) with a lesser standard of coercion applying 
than would be necessary for the application of Article 14(1)’484.  
Third, Article 14 only prohibits RPM and does not prohibit the imposition of other 
types of vertical restraints such as exclusive distributorship, territorial or customer 
restraints, tying arrangements, reciprocal dealing agreements, etc. unless these 
contain price restrictions
485
. Yet, the general catch-all provision of Article 14 allows 
the AMEAs to condemn these restraints if necessary. In reality, SAIC later indicated 
that non-price vertical restraints are analyzed under a rule of reason
486
. 
3.4.3. Block exemptions 
China follows the EC’s exemption and exception system487. Similar to both the 
language and the approach of Article 101(3) of the TFEU, Article 15 of the AML 
exempts anti-competitive agreements if they were entered for the purposes of: 
(1) improving technologies, researching and developing new products; 
This exemption of R&D agreements is consistent with the strong public policy in 
China supporting the development of indigenous intellectual property
488
. However, 
                                                 
484
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.03. 
485
 Furse, ibid.; Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.78. 
486
 Article 8, SAIC Rules on the Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements. 
487
 Wu noted that these exemptions are ‘similar to the categories of exemptions provided for in the EU 
Treaty’, see Wu, supra note 75, p.81. 
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there has been some concern about how far such an agreement may extend, and 
whether, for example, the parties to a research and development agreement may also 
agree joint production and/or joint marketing of the fruits of the agreement
489
.   
(2) upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, unifying product 
specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor division; 
(3) enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the competitiveness of small and 
medium-sized business operators; 
This exemption is similar to other jurisdiction, the rationale of such exemption 
include lightening the burden on enforcement authorities by exempting activities with 
a de minimis effect on competition, as well as allowing SMEs to achieve economies 
of scale without undertaking mergers which may be deleterious to competition
490
. 
This exemption is also consistent with China’s policy to promote SMEs to create 
more jobs opportunities in both urban and rural areas
491
, although the AML gives no 
definition of ‘small and medium sized business operators’. Pate, however, has warned 
that this exemption  
‘…would potentially result in China, unlike other countries, protecting small enterprises 
from competition solely because of their size. This, like China's interest in preserving 
inefficient competitors for the sake of stability, does not necessarily serve consumer 
welfare’492. 
                                                                                                                                           
488
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.81. 
489
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.07 
490
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.83. 
491
 PRC’s Law on Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 2002. 
492
 Pate, supra note 73, p.205. 
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(4) achieving public interests such as conserving energy, protecting the environment 
and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
It has been commented that although these goals are valid, ‘this provision should be 
otiose in modern antitrust law
493
. Further, this exemption has also raised concerns 
since there has been no definition of the concept of ‘public interests’. Wang opined 
that ‘State-owned, large companies are more likely to demonstrate the ‘public 
interest’ exemption’494. 
(5) mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously excessive production 
during economic recessions; 
It seems that China has followed the German model, rather than the EU model, and 
allowed crisis cartels
495
. Several commentators have expressed their concerns with 
this exemption
496
. The rationale behind this approach lies in Chinese government’s 
                                                 
493
 Harris, supra note 8, p.192 (explaining that ‘“saving energy” should either be dealt with through the 
market mechanism, thereby ensuring that the most efficient producer will, ceteris paribus, be the most 
efficient user of energy and hence the winner in price competition, or by legislation distinct from the 
Anti-Monopoly Law’). 
494
 Wang, supra note 33, p. 143. 
495
 The Treaty of Rome does not contain any clauses regarding crisis conditions and the European 
Commission could not justify applying the Article 101(3) TFEU criteria in periods of crisis, thus the 
Commission initially reduced fines on cartels existing in crisis situations. German law was more 
lenient towards crisis cartels by allowing structural crisis agreements. In contrast, US authorities and 
courts have always been stricter than Germany and EU on such cartels, assessing them pursuant to an 
approach of per se illegality, see Ioannis Kokkoris & Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, ‘Antitrust Law amidst 
Financial Crises’ (Cambridge University Press, New York: 2010) p.262. 
496
 E.g., Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.07 (this provision ‘is out of line with more usual practice in 
antitrust law. As well as being objectionable on policy grounds the provision is also poorly drafted, and 
the meaning of ‘economic recession’ in uncertain’); Wang, supra note 33, p. 137 (‘a cartel formed for 
the purpose of mitigating serious decreases in sales or excessive overstock during economic depression 
should not be exempted because economic downturns are part of normal commercial risks and often 
create efficiencies that are necessary to the operation of a free market. Additionally, competition 
during an economic depression may be benefited by the adjustment of the market and product 
structure’); Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.84 (‘establishment through 
implementing rules of clear criteria to qualify for such exemptions under the AML would help ensure 
that competitors do not resort to collusion whenever economic conditions are less than ideal, and that 
the provision is applied in a consistent and predictable manner’).  
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concern with stability, as explained by Pate, ‘Chinese officials have approved 
anticompetitive actions precisely because of their tendency to promote stability’497. 
(6) safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign trade or foreign economic 
cooperation;  
Similar to many other jurisdictions, export cartels appear to be exempted from 
antitrust scrutiny in China
498
. In fact, an earlier draft of the legislation contained 
within it a much more express provision clearly exempted export cartels
499
, however, 
‘such a provision generated some hostile reaction from international commentators, 
so the text as now written, although still permit export cartels, restricts the 
exemptions only to “justifiable interests”’500. Wang noted that this exemption ‘may be 
justifiable for Chinese companies to organize price cartels to avoid a price war among 
them and to avoid anti-dumping suits’501. Indeed, 70 per cent of China’s exports are 
products most vulnerable to antidumping measures, further, China’s situation is even 
worse than other WTO’s members because of the highly discriminatory non-market 
economy provision
502
. Thus, historically, trade associations, many of which have 
been formed under the aegis of MOFCOM and other government bodies, have 
                                                 
497
 Pate, supra note 73, p.201. 
498
 See D. Daniel Sokol, ‘What Do We Really Know about Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate 
Solution?’, (2008) 4:4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 967, p.968 (‘there has been a long-
standing practice in many countries to allow export cartel exemptions to antitrust laws’). 
499
 See Draft of 8 April 2005 which contained at Article 9(iv) the following exemption: ‘Agreements to 
enhance the competitiveness of exports in global market’. 
500
 Furse, supra note 5, 2-2.07 
501
 Wang, supra note 33, p. 137. Owen, Sun and Zheng also noted that ‘the government has also 
stepped up its efforts to limit competition among China's exporters to reduce their exposure to 
antidumping investigations by foreign governments. For instance, in 2003 the government imposed an 
"advance approval" requirement for the export of thirty-six goods. Under the requirement, exporters 
must first submit their export contracts to the respective trade associations for approval prior to export. 
Policies such as "industrial self-discipline" and "advance approval" to a large degree function simply as 
government sponsored price cartels.’ see Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.249. 
502
 Bhattasali, Li & Martin, supra note 156, p.3. 
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undertaken to orchestrate the exporting activities of the associations’ members, 
including setting prices for export cartels. It should always be emphasized, however, 
that an export cartel legitimated in China would still face potential condemnation by 
its trading partners if it were found that their competition laws were being 
breached
503
. One interesting and illuminating case is the Vitamin C
504
 case in 2008 in 
which four Chinese manufacturers and their association were accused of fixing prices 
and limiting exports before a US court. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss 
the case on the ground that their conduct was compelled by the Chinese authorities. 
The defendants’ motion was later denied since the court found the evidence too 
ambiguous
505
.   
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council 
Although this is a catch-all provision, it does not allow an AMEA itself to create 
other grounds of exemption in the course of its day-to-day enforcement activity. 
Moreover, and using language similar to that employed in the application of Article 
101(3) TFEU, the parties are required to prove that these agreements (1) ‘enable 
consumers to share the interests derived from the agreement’, and (2) ‘will not 
substantially restrict the competition in the relevant market’506.  
                                                 
503
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-2.07 (‘General principles of international law make a clear distinction 
between the authorization of an act in one State, and the State compelling the act. Only in the later case 
would antitrust enforcement activity by a third State be excluded’).  
504
 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
505
 For more analysis of this case, see Marek Martyniszyn, ‘A Comparative Look at Foreign State 
Compulsion as a Defense in Antitrust Litigation’, (2012) 8:2 The Competition LawReview 143 (ISSN 
1745-638X (Online); see also Jane Lee, ‘Vitamin “C” is for Compulsion: Delimiting the Foreign 
Sovereign Compulsion Defense’, (2010) 50:3 Virginia Journal of International Law 757; and 
Dingding Tina Wang, ‘When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.-China 
WTO Disputes in Deciding Antitrust Cases Involving Chinese Exports’, (2012) 112:5 Colombia Law 
Review 1096. 
506
 Article 15 of the AML. 
  113 
There are some important comments on Article 15 as follows: 
First, it appears that these exemptions are applicable to all monopolistic agreements 
prescribed in Article 13 and Article 14 since the AML makes no distinctions between 
hard core restraints and non-hard core restraints.  
Second, it was noted that some of the listed grounds for exemptions are not generally 
accepted as pro-competitive benefits in other jurisdictions, but were claimed to be 
modeled after the competition laws of Germany and South Korea among others
507
. As 




Third, it is unclear from Article 15 whether a monopolistic agreement would qualify 
for exemption if it were proven that the parties entered into it with the intent of 
achieving one of the beneficial purposes in the article, or whether it must be proven 
that the agreement in fact achieved such a purpose. There is no requirement that the 
qualifying benefits be substantial or material, thus it is also unclear whether a de 
minimis benefit of a type listed would be sufficient to exempt a monopolistic 
agreement
509
. Last but not least, there is no requirement, as under EU practice, that 
the restraints imposed be “indispensable” or necessary to the attainment of the exempt 
objectives – ‘making the exemptions for crisis cartels, export cartels, and unspecified 
                                                 
507
 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, ‘The AML Interpretation Book’, pp.85-89, 
cited in Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.78. 
508
 Wang Xiaoye, ‘Interpretation of the AML’ (IP Publishing House, Beijing: 2008) pp.122-123, cited 
in Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.78. 
509
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, ibid., p.80.  
  114 
“public interests” even more worrisome’510. Owen, Sun and Zheng have commented 
that  
‘[d]espite … signs of compromise between promoting competition and ensuring market 
stability, it is clear that the balance in the AML is slightly tilted towards the latter. 
Nowhere is this bias more vividly displayed than in the exceptions to monopolistic 
agreements written into the AML’511. 
All of the exemptions are subject to approval of the competent anti-monopoly 
authority. While the final power to grant exemptions belongs to SAIC for non-price 
monopoly agreements, such power belongs to NDRC for price-related ones. 
Unfortunately, both the AML and the subsequent guidelines have not specified how 
the exemptions process will work in practice
512
. There is still no clarification of the 
burden of proof or the evidence that will be required to satisfy the exemption 
provision, although one author has suggested that the burden facing those seeking to 
rely on the exemptions ‘is similar to, but likely broader than, the ‘rule of reason’ used 
by US courts’513. 
3.4.4. Trade associations 
The term ‘trade association’ is undefined under the AML and it might be interpreted 
to cover all trade associations, chambers of commerce, and their divisions and 
branches, regardless of name, so long as they perform the functions of an industry or 
                                                 
510
 Bush, supra note 408, p.7 (adding that ‘[w]ithout clear blacklisting of hard core restraints, Article 
15 may be used to authorize or forgive gravely anticompetitive conduct’). 
511
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.250. 
512
 Article 21 of the Procedural Rules by Administration of Industry and Commerce regarding 
Investigation and Handling of Cases relating to Monopoly Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Market 
Position simply states that ‘if the business operator can demonstrate that the agreement satisfies the 
prescription of Article 15 of the Anti-monopoly Law, AIC may exempt the relevant conducts’. 
513
 Wang, supra note 33, p.137. 
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trade associations
514. Trade associations do not fall within the definition of ‘business 
operator’ in the AML and the general prohibitions of the AML do not therefore apply 
to their activities. Yet, due to the important role they play, trade associations cannot 
be left outside the AML (Chapter 1). On the one hand, Article 11 of the AML 
emphasizes the role of trade associations as follows:  
“A trade association shall intensify industrial self-discipline, guide business operators to 
lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the market.” 
On the other hand, Article 16 of the AML states that these entities are prohibited from 
organizing the business operators in its own industry to implement the monopolistic 
agreements. More specifically, for price-related monopolistic agreements, trade 
associations are prohibited from (1) formulating rules, decisions, notices… etc., to 
eliminate or restrict price competition; (2) assembling business operators to form 
price-monopoly agreements that are prohibited by these Regulations; and (3) other 
acts to assemble business operators to form or implement price-monopoly 
agreements
515
. For non-price-related monopolistic agreements, trade associations are 
prohibited from (1) formulating and issuing articles of association, rules, decision, 
notice or standard containing contents eliminating or restricting competition by the 
industry association; and (2) convening, organizing or promoting undertakings in the 
relevant industry to reach agreements, decisions, minutes and/or memorandums 
containing contents eliminating or restricting competition
516
. 
                                                 
514
 Cao, supra note 59, p.43. 
515
 Article 9, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
516
 Article 9, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements.  
  116 
In cases in which trade associations effect a breach of the law by organizing an 
unlawful monopoly agreement they may be fined, and where the breach is serious 
they may face deregistration
517
. Commentators, however, read these provisions only 
to indicate that the State will continue to have an important role in regulating industry 
activities, or as ‘propaganda’ that serves as a starting point for discussion rather than 
a real restriction on the activities of such trade associations
518
. 
3.5. Abuse of Market Dominant Position 
3.5.1 Market dominant position 
Article 17 of the AML defines market dominant position as: 
‘…a market position held by a business operator having the capacity to control the price, 
quantity or other trading conditions of commodities in relevant market, or to hinder or 
affect any other business operator to enter the relevant market’519. 
The subsequently issued guidelines further explains that ‘other trading conditions’ 
refers to ‘elements other than price and volume that may substantially affect market 
transactions, including product quality, payment condition, delivery method and after-
sale service of the product, transaction options and technological restrictive 
                                                 
517
 Article 46 of the AML 
518
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.206; Williams, supra note 120, pp.137-
138; Yong Huang, ‘Chinese Antimonopoly Law: Growing Along with Market Economic Background, 
Legal Framework and Implementation Outlook’, Doing Business in China 2008, 1681 PLI/Corp 51, 
(Practicing Law Institute: 2008), p.65. 
519
 Emch noted that “the dominant market position concept contained in the AML can be seen as a shift 
of paradigm in Chinese competition policy towards market economy principles. Before the adoption of 
the AML, the authorities' intrusion in the functioning of the market was more far-reaching. Under prior 
competition rules, the concept of DMP was notable through its absence. Instead, the relevant 
competition rules on single-firm conduct in principle applied to all undertakings - whether or not they 
were in a DMP. The Price Law, which had been an important piece of China's competition policy prior 
to the adoption of the AML, prohibited undertakings in general from engaging in unfair pricing. 
Similarly, the AUCL made all undertakings subject to the prohibitions of predatory pricing and tying.”, 
see Emch, supra note 418, p.617. 
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conditions etc.
520; and ‘to hinder or affect any other business operator to enter the 
relevant market’ means preventing other undertakings from entering the relevant 
market, or deferring other undertakings’ entry into the relevant market within a 
reasonable time, or increasing the market entry cost, thus making it difficult for the 




Generally, this definition is similar to the way market power is described in both US 
monopolization law and the abuse of a dominant position in EC competition law. 
Substantial market power or dominance in China means two things: the ability to 
control price (the traditional meaning in economics) and the power to exclude 
competitors. However, the definition of dominance refers only to a single firm power 
(‘a market position held by a business operator’) although group power (or 
‘collective dominance’) is referred to in Article 19(2) and 19(3) of the AML. 
Interestingly, the AML seems to recognize both buyer dominance as well as seller 
dominance since buying products at unfairly low prices is a potential abuse of 
dominance
522
. Last but not least, there is no reference here to the dominance existing 
within China. Thus, ‘a possible, but unwelcome consequence of this lacuna is that, in 
conjunction with Article 2 which delimits the territorial scope of the Law, a business 
operator could be found to be dominant globally, but not in China, and still be found 
to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Law’523.  
                                                 
520
 Article 3, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position; Article 17, NDRC  
Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
521
 Article 3, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position; Article 17, NDRC 
Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
522
 See AML, Article 17(1). 
523
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-3.02 
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Article 18 of the AML gives an open list of factors to be considered in verifying the 
existence of a dominant market position. Unfortunately, so far only the SAIC has 
clarified its approach to examine these factors, in contrast, the NDRC Regulations for 
Prohibiting Price Monopoly sheds no light on how NDRC will conduct their 
examination.  
The factors provided by Article 18 include:  
(1) the market share of a business operator in relevant market, and the competition 
situation of the relevant market
524
; 




(3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator
526
; 




(5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market
528
. 
                                                 
524
 Market share refers to the turnover, sales volume and other measurements of an undertaking 
expressed as a percentage in the relevant market over a given period of time. When analyzing the 
competition status of relevant market, SAIC will take into account the development of the relevant 
market, number of existing competitors, market shares, differentiation of products and situation of 
potential competitors, etc., see Article 10(1), SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market 
Position. 
525
 SAIC shall consider factors such as the business operator’s ability to control the sales channels or 
the purchase channels, the ability to impact or determine the price, the output, term or other contract 
conditions and to have priority access to raw material, such as raw material supplies, semi-products, 
part and component, as well as relevant equipment necessary for the production and operation of an 
undertaking, see Article 10(2) , SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
526
 SAIC shall consider the capital scale, the financial position, the profitability, the financing 
capability, the R&D capability, technical equipment, technology innovation and application ability, 
and the intellectual property owned by such undertaking. Moreover, analysis of the financial and 
technological conditions of the undertaking shall also take into consideration those of its affiliates, see 
Article 10(3), SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
527
 SAIC shall consider the transaction volume, duration of the trading relationship with such 
undertaking in question, and degree of difficulty to switch to other counterparties, see Article 10(4), 
SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
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Dominance is defined in relation to market power within a market. Wang and Wu 
explained that in view of the fact that the market structure plays a key role in 
influencing the market behaviour of business operators
529
 and to save law 
enforcement costs and to conduct effective supervision of operators
530
, the AML also 
borrows from international experiences and establishes a presumption. Article 19 
contains three presumptions of a market dominant position based entirely on the 
market share thresholds. A business operator may be presumed to be have a dominant 
market position when its market share is 50% or greater; or when the joint relevant 
market share of two business operators accounts for 2/3 or above; or when the joint 
relevant market share of three business operators accounts for 3/4 or above. However, 
Article 19 also creates a safe harbour by providing that if any one of the relevant 
business operators has a market share of less than 1/10 it will not be presumed as 
having a dominant market position. Thus, Article 19 seems to adopt the concept of 
‘collective dominance’ in EU competition law. However, this presumption of 
collective dominance has raised much concern among commentators
531
. There is 
possibility that a firm with a low share (e.g., 11 per cent) could be presumed 
                                                                                                                                           
528
 SAIC shall consider the regulation on the market access, possession of essential facilities, 
distribution channel, financial and technological requirements and costs etc., see Article 10(5), SAIC 
Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
529
 Wang, supra note 33, p.138. 
530
 Wu, supra note 75, p.86. 
531
 E.g., Harris & Ganske, supra note 418, p.213 (‘the Chinese approach to collective dominance, 
which presumes the dominant position of multiple entities based on their combined market shares, is 
unique and troubling’); Furse, supra note 5, at 2-3.05 (‘[a]lthough it is clear on the face of the 
legislation that these presumptions are rebuttable, the fact that they exist, suggesting antipathy towards 
firms with high market shares, or a suspicion that oligopolistic markets may tend to collusion, may be 
a matter of some concern unless practice demonstrates that this is not the operating principle’). 
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dominant if it happens to be the third largest competitor in a market and the other two 
leading firms together have a 64 per cent share of the market
532
.  
These presumptions are rebuttable since Article 19 of the AML at the same time 
provides that: 
Where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant market position 
can otherwise prove that they do not have a dominant market, it shall not be determined 
as having a dominant market position. 
To rebut the presumptions, the undertaking in questions must prove that it has no 
ability to control the price, the output of the product, or other transaction conditions in 
relevant market, or the ability to prevent or affect entry into the relevant market by 
other undertakings
533
. However, concerns have been expressed about the risks that 
China’s competition enforcers may place too much weight on market shares as an 
indication of dominance, in contrast to the practice in leading jurisdiction where 
market shares are used only as a starting point for determination of dominance
534
. 
3.5.2. Prohibited conducts 
Article 17 of the AML appears to follow the EU and German’s approaches535 and 
expressly prohibits the following six forms of abuse of market dominant position: 
(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low 
prices; 
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 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.97. 
533
 Article 12, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
534
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.100. 
535
 Wu, supra note 75, p.85 (explaining that there are two major legislative approaches for addressing 
abuse: one is the ‘general mode’, which only provides regulation in principle without listing the 
specific abusive practices, as illustrated by U.S antitrust laws, and another is the ‘general plus listing’ 
mode, which lists some examples of prohibited abusive actions while also setting forth general 
principles_. 
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China has followed the EC’s approach, rather than the US, to condemn exploitative 
pricing
536
. Needless to say, this approach has been criticized for various reasons: first, 
‘determination of a fair price is very difficult, if not impossible, for courts, as modern 
economic thought teaches that there is no "fair" or 'just" price, other than the price 
resulting from free competition’537; second, this provision may create a per se abuse 
due to a lack of the term ‘without justification’, although Wu explained that ‘the use 
of the word ‘unfairly’ applied in relation to both high and low pricing allows the 
exercise of some enforcement discretion and is tractable to justification’538; third, 
some are afraid that ‘Chinese regulators may be more prone than their Brussels 
counterparts to scrutinize the pricing practices of dominant firms based on intuitions 
of “fairness” or industrial policy rather than sound economic analysis’539, and this 
concern is valid since China has a history of regulating prices directly
540
. The 
NDRC’s interpretations later on “unfairly high price” and “unfairly low price” 541 do 
not really provide more predictability of the concept of ‘fair price’. Thus, this 
prohibition can be troublesome for business and, if strictly enforced, might 
                                                 
536
 However it should be noted that even when EC competition law prohibits "unfair" or "unjust" 
prices, such a provision has rarely been enforced. Note also that one of the first complaints made 
related to the allegedly excessive prices charge by Microsoft. This complaint was submitted by a 
lawyer with one of China’s largest law firms on 31 July 2008. 
537
 Harris & Ganske, supra note 418, p.217. 
538
 Wu, supra note 75, p.85. 
539
 Bush, supra note 408, p.8. 
540
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.107. 
541
 In the identification of “unfairly high price” and “unfairly low price”, NDRC will take the following 
factors into account: (a) Whether the selling price or purchasing price is apparently higher or lower 
than the price of another business operator uses to sell or purchase the same commodity; (b) Whether 
the selling price increase or purchasing price reduction is beyond a normal volume when the cost is 
basically stable; (c) Whether the price increase of a commodity sold is apparently larger than the 
increase in the cost of such product, or whether the price reduction of a commodity purchased is 
apparently larger than the decrease in the cost of such commodity; and (d) Some other concerned 
factors to be taken into account, see Article 11, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
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significantly limit "dominant" firms in pricing their products or services, making their 
pricing subject to competitors' pricing and tying price changes directly to costs. 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
This prohibition applies to predatory pricing, what is strange in this prohibition, 
however, is that there is no requirement to demonstrate harm to competition though 
an earlier version of the Law made explicit reference to the requirement that this be 
‘in order to eliminate competition’, consequently, this prohibition may extend to 
harmless below cost sales. Similar to EU law, there is also no requirement of the 
‘proof of recoupment’ element as in the US. "Justifiable cause" mentioned in this 
provision has been interpreted as including: (a) sale of fresh and live commodities, 
seasonal commodities, expiring commodities or overstocked commodities at reduced 
prices; (b) sale of commodities at reduced prices due to liquidation of debts, change 
of production lines or closing down of the business; (c) sales promotion carried out to 
promote new products; and (d) any other reason that can prove justifiability of 
business operators' acts
542
. It should also be noted that below cost selling in China is 
also prohibited by the AUCL 1993 and the Price Law 1997
543
. 
 (3) refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
                                                 
542
 Article 12, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
543
 Article 11 of the AUCL states that ‘a business operator shall not sell his products at a price that is 
below the cost for the purpose of excluding his competitors’, however, below cost sales are allowed in 
relation to ‘perishables or live products’, disposal of items whose validity terms was about to expire, or 
overstocks, seasonal sales, or sales made in the process of liquidations or for debt clearance. Article 
14(2) of the Price Law provides that ‘business operators shall not … dump merchandise below cost in 
order to force out competitors or to monopolize the market, thereby disturbing the normal order of 
production and business and causing damage to the interest of the State or the legitimate rights and 
interests of other business operators, except for lawful disposal of merchandise such as fresh or live 
merchandise, seasonal merchandise and overstocked merchandise at reduced prices’. Penalties are also 
provided for in the Provision Concerning the Administrative Punishment for Illegal Pricing Acts 1999, 
however, penalties may only be applied where gains have occurred, no sanctions are available under 
these laws in respect of failed attempts at exclusionary predation. 
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China prohibits a refusal to deal in a disguised form to trade with transaction 
counterparties without a justified reason by setting an excessively high selling price 
or overly low purchasing price
544
. "Justifiable cause" here mean (a) the transaction 
counterparties have extremely bad credit record or undergo continuous deterioration 
of the operation, which may cause great risks the trade security; (b) the transaction 
counterparties can purchase the same kind of commodities or substitute commodities 
at reasonable prices from other business operators, or sell commodities at reasonable 
prices to other business operators; and (c) any other reason that can prove 
justifiability of business operators' acts
545
. 
Further, a dominant business operator is prohibited from refusing to deal by means of 
reducing its current trade volume with the counterparty; delaying, terminating its 
current transaction with the counterparty; refusing to have any new transaction with 
the counterparty; imposing restrictive conditions which makes it difficult for the 
counterparty to continue its dealings with the said undertaking;  refusing to allow the 
counterparty to use its necessary facilities under reasonable conditions in the course 
of production and operations
546. Thus, China appears to accept the ‘essential facility’ 
doctrine in examining both price and non-price related refusal to deal. The ‘essential’ 
nature of the facility in question shall be determined based on factors such as 
feasibility in separately investing and building, or developing such facilities, degree 
of reliance of the counterparty on such facilities in effectively running its production 
and operations, possibilities of such undertaking making available such facilities, and 
                                                 
544
 Article 13, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
545
 Article 13, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
546
 Article 4, Rules of the Administration for Industry and Commerce on Prohibition of Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position. 
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its impact over the production and operations of such undertaking
547
. Unfortunately, 
there is no requirement to limit the application of this doctrine such as the 
requirement that the party seeking access to the facility prove that such access is 
indispensable to compete on a downstream market
548
. 
This provision has been much criticized due to the fact that it requires firms to 
provide valid reasons for refusing to trade with a third party, which ‘appears to be 
inconsistent with both U.S and EU law’549. Indeed, under both the US and the EU 
competition law, parties are free to choose their trading partners, and that obligations 
to trade will be imposed on dominant firms only in exceptional circumstances
550
. 
(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade exclusively with 
a designated business operator(s) without any justifiable cause; 
One example of exclusive dealing is requiring a trading party to trade exclusively 
with itself or trade exclusively with a designated business operator(s) by means of 
                                                 
547
 Article 4, Rules of the Administration for Industry and Commerce on Prohibition of Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position. 
548
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.111. 
549
 See Harris & Ganske, supra note 418, p.213. (Under U.S. antitrust law, ‘particularly the Colgate 
doctrine,' firms generally have discretion in deciding with whom they will, or will not, deal in the 
absence of proof that the refusal is a step towards creating or maintaining a monopoly. Although the 
European Commission and European courts have imposed an obligation to deal more frequently than 
U.S. courts, and refusals to deal may constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of EC 
Treaty Article 82 (unless "objectively justified"), firms competing in Europe also are, "as a rule, free to 
choose their business partners.’) 
550
 For example, it was held in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) that: "In the 
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman A]ct does not restrict the long 
recognized right of [a seller] ... to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he 
will deal". Frischmann and Waller have pointed out that in the US, ‘the practice is that courts have 
applied the essential facility doctrine more stringently and more sparingly, at the same time, US courts 
are becoming increasingly sophisticated about insisting on the truly "essential" nature of the facility at 
issue’, see Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Revitalizing Essential Facilities’, (2008) 75 
Antitrust Law Journal 1, p.7. It is also notable that the US Supreme Court noted in 2004 in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko 540 U.S. 398 (2004) that the Supreme Court 
has never recognized such a doctrine in the past. 
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price discount (loyalty discounts)
551. “Justifiable causes for this practice include (a) to 
guarantee the quality and safety of products; (b) to maintain brand image or improve 
service quality; (c) to remarkably reduce costs and improving efficiency and enable 
consumers to share the interests thereof; and (d) any other reason that can prove 
justifiability of business operators' acts
552
. Further, a dominant undertaking is 




(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading 
without any justifiable cause; 
Examples of these practices include (1) forcibly tying in different products or 
bundling of different products in violation of the trade practices or consumer habits, 
or in disregard of the functions of the product; (2) imposing unreasonable restrictions 
regarding term of the contract, method of payment, transport of the products, manner 
of delivery and manner in which the services are delivered etc.; (3) imposing 
unreasonable restrictions regarding sales territory, target customers and after-sales 
services etc. for the products; (4) imposing trading conditions irrelevant to the subject 
product of the transaction
554
; and (5) imposing additional unreasonable fees to the 
price in trading
555
. Thus, any vertical restraints imposed by a dominant market player 
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 See Article 14, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
552
 Article 14, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
553
 Article 5, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
554
 Article 6, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
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 Article 15, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
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might be potentially caught by the broad prohibition of ‘unreasonable trading 
conditions’556. 
 (6) applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties with equal 
standing; 
This practice is interpreted as ‘according differential treatment to similarly situated 
counterparties in respect of conditions of the transaction without valid 
justification’557. It is also noteworthy that in China, price discrimination is also 
prohibited by Article 14(5) of the Price Law 1997. 
Moreover, Article 17 allows the AMEAs to determine other conducts as abuse of a 
dominant position
558
. In fact, this final subpart of Article 17 has raised serious 
concerns among commentators
559
. Fortunately, the Guidelines on Abuse of Dominant 
Market Position issued subsequently has made it clear that ‘except price monopolistic 
conduct, the SAIC shall determine, according to laws, any other abuse of dominant 
market position not expressly covered in these Rules’560. This provision is significant 
because it excludes the SAIC’s ability to expand the categories of abusive conduct on 
a case-by-case basis. 
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 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.116. 
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 Article 7, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position (examples of this 
practice include: (1) offering different trade volumes, grades, qualities; (2) offering differential 
preferential conditions, such as differential quantity-based discounts; (3) applying differential terms of 
payment and method of delivery; (4) applying differential after-sales services conditions, such as 
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different spare parts supply and technical instructions). Further, price discrimination means applying 
differential treatment to trading counterparties with the same conditions in term of transaction price, 
see Article 16, NDRC Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
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 Article 17(7) of the AML 
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 E.g., Harris & Ganske, supra note 418, p.218 (‘while the intention may be for this provision to 
serve as a catch-all, without a requirement that other forms of abuse identified by regulators at least be 
grounded in an effects-based analysis, this provision may prove ripe for misuse (or at least confusion) 
by regulators’). 
560
 Article 9, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position (emphasis added). 
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There is no mechanism by which exemptions can be granted for abusive conducts, 
however, a key element of each listed abuse is that the dominant firm acts 'without 
justification' (or engages in ‘unfair’ pricing), which suggests a ‘rule of reason’ 
approach and ‘provides a textual hook for a balancing of pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects’561. The Guidelines on Abuse of Dominant Market Position 
further specifies that in judging the justification of an alleged abuse, SAIC will take 
the following factors into account: (1) whether the conduct is based on normal 
operations and for normal benefits of the undertaking; and (2) the effect of the 
relevant conduct on economic efficiency, public interest and economic growth
562
. The 
second factor might be problematic as the concept of ‘public interests’ is ambiguous 
and may favor the SOE’s interests rather than consumers’ interest. Similarly, the goal 
of ‘economic growth’ may be invoked to tolerate anti-competitive conducts in the 
name of industrial policy. 
In practice, as reported by the SPC up to June 2010, there have been nine cases 
concerning abuse of dominant position
563. However, no plaintiff’s claims have been 
sustained by the people’s courts because either the court decided against the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff withdrew the case. In the cases where the court has decided against the 
plaintiff, a common reason was that insufficient evidence was provided to establish 
the relevant market and/or the defendant’s dominant position (except the Huzhou 
Yiting Termite Prevention Service Co., Ltd vs. Huzhou Termite Prevention Research 
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 Bush, supra note 469.  
562
 Article 8, SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Position. 
563
 These cases include: Tencent's QQ, Huzhou Yiting Termite Prevention, CB-CE, WB-WCR, Shanda, 
China Netcom, Baidu etc. For a brief description of these cases, see, Susan Ning, Ding Liang and Shan 
Lining, ‘Two Years On, Ten Antitrust Private Action’, available at 
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2010/09/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/two-years-on-ten-
antitrust-private-actions   
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Institute case in 2009 which was the first case in which the court has found that an 
entity was dominant in a relevant market, yet, there was insufficient evidence to 
prove the abusive conduct as well as the intention of restricting or eliminating 
competition in the relevant market on the part of the defendant
564
). Thus, few of the 
decided cases appear to have required or involved a conclusive determination of 
whether relevant conduct by the defendant would constitute abuse of dominance, and 
the published jurisprudence in this area does not significantly assist understanding of 
the scope of the AML conduct prohibitions
565
.  
3.6. Control of Concentrations between Undertakings  
One commentator has remarked that given the global importance of Chinese trade and 
the level of business conducted in China, it is possible that ‘China has the potential, 
alongside the EU and the US to develop into a key jurisdiction in deciding whether a 
transaction can be completed or not’566. Hence, China’s merger control system has 
attracted much attention from the international community since the AML drafting 
period. Prior to the enactment of the AML, the only laws which governed merger 
control in China were directed at foreign acquisitions of Chinese enterprises, or 
related to specific industries, which was criticized as anti-foreign entrants
567
. The 
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 For more details of this case, see Susan Ning, ‘Termites and Abuse of Dominance’, on 17 October 
2010 available at http://www.martindale.com/international-trade-law/article_King-
Wood_1172760.htm  
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 Lorenz, supra note 470, p.263. 
567
 For instance, Furse commented that ‘[t[his gave rise both to accusations of antitrust law being used 
to protect Chinese businesses and disadvantage foreign entrants into the market, and to inconsistencies 
and difficulties. A clear example of the latter may be seen in the approach taken by the Chinese 
authorities to the proposed acquisitions by a Chinese firm of a foreign enterprise. In the event the bid 
collapsed, in part because China Mobile required the permission of no less than three ministries giving 
rise to fatal uncertainties’, see Furse, supra note 5, at 2-4.01. 
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enactment of the AML, therefore, was welcomed since it offers a ‘one-stop shop’ for 
both foreign and Chinese parties alike, although there is a reservation in respect of 
mergers affecting national security which involve foreign parties568.  
3.6.1. The concept of ‘concentration’ 
Article 20 of the AML provides an exhaustive list of concentrations and provides that 
concentration refers to either a merger of business operators; or acquisition of control 
over other business operators by virtue of acquiring their equities or assets; or 
acquisition of control over other business operators or possibility of exercising 
decisive influence on other business operators by virtue of contact or any other 
means. Thus, Article 20 would apply to mergers and acquisitions, as well as certain 
kinds of joint ventures
569
. Unfortunately, the Notification Rules issued by MOFCOM 
later did not clarify the concept of ‘acquisition of control’ and ‘decisive influence’ 
used in Article 20 of the AML
570
. It is also unclear whether partial function joint 
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 China’s merger control regime is now speculated in Chapter IV of the AML, the State Council 
Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings (State Decree No. 529) 
promulgated by the State Council on August 3, 2008, MOFCOM’s Rules on Turnover Calculation for 
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Notification of Concentration of Undertakings ("Notification Rules"), which sets out certain procedural 
requirements that apply to businesses proposing to engage in notifiable concentrations; MOFCOM’s 
Directive Opinions on Documents and Information Submitted for Notification of Concentration of 
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 Wu, supra note 75, p.87. 
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 Even though in an earlier draft of this Rule the notion of ‘acquisition of control’ was defined as 
acquiring more than 50 per cent of the voting shares or assets of another undertaking; or acquiring the 
ability through any means, including contract, to decide the appointment of one or more members of 
the board of directors and to make key management, financial budget, operation, and sales, pricing, 
major investment, as well as other important management and operation decisions of another 
undertaking, see MOFCOM Provisional Rules on Notification of Concentration of Undertakings (Draft 
for Public Comments) published by MOFCOM on 20 January 2009, cited in Harris, Wang, Zhang, 
Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.129. 
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ventures will be treated as concentrations
571
. It has been suggested, however, that 
reference may be made to the Company Law 2005, which defines both ‘controlling 
shareholders’ and ‘actual controllers’572. A ‘controlling shareholders’ is defined in 
Article 217(2) of the Company Law as: 
‘a shareholder whose capital contribution occupies 5% or more in the total capital of  a 
limited liability company or a shareholder whose stock occupies more than 50% of the 
total equity stocks of a joint stock limited company or a shareholder whose capital 
contribution or proportion of stock is less than 50% but who enjoys  a voting right 
according to its capital contribution or the stocks it holds is large enough to impose a 
large impact upon the resolution of the shareholders’ meeting or the shareholders’ 
assembly’573. 
An ‘actual controller’ is defined in Article 217(3) of the Company Law as: 
‘anyone who is not a shareholder but is able to hold actual control of the facts of the 
company by means of investment relations, agreements or any other arrangements’574 
3.6.2. Pre-merger notification requirements  
The AML establishes a system of pre-merger review, with compulsory notification, 
for mergers that reaches the threshold of declaration stipulated by the State Council
575
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 Hannah C. L. Ha, John M. Hickin & Gerry P. O’Brien, ‘China: Merger Control’, Global 
Competition Review, available at 
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 Wu suggested that ‘these definitions from the Company Law should be applicable under the AML’, 
see Wu, supra note 75, p.87. 
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 Article 21 of the AML. The reason, presumably, is that ‘the People’s Congress was not satisfied 
with the notification standard decided by the State Council in its submitted draft and, thus, desires that 
the State Council consider the issue again’575, or it is simply because it is better to authorise the State 
Council to set specific thresholds that can be more easily adjusted overtime to reflect the development 
in China’s fast moving economy, see Wu, supra note 75, p.8. 
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with the exception of internal group concentration
576
 which need not be declared. The 
formulation of the thresholds is that both the worldwide and the Chinese turnover will 
be taken into account, which is similar to the EU model. Notification of a transaction 
that qualifies as a “concentration” under the AML will be required if either of the 
following thresholds is met: 
(i) The worldwide turnover over the last accounting year of all parties to the 
concentration exceeds RMB 10 billion (approx. US$1.46 billion), and turnover 
within the territory of China of each of at least two of those parties exceeds RMB 400 
million (approx. US$58.6 million) over the last accounting year; or 
(ii) The turnover within the territory of China over the last accounting year of all 
parties to the concentration exceeds RMB 2 billion (approx. US$293 million), and 
turnover within the territory of China of each of at least two of those parties exceeds 
RMB 400 million (approx. US$58.6 million) over the last accounting year
577
. 
As such, China has chosen to rely on turnover-based notification tests since turnover 
thresholds are ‘objective, clear, easily judged’ and are transparent’578. Turnover 
includes revenue for the previous fiscal year that the concerned business operators 
obtained from the sale of products and the supply of services, minus various taxes and 
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concerned, whether of the equity or the assets, see Article 22 of the AML. Interestingly, Furse 
commented on this provision that ‘[i]t may be questioned therefore whether it is intended that the 
merger control provisions relate to SOEs, all of whom ultimately have the same owner’, see Furse, 
supra note 5, at.2-4.04, n.7. 
577
 State Council Regulation on Notification Thresholds for Concentration of Undertakings, Article 3. 
578
 Officials of the Legislation Office of State Council Answering Reporters’ Questions Regarding 
Rules of State Council on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of Operators, 4 August 2008. 
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surcharges
579
. The expression “within the territory of China” means that the location 
of the purchaser of the products or services provided by a business operator is within 
the territory of China. Turnover from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan will be 
included as part of the turnover for assets held in China
580
. Unfortunately, China 
makes no distinction among horizontal mergers, vertical mergers and conglomerate 
mergers (which often raise less competition concern than horizontal mergers), thus 
notification will be required even in case of mergers between non-competing firms 
where the thresholds are met. Moreover, commentators have expressed concern about 
the lack of threshold or safe harbour based on the size of the transaction or whether it 
has any jurisdictional nexus to China
581
. The concern is that many non-Chinese 
mergers are subject to mandatory notification even if the transaction (rather than the 
parties) has no significant impact on any market in China
582
.  
For failing to notify a concentration, MOFCOM shall initiate a two-phase 
investigation which can take 10 months or even more and once Phase 2 starts, the 
company shall suspend implementation of the transaction no matter what
583
. The 
                                                 
579
 Article 4, MOFCOM’s Rules on the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators. The 
calculation of turnover for entities in the financial industry is subject to special rules provided in 
MOFCOM’s Rules on Turnover Calculation for Notification of Concentration of Financial 
Undertakings (jointly promulgated with the People's Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission and other agencies). These rules only apply to the calculation of turnover for entities in 
the financial industry, including (but not limited to) banking financial institutions (e.g. any financial 
institutions absorbing public savings, such as a commercial bank, urban credit cooperation and rural 
credit cooperation, as well as financial asset management companies, trust companies, finance 
companies, financial lease companies, automobile finance companies, money brokerage companies 
and other financial institutions established under the approval of the banking regulatory authorities); 
securities companies; futures companies; fund management companies; and insurance companies. 
580
 MOFCOM Rules on the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators, Article 4. 
581
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.141. 
582
 Ibid., p.132 
583
 See MOFCOM’s Interim Measures on Investigation and Punishment of Failure to Duly Notify 
Concentrations of Undertakings, promulgated by MOFCOM on 30 December 2011, effective from 
February 1, 2012. See also Susan Ning, Ji Kailun & Hazel Yin, ‘MOFCOM Getting Tough on Failure 
to Notify a Concentration’, on January 16, 2012, available at 
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penalties may include a fine of no more than RMB500,000, and an order for the 
company to take actions to rewind the transaction, such as ceasing implementation of 
the concentration, disposal of shares or assets, and transfer of business
584
. 
Although turnover is the basis for judging whether or not a concentration of business 
operators is subject to notification in China, there are still troubles that come from 
Article 4 of the State Council’s Decree No. 529 which provides that: 
‘With respect to a concentration which does not meet any of the notification 
thresholds prescribed under Article 3 but facts and evidence gathered pursuant to 
prescribed procedures indicate that such concentration has or may have the effect of 
foreclosing or restricting competition, investigations shall be carried out’. 
Subsequently, this provision was interpreted that when a concentration of business 
operators does not reach the notification threshold and the participating business 
operators voluntarily file a notification of the concentration, and if MOFCOM 
believes it is necessary to establish a case, it may establish the case for examination 
and make its decisions
585
. During this period, the participating business operators 
may, in their sole discretion, decide whether or not to suspend the implementation of 




3.6.3 The review process of concentrations 




 Ning, Ji & Yin, ibid. 
585
 Article 16, MOFCOM Rules on the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
586
 Article 16, MOFCOM Rules on the Notification of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
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The AML contemplates a two-stage review process. MOFCOM shall conduct a 
preliminary review of the declared concentration and make a decision whether to 
conduct further review and notify the business operators in written form within 30 
days upon receipt of the documents and materials submitted by the business 
operators. Before such a decision is made, the concentration may be not 
implemented
587
. If MOFCOM decides not to conduct further review or fails to make a 
decision at expiry of the stipulated period, the concentration may be implemented. 
The second review must be completed within 90 days from the date of decision, this 
period may be extended to no more than 60 days
588
, and MOFCOM has to make a 
decision on whether to prohibit the concentration, and notify the business operators 
concerned of the decision in written form attached with reasons therefore. The 
maximum review period is 180 days
589
, and within the review period parties must not 
implement the concentration. It is noteworthy that in practice the review period is 
often longer due to the relatively common practice of MOFCOM refusing to accept 
that a filing is ‘complete’. It is normal practice for merging parties to have to respond 
to at least one set of supplemental questions before MOFCOM decides that the filing 
is complete and can be accepted
590. By refusing to accept a filing as ‘complete’, 
MOFCOM can effectively extend their time for reviewing the concentration.  
                                                 
587
 Article 25 of the AML 
588
 Article 26 of the AML. 
589
 It is noteworthy that the AML is silent on whether these periods refer to business days or calendar 
days. 
590
 See Jones Day, ‘Lessons from China's Merger Review Decisions Learned in Recent Hard Drive 
Acquisitions’, available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=4f4553a2-c62e-4e4a-
8f5b-ab12575a0aca&RSS=true (last visited September 2012). 
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During the review process, related parties may submit their written statements to 
MOFCOM by letter, fax or other means in order to defend themselves, and 
MOFCOM shall listen to the statement and defending arguments of the parties 
concerned
591
. Such a right of defense is crucial to the objectivity and fairness of the 
merger review. Further, during the examination, MOFCOM may, where necessary, 
solicit opinions from other governmental authorities, industry associations, business 
operators, consumers, and other entities or individuals
592
. A hearing is also 
contemplated, however, this is not compulsory in all cases
593
.  
During the second review process, MOFCOM may raise objections to the 
concentration of business operators which may result or has resulted in eliminating or 
restricting competition
594
 (this practice is consistent with that in the US and EU).  
Simultaneously, either related parties or MOFCOM may suggest restrictive 
conditions that may eliminate or reduce the adverse impact of the concentration on 




                                                 
591
 Article 5, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
592
 Article 6, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
593
 Article 7, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators 
(‘MOFCOM may conduct a hearing to carry out the investigation, collect evidence and listen to the 
opinions of relevant parties’). This Article also provides that parties attending the hearing may vary 
and may include, at MOFCOM’s discretion, the business operators participating in the concentration 
and their competitors, upstream and downstream enterprises and other related enterprises, relevant 
experts, representatives of industry associations, relevant government authorities and consumer 
representatives.  Moreover, separate hearings may be arranged in consideration of confidentiality of 
trade secrets and other factors. 
594
 Article 10, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
595
 Article 11, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators.  
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Finally, confidentiality is a paramount issue in the merger review process. MOFCOM 
and all parties concerned are under a duty to keep trade secrets and other confidential 
information obtained during its review and any related consultation processes
596
. 
3.6.4. Prohibited concentrations 
A concentration is to be prohibited if it has or may have effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition
597
. The Chinese substantive standard does not require that 
there be a ‘substantial’ or ‘material’ effect on competition. According to Article 27 of 
the AML, the factors to be considered by MOFCOM include (this is a non-exhaustive 
list):  
(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant market and the 
controlling power thereof over that market;  
(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market;  
(3) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the market access and 
technological progress;  
(4) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the consumers and other 
business operators; and  




                                                 
596
 Article 41 of the AML; Article 17, MOFCOM Rules on the Notification of Concentrations of 
Business Operators; Article 16, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business 
Operators. 
597
 Article 28 of the AML. 
598
 AML, Article 27. These factors are further elaborated in MOFCOM’s Provisional Rules on 
Assessment of Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business Operators  issued by MOFCOM on 
September 2, 2011. 
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In examining the competitive effects of a concentration, MOFCOM has to consider 
all the unilateral effects, coordinated effects, and vertical or conglomerate effects. 
Market control power and market concentration levels appear to be the most 
important factors to be considered by MOFCOM in its assessment. Market control 
power can be assessed based on factors such as merging parties' market shares, 
substitutability of the their products or services, their ability to control the sales 
market or the procurement market for raw materials, production capability of non-
merging parties, and purchasing power of the merging parties' downstream customers 
market
599
. Market concentration level can generally be measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ("HHI") and the Concentration Ratio (CR)
600
. However, it is still 
unclear what levels of HHI or CR will be considered as indicating strong market 
concentration.  
As a matter of practice, the business sector may have ongoing concerns about the fact 
that MOFCOM's decision statements continue to evidence a tendency to rely on high 
existing market shares as a basis upon which to assume that the merged business 
operator will not be adequately constrained from unilaterally raising prices or 
otherwise imposing more onerous terms on customers
601
. In any event, how 
MOFCOM will balance the factors mentioned in Article 27 of the AML is not a 
straightforward issue. As noted by Wang, ‘the competition policy expressed in 
subparagraph (1), for example, and the industrial policy expressed in subparagraph 
                                                 
599
 Article 5, MOFCOM Provisional Rules on Assessment of Competitive Effects of Concentration of 
Business Operators. 
600
 Article 6, MOFCOM Provisional Rules on Assessment of Competitive Effects of Concentration of 
Business Operators. 
601
 Hannah C. L. Ha, John M. Hickin & Gerry P. O’Brien, ‘China: China Imposes Conditions On 
Uralkali/Silvinit Merger After Anti-monopoly Review’, available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=11105&nid=6  
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(5) are not always harmonized with each other’602. It is also possible that the 
reference to the ‘national development’ factor may be used to justify differential 




Exemptions may be granted if the parties can demonstrate either that the transaction 
brings more positive impact than negative impact on competition (the efficiency 
defence) or the concentration is pursuant to public interests (the ‘public interest’ 
defence)
604
. The transaction may be cleared if the related parties can demonstrate that 
the transaction generates beneficial elements and such beneficial elements outweigh 
any relevant detriment to competition
605
. The Law, however, is silent as to which 
public interests are taken into account, although it has been noted that it may be 
harder for parties to a purely ‘foreign merger’ to argue the ‘public interest’ defence 
than parties to a domestic one
606
. Further, similar to the case of anti-monopoly 
agreements, ‘the ‘public interest’ defence is more likely to be demonstrated by State-
                                                 
602
 Wang, supra note 33, p.139. 
603
 Wu, supra note 75, p.97 (A high-ranking official of MOFCOM once stated that: ‘[t]he current 
situation of Chinese economic development is that most enterprises have insufficient scale and low 
competitiveness. The government should encourage enterprises to be big and strong through their own 
development efforts… While it is necessary to prevent over-concentration and monopoly, it is also 
necessary to encourage domestic enterprises to consolidate lawfully in order to become big and strong, 
realize economies of scale, increase industry concentration, and increase competitiveness’). 
604
 Article 28 of the AML. 
605
 MOFCOM’s Provisional Rules on Assessment of Competitive Effects of Concentration of Business 
Operators (The beneficial elements include where the transaction: (i) will allow the concerned business 
operators to better integrate their resources and powers in relation to technical research and 
development; (ii) will facilitate technical progress to the benefit of consumers; (iii) will increase 
competitive pressure on other business operators in the relevant market(s) to improve the quality of 
their products, reduce their prices, or better protect the benefits of consumers; and (iv) will assist to 
facilitate expansion of business scale and enhancement of market competitiveness, thereby increasing 
economic efficiency and promoting the development of China's national economy). 
606
 Furse, supra note 5, p.102, 106. 
  139 
owned large companies’ and that ‘a transaction that benefits some public interest may 
not benefit competition’607.  
In practice, some authors have observed that the enforcement strategy of MOFCOM 
seems prudent and as a new agency in a developing country such as China, 
MOFCOM appears to favor the use of remedies more than complete closure of a 
deal
608
. From 1 August 2008, to the end of 2011, MOFCOM completed its review of 
and made decisions on 382 cases, among which 371 were approved unconditionally 
(97 per cent). Only one case was blocked and 10 cases were approved with conditions 
attached
609
. So far, the first and only prohibited concentration decision was the Coca-
Cola/Huiyuan case in 2008
610
 in which the reasons for the deal to be blocked were (1) 
Coca-Cola may extend its dominant position in the carbonated soft drinks (CSDs) 
market to the fruit drink market post-merger and eliminate existing juice enterprises, 
limit competition, and harm consumer welfare; (2) Coca-Cola may greatly enhance its 
market power by controlling two well-known brands: Meizhiyuan, currently owned 
by Coca-Cola, and Huiyuan, currently owned by Huiyuan; leverage its market power 
in the CSDs market; and foreclose potential competitors from entering the juice 
market; (3) the concentration would narrow the space of domestic, small- and 
                                                 
607
 Wang, supra note 33, p.143. 
608
 Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications’, 
(2010) 6:2 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 477, pp.491-492. 
609
 McDermott Will & Emery , ‘China Summarises 2011 AML Enforcement, Promises Action On 
Failures To Notify A Concentration In 2012’, on 26 January 2012, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com 
610
 On September 2, 2008, U.S. soft drink giant Coca-Cola offered to buy Chinese juice maker 
Huiyuan Juice Group for $2.4 billion. If it endured the merger review by MOFCOM, this acquisition 
would represent Coca-Cola’s largest proposed acquisition in China and would be the second largest 
acquisition for Coca-Cola globally. On November 20, 2008, MOFCOM officially started its 
investigation after sending several requests for supplementary materials to Coca-Cola. Thirty days 
later, MOFCOM decided to enter Phase II given “the large scale and considerable influence of this 
concentration.” Concerned by Coca-Cola’s 60.6 percent market share in the carbonated soft drinks 
(CSDs) market in China,10 on March 20, 2009 — exactly 90 days after the case entered Phase II 
investigation —  MOFCOM decided to block the proposed merger. 
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medium-sized fruit juice enterprises, restrain the domestic enterprises from 
conducting independent R&D, and cause adverse effects on effective competition in 
the Chinese juice market; and (4) Coca-Cola could not provide necessary remedies 
that would offset the negative effects of the merger to competition. This decision, 
however, has been severely criticized for being driven by nationalism (see Chapter 5). 
It has been suspected that the real motivation for the decision was the domestic 
political controversy surrounding 'nationalist sentiment' in China, rather than the 
unconvincing official reasoning given in the formal decision. 
3.6.5. Conditioned concentration 
For the concentration of business operators that is not forbidden, MOFCOM may 
decide to attach restrictive conditions for reducing the adverse influence of the 
concentration on competition
611
. The restrictive conditions proposed by the 
participating business operators shall be able to eliminate the effect of the 
concentration transaction that may result, or have resulted, in eliminating or 
restricting competition, and shall be practicable
612
. 
Depending on the specific circumstances of the concentration transaction of business 
operators, the restrictive conditions may include (1) structural conditions such as 
divestiture of part of assets or businesses of the participating business operators; (2) 
behavioral conditions such as providing access to the network, platform or other 
infrastructures of the participating business operators, or licensing key technologies 
(including patents, know-how and other intellectual properties), or terminating 
                                                 
611
 See Article 29 of the AML; Article 14 of MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of 
Business Operators. 
612
 Article 12, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
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exclusive agreements; (3) combination of both structural and behavioral conditions
613
. 
Some commentators have pointed out the difficulties that MOFCOM might face in 
imposing structural remedies
614. However, as observed by Furse, ‘the previous 
practice of merger control in China has been to shy away from structural remedies 
short of full blocking of the merger’, and ‘in a legal and economic culture where state 
intervention is viewed more favourably than is the case in the US or the EC there may 
be less cultural resistance to the imposition of behavioural remedies’615. In any event, 
as explained by a Chinese high-ranking official, the scope of the restrictive 
requirements cannot be extended indefinitely and these restrictive conditions must be 
closely related to competition factors
616
.  
In practice, MOFCOM has ordered substantial and increasingly broad conditions in a 
number of significant cases, and most of the time the behavioral conditions appeared 
to be preferred even though structural conditions have also been applied: 
For example, in the InBev/Anheuser-Busch case in 2008
617
, MOFCOM imposed three 
far-reaching and unusual behavioral conditions on InBev: (1) post-merger InBev 
                                                 
613
 Article 11, MOFCOM Rules on the Examination of Concentrations of Business Operators. 
614
 Zhang & Zhang, supra note 608, pp.491-492 (‘The co-existence of behavioral and structural 
remedies definitely challenges MOFCOM’s capability of enforcement, as behavioral remedies are 
more difficult to enforce than structural ones. More importantly, some behavioral aspects of the 
remedies necessarily force the antitrust agency to function as an industrial regulator for which it is mis-
suited by nature’). 
615
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-4.22. 
616
 Wu, supra note 75, p.92.  
617
 On July 13, 2008, Belgium-based beer giant InBev (the owner of Stella Artois) and U.S.-based beer 
giant Anheuser-Busch (hereinafter “AB”) (the owner of Budweiser) announced InBev’s acquisition of 
AB for $49.91 billion. Because InBev’s and AB’s turnovers in 2007 were 5.76 and 4.49 billion CNY 
($786.88 million and $589.59 million) in China, respectively, the merger met the notification 
thresholds, and the mandatory filing mechanism was triggered. InBev filed the merger with MOFCOM 
on September 10, 2008, and the case was officially accepted on October 27, 2008, after InBev met the 
filing requirements. MOFCOM found that after the transaction, the merger party will hold a relatively 
large market share and its competitive strength will be increased significantly. In addition, post-merger 
InBev will hold significant stakes in two of the four largest beer producers in China. 
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should not increase its stakes from pre-merger levels; (2) InBev should not acquire 
any stakes in either China Resources Snow Breweries or Beijing Yanjing Brewery, 
the other two largest beer producers in which InBev does not currently have stakes; 
and (3) InBev will be obliged to notify MOFCOM of any changes in its controlling 
shareholders. Similarly, in the Uralkalis/Silvinit case in 2011
618
, MOFCOM imposed 
three behavioral remedies on the acquisition, including (1) the merged entity is 
required to maintain its established sales process and procedures when supplying 
potassium chloride to customers in China, including by maintaining direct trade and 
supply via rail or sea in a reliable and diligent manner; (2) the merged entity must 
continue to meet the demands of China's customers (including those in agricultural, 
general and 'special' industries) for potassium chloride - both in terms of product 
volume and product range; and (3) in relation to price negotiations with customers in 
China, the merged entity must continue to utilise traditional negotiation procedures 
with such customers and take account of the historical and current trading situation as 
well as the unique features of the Chinese market. Further, the merged company is 
required to report to MOFCOM every six months (or upon being requested to do so 
by MOFCOM) on fulfilment of these conditions, and MOFCOM retains the right to 
impose sanctions for any failure to comply. 
                                                 
618
 Both Silvinit and Uralkali are Russian companies with leading positions in the global fertiliser 
industry. Silvinit's main outputs include mineral fertilisers, while Uralkali is a major producer of 
potash fertiliser. The proposed merger of the two companies was announced in December 2010, and 
prior to MOFCOM's conditional approval decision the transaction had received approvals from 
competition authorities in Russia, Brazil, Poland and Ukraine. MOFCOM determined that the relevant 
product market in the context of the proposed merger was the market for potassium chloride. Further, 
MOFCOM determined that the proposed transaction would increase the level of concentration in the 
relevant market, would provide the merged entity with significant market power, and would potentially 
increase the risk of co-ordination between major global suppliers of potassium chloride. Thus, the 
acquisition was only approved with conditions.  
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On the other hand, structural conditions were applied in the Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite 
case in 2008
619
, in which MOFCOM imposed a divestiture remedy requiring Lucite 
China to divest 50 percent of its annual methyl methacrylate (MMA) production 
capacity for a one-time sale to one or several non-related third-party buyers for a 
period of five years. During this period, the third-party buyers will have the right to 
purchase MMA products produced by Lucite China at cost-based prices. Moreover, 
Lucite will operate independently from the MMA monomer business operations of 
Mitsubishi Rayon China until the completion of the capacity divestiture; and both 
Mitsubishi Rayon and Lucite are restricted in further acquisitions and new plant 
construction in mainland China. 
As such, in contrast to competition agencies in mature competition jurisdictions who 
generally prefer structural conditions which do not require continuous supervision, 
Chinese competition authority has been relatively comfortable with behaviorial 
conditions. However, due to its limited capacity and the increasing number of merger 
filings, MOFCOM would often allow the use of trustees to monitor the 
implementation process
620. China’s extensive use of behavioural conditions and 
monitoring trustees is far different from international practice and reflects the Chinese 
                                                 
619
 On September 11, 2008, Japanese chemical giant Mitsubishi Rayon Co. announced its acquisition 
of U.K. plastics maker Lucite International Group for $1.6 billion. Although neither of the companies 
involved in the deal are based in China, both have operations in China. Their sales in both China and 
worldwide exceed the notification thresholds prescribed by the Threshold Regulation. On December 
22, 2008, Mitsubishi Rayon filed the notification documents with MOFCOM and the antitrust review 
clock formally started on January 20, 2009. After the expiration of the preliminary review period, 
MOFCOM decided to implement a further review and notified Mitsubishi Rayon that additional 
review would be finished by May 20, 2009. After a four-month probe, MOFCOM expressed its 
concerns that the proposed merger could hurt competition given that the merging parties would have a 
combined market share of 64 percent for methyl methacrylate (MMA) in China. 
620 Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘China’s Merger Control Policy: Patterns of New 
Developments’, Competition Policy International: Asia Antitrust Column, p.3, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cpi-asia-antitrust-column-1/ (last visited September 
2012). 
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government’s willingness to intrude on business activities and to tightly control its 
economy.  
3.6.6. National security review 
The AML states that where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic 
enterprise or participate in concentration by other means, if state security is involved, 
besides the examination on the concentration in accordance with this Law, the 
examination on national security shall also be conducted in accordance with the 
relevant State provisions
621
. Thus, national security review relates exclusively to 
foreign investors
622
 although there is no definition of the ‘national security’ either in 
the AML itself or in the general law of China. Foreign companies have worried that 
the clause is sufficiently vague that it may widely prevent foreign investors from 
investing in Chinese firms
623
. Lorenz also observed that ‘the existing foreign merger 
case law of [MOFCOM] shows that the “threat to national security” objection is 
raised when foreign investors have attempted to gain majority interests in well-known 
state enterprises’624. Even though not only China implements a security review 
process
625
, the difference lies in the interpretation of the term: 
                                                 
621
 Article 31 of the AML 
622
 Interestingly, investors located in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan will be considered to be foreign 
investors for the purposes of the Security Review process. 
623
 Tom Miller, ‘National Security Checks Raise Fears of Protectionism’, South China Morning Post 
on June 26, 2007, at 1. 
624
 Lorenz, supra note 470, p.261. 
625
 Note that other countries such as the U.S., Canada and Australia also have already provided 
government agencies with the power to block or impose conditions on foreign investment proposals 
which are deemed to raise national security concerns. E.g., the United States limits foreign ownership 
of broadcast stations, airlines, and merchant vessels, see Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.253. 
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‘[t]he term "national security" in China carries a meaning very different from its 
English origin. For the Chinese, this phrase has little to do with the fight against 
terrorism - it purely refers to China's economic interests, in a nationalist sense’626. 
On 3 February 2011, the State Council issued the Circular of the General Office of 
the State Council on the Establishment of a Security Review System Regarding 
Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
627
 to clarify 
several aspects of the security review. According to the Circular, the security review 
process will apply to two types of transactions: 
First, transactions that result in a domestic Chinese enterprise coming under foreign 
control. A domestic Chinese enterprise will be deemed to be foreign-controlled if: 
(i) the total shareholding of a single foreign investor (including its parent company 
and subsidiaries) exceeds 50 percent, or once the total shares of several foreign 
investors exceed 50 percent; or  
(ii) notwithstanding that the total shareholding in the domestic Chinese enterprise by 
foreign investors is 50 percent or less, those foreign investors have control over the 
management and operation of the domestic Chinese enterprise via the holding of 
relevant voting or other rights
628
.  
Second, transactions that concern a relevant industry sector in China (Security 
Review Sector).  
                                                 
626
 Huang, supra note 9, p.129. See also Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.253 (‘national security’ 
in China is not limited to national defense security but extends to national economic security as well). 
627
 The Circular was effective as of 5 March 2011. 
628
 Article 1, State Council Circular on the Establishment of a Security Review System Regarding 
Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. 
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China’s Security Review Sectors include: national defence, key agricultural products, 
key basic infrastructure, key energy and resources, major equipment manufacturing, 
key technology, and key transportation services. It was noted that some of these 
sectors overlap with the nine "pillar industries" announced by China's State Council 




The Security Review will be conducted by a multi-agency Panel named as the Cross-
Ministry Joint Panel System for Security Review of Foreign M&A of Domestic 
Enterprises officially led by the State Council. The Panel will effectively have the 
power to block the deal, or impose conditions on it, if it considers that such measures 
are appropriate to address the identified concerns. 
The Security Review process will run in parallel to any Anti-Monopoly Merger 
Review. As such, where a foreign investor proposes to acquire or take a relevant stake 
in a domestic Chinese enterprise, and that transaction triggers the mandatory anti-
monopoly pre-notification provisions, then two notifications may need to be made - 
one to MOFCOM and one to the new Panel.  
During the Security Review, the Panel will focus on the proposed transaction's impact 
on: (a) national security, (b) the stable operation of the national economy, (c) basic 
social order, and (d) the research and development capabilities of key national 
security technologies
630
. Except for the ‘national security’ factor631, no elaboration is 
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 See Hannah C. L. Ha, Xiang Yang Ge & Gerry P. O’Brien, ‘China: New Review Procedures for 
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 Article 2, State Council Circular on the Establishment of a Security Review System Regarding 
Mergers and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors. 
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provided in relation to the other areas of focus. Some commentators have raised the 
concern that  
‘The broad terminology used in the circular, and in particular, the ability of the Panel to 
make reference to the impact of a transaction on the stable operation of China's 
economy and social order, will allow the Panel wide discretion to scrutinize and restrict 
foreign investment in China that is seen to be at odds with the country's unique socialist 
market economy and social development goals’632.  
3.7. Abuses of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition
633
 
Although the AML does not give a definition of administrative monopoly, as 
suggested by the name, administrative monopolies are monopolies created by 
administrative agencies
634
. Article 8 of the AML states a basic principle that: 
‘No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative powers to eliminate or 
restrict competition’. 
This principle is further elaborated in several provisions of Chapter V, according to 
which administrative organs or organizations empowered by a law or administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs are prohibited from:  
(1) restricting entities and individuals to operate, purchase or use the commodities 
provided by business operators designated by it
635
;  
                                                                                                                                           
631
 In relation to national security, the Security Review will assess the effect of the relevant transaction 
on the target enterprise's ability to produce goods for the domestic market, services, equipment, and 
facilities relating to national security. 
632
 See Ha, Xiang & O’Brien, supra note 629. 
633
 Administrative monopoly are addressed in Chapter V of the AML, as well as SAIC Rules on 
Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting 
Competition and NDRC Rules on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Anti-Price Monopoly. 
634
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.254. 
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(2) blocking free circulation of commodities between regions
636
; 
(3) rejecting or restricting business operators from outside the locality to participate in 
local tendering and bidding activities by such means as imposing discriminative 




(4) rejecting or restricting business operators from outside the locality to invest or set up 




                                                                                                                                           
635
 Article 32 of the AML, this practice is interpreted as ‘restricting or disguisedly restricting 
organizations or individuals to deal, purchase, or use products provided by designated undertakings or 
restricting the normal operation activities of others by expressly requiring, implying, rejecting or 
postponing administrative licensing, repeatedly inspecting, or any other forms’, see Article 3(1) of the 
SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes of Eliminating or 
Restricting Competition, effective as of February 1, 2011, an unofficial translation of this guideline by 
Jones Day is available at < 
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636
 Article 33 of the AML. This practice means (1) blocking or restricting the entry of products 
originating from other regions into the local market by (a) imposing technical requirements or 
inspection standards on products originating from other regions that are different from those on local 
like products, or taking discriminatory technical measures, such as repeated inspection or certification 
on products originating from other regions’, or (b) creating administrative licensing targeting products 
from other regions, or adopting different conditions, procedures, time limit when implementing 
administrative licensing on products originating from other regions or (2) blocking or restricting either 
the entry of products originating from other regions into the local market or the exit of local products 
to the market of other regions by setting up checkpoints or other measures, see Article 3 of the Rules of 
Administration of Industry and Commerce on Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the 
Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting Competition issued by SAIC. Article 20 of the NDRC 
Regulations for Prohibiting Price Monopoly interpretes this practice as (a) creating discriminatory 
charging items on the commodities from other places; (b) applying discriminatory charging rates on 
the commodities from other places; (c) specifying discriminatory prices for the commodities from 
other places; (d) any other price-fixing or fee-charging activities, which obstruct the free circulation of 
commodities among regions. On this prohibition, Robertson commented that ‘the AML include a 
commerce clause (Article 33) ‘that is perhaps clearer than the Supreme Court’s application of the 
‘dormant Commerce Clause’ in the United States’’, see Robertson, supra note 54, p.70. 
637
 Article 34 of the AML, this practice is interpreted as ‘repulsing or restricting participation of 
undertakings from other regions in local bidding activities by imposing discriminatory qualification 
requirements or assessment standards or by failing to publish information in accordance with the law’, 
see Article 3(5) of the SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes 
of Eliminating or Restricting Competition. 
638
 Article 35 of the AML, see also Article 3(6) of the SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of 
Administrative Power for the Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting Competition. 
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(5) forcing business operators to engage in the monopolistic conducts as prescribed in the 
AML
639
; and  
(6) setting down such provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition
640
.  
These are, in reality, ‘several common tactics of abuse of administrative power to 
eliminate or restrict competition’641. The AML’s approach on administrative 
monopolies is similar to a number of legislative acts in Central and Eastern Europe
642
 
which give a rather detail lists of state acts considered anti-competitive or 
discriminatory
643
. These lists include prohibition of establishment of new economic 
actors, restrictions of free exchange of goods, granting customs privileges to some 
economic entities, establishing priorities in deliveries of products or in execution of 
contracts, and similar acts
644
. 
In addition to imposing prohibitions on administrative agencies, China also prohibits 
undertakings from concluding, implementing monopoly agreement or abusing their 
dominant market positions on the ground of (1) administrative restrictions, or (2) 
administrative authorization, or (3) administrative regulations promulgated or issued 
                                                 
639
 Article 36 of the AML, this practice means ‘compelling undertakings to conclude and implement 
monopoly agreement for the purpose of eliminating or restricting competition, or compelling 
undertakings to abuse their dominant market position’, see Article 3(7) of the SAIC Rules on 
Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes of Eliminating or Restricting 
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640
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 Wu, supra note 75, p.95. 
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by administrative agencies and organizations empowered by laws and regulations to 
perform the functions of public affairs administration
645
. 
The shortcoming of the AML, however, is that ‘the AML does not expressly outlaw 
administrative monopolies or provide for the absolute superiority of national 
competition enforcers’646. Article 51 of the AML simply provides that:  
‘Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power to 
eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to make 
correction and impose punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other 
directly liable persons. The anti-monopoly authority may put forward suggestions on 
handling according to law to the relevant superior authority’ [emphasis added]647. 
This means competition authorities cannot directly enforce the administrative 
monopoly rules against officialdom, but such power is still in the hands of sectoral 
administrative authorities. For instance, in case of abuses committed by any authority 
under the State Council or by any provincial people’s government, SAIC may make a 
proposal for duly dealing with the offense to the State Council, clarifying that the State 
Council is the ‘superior authority’ in such instances648. For abuses by a government 
department at the provincial level or below, the appropriate Provincial Administration 
                                                 
645
 Article 5 of SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes of 
Eliminating or Restricting Competition.  
646
 Harris & Ganske, supra note 418, p.225. 
647
 Article 6 of SAIC Rules on Prohibition of Abuse of Administrative Power for the Purposes of 
Eliminating or Restricting Competition also states that ‘when an administrative agency or an 
organization empowered by laws and regulations to perform the functions of public affairs 
administration violates Article 3 or Article 4 of these Rules, SAIC and Provincial AIC may, in 
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the relevant superior authority’.  
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for Industry and Commerce may make such a proposal to the relevant superior or 
managing authority
649
 under the supervision of SAIC
650
.  
Further, when there are conflicts between the AML and other laws and regulations, 
the AML will yield, as stated by the second paragraph of Article 51 of the AML as 
follows:  
‘Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the handling the 
organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs 
who abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, such provisions 
shall prevail’ [emphasis added]. 
In other words, the prohibitions in Chapter V would be limited to those 
anticompetitive acts that a government body’s superiors did not authorize and do not 
sympathize with
651. As such, ‘the law would be less a tool to improve competition 
and more a disciplinary device for rogue Bureaucrats’652. This enforcement 
mechanism has been criticised as ‘so weak that the prohibitory language may be mere 
aspiration’653 and renders the AML prohibition against administrative monopoly a 
“paper tiger”654. Harris and Ganske have explained that:  
‘the national competition enforcement agencies are likely the most knowledgeable 
authorities in the proper enforcement of the competition law, the most informed 
concerning the competitive conditions throughout the economy, and are thus the best 
advocates for competition and best able to stand up to the myriad of strategies engaged in 
                                                 
649
 Ibid., Article 4.  
650
 Ibid., Article 7.  
651
 Merah & Meng, supra note 26, p.422. 
652
 Merah & Meng, ibid. 
653
 Fox, supra note 125, p.177 
654
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by local or regional governments and SOEs, designed to protect local business at the 
expense of the rest of China's economy’655.  
Presumably, this weak arrangement ‘is a reluctant acknowledgement of the fact that 
tackling administrative monopolies through the legal system in China is still not 
feasible at this time’656. 
In practice, on August 1, 2008, the very first day the AML took effect, four 
companies filed a lawsuit in Beijing No. 1 Intermediary People’s Court against 
China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(“AQSIQ”), China’s standard setting agency, for allegedly requiring companies in 
China to use the anti-counterfeiting products of a company partially owned by 
AQSIQ. But given the institutional constraints on the courts mentioned above, the 
courts are not all that eager to get involved in such lawsuits. About one month after 
the suit against AQSIQ was filed, in September 2008, the Beijing court dismissed the 
suit on grounds that the statute of limitations for raising claims against AQSIQ under 




3.8. The Interface between Antimonopoly Law and Intellectual Property Rights 
The AML is the principal document providing guidance on how competition law will 
apply to IPRs. Each major chapter of the AML – covering agreements, abuses of 
dominance, and merger control – specifically contemplates consideration of IPRs as 
part of evaluating potential anticompetitive effects: Article 13 prohibits horizontal 
                                                 
655
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656
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657
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agreements that restrict the purchase or development of new technology; Article 15 
provides a basis for potential exemption of otherwise anticompetitive agreements if 
they, inter alia, improve research and development or promote standardization; 
Article 18(3) requires evaluation of a company’s technology in evaluating market 
dominance; Article 27(3) requires MOFCOM to consider the effect of a proposed 
transaction on the progress of technology during merger review; and finally, Article 
55 prohibits abuses of IPRs. 
Of the above mentioned provisions, the most relevant provision on the interface 
between antimonopoly law and IPRs is Article 55 on prohibition of abuses of IPRs. 
This article so far has also raised most concerns from foreign firms and 
commentators. Article 55 of the AML states that: 
This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise their 
intellectual property rights under laws and relevant administrative regulations on 
intellectual property rights; however, business operators' conduct to eliminate or 
restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be 
governed by this Law. 
As such, Article 55 exempts conduct which amounts to an exercise of IPRs so long as 
those IPRs are exercised in accordance with the provisions of laws and administrative 
regulation relating to IPRs; and the conduct does not amount to an abuse of IPRs by 
eliminating or restricting competition. Some authors have noted that this approach is 
very similar to the approaches in Australia and Canada
658
. In both countries, there has 
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 Angie Ng, Ding Liang & Peter Waters, ‘The Intersect between Intellectual Property Law and 
Competition Law – Implications for China’, IP Bulletin Special Issue 2008, available at 
<http://www.kingandwood.com> 
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been debate about when the IPR owner is only fairly exercising their inherent rights 
in the IPR or is trying to achieve something more which has an anti-competitive 
outcome
659
. These authors also noted that experiences in both countries show that this 
dividing line can be difficult to draw
660
. In addition, there are, at least three problems 
with this article: 
First, and interestingly, the prohibition on the abuse of IPRs is not included with its 
chapter on abuse of a dominant position (as in other countries) but is provided in 
Article 55 of the AML, along with other supplemental provisions. Thus, some 
commentators believe that Article 55 may have extended the scope of the prohibition 
on abusing a dominant market position to activities that non-dominant companies 
carried out in an IP context
661
.  Other authors, however, noted that while at first sight 
this provision seems to be an exception to the rule that only dominant undertakings 
can be subject to the rules on single-firm conduct, in reality there may not be such an 
exception. Indeed, the abuse of IPRs censored by art.55 of the AML is unlikely to 
constitute an autonomous abuse. Rather, it would seem, simply, that the exercise of 
IPRs would trigger the application of the general rules of abuses of a dominant 
market position, i.e. arts 17-19 of the AML
662
. In any event, China’s approach on this 
issue is still unclear.  
Second, although Article 55 reflects global concerns on IP abuses and the intersection 
between IP and competition law, the language of Article 55 is overly general. Article 
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55 does not clearly distinguish ‘abuse’ from ‘legitimate’ exercises of IPRs and ‘this 
uncertainty about whether traditional use of IPRs may be deemed an illegal abuse 
must be viewed in the context of existing concerns about China’s inadequate 
protection of intellectual property rights, which have been a frequent source of 
friction between China and its principal trading partners’663. Pate cautioned that ‘the 
desire to protect local businesses may mean that multinational companies cannot 
expect to vindicate intellectual property rights when they are accused of acting in 
ways judged "anticompetitive" by Chinese standards that may be very different from 
our own’664.  
Finally, there have been concerns that China’s provision on IP related abuse of 
dominance may be used against foreign firms rather than domestic ones
665
. This may 
be explained by the fact that inadequate technology and limited capacity to innovate 
are particular weaknesses of much of Chinese industry
 
and the technology transferred 
by foreign enterprises to Chinese firms seems to have been limited in both amount 
and scope
666
. Thus, foreign investors are particularly concerned that normal business 
practices intended to protect IPRs may be found unlawful or that dominant 
undertakings may be systematically forced to license their IP to competitors
667
. These 
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concerns are intensified by official Chinese statements such as the June 2007 
statement of Zhang Qin, Deputy Director of China’s State Intellectual Property Office 
(SIPO), who highlighted the importance of banning misuse of intellectual property, a 
ban he characterized as “largely aimed at multi-national companies, U.S. companies 
in particular’668. Other authors, however, have noted that ‘ultimately, China’s 
emergence as a major center of innovative intellectual property activity may alter 
policies that appear to diminish the value of foreign IPRs and may also temper 
rhetoric that is occasionally heard of using competition law and other policies as 
“counter strategies” to Western “IP oppression”669. 
Overall, the AML sheds very little light on China’s likely approach to this 
controversial issue. The AML is silent on licensing restrictions, patent pools, 
deceptive conduct during standards setting, mergers of IP holders, the relationship 
between IPRs and market power, compulsory licensing as a remedy for abusive 
conduct
670, the obligations of ‘dominant’ IP holders, the analytical framework that 
AMEAs will follow and other IP related antitrust issues. Thus, more detailed 
interpretation is needed. At present, SAIC, as entrusted by the Antimonopoly 
Commission under the State Council, and SIPO are in the process of drafting the 
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Guidelines on the subject. Unfortunately, this draft is not publicly available
671
. To 
conclude, foreign firms should be cautioned that  
‘With respect to IP, the interface between China's antitrust policy and IP rights will 
depend on its attitude towards innovation by market leaders. If China is committed to 
respecting IP rights, it is not likely to systematically force dominant undertakings to 
license IP to competitors. If, however, China uses the AML to find as abuse the exercise 
of IP rights in normal business practices that it deems unfavorable to its economy, it 
could deter investment in research and development’672. 
3.9. Procedural Matters and Remedies  
3.9.1. Administrative enforcement and penalties 
The AML is principally enforced through administrative investigations conducted by 
three enforcement agencies namely MOFCOM, SAIC and NDRC (known as ‘the 
AMEAs’)673 who impose administrative penalties (see Chapter 5 for the reasoning for 
the appointment of three separate enforcement agencies). The AMEAs enjoy 
substantial investigative power
674
 and may initiate investigations on their own 
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initiatives or upon written complaints including ‘relevant facts and necessary 
evidence’ from any organization or individual675.  
The AML distinguishes two types of breaches: breaches of substantive law relating to 
monopoly agreements, abuses of a market dominant position, and merger control 
(Articles 46-48) and procedural breaches during anti-monopoly investigations 
(Article 52). 
For entering monopoly agreements and abuses of a market dominant position, the 
penalties include cessation of conduct, confiscation of illegal gains and fines of 1 per 
cent to 10 per cent of the offenders’s total sales revenue in the previous year676. It’s 
noteworthy that neither the AML nor the implementing rules explicitly limits such 
penalties to sales revenue derived from business operations in China or from the 
relevant market. Further, Article 46 makes a distinction between cases where business 
operators reach an monopoly agreement and perform it, the AMEA shall order them 
to cease doing so, and shall confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 
10% of the sales revenue in the previous year and where the reached monopoly 
agreement has not been performed in which a relatively small fine of less than 
500,000 yuan (roughly US$75,000) shall be imposed. This distinction is rather 
ambiguous since ‘[i]t is not clear in the use of the word ‘performed’ whether an 
agreement that the parties actively take steps to implement, but which is unsuccessful, 
                                                                                                                                           
and (5) inquiring about the business operators' bank accounts under investigation,
 
see Article 39 of the 
AML; Article 10 of SAIC Procedural Rules on Investigation and Handling of Cases relating to 
Monopoly Agreement and Abuse of Dominant Market Position; Article 6 of NDRC Regulations on 
Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Prohibiting Price Monopoly. 
675
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676
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will benefit from this lesser penalty’677. Further, the AML’s requirement of 
confiscation of the illegal gains is also a notable one. ‘While this is arguably an 
economically efficient deterrence mechanism, it is no easy task to calculate the ill-
gotten gains from cartel activity’678. Where a trade association help the achievement 
of a monopoly agreement by business operators in its own industry in violation of the 
AML, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed thereupon; in case of serious 
circumstances, the social group registration authority may deregister the guild
679
.  
Where a concentration is implemented in violation of the AML, MOFCOM shall 
order parties to stop implementing the concentration, to take corrective measures to 
restore the market situation before the concentration within a time limit (e.g., 
disposing of shares or assets, transfering the business etc.), and to impose a fine of 
less than RMB 500,000
680
.  
Penalties for breaches of the obligation to cooperate in an anti-monopoly 
investigation are specified as follows: 
If business operators refuse to provide related materials and information, provide 
fraudulent materials or information, conceal, destroy or remove evidence, or refuse or 
obstruct investigation in other ways, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to 
make rectification, impose a fine of less than 20,000 yuan on individuals, and a fine of 
less than 200,000 yuan on entities; and in case of serious circumstances, the anti-
monopoly authority may impose a fine of 20,000 yuan up to 100,000 yuan on individuals, 
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and a fine of 200,000 yuan up to one million yuan on entities; where a crime is 
constituted, the relevant business operators shall assume criminal liabilities
681
. 
Learning from the experience of enforcing competition law from more mature 
competition jurisdictions
682
, China has also adopted a leniency program to tackle 
cartels more efficiently
683
. Article 46 of the AML states that  
Where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reaching the monopoly 
agreement and provides important evidences to the AMEA, it may be imposed a 
mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment as the case may be. 
What is notable in Chinese competition regimes is the existence of two separate 
leniency regimes governed by two agencies
684
. Thus, leniency applicants would have 
to report to NDRC about price-related conducts and to SAIC about non-price 
conducts. However, as a result of the vagueness in the allocation of jurisdiction 
between SAIC and NDRC
685
, would-be leniency applicants may in certain cases need 
to file with both agencies. A further problem is that although the SAIC and NDRC’s 
leniency programs are largely similar, there still exist certain differences between the 
two leniency schemes: 
First, while the NDRC rules explicitly provide that NDRC "may" grant immunity for 
the first applicant, the SAIC rules do not specify whether SAIC "may" or "should" 
                                                 
681
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Second, in contrast to the NDRC rules which do not seem to exclude the possibility of 
immunity for cartel organizers, the SAIC states that the "organizer" of a cartel will 




Third, while the NDRC rules makes it clear that NDRC "may" reduce the penalty for 
subsequent applicants (the second applicant may receive a reduction of at least 50 
percent, the third and subsequent applicants may receive reductions of at most 50 
percent), the SAIC rules leave the level of fine reduction for subsequent applicants 
entirely at the discretion of the agency. There are no ranges of possible reductions 
specified, as they are in the NDRC Guidelines. The only guidance provided is that the 
reduction will depend on the time sequence of the application, the importance of the 
evidence provided, the relevant information about the concluding or implementing of 
the agreement, and the cooperation with the investigation
688
. 
It is noteworthy that Chinese leniency program does not contain the same level of 
detailed guidance found in other jurisdictions, especially the EU
689
 and the US
690
. 
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There are still various ambiguities in both of the leniency programs. For instance, 
"important" evidence is interpreted in these rules as evidence that is sufficient to 
initiate an investigation or that plays a key role in finding a monopoly agreement, 
including information on the parties to the agreement, the products involved, the form 
and content of the agreement and specific details of implementation of the 
agreement
691
, it is unclear, however, whether SAIC and NDRC will accept oral 
statements as leniency applications, as is the practice in other jurisdictions. Further, it 
is also unclear in both leniency schemes whether the immunity or leniency that 
NDRC and SAIC may grant will cover not only the fines that they can impose but 
also confiscation of illegal gains.
 
Since Article 46 AML provides that the exemption 
or reduction will apply to the "penalty" it can impose, it is possible that the immunity 
or leniency will cover all the penalties covered by Article 46 AML—that is, both 
"fines" and "confiscation". Both the SAIC rules and the NDRC rules are short on 
practical considerations, such as whether NDRC will grant a marker to the first 
application, protecting his place in the "queue," and when it will confirm to the first 
applicant that immunity will be granted. It is also unclear whether the agency will ask 
the applicant to admit to the existence of a violation of the AML. Finally, the NDRC 
rules do not specify explicitly that the applicant must terminate its participation in the 
cartel nor the extent to which it must cooperate with the agency, although it is likely 
that both will be a prerequisite to leniency. 
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As such, the Chinese agencies expressly have reserved considerable discretion 
regarding whether and when to grant full or partial leniency. This lack of certainty 
could provide insufficient incentive for cartel participants to self-report their behavior 
and deter certain would-be applicants
692
.  
3.9.2. Administrative and judicial review of AMEAs’ enforcement decisions  
Article 53 of the AML creates a right of appeal against decisions taken by the 
enforcement authorities: aggrieved parties may challenge the decisions of 
enforcement authorities either by applying for an administrative review (i.e., seeking 
review by a higher administrative authority) or bringing an administrative action (i.e., 
challenging the decision in court). However, for decisions to prohibit or conditionally 
approve a concentration, aggrieved parties must first apply for administrative 
reconsideration, only if it objects to the reconsideration decision may it lodge an 
administrative lawsuit. Wang noted that compared with administrative 
reconsideration, judicial review is a more appropriate appeal mechanism given that 
the judiciary is a more impartial referee for the parties
693
. In both cases, appeals may 
be made by ‘any party concerned’ (although who is a party concerned is still unclear). 
Further, it is also unclear whether the AMC, or only the three AMEAs, can be a 
defendant to an appeal relating to the application of the AML. 
Administrative appeals in China generally are governed by the Administrative 
Litigation Law 1989 and the Administrative Review Law 1999, which set out clear 
mechanism for appeals against the actions or decisions of administrative bodies. 
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There also exist in China a right under the Constitution to make complaints against 
actions taken by the State, and to seek compensation where these are found to be 
unlawful
694
. This right however is only available to Chinese citizens, and would not 
apply to a company not incorporated in China.  
3.9.3. Private actions and damages 
Private actions against business operators:  
Article 50 of the AML provides that 
Where any loss was caused by a business operator’s monopolistic conducts to other 
entities and individuals, the business operator shall assume the civil liabilities. 
Thus, Article 50 opens the door for private actions
695
 in China and allow consumers 
or competitors to claim damages from monopolistic conducts. The draft "Provisions 
on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in relation to Trials of Monopoly Civil 
Dispute Cases"
696
, confirmed, regarding standing, that "natural persons, legal persons 
and other organizations who have suffered harm as a result of monopolistic conduct, 
including business operators and consumers, may file a civil suit". This broad 
provision seems to suggest that persons who are directly or indirectly harmed by a 
monopoly act may sue. The normal rules of civil procedure will apply to such actions. 
Although an earlier version of Article 5 of the AML gave plaintiffs the right to 
multiple damages, the assessment of damages is now left to the appropriate civil 
                                                 
694
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courts in accordance with the general principles of Chinese law
697
 which means that 
multiple damages is not allowed in China. It is note worthy that commentators have 
expressed their concern that allowing private actions to determine breaches of 
competition law may not be desirable in China’s context because of the possibility of 
wrongful or inconsistent rulings
698
. 
According to the draft "Provisions on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in 
relation to Trials of Monopoly Civil Dispute Cases", private actions in China can be 
brought as both stand-alone claims and follow-on actions following a finding of an 
infringement by administrative enforcement. Regarding the link between AML 
investigations and litigation, in situations where monopolistic conduct has been 
investigated by but not yet determined by the antitrust authorities, the courts may still 
make determinations based on these investigations or decide to grant a stay to cases in 
which investigations into alleged monopolistic conduct has not been concluded by the 
antitrust authorities. The burden of proof always lies on the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
has to prove (1) the existence of the alleged monopolistic conduct; (2) the existence 
of damages; and (3) the causal link between the alleged monopolistic conduct and 
damages. Plaintiffs are entitled to apply for a court order to instruct defendants to 
provide further evidence, provided the a number of elements are satisfied, including: 
that plaintiffs are able to prove the "probable existence" of damages due to the 
monopolistic conduct and plaintiffs have used "reasonable means" to obtain evidence 
                                                 
697
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but to no avail. Further, both plaintiffs and defendants may apply to the courts if they 
wish to submit expert evidence. Statutory limitations for civil antitrust actions is (i) 
two years commencing from the day when the aggrieved party is aware of or should 
be aware of the infringement for stand alone actions; or (ii) two years commencing 
from the day when the aggrieved party either is aware of or should be aware of the 
determination by the antitrust authorities for follow on actions.  
Private actions against administrative monopolies: 
Whether it is possible for private litigants to directly sue offending government 
agencies for violating the administrative monopoly prohibitions of the AML is still 
unclear. Article 51 of the AML states that administrative agencies are prohibited from 
abusing their administrative powers to exclude or restrict competition, however, it 
does not say explicitly that entities would be entitled to damages upon winning a case 
pursuant to that article. Private civil right of action in Article 50 extends only to 
claims for damages against ‘business operators’. Some commentators have argued 
that it is very unlikely that private litigants will be allowed to bring AML claims 
against administrative monopolies
699
. However, theoretically, injured parties may still 
have claims against offending government entities under the Administrative 
Litigation Law, and in fact, as noted by Professor Zheng, Chinese citizens filed 
private lawsuits against administrative monopolies in courts anyway
700
. In a recent 
case (AQSIQ case), the court dismissed the case based on the statute of limitations, 
rather than for lack of jurisdiction over the claim of administrative monopoly
701
, 
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which suggests that it is possible for private actions against administrative 
monopolies. In terms of compensation, Article 67 of the Law on Administrative 
Litigation permits injured parties to seek compensation for damages suffered because 




According to the draft "Provisions on Issues Concerning the Application of Law in 
relation to Trials of Monopoly Civil Dispute Cases", in contrast to private actions 
against business operators, there are only follow on rights of actions in relation to 
breaches of the AML by administrative agencies. 
Regarding antitrust private actions in China, Bush has anticipated that ‘local PRC 
courts may face a wave of private antitrust suits in the near future’703. This 
anticipation seems to be correct when it was reported in the press
 
on 30 October 2010 
that the People's Court has thus far accepted 11 antitrust cases (for the period 1 
August 2008 to June 2010). Out of these 11 cases, 10 were antitrust civil cases and 1 
was an antitrust administrative action. Out of the 10 civil cases, 9 cases are abuse of 
dominance cases; and 1 case is a cartel case
704
. However, there has not yet been a 
private antitrust case in which the plaintiff was successful in his or her claim. 
According to Chief Judge of the IP Court of the People's Court, He Zhonglin, the root 
of the problem lies in the difficulties being faced by plaintiffs in adducing evidence in 
relation to market definition; dominance or abuse of dominance by defendants
705
.  
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3.9.4. Criminal sanctions  
The AML itself does not provide criminal sanctions for antimonopoly violations but 
Article 52 of the AML provides that 'where any conduct constitutes a criminal 
offense, the relevant individual or organization shall be prosecuted for criminal 
liability in accordance with the law'. As such, monopolistic conducts may still be 
subject to provisions of China’s Criminal Law 1997, which includes provisions 
penalizing bid-rigging, and less-clearly-defined economic crimes such as “coercion” 
and “disturbing market order”706.  
Article 223 of the Criminal Law provides for criminal liability for bid-rigging as 
follows: 
A bidder who informs mutually the quoted price of a bid in collaboration to harm the 
interests of the bid inviter or another bidder shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and concurrently or 
independently, to a fine, if the circumstance is serious. 
A bidder and a bid inviter who act in collaboration in bidding, thus harming the 
legitimate interests of the state, collective or citizen, shall be sentenced in accordance 
with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.  
For the so called “disturbing market order”, Article 225 of the Criminal Law states 
that  
A person who, in violation of the state’s regulations, commits any of the following illegal 
business operations, thus disturbing the market order, shall be sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonment of not more than five years or criminal detention and concurrently or 
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 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.327. 
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independently, to a fine of not less than one time and not more than five times the illegal 
gains therefrom of the circumstance is serious and, if the circumstance is especially 
serious, to fixed-term imprisonment of not more less than five years and concurrently to a 
fine of not less than one time and not more than five times the illegal gains therefrom or 
confiscation of property: 
…3. to commit any other act of illegal business operations which disturbs seriously the 
market order. 
Notably on 4 December 2010, the State Council of China published revisions to the 
Provisions on Administrative Penalties on Price Violations - currently the key basis 
for determining penalties imposed on monopolistic pricing activities - which clarified 
that serious price violations that disturb market order may attract criminal liability
707
.  
Article 226 of the Criminal Law provides for “coercion” as follows: 
A person who, by means of violence or threat, buys or sells a commodity, or forces others 
to provide or accept service, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more 
than three years or criminal detention and concurrently or independently, to a fine, if the 
circumstance is serious. 
In practice, there have been recent reports of criminal investigations against cartel 
participants who have either coerced others to participate or have seriously disrupted 
the market order. For example, Chinese media have reported that five organizers of 
the rice noodle cartel in Liuzhou City were arrested for criminal enforcement 
                                                 
707
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pursuant to Article 225 of the Criminal Law, which broadly prohibits 'other illegal 
business activities that seriously disrupt the market order'
708
.  
The possibility of applying criminal sanctions to monopolistic conducts in China has 
raised great concerns since ‘these provisions are worded vaguely enough to be 
invoked in all manner of circumstances and the fact remains that the application of 
China’s criminal law remains an area where a degree of opaque standards and 
politically-influenced decision making can always be expected’709.  
3.10. Conclusion  
Some authors have commented that ‘China’s law is a unique piece of legislation 
directed to China’s unique economic and political circumstances and not borrowed 
wholesale from the EU, US, or any other system’710. China’s approach toward 
anticompetitive practices, to a large extent, converges with more mature competition 
jurisdictions. However, there are still important divergences that come from China’s 
specific economic and political system
711
: 
First, while competition law in mature antitrust jurisdictions are normally concerned 
with anti-competitive private practices, the AML has specific provisions dealing with 
administrative monopolies, SOEs and trade associations, which are considered to 
have caused lots of competition problems in a socialist economy like China. 
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However, it should be noted that from the ambiguous language of the AML, it is still 
unclear whether SOEs are within the scope of application of anti-monopoly law and 
whether the AML prevails over other sectoral laws and regulations. Further, despite 
dedicating a whole chapter to prohibit administrative monopolies, the AML failed to 
provide an effective mechanism for competition regulators to sanctions or correct 
those conducts.  
Second, the AML contains such ambiguous goals as ‘socialist market economy’, ‘fair 
competition’ and ‘public interest’, which have raised a lot of concerns due to their 
potential conflicts with ‘efficiency’ and ‘consumer welfare’, which should be the 
main goals of competition policy. Moreover, the language of the AML on this issue is 
vague and flexible enough to give the State wide discretion in pursuing industrial 
policies when it deems necessary. This concern is further exacerbated by various 
ambiguous grounds for exemption of monopoly agreements, abuse of dominant 
position and concentration in the AML. 
Third, in terms of substantive rules, it appears that China has relied more on the EC 
model than on the US model. For instance, the AML follows the EU’s exemption and 
exception system instead of the US’s per se rule and rule of reason approach 
regarding monopoly agreements. The AML also adopts the EU’s concept of 
“collective dominance” based on market share presumption although such a 
presumption is rebuttable. China’s “collective dominance” presumption, however, has 
raised much concern that a firm with 11 per cent of market share would be found to 
be dominant. China’s prohibition of excessive pricing is also in line with the EU’s 
approach, although this prohibition too has raised concerns that it might significantly 
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limit "dominant" firms in pricing their products or services. Another remarkable 
feature of the AML is the provision on refusal to deal. China seems to require firms to 
provide valid reasons for refusing to trade with a third party, which appears to be 
inconsistent with both U.S and EU law. Regarding merger control, the AML is 
applicable to horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers, although the concept of 
“concentration” is not very clear. China applies a compulsory pre-merger notification 
requirement using turnover as threshold for notification. Conditional approval is 
allowed and Chinese competition regulators are in practice willing to apply both 
structural remedies and behavioural remedies, which is quite different from 
international practice. Finally, and notably, China has a separate national security 
review in parallel with merger review – which has attracted must attention from 
international observers. It has been feared that China’s national security review may 
be used as a potential tool for protectionist policy.  
Finally, in regard to procedure matters and remedies, China’s antimonopoly regime 
relies heavily on administrative investigations and remedies with very serious 
penalties of up to 10% of the previous fiscal year revenue. The AML’s requirement of 
confiscation of the illegal gains is also a notable one. Another remarkable feature of 
Chinese competition regime is the existence of two different leniency programs 
granted by two different agencies, with great uncertainty and considerable discretion 
reserved for the Chinese competition regulators in implementing them. Moreover, 
private actions to enforce competition law against business operators and to claim 
damages are allowed in China although multiple damages are not accepted. Finally, 
antimonopoly practices are potentially subject to criminal sanctions in China – which 
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should be worrisome since it is still unclear whether such criminal sanctions will be 
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Chapter 4 – Competition Law in Vietnam 
4.1. Structure and Scope of Application of the VCL 
The VCL’s structure 
The scope of the VCL is broader than the AML since it regulates not only the three 
standard types of practices (anti-competitive agreements, abuse of market dominance 
and economic concentrations) but also covers unfair competitive practices that harm 
competitors and/or deceive consumers
712
. Article 1, which sets out the scope of the 
regulation, specifies that: 
This Law governs practices in restraint of competition, unfair competitive practices, the 
order and procedures for resolution of competition cases, and measures for dealing with 
breaches of the laws on competition. 
The reason for this divergence is that Vietnam has followed the approach of some 
Central and Eastern European countries
713
, Japan and Australia etc. in including 
unfair competition provisions in its competition law.  
Scope of application 
Article 2 of the VCL provides that the Law applies to enterprises and sole proprietors, 
including enterprises engaged in production or supply of public utility products or 
services, enterprises conducting business in State monopoly industries and sectors, 
                                                 
712
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foreign enterprises conducting business in Vietnam, and trade associations operating 
in Vietnam. 
Thus, in contrast to the ambiguous provision of Article 7 of the AML, the VCL 
makes it very clear that SOEs are well within the scope of the VCL application
714
, 
which was considered as a strength of the VCL
715
 since these entities have raised a lot 
of competition concerns in the Vietnamese economy (Chapter 2). However, 
application of the VCL to State monopolies and enterprises engaged in production or 
supply of public utility products or services is severely limited by Article 15 of the 
VCL which states that: 
‘The State shall control enterprises which operate in State monopoly sectors by deciding 
the selling price or purchasing price of goods and services in State monopoly sectors; and 




The State shall control enterprises which produce or supply public utility products or 
services by the method of placing orders, assigning plans or conducting tendering in 
accordance with prices or fees stipulated by the State
717
. 
When conducting business activities outside State monopoly sectors and other than 
production or supply of public utility products or services, enterprises shall not be subject 
to the controls stipulated in clauses 1 and 2 of this article but shall be governed by the 
other provisions of this Law’.  
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In terms of sectors, the VCL will be applicable to all sectors since Article 5 states that 
where there is inconsistency between the VCL and other laws on competition 
restriction practices, the VCL will prevail. In particular, there’s no general exemption 
for the agriculture industry in terms of anti-competitive agreements, which is in 
contrast with China’s AML. 
Extra-territorial jurisdiction 
In contrast to the AML, the issue of ‘extra-territorial jurisdiction’ is not applicable in 
Vietnam’s competition regime although it is the case in Vietnam that most large-scale 
mergers involve foreign parties in some ways. The VCL only states that the law is 
applicable to ‘foreign enterprises conducting business in Vietnam’718. Similarly, the 
subsequent implementing Decree states that the Decree applies to those ‘conducting 
business… in Vietnam’719. ‘This would appear to exclude the operation of the effects 
doctrine’720. The only question is whether the enterprises are conducting business in 
Vietnam. However, the term ‘conducting business in Vietnam’ is not defined by law 
and it is still unclear whether the law is applicable to overseas enterprises that have a 
subsidiary, a representative office or a branch in Vietnam; or overseas enterprises that 
provide services in Vietnam (e.g. foreign contractors) with or without an office in 
Vietnam; or overseas enterprises that distribute their products into Vietnam directly 
or via a distributor etc. 721. However, in its 2009 Report on Economic Concentration in 
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Vietnam, the VCAD seemed to suggest that Vietnam’s merger review is not applied 
to an economic concentration by overseas enterprises selling to Vietnamese 
customers, but could apply to the extent that the overseas enterprises have business 
presence, i.e., having subsidiaries or branches, in the Vietnamese market
722
. In its 
2010 Annual Report the VCAD also referred to Prudential Plc's proposed acquisition 
of AIG which was an offshore acquisition of an American company by a UK 
company.  Both groups had Vietnamese subsidiaries and the VCAD indicated that the 
acquisition was subject to notification procedures
723
. Except for this circumstance, the 
exact range of foreign entities which are caught by the provisions of the VCL remains 
unclear. 
This provision has been subject to criticism because it has restricted the power of 
Vietnam’s competition agencies in protecting the competition environment and the 
legitimate interests of Vietnamese consumers
724
. Indeed, with the process of 
globalization, cross-border transactions can have great influence on domestic markets 
and, therefore, not only mature competition regimes such as the US or the EU have 
applied extra-territorial jurisdiction, even developing countries (such as China, India 
etc.) have also been aware of the importance of protecting their enterprises and 
consumers from anticompetitive conducts of foreign firms, multinational corporations 
or international cartels. However, one possible explanation for this limited 
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jurisdiction is that Vietnamese competition agencies are still green and lack of 
resources to effectively assert jurisdiction in cases that involve anticompetitive 
practices conducted overseas. 
4.2. Vietnam’s Competition Law Goals 
Unlike the AML of China and a number of other antitrust laws (although in common 
with the US and the EU law), the VCL itself does not have any specific provision that 
clearly states out the goals or objectives of Vietnam’s competition law. Although this 
practice is not unusual in Vietnam’s legislation process, the lack of clearly defined 
goals has been considered as a weakness of the VCL because ‘[c]learly defining the 
goals of competition law will help in the interpretation and application of specific 
provisions of the law as well as in the drafting and promulgation of the guidelines’725. 
However, the VCL itself does offer some hints about its goals from various 
provisions, especially those relating to the exemptions. Furthermore, from the 
speeches of high-ranking officials
726
 and the debate before the VCL was promulgated, 
one can validly identify several possible goals of this law. 
The first possible goal of Vietnam’s competition law is similar to the normal goal in 
more mature competition regimes, which is to create a more competitive environment 
and to improve consumer welfare. The commitment to competition as a dominant 
mode of economic activity is evident right from the words of Article 4(1), which 
states that ‘enterprises enjoy freedom to competition within the legal framework’. 
Moreover, Article 4(2) states that competition is to be conducted without harming the 
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legitimate rights and interests of consumers. Similarly, one of the conditions for anti-
competitive agreements to be granted exemption is they are ‘aimed at benefiting 
consumers’727.  
The second possible goal of the VCL is to create favorable conditions for the 
development of SMEs. As a VCAD official puts it ‘the VCL not only protects SMEs 
from abuses of market power by bigger enterprises but also has provisions reflecting 
the State’s more tolerant policy towards SMEs728’. One can see this policy from 
various provisions of the VCL, for example, prohibited anticompetitive agreements 
(even hard-core cartel agreements) may be granted exemption if they ‘increase the 
competitiveness of SMEs’729. The flip side of this exemption, however, is given that 
SMEs account for 96 per cent of the total number of Vietnamese enterprises
730
, such 
exemptions may lead to a very unhealthy competition culture in a large part of the 
economy in Vietnam. Moreover, economic concentrations that result in SMEs are 
neither prohibited nor required to be notified to competition agencies
731
.  
The third possible goal, which is noteworthy, of the VCL is to protect domestic 
enterprises from giant transnational corporations (TNCs) as a result of Vietnam’s 
deeper integration into the world market. Perhaps this is the reason why a prohibited 
anti-competitive agreement may be exempted from condemnation if ‘it increases the 
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competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises in the international market’732. Similarly, a 
prohibited economic concentration may still be allowed if ‘the economic 
concentration has the effect of extension of export or contribution to socio-economic 
development and/or to technical and technological progress’733. According to Doan 
and Bui, although it was officially stated that the main purposes of the law was to 
create a fair competition environment and promote market structure in Vietnam, 
‘people believe that one of the reasons behind the issuance of the law was the 
government’s concern about threat from giant companies that may enter the domestic 
market after it is opened in accordance with WTO commitments’734. If this is the 
case, competition law may be used as a tool for protectionism during the process of 
Vietnam’s integration into the world economy. 
Other possible goals can be inferred from Article 4(2) which states that ‘competition 
must be undertaken on the principles of non-infringement of the interests of the State, 
the public interest, and the lawful rights and interests of other enterprises’735. As such, 
other possible goals include the State’s interests (does it imply SOEs?), public 
interests (are they equivalent to consumers’ interests?) and other enterprises’ interests 
(does it mean the VCL protects competitors and not competition?). In fact, there has 
never been any explanation of these terms and it is afraid that such ambiguous terms 
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may be wrongly used to justify the State’s industrial policies even if they conflict 
with competition policies.  
Last but not least, it is obvious that some of the above-mentioned goals are 
conflicting and irreconcilable. For example, it is hard to reconcile the commitment to 
create a fair competition environment and efficiency with the goal of protecting the 
State’s interests (which may be explained as SOEs’ interests) and other enterprises’ 
interests. Similarly, the protectionist policy may be in conflict with competition 
policy which aims at protecting competition and not competitors. Neilson noted that 
during the drafting process, ‘much debate has ensued over the definition of 
‘unhealthy’, ‘unfair’ or ‘illegal’ competition, confirming the apprehension that the 
proposed law’s principal objective will not be promotion of economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare’736. 
4.3. Market Definition 
In all competition jurisdictions, market definition plays a very important role in 
dealing with competition cases, this is especially true in the context of Vietnam since 
the VCL uses market share as the main criteria to allow or prohibit certain 
agreements, transactions or behaviors
737
. In order to calculate market shares for the 
related enterprise(s), the very first step that must be taken is defining the relevant 
market. 
Article 3(1) of VCL states that: 
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‘Relevant market consists of the relevant product market and the relevant geographic 
market.  
Relevant product market means a market comprising goods or services which may be 
substituted for each other in terms of characteristics, use purpose and price.  
Relevant geographic market means a specific geographical area in which goods or 
services may be substituted for each other with similar competitive conditions and which 
area is significantly different from neighboring areas’. 
As such, the Vietnamese approach towards market definition is consistent with the 
international approach and the relevant market consists of the relevant product market 
and the relevant geographic market. Moreover, the temporal aspect of the relevant 
market will also be considered when necessary. Decree No.116 states that the 
competition agencies may consider ‘the use duration of the goods or services’ in 
order to determine whether goods or services are capable of being substitutable
738
. 
Unfortunately, no further guidance on the temporal component in defining markets 
has been provided. 
In order to define the relevant market, Vietnamese competition agencies will use the 
following analytical framework: 
Demand Substitution:  
Goods and services shall be deemed to be substitutable if they are substitutable in 
terms of characteristics or purposes or prices. The characteristics of goods or services 
may be determined on one or more bases such as their physical features, chemical 
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 Article 4(6) of Decree No.116 
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features, technical features, side effects on the users and ability to assimilate
739
. A 
determination of use of goods or services shall be based on the prime principal use 
purpose of such goods or services
740
. Moreover, competition agencies may consider 
other factors such as cross-elasticity of demand and the duration of supply of goods or 
services onto the market when there is a sudden increase in demand
741
. It is worth 
noting that analysis of the these factors is not compulsory and will only be conducted 
when the method of determining whether goods or services are capable of being 




Supply Substitution:  
Vietnam follows the EU model (and diverges from the US) and may factor supply-
side substitution into market definition when necessary
743
. Supply-side substitution is 
defined as the capability of an enterprise which is currently producing or distributing 
any one goods or service to change to the production or distribution of another goods 
or service within a short period without any significant increase in expenses in a 
context where there are price increases for such goods or services
744
.  
The Hypothetical Monopolist Test: 
Under the Vietnamese regime, goods and services shall be deemed to be substitutable 
in terms of price 
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‘… if above 50% of a random sample quantity taken from one thousand (1,000) 
consumers living in the relevant geographical area change to purchasing or intend to 
purchase other goods or services with the same characteristics and use purpose as the 
goods they are currently using or intend to use where the price of such goods or services 
increases more than 10% and remain stable for six consecutive months’745.  
Apparently, Vietnamese law makers tried to apply the SSNIP test to define the 
relevant product market though the Vietnamese version of SSNIP test is far different 
from the standard one. In the US or EC, the hypothetical price increase in the SSNIP 
test is normally between 5-10% above competitive levels and in the period of one 
year. This amount and period is regarded as appropriate to determine the possible 
change of demand in the market. However, the SSNIP test when transplanted into 
Vietnam’s competition law appears problematic. First, this Vietnam’s SSNIP test 
version may produce inaccurate result because of the cellophane fallacy. It is 
stipulated that the price of goods or services for determining the relevant market shall 
be the price recorded in the retail sales invoice
746
. The problem is since this relevant 
market definition is used in all competition cases, this may lead to the cellophane 
fallacy in abuse of dominance cases. Second, there is a problem of circularity, Furse 
has rightly pointed out that 
“reliance on such a survey is unlikely to produce robust results, and that a circularity 
enters the process with a requirement that a geographic market be determined within 
which the survey is to be conducted before a product market has been determined”747.  
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 Article 4(5) of Decree No.116 
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 Article 4(4) of Decree No.116 
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 Furse, supra note 5, at 6-3.03. 
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Third, there is a vagueness in this provision and Nguyen suggested that “[p]erhaps we 
should reconsider the increase of more than 10% and there should be a limit to this 
hypothetical increase”748. These authors’ speculations are correct, indeed, from the 
practice of Vietnam’s competition agencies in handling the cases so far, it appears 
that these agencies have treated this kind of SSNIP test as useless
749
 and avoided 
having to use it, which also makes Vietnam’s competition regime far different from 
other jurisdictions.  
Fourth, another problem is that substitutability is determined by the marginal 
consumers who stop buying when price is increased. A general survey would ask 
question of people who do not buy at that price or those consumers who would not 
stop buying unless the price was increased by a much greater amount. The survey, 
thus, would be biased
750
. 
Lastly, there is no specific reference to technology markets under Vietnamese regime, 
which is different from the Chinese regime, although Decree 116 does refer to IPRs 
as a barrier to market entry
751
. 
In practice, so far, Vietnam has had only two handled cases, one related to a price-
fixing insurance premium agreement and the other related to an abuse of monopoly 
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position. The analysis of both cases reveals that Vietnamese competition agencies 
mainly based their product market definition on characteristics and use purpose of the 
services without carrying out any type of the SSNIP test. For example, in the Vinapco 
case, the VCC decided that the relevant market product in this case was the civil 
aviation fuel supply service market on the ground of characteristics and use purpose 
of this type of service
752
. Similarly, in the case of price-fixing insurance premium 
agreement by 19 insurance companies, the VCC also base their conclusion that the 
relevant product market was the automobile material insurance service market on the 
ground of distinguishing this type of service with other motor insurance service 
according to their characteristics, use purposes and prices
753
. On the one hand, such 
an approach is in contrast with the practice of competition agencies in more mature 
competition law jurisdictions (especially in the US) which “have always attempted to 
apply the SSNIP test in a rigorous manner through the use of transaction and any 
other relevant data particular to a case”754. On the other hand, in the context of 
Vietnam where the SSNIP test was poorly and unreasonably provided for, the 
omission of such a test is understandable and may bring more accurate results.  
In terms of defining the geographic market, so far, the VCC has paid much of their 
attention to entry barriers when defining the relevant geographic market. In both 
cases, the most important entry barriers mentioned are the State’s legal requirements 
or licenses to provide certain services. In the Vinapco case, basing on the 
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distinguished characteristics of the location for supplying jet fuel to civil aeroplanes 
and two entry barriers which are License of Importing and Exporting Petroleum 
issued by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and License of Aviation Fuel 
Service Supply issued by the Ministry of Transportation, the VCC concluded that the 
relevant geographic market were civil airports and airports for both civil and military 
purposes in Vietnam
755
. In the price-fixing insurance premium case, the VCC decided 
that the relevant geographic market was the national market, basing their conclusion 
on the entry barriers which are the State conditions on insurance service according to 
which (a) all persons and organizations can only insure at insurance companies that 
are doing business in Vietnam and (b) only non-life insurance companies legally 




4.4. Anti-competitive Agreements 
4.4.1. Prohibited agreements 
In contrast to the AML, there is also no clear distinction between horizontal 
agreements and vertical agreements in the VCL. What is noteworthy is that although 
Article 8 refers to ‘competition restriction agreements’, which arguably may consist 
of both horizontal and vertical agreements, the term ‘combined market share of 
participating parties’ in Article 9(2) of the VCL757 would suggest that the provisions 
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relating to anti-competitive agreements in the VCL only apply to horizontal 
agreements and so all vertical anti-competitive agreements could only be investigated 
under provisions relating to abuse of dominant or monopoly position
758
. 
The primary prohibition on anti-competitive agreements is found in Article 8 of the 
VCL although certain types of restrictive agreements can also be found in Article 42 
which falls within the chapter dealing with ‘unfair competitive acts’. Unlike Article 
13 and Article 14 of the AML, Article 8 of the VCL gives an exhaustive list of eight 
categories of anti-competitive agreements that are prohibited as follows: 
(1) Agreements either directly or indirectly fixing the price of goods and services
759
;  




(3) Agreements to restrain or control the quantity or volume of goods and services 
produced, purchased or sold
761
; 
                                                                                                                                           
which may be substituted for each other (Article 3(1) of the VCL), thus, such agreements can only be 
reached between parties operating at the same industrial level. 
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 See Nguyen Thanh Tu, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights in Vietnam’, CUTS 
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(5) Agreements to impose on other enterprises conditions for signing contracts for the 
purchase and sale of goods and services or to force other enterprises to accept 




(6) Agreements which prevent, impede or do not allow other enterprises to participate 
in the market or to develop business (market foreclosing agreements). Both 
prohibitions apply where an agreement is entered into which operates against those 
not party to the agreement though there is a distinction between agreements designed 
to preclude other enterprises to ‘participate’ and those to prevent them from 
‘developing’764; 
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(8) Collusion in order for one or more parties to win a tender for supply of goods and 
services. As such, unlike the AML, the VCL has a specific prohibition of bid-rigging 
in its competition act. Beside the VCL, Vietnam also has a Law on Bidding 2005 in 
which bid-rigging is forbidden yet these rules only apply to foreign contractors. In 




Of the above agreements, the last three agreements are prohibited in any event, 
irrespective of the involved parties’ market shares, and exemptions provided in 
Article 10 of the VCL are not applicable to these agreements
767
. The reason, perhaps, 
is that these agreements are perceived by Vietnamese legislators to be outright 
anticompetitive and must be condemned seriously. On the contrary, the other 
agreements are only prohibited when the parties to the agreements have a combined 
market share of thirty (30) per cent or more of the relevant market
768
, which is 
equivalent to the EU’s de minimis principle, and may be exempted from punishment 
according to Article 10 of the VCL. As such, of the so-called hard core restrictions, 
only bid-rigging is prohibited per se, the other three types of hard core cartels will be 
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forgiven if the combined market share of the relevant parties is below 30%, or if they 
enjoy the exemptions provided in Article 10. This approach is far different from those 
in China, the US and the EU but is consistent with Vietnam’s protection of SMEs 
policy. It has been opined during the drafting process that exempting anticompetitive 
agreements when the combined market share of relevant parties does not exceed 30 
per cent of the relevant market is really a pitfall in the law since ‘the prohibition of 
these agreements itself plays an important role in creating the mindset, business 
practices and competition culture for enterprises’769. Moreover, ‘such a blanket 
exemption will probably help many anticompetitive agreements escape the net of 
competition law in the context of Vietnam where statistics and data collection are still 
too difficult to help measuring, precisely, market shares’770.  
In contrast to the AML which defines monopolistic agreements as agreements, 
decisions or other concerted actions, the notion of ‘agreement’ in the VCL is unclear. 
Further, and similar to the AML, it also remains unclear whether tacit collusion 
would be condemned under the VCL. There is also no provision on exchange of 
information between competitors, so it is still unclear what type of information 
exchange is allowed. In fact, the term ‘agreement’ has not been defined anywhere in 
the VCL and the interpreting provisions in Decree No.116 on prohibited 
anticompetitive agreements are extremely poorly drafted. Article 14 and 21 of Decree 
No. 116 refer to ‘reaching agreement, taking joint action’, Article 15, 16, 17 and 18 
refer to ‘reaching agreement’ only, while Article  19 refers to ‘reaching agreement or 
taking joint action’ and Article 20 refers to ‘reaching agreement and taking joint 
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action’. As such, in some cases concerted practice will be condemned while in the 
others concerted practice can escape the prohibition, and according to Article 20 of 
Decree No.116
771
, an agreement that has been reached but has not been performed 
may technically not be caught since the element of ‘taking joint action’ is required. 
4.4.2. Exemptions 
Similar to China, Vietnam adopts the EU’s exemption and exception system instead 
of the US’s per se rule or rule of reason approach. The exemption system operates on 
the basis of individually-granted exemptions and must be applied for in advance. The 
granting of exemptions appears to be a politicized process, such that exemptions can 




The prohibited agreements shall be entitled to exemption if they satisfy one of the 
following criteria aimed at reducing prime costs
773
 and benefiting consumers:  
(1) It rationalizes an organizational structure or a business scale or increases business 
efficiency; 
(2) It promotes technical or technological progress or improves the quality of goods and 
services; 
(3) It promotes uniform applicability of quality standards and technical ratings of product 
types; 
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(4) It unifies conditions on trading, delivery of goods and payment, but does not relate to 
price or any pricing factors; 
(5) It increases the competitiveness of medium and small sized enterprises; 




As such, for an anti-competitive agreement to be exempted from the prohibition, it 
must satisfy one of the six above-mentioned circumstances, and it must have the 
purpose of reducing prime costs, and it must benefit consumers. Yet, even when an 
anti-competitive agreement satisfies those three conditions, it will not be exempted 
eternally but only ‘for a definite period’775. One may easily point out that providing 
that the anti-competitive agreement ‘must have the purpose of reducing costs’ is a 
pitfall of the VCL since it takes IP cooperation agreements, for instance, out of the 
scope of the exemption application. Such agreements may benefit consumers in the 
sense that it will bring more advanced products (better quality) though the potential 
product’s price may not go down.  
In contrast to the current Chinese regime, procedures for obtaining exemption in 
Vietnam are clearly set out in section 4 of Chapter 2 of the VCL. Parties to 
competition-restriction agreements which are granted exemption can only perform 
such agreement after they have a decision granting exemption from the Minister of 
Trade and Industry
776
. Such a decision may be revoked in the following 
circumstances: (1) upon discovery of fraud during application for exemption; (2) 
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when an enterprise granted exemption fails to fulfill the conditions and discharge the 
obligations within the time-limit stipulated in the decision granting exemption; and 
(3) when the conditions for exemption no longer exist
777
. In case agreements have 
been entered into prior to the granting of an exemption, Article 85(2) of Decree 
No.116 can be invoked to mitigate the sanction. Article 85(2) states that when 
calculating penalties, it may be an extenuating circumstance if the ‘conduct in breach 
has a positive impact on the development of the economy’.  
4.4.3. Trade associations 
Although the term ‘decisions by associations’ is not mentioned in Article 8 of the 
VCL, trade associations’ practices are well within the scope of the VCL778 and there 
is no general exemption applying to their activities. According to Article 47 of the 
VCL, trade associations are prohibited from engaging in discrimination by (1) 
refusing admission to or refusing withdrawal from the association by any 
organization or individual satisfying the conditions for admission or withdrawal, if 
such refusal constitutes discriminatory treatment and places such organization or 
individual at a competitive disadvantage or (2) unreasonably restricting the business 
activities or other activities involving a business objective of member enterprises.  
The penalty for violation of these prohibitions, however, is fine only
779
 and trade 
associations may not face a penalty as serious as deregistration like in the AML of 
China. If a trade association violates Article 8 of the VCL, it seems that only the 
                                                 
777
 Article 37 of the VCL.  
778
 See Article 2(2) of the VCL. 
779
 See Decree No.120/2005/ND-CP on Administrative Offences in the Field of Competition, dated 
Sept 30
th, 2005. This Decree is available at the Ministry of Justice’s website at 
http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=6560 
  195 
members are to be condemned (not the association itself or its officials) since Article 
8 does not mention trade associations and Article 9 specifically refers to the 
‘combined market share’ of the ‘parties to the agreement’. This mechanism is really a 
pitfall of the law because in the context of Vietnam, a trade association can play a 
very active role in organizing its members to reach a prohibited anti-competitive 
agreement (Chapter 2) and it will be unreasonable for the association itself not to be 
sanctioned.   
Case study: 
On 15 September 2008, at a CEO Conference organized by the Vietnam Association 
of Insurance, 15 non-life insurance companies agreed to sign in the Agreement on 
Cooperation among Insurance Companies in Motor Insurance and the Clause on the 
Rates of Premium in Motor Insurance (the Agreement) in which they agreed to fix the 
premium rates for car material insurance in specific numbers, i.e. the standard 
premium is 1,56%, the premium rates for transportation cars, cross-region passenger 
transportation cars, frozen goods transportation cars, front-engine cars and taxis are 
1,83%; 2,07%; 2,62%; 2,84%; and 3,95% respectively. On the basis of the Notice of 
the Vietnam Association of Insurance No. 226/HHBH/2008 on 18 September on the 
signing of cooperation agreements sent to the Association’s members, another four 
non-life insurance companies signed the above-mentioned Agreement, which made 
the total number of signing parties 19 companies. The Agreement came into effect on 
01 October 2008. 
On 18 November 2008, the Head of VCAD issued Decision no. 93/QD-QLCT on 
preliminary investigation on price-fixing related competition case provided in Article 
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8 of VCL. After more than one year of investigation, a hearing was held on 29 July 
2010. In this case, the relevant market was defined as the national automobile 
material insurance service market (see Part 4.4 on Market Definition above). The 
VCC concluded that the signing of the Agreement of the 19 investigated companies is 
the conduct provided for in Article 8 of the VCL and violated Article 9(2) of the VCL 
since the combined market share of the relating parties has exceeded 30% (according 
to the Council’s calculations, the 19 companies that entered into the Agreement 
accounted for 99,79% of market share of the whole market). From this finding, the 
VCC decided to impose a fine of 0,025% of the total revenue of the previous fiscal 
year on all participating insurance companies. As a result, 19 insurance companies, 




In a press release relating to the decision afterwards, the VCAD stated that the 
penalty was of a “warning nature”, and noted that this was due to factors including 
“low awareness” of competition law. The VCAD press release also indicated that 
penalties of a “warning nature” should not be expected going forward. Indeed, the 
press release states that “[f]rom now on, all and any practices in restraint of 
competition shall be strictly dealt with in accordance with the laws of Vietnam”781. 
Foreign commentators have opined that ‘the decision should be seen as a signal to the 
business community in Vietnam about the likelihood for more vigorous enforcement 
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of the VCL (and more significant penalties for identified violations of the law) going 
forward’782.  
4.5. Abuse of Market Dominant Position 
4.5.1 Market dominant position 
Provisions on abuse of dominance and monopoly are set out at Section 2 of Chapter 2 
of the VCL.  The VCL creates two different sets of presumptions and prohibited 
conducts, one applies to enterprises holding dominant positions, and the other applies 
to monopolists
783
, which may be a unique feature of the Vietnamese competition 
regime.  
What is also noteworthy is that under the Vietnamese competition regime, enterprises 
are deemed to be in a dominant position where their market share is 30 per cent or 
greater, or if they are ‘capable of restricting competition considerably’784. This 
provision has been vigorously criticized for several reasons. First, the 30% threshold 
is too low as compared to the thresholds in other competition regimes. For instance, 
under the U.S. approach, a firm with less than 50 percent market share is almost never 
presumed to hold monopoly power
785
 and the Supreme Court has held that monopoly 
power could be inferred from an 80 percent market share
786
. On the other hand, under 
the EU approach, the Commission presumes dominance at 50 percent market share 
and takes the view that a dominant position can generally be found when a firm has 
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40 percent to 45 percent market share
787
. This threshold is also lower than that in the 
AML which is 50% of the relevant market. Second, as Furse has commented, ‘it is 
perhaps unfortunate that the language here uses ‘or’ rather than ‘and’ since a market 
share of 30% does not necessarily mean that the enterprise holding it has the ability to 
restrict competition, let alone do so ‘considerably’788. As such, unlike the AML which 
assess the dominant status on several factors including market share, Vietnam’s 
competition regime assess market power purely on market share basis and it seems 
that this presumption is not rebuttable (although there has not been any case to prove 
this speculation). More dangerously, even an enterprise with less than 30 per cent of 
market share may still be found to hold market dominant position, and, thus, will be 
subject to stricter rules on their business conducts, which is an idiosyncratic feature of 
the Vietnamese regime – but consistent with the policy to protect local companies 
against large multinationals trying to establish a presence in Vietnam. The bases for 
determining capability of enterprise to substantially restrain competition include the 
financial capacity of the relevant enterprise, of the organizations and individuals 
which established the enterprise, of the organizations and individuals with the right to 
control or govern the operations of the enterprise, of the parent company; 
technological capability; ownership of or right to use intellectual property objects; 
and scale of distribution network
789
. One Vietnamese author, however, explained that  
‘the VCL 2004 has broadened the scope of firms holding dominant position and included 
those whose market shares do not reach the threshold yet they are still capable of 
substantially restraining competition… such an approach of the VCL should be welcome 
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since it entitles competent authorities to counter big corporations’ financial subsidy 
tactics for their subsidiaries’790. 
Collective dominance is also mentioned to and a group of enterprises shall be deemed 
to be in a dominant market position if they act together in order to restrain 
competition and fall into one of the following categories: 
(a) Two enterprises have a market share of fifty (50) per cent or more in the relevant 
market; 
(b) Three enterprises have a market share of sixty five (65) per cent or more in the 
relevant market; 




As such, similar to the AML, the VCL employs the market share ratio presumptions 
for collective dominance. However, there are still important divergences from the 
AML. First, unlike the AML, which also employs the market share ratio presumption, 
there is no exclusion of an enterprise with very low market share in assessing group 
dominance (the AML excludes those with market shares below 10% from this 
presumption), thus, even an enterprise with very low market share can still be caught 
by this presumption to be considered as holding a collective dominant position. 
However, in contrast to the AML’s vagueness, where the CR threshold are met, an 
individual act by one of the relevant enterprises will not be condemned by the VCL 
unless it is individually dominant since it is required that they ‘act together’ in order 
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to restrain competition
792
. Only if all relevant enterprises act in the same manner will 
a collective infringement be found. Second, it seems that these enterprises cannot 
rebut the presumption that they have market dominance once their combined market 
share reaches the threshold because Article 11 does not contain within it any measure 
which permits an enterprise to rebut the presumption of dominance. Although Article 
22 of Decree No.116 refers to bases for determining capability of enterprise to 
substantially restrain competition in relevant market, this provision is to be applied in 
the situation where an enterprise’s market share is below 30 per cent but it is still 
‘capable of substantially restraining competition’.  
A monopoly is defined as an enterprise which has no competitors for goods it trades 
or for services it provides on the relevant market
793
. It does not appear that the 
enterprise holding 100% market share is able to rebut the presumption that it is a 
monopoly, except to argue that the relevant market is broader. On this presumption, 
Furse has commented that ‘[w]hile this is perhaps more reasonable than is the case in 
the operation of low thresholds provided for in Article 11, it is nevertheless trite to 
point out that even an enterprise holding a 100 per cent market share may not, in all 
cases, hold significant market power’794. The reason is straightforward: if entry 
barriers are low, such an enterprise will not have market power. 
As such, market share plays a central role in determining market power and this is a 
unique feature of Vietnam’s competition regime. In explaining why this 30% 
threshold was chosen in the VCL, the Minister of Trade, while defending the 
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Competition Bill before the National Assembly, stated that anticompetitive 
agreements, conducts or concentration would only be prohibited if the involved 
enterprises had market power to a certain extent and the 30% threshold would be 
applied because it was applied in Germany and Canada and this threshold was also 
provided in the current Ordinance on Posting and Telecommunication of Vietnam to 
determine whether an enterprise held dominant market position
795
. However, it is 
submitted that there is a difference between providing an indicative minimum or 
presumption and stating it will be regarded as indicating dominance. 
Not to mention that the threshold of 30% is significantly lower than that in other 
competition jurisdictions (such as the US or the EU), the presumption of enterprises’ 
market power only from their market shares or concentration ratios (also based on 
market shares) is rather too simplistic from an economic perspective and is likely to 
result in incorrect conclusions. Consequently, competition agencies may apply 
sanctions to punish enterprises or prohibit agreements or transactions when these 
enterprises’ conducts, agreements or transactions do not have the capability of 
substantially restraining competition. As analysed above, to determine the market 
power of enterprises, competition agencies around the world would have to conduct 
comprehensive and complex analysis, in which market shares is only one factor to 
take into consideration. Although Vietnamese competition agencies are still green at 
implementing competition law and a provision allowing market power to be 
measured by market share would make law implementation less complicated for these 
agencies, focusing only on market power is likely to lead to inaccurate conclusions. 
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It’s submitted that other factors such as the HHI796, barriers to entry, barriers of 
expansion, buyer power, the ability to exclude competitors etc. should be considered 
into the law so that market power analysis becomes more accurate.  
4.5.2 Prohibited conducts 
Article 13 and 14 of VCL set out the prohibitions on abusive conducts. While the 
prohibitions in Article 13 apply to both enterprises with dominant position and 
monopolies, those in Article 14 place further restrictions on conduct by monopolies. 
No exemption is available to any prohibited conduct, in other words, these conducts 
are prohibited per se. It has been pointed out that such an approach ‘reflects the 
State’s strict attitude towards abuse of dominance conducts’797. However, this 
approach is too rigid and even risky given that some conducts may look abusive on 
the surface but is in fact pro-competitive and will bring efficiencies. 
In contrast to China’s approach, the VCL provides an exhaustive list of prohibited 
abuses of market dominance and monopoly. Enterprises holding dominant positions 
or monopolies are prohibited from doing the following: 
(1) Selling goods or providing services below total prime cost of the goods aimed at 
excluding competitors
798
. As such, this prohibition applies to predatory pricing, yet, 
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there is no requirement for “recoupment” element as in the US law, although this 
approach is similar to the EU and China’s regime.  
(2) Fixing an unreasonable selling or purchasing price or fixing a minimum re-selling 
price goods or services, thereby causing loss to customers. It appears that this 
provision is intended to condemn exploitative pricing. ‘Unreasonable’ purchasing 
price is defined as purchasing price which is less than the prime cost of producing 
products and services
799
. Fixing a selling price shall be deemed unreasonable if the 
average retail price set for a minimum period of sixty (60) consecutive days increases 
once at more than 5%; or increases a number of times at a total level of more than 5% 
of the selling price prior to such minimum period
800. Regarding ‘fixing a minimum 
re-selling price goods or services, thereby causing loss to customers’ (RPM), 
unfortunately, no further guidance was given by Decree No.116 on this type of 
practice. This provision is worrisome, as Furse has commented, ‘[i]n effect this rubric 
appears to introduce as part of the Vietnamese antitrust law a price-control 
mechanism operating in respect of all enterprises which are either dominant or are 
monopolists’801.  
(3) Restraining production or distribution of goods or services, limiting the market, or 
impeding technical or technological development, thereby causing loss to 
customers
802
. This prohibition seems to apply to refusal to trade, although there is no 
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reference to the “essential facility” doctrine and there is also no requirement of 
‘without valid justification’ as provided in the AML. Such a provision is dangerous in 
the sense that it may create an obligation on firms with market power to deal with 
third parties in all circumstances.  
(4) Applying different commercial conditions to the same transactions aimed at 
creating inequality in competition
803
.  
(5) Imposing conditions on other enterprises signing contracts for the purchase and 
sale of goods and services or forcing other enterprises to agree to obligations which 
are not related in a direct way to the subject matter of the contract
804
. 
(6) Preventing market participation by new competitors
805
.  
                                                                                                                                           
first kind of practice include (a) cutting down on the amount of goods or services supplied compared to 
the amount of goods or services supplied previously in conditions where there are no large fluctuations 
in the supply and demand relationship; where there is no economic crisis, natural disaster or 
destruction by an enemy; where there is no significant technical breakdown; or where there is no 
emergency situation; (b) fixing the amount of goods or services to be supplied at a level sufficient to 
create a market shortage; (c) hoarding goods and not selling them in order to create instability. The 
second kind of abuse means supplying goods or services in only one or a number of specified 
geographical areas or purchasing goods or services from only one or a number of specified sources, 
except where other sources of supply fail to satisfy the conditions set by the purchaser and such 
conditions are both reasonable and consistent with normal commercial practice. The final abuse means 
purchasing a patent, utility solution or industrial design in order to destroy it or keep it from being used 
or threatening or coercing a person engaged in research into technical or technological development to 
suspend or abandon such research. 
803
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In addition to the above restrictions
806
, monopolistic enterprises are further prohibited 
from: 
(1) imposing unfavorable conditions on customers; and  
(2) using the monopoly power held to unilaterally modify or cancel the contracts 
already signed without plausible reasons
807
.  
The first prohibited conduct was explained as imposing conditions, which can cause 
difficulty to the customer during the process of performance of the contract
808
 (see the 
analysis in the case study below). The second prohibition was explained as 
unilaterally changing or canceling a signed contract without prior notice to the 
customer where there is no liability to bear any sanction or based on one or more 
reasons not directly related to essential conditions in order to continue to implement 




This case concerned the conduct of Vietnam Aviation Petroleum Company 
(Vinapco)
810
, the only aviation fuel supplier in Vietnam, in suspending the supply of 
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jet fuel to JetStar Pacific Airlines (Jetstar)
811
 on 1 April 2008 due to a dispute over 
the level of service fee. 
Up to the time of the dispute, Vinapco had been supplying jet fuel to Jetstar under a 
contract signed on 31 December 2007.  According to this contract, the service fee 
imposed on Jetstar is VND 593,000 per tonne of fuel. The contract also provides that 
when there is a change of service fee, Vinapco will be obligated to inform Jetstar via 
fax and if any dispute arises from the Contract, the two parties must negotiate to 
resolve the dispute first.  Failing such negotiations, the dispute shall be referred to the 
Economic Court of Hanoi City. Lastly, any amendment of the contract must be in 
writing signed by both parties. 
Things had been going well until in the middle of March 2008 when Vinapco 
informed Jetstar that the service fee would be increased to VND 750,000 per tonne 
effective from 1 April 2008.  Jetstar refused to accept this new fee, essentially on the 
basis of inequality with Vietnam Airlines, the national flag carrier and is also 
Vinapco's parent company.  Following some exchanges of correspondences, on 28 
March 2008, Vinapco sent Jetstar a written ultimatum demanding Jetstar to accept the 
new fee otherwise fuel supply would be suspended from 1 April 2008.  On 00h00 on 
1 April 2008, since Jetstar had not accepted the new fee, Vinapco suspended the fuel 
supply to Jetstar, causing Jetstar to cancel and delay a number of flights and suffer 
substantial damage.  Fortunately, upon direction from the Civil Aviation 
Administration Agency under the Ministry of Transport, fuel supply was resumed 
later on the same day. 
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This triggered an investigation by the VCAD into whether Vinapco had abused its 
monopoly position.   On 2 January 2009, the VCAD recommended to the VCC that 
Vinapco, as a monopoly business in Vietnam, had contravened two prohibitions in the 
Competition Law namely “imposing disadvantageous terms on a customer” (Article 
14.2) and “using the monopoly position to modify or terminate unilaterally the 
contract without valid reasons” (Article 14.3). The VCC delivered a decision on 14 
April 2009 in which it upheld the recommendations of the VCAD that Vinapco had 
committed two above-mentioned conducts prohibited by the VCL. 
First, the Council found that Vinapco had imposed unfavourable conditions on a 
customer. Vinapco unilaterally imposed a new service fee on Jetstar without 
following the procedures set out in the contract which require negotiations or court 
decision to settle differences and that any amendment of the Contract must be in 
writing.  By unilaterally terminating the negotiations that it was not entitled to do 
under the Contract, Vinapco forced Jetstar to accept unconditionally the new service 
fee.  Such act is inconsistent with the terms of the Contract and caused a lot of 
difficulties for Jetstar as it had to cancel and delay a number of flights.   
Second, the Council found that Vinapco, by terminating the discussions on the new 
service fee, had unilaterally terminated or modified the Contract without complying 
with the procedure set out in the contract and such unilateral modification or 
termination of the contract was without a valid excuse. Delayed payment was the only 
ground in the contract which would entitle Vinapco to suspend fuel supply but there 
was no delayed payment in this case.  Disagreement over the service fee is not a valid 
ground on which Vinapco may terminate the Contract.  
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From the above finding, the Council ordered Vinapco to pay a fine of VND 
3,378,086,700, equal to 0.05% of its revenue in 2007, the year preceding the 
contraventions. In addition, the Council recommended that Vinapco be separated 
from Vietnam Airlines, that other companies be licensed to provide aviation fuel and 
that state administration over this service be strengthened
812
.  
Upon the appeal of Vinapco, about two months later, the VCC issued a decision in 




4.6. Control of Economic Concentrations  
4.6.1. The concept of ‘economic concentration’ 
Under the Vietnamese regime, economic concentration is an open concept which 
includes, inter alia, mergers, consolidations, acquisitions and joint venture
814
. 
Definition of these concepts is provided in Article 17 as follows: 
1. Merger of enterprises means the transfer by one or more enterprise(s) of all of its 
lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to another enterprise and at the same time 
the termination of the existence of the merging enterprise(s). 
2. Consolidation of enterprises means the transfer by two or more enterprises of all of 
their lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to form one new enterprise and at the 
same time the termination of the existence of the consolidating enterprises. 
                                                 
812
 Decision No. 11/QD-HDXL of the Competition Case Handling Council on Handling the Case of 
Vietnam Aviation Petrol Company (Vinapco) Pausing Fuel Supply to Jetstar Pacific Airlines on 14 April 2009. 
813
 Decision No. 10/QD-HDCT of the VCC on the Appeal of Vinapco against Decision No.11/QD-
HDXL of the Competition Case Handling Council on 26 June 2009. 
814
 Article 16 of the VCL 
  209 
3. Acquisition of an enterprise means the purchase by one enterprise of all or part of the 
assets of another enterprise sufficient to control or govern the activities of one or all of 
the trades of the acquired enterprise
815
.  
4. Joint venture between enterprises means two or more enterprises together contribute a 
portion of their lawful assets, rights, obligations and interests to form a new enterprise. 
Unlike the AML of China, Vietnam’s merger control regime does not mention either 
a ‘vertical merger’ or a ‘conglomerate merger’. The VCL uses the combined market 
share, which is defined as the total market share in the relevant market of the 
participating enterprises in an economic concentration
816
, as the only ground for 
merger review. The relevant product market is defined as a market comprising of 
goods or services that can be substituted for each other
817
. This means that the VCL 
only controls horizontal mergers, and ‘mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, and 
joint-ventures that do not occur in the same relevant market are not within the 
purview of the VCL’818. ‘It may be that the drafters of the VCL were reluctant to find 
proper measures to control these types of mergers because of their 
complicatedness’819. However, this is truly a loophole of the VCL because 
economists have long pointed out the possible adverse effect of vertical mergers and 
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conglomerate mergers on competition, which means that these mergers should also be 
under control. Another pitfall in the VCL, but similar to Chinese regime, is that there 
is no mention of controlling interlocking directorate, which occurs when the same 
person sits on the board of directors of two or more firms. It is well known in 
competition law that interlocking directorate may lead to reduction in inter-firm 
rivalry. 
4.6.2. Pre-merger notification requirements  
Similar to the Chinese regime, pre-merger notification is compulsory however, there 
is no exception for intra-enterprise concentrations as in China’s regime. Where 
enterprises participating in an economic concentration have a combined market share 
in the relevant market of from thirty (30) per cent to fifty (50) per cent, the legal 
representative of such enterprises must notify the administrative body for competition 
prior to carrying out the economic concentration
820
. It was explained that ‘an 
enterprise with 30% of market share is deemed to hold market dominant position and 
will be put under control, in consistence with such an approach, an enterprise as a 
result of the economic concentration with a market share from 30% should also be put 
under control by the notification mechanism’821.  
Notification is not required where the enterprise after the economic concentration still 
falls within the category of medium and small sized enterprises
822
. An SME is defined 
as (1) an enterprise with the charter capital not over VND 100 bn (USD 200 ml) or 
the annual average number of employees not exceeding 300 (in agriculture, forestry, 
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fishery, industry and construction sectors) or (2) an enterprise with the charter capital 
not over VND 50 bn (USD 100 ml) or the annual average number of employees not 
exceeding 100 (in service and commerce sectors)
823
.  
In contrast to the AML, which uses turnover thresholds for merger notification, the 
VCL uses market share thresholds. This approach will bring difficulties to enterprises 
because ‘the definition of a relevant market, and the determination of shares within 
that market are both matters which may be contested’824. According to a recent 
VCAD’s report, since the VCL took effect, there have been only 20 notified 
concentrations (either by written documents or by oral consultation with VCAD), as 
such, ‘the number of concentrations notified to VCAD is still modest as compared to 
the actual concentrations carried out in Vietnam’s market, above 100 concentrations, 
which reveals that concentrations that reach the notification threshold are still rare in 
Vietnam’825. On the other hand, another reason for this few number of notified 
concentration is because ‘requirement of concentration notification based on market 
share threshold make many enterprises ‘believe’ that their combined market share 
does not reach this threshold’826. VCAD admitted that ‘[d]efining market share in the 
relevant market is a complicated technical task, which make relevant enterprises feel 
confused’827. Therefore, the VCAD appears to be in favour of revising the law to 
incorporate a notification requirement based on turnover. 
4.6.3. The review process of concentrations 
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The review process contains two basic steps. First, VCAD must notify in writing to 
the applicant, in seven working days, whether the notification dossier is complete
828
. 
Second, once a complete notification dossier has been accepted by the VCAD, in 45 
working days
829
, it will make one of two decisions: (a) that the concentration does not 
fall within one of the prohibitions; or (b) that the concentration is prohibited under 
Article 18 of the VCL. In the latter case the VCAD is required to ‘clearly state’ its 
reasons for applying the prohibition in writing. Yet, since the VCL makes no 
reference to the competition test, it’s very likely that the only reason may be limited 
to a statement of the finding that the market share thresholds that invoke the 
prohibition are satisfied
830
. In the event that the merging parties disagree with 
VCAD’s decision, they can lodge an appeal to the Minister of Trade and Industry 
according to the normal administrative review procedure
831
. 
Unlike China’s regime which requires the MOFCOM to publish only negative 
decisions, the VCL requires competition agencies to publish all concentration 
decisions in writing. The relevant enterprises may conduct procedures for the 
economic concentration only after having received a written reply from the 
administrative body for competition that the economic concentration is not within the 
prohibited category
832
. During the drafting process, it was proposed that the VCL 
should allow parties to automatically carry out the notified economic concentration if 
they do not receive any written reply at the expiry date of the time-limit for reply to 
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notification of economic concentration, however, there was a concern that such an 
approach might lead to abuse by both competition agencies and relevant 
enterprises
833
, in the end, the final version of the VCL adopted the second view. 
Unfortunately, and this is different from the Chinese regime, the VCL and its 
implementing decrees are silent on whether related parties have the right of defense 
before VCAD and whether VCAD must open a hearing during the merger review 
process. Further, there is no requirement that VCAD officials have the obligation to 
keep the relevant parties’ trade secret as confidential.  
4.6.4. Prohibited concentrations 
In contrast to China’s regime which considers various factors before deciding 
whether to prohibit a concentration, Vietnam’s competition law prohibits any 
concentration where the enterprises participating in the economic concentration have 
a combined market share in the relevant market of more than fifty (50) per cent
834
. In 
other words, there is no attempt to analyze the effect of the concentration using either 
the SIEC (Significantly Impede Effective Competition) test as in the EU or the SLC 
(Substantial Lessening of Competition) test as in the US in Vietnam. Further, even an 
intra-enterprise concentration can still be prohibited if it results in a combined market 
share of more than 50% in the relevant market (unless it is exempted). The lawmakers 
explained for this approach as follows:  
‘the Bill prohibits economic concentration that results in an enterprise with more than 
50% of the market share in the relevant market since such an enterprise will inevitably 
                                                 
833
 Duong & Nguyen, supra note 806, p.39. 
834
 Article 18 of the VCL 
  214 
have the ability to control the market. It’s necessary to set out the above-mentioned 
threshold for economic concentration prohibition in order to prevent mergers, 
acquisition, consolidation or joint ventures by multinational corporations that, in 
essence, have the purpose of eliminating Vietnamese trading partners in order to 
abolish competition, and annul the emergence of small and medium enterprises”835.  
Needless to say, this approach has been severely criticized by commentators. Furse 
rightly pointed out that ‘the analysis of the merger may, unless the parties seek to rely 
on exemptions in Article 19, be devoid of any economic reasoning, save for a 
formalistic market-share calculation exercise’836. Aware of this pitfall of this merger 
control regime, VCAD recently has proposed that ‘there should be reasonable criteria 
to distinguish economic concentrations that truly harm competition on the market and 
those which may bring benefits to the economy’837. 
According to Article 19 of the VCL, a prohibited concentration can be exempted 
where: 
(1) One or more of the parties participating in the economic concentration is or are 
at risk of being dissolved or of becoming bankrupt
838
. This suggests that the failing 
firm defense is accepted in Vietnam. However, there are no further criteria specified 
in the VCL as to the determination of the immediacy of the failure, or as to the 
consideration of whether other, less restrictive, arrangements might exist which 
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would mitigate against the failure
839
. The Minister of Industry and Trade has the 
power to grant this type of exemption.  
(2) The economic concentration has the effect of extension of export or contribution 
to socio-economic development and/or to technical and technological progress
840
. It 
appears that Vietnam also accepts the efficiency defense. However, the wording of 
this exemption is ‘so general that it can extend to a wide range of claimed benefits, 
including, inter alia, efficiencies, saving jobs, industrial restructuring, the creation of 
national champions (also expressly recognized in the first clause), and environmental 
considerations’841. To further this concern, only the Prime Minister has the power to 
grant this type of exemption and unlike other competition case decisions, this 
decision cannot be appealed, which suggests a highly politicized process and this 
exemption might be used as a tool to implement industrial policy. For instance, it can 
be used to clear mergers among big SOEs to promote “national champions” in the 
name of ‘extension of export’ or ‘contribution to socio-economic development’. 
Indeed, the reason for providing for this exemption, as explained by the Vietnamese 
government, is  
‘from the starting point of a small economy, Vietnam needs powerful enterprises… thus 
the Competition Bill has provided for exemptions including contribution to socio-
economic development and increasing the competition ability of Vietnamese enterprises 
in international markets… Providing for this exemption will entitle the Communist Party 
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and the State to carry out the policy of creating powerful State-owned groups which will 
be able to compete in the world market’842. 
In short, ‘the granting of exemptions is somewhat politicized given the vagueness of 
some of the exemption criteria and by virtue of the fact that in certain cases the power 
to grant an exemption is vested exclusively in the Prime Minister’843. 
In practice, so far, merger control provisions in the VCL have not been widely used. 
Some concentrations have actually been notified to VCAD and all have been cleared. 
The reason, as explained by VCAD, is ‘[d]ue to the fact that most of enterprises are 
SMEs and the majority of economic concentrations are small and medium-sized 
transactions, the number of concentrations under merger control review is still 
modest’844. 
4.6.5. Conditioned concentration 
Unlike the AML, the VCL does not have any provisions on conditioned 
concentrations. Therefore, all concentrations that result in an enterprise with more 
than 50% of the market share in the relevant market will be prohibited, regardless of 
whether the anticompetitive effects can be prevented or restricted or not, unless 
exemptions are granted. From the concerns about the integration and economic 
development process when Vietnam faces fierce competition from big foreign firms 
and needs strong local corporations to compete with them, this approach is very 
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 First Reading before the National Assembly by the Government on the Competition Law Bill, April 
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 VCAD, supra note 818, p.60; see also Pham Duy Nghia, ‘The Legal Corridor for Mergers and 
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rigid
845
. Further, since a concentration with participating firms having a combined 
market share in the relevant market of more than 50 per cent may be granted an 
exemption, ‘these exemptions will legalize competition restriction effects of some 
economic concentrations if competition law does not provide for merger remedies’846. 
In fact, the VCL does refer to ‘measures remedying consequences’ including 
restructure of an enterprise which abuses its dominant market position; and division 
or separation of enterprises which merged or consolidated; compulsory re-sale of that 
part of an enterprise which was acquired
847
. However, in essence, these measures are 
far different from the so-called merger remedies since they can only be applied ex 
post, i.e. after a violation of merger control has been found, whereas merger remedies 
can be applied either ex ante or ex post. Moreover, merger remedies aim at changing 
the result of merger reviews, i.e. allowing mergers with benefits while still 
maintaining competition rather than prohibiting them, the measures provided in the 
VCL only aim at remedying the consequences of a violation of merger control. 
4.6.6. National security review 
Unlike the Chinese regime, there is no separate national security review in Vietnam. 
4.7. Abuses of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Similar to the AML, Vietnam’s competition law also has provisions requiring all 
government entities not to intervene unreasonably to market activities and create 
negative impacts on competition. One Vietnamese author has explained that ‘Chinese 
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people have created the term ‘administrative monopolies’ to refer to privileges 
enjoyed by SOEs as a result of State administrative body’s assistance rather than their 
own competition’848. This term is also well-known and often used in the Vietnamese 
context
849
 though the term is not mentioned in the VCL.  
Article 6 of the VCL states that State administrative bodies shall not be permitted to 
perform the following acts in order to hinder competition in the market: 
(1) forcing an enterprise, organization or individual to purchase or sell goods or services 
with an enterprise appointed by such body, except for goods and services belonging to 
State monopoly sectors or in cases of emergency as stipulated by law; 
(2) discriminating between enterprises; 
(3) forcing industry associations or enterprises to associate with each other aimed at 
excluding, restraining or hindering other enterprises from competing in the market; and  
(4) other practices which hinder the lawful business activities of enterprises. 
Pham explained that this provision was actually drafted based on a similar provision 
in the Unfair Competition Act 1993 of China: 
‘During the drafting process of China’s competition law, the Chinese drafters 
speculated a separate chapter including of five articles to deal with administrative 
monopolies… Learning from those ideas, Vietnamese drafters transformed the Chinese 
competition bill’s chapter on administrative monopolies into only one article with four 
paragraphs respectively’850.  
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As such, in contrast to competition law in developed countries, which normally 
regulates competition practices of private entities only, competition law in (former) 
socialist economies, including China and Vietnam, have to prevent competition 
distortion that comes from public entities. These provisions are typical in (former) 
socialist economies where government entities in these countries directly ran the 
economy in the past and are reluctant to give up their involvement in business life. 
However, a noteworthy difference between the AML and the VCL on abuse of 
administrative power is that the AML appears to put more emphasis on regulating 
abuse of administrative power (especially regional blockage) with more articles and 
more specific details
851
. The possible reason, as analyzed in Chapter 2, is because 
provincialism in Vietnam is not as serious a problem as in China taking into account 
Vietnam’s much smaller size and the central government’s less dependence on local 
ones. 
Similar to China’s AML, a clear pitfall in Vietnam’s competition law is that there is 
no sanctions behind those prohibitions which are intended to protect competition. The 
competition agencies in both countries also appear to play no role in preventing such 
abuses of administrative power. The VCL prescribes no specific remedy for abuses of 
administrative power to restrict or distort competition and Decree No.06/2006 only 
mentions that VCAD has the power to identify and put forward suggestions to the 
relevant State agency on documents that are inconsistent with the VCL’s 
provisions
852
, and it is up to the relevant agency to pay attention to this suggestion or 
not. Thus, one Vietnamese author has raised a question that ‘[w]hat can a competition 
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agency do to deter the Government, various Ministries and provinces from 
intervening in competition and protecting their own enterprises?’853. In short, 
prohibitions on abuse of administrative power in both the AML and the VCL simply 
play the role of raising some awareness among administrative agencies about their 
proper roles and sending a positive signal of the intention to build a market economy 
in these countries.    
4.8. The Interface between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights  
Unlike the AML, which at least prohibits the abuse of intellectual property rights to 
eliminate or restrict market competition
854
, the VCL has no specific provision to 
govern the relationship between competition law and IPRs. The VCL only refers to 
and forbids some unfair competition conducts such as misleading instructions (Article 
40) and infringement of business secrets (Article 41), moreover, other two unfair 
competition practices have been added in the IP Law 2005, including (1) using a 
trademark that is registered and/or protected in other member of Paris Convention on 
Industrial Property Protection without consent of the overseas owner; and (2) 
registering or possessing a domain name for the purpose of misleading or exploiting 
reputation of a certain trademark, trade name or geographical indication
855
. However, 
these unfair competition conducts normally do not fall into the intersection between 
competition and IP law. It is also noteworthy that, in this respect, the VCL may 
function like a supplement tool for IP protection rather than prove itself as a barrier to 
limit IPR exercise for market efficiency and public interest. Indeed, the VCL provides 
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that ‘other bodies authorized to impose penalties for unfair competitive practices 
relating to intellectual property shall do so in accordance with the laws on dealing 
with administrative offences’856, which can be understood as depriving the 
competition agencies of the power to impose penalties for unfair competitive 
practices relating to intellectual property. 
In short, there is a vacuum in the VCL regarding the intersection between competition 
law and IP law since it makes no reference to abuse of market dominance arising 
from IPRs or using license agreements to hide anticompetitive agreements, which lie 
at the center of the intersection between competition and IP law. Yet, some 
intersection related to vertical issues can be found in IP laws and regulations, namely 
compulsory licensing and licensing contract. 
Compulsory licensing 
Compulsory licensing is provided in Chapter 10 of the Intellectual Property Law 2005 
according to which, compulsory licensing can be applied to owners of inventions and 
plant varieties. Inventions are subjected to compulsory licensing following a decision 
of the competent authority regardless of the owner’s consensus when, inter alia, ‘the 
owner of the invention is considered as exercising competition restriction practices 
prohibited by competition law’ [emphasis added] 857.  
In accordance with international IP protection standard, compulsory licensing in 
Vietnam is subject to certain limitations to reserve rights and benefits of the owners. 
These limitations include: (1) Compulsory license is not exclusive one; i.e the 
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licensee shall not enjoy an exclusive right of using the invention; (2) Compulsory 
license is limited in scope and duration that are sufficient to meet licensing objectives, 
and largely for the domestic market; (3) The licensee is not allowed to transfer the use 
of license, unless he/she sell out all  of his/her business; (4) The licensee has to pay 
the owner a reasonable licensing fee based on the economic value of the invention in 
real conditions and compliant with the compensation bracket set by the competent 
authority; (5) The owner of the main invention may request the grant-back licensing 
of dependent invention with reasonable price and conditions
858
. In any case, the 
invention owner also has the right to request the termination of the compulsory 
license when the bases for licensing no longer exist and are unlikely to recur, 
provided that such termination shall not be prejudicial to the licensee
859
. Compulory 
licensing on plant varieties is provided in the Article 195 with conditions and 
limitations similar to those applied to invention.  
According to IP regulations, different government entities may be involved in 
compulsory licensing decisions. In case compulsory licensing is resulted from a 
misconduct of the owner, including refusal to deal, inactivation or other anti-
competitive behaviors, the Ministry of Science and Technology makes decision on 
invention licensing; the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Healthcare make 
decision on plant variety licensing for agricultural and medical plants. It is 
noteworthy that IP Law does not mention the role of competition authority regarding 
anti-competition aspects of compulsory licensing process. 
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In practice, the only case in which a compulsory license was almost decided was 
reported in 2005, when Vietnam was seriously impacted from bird flu epidemic. 
However, in the end, no action was taken after that as bird flu was prevented 




In order to prevent IP owner from misuse or abuse of his/her exclusive rights, IP Law 
does not allow any contract term that imposes unreasonable restrictions on licensee,  
particularly those do not derive from the rights of the licensor by nature. The 
following terms are prohibited in licensing contracts:  
(1) Terms that prohibit the licensee to improve the industrial property object (trademark 
excluded), compelling the licensee to transfer or grant-back to the licensor any 
improvements of the industrial property object free of charge;  
(2) Terms that directly or indirectly restricting the licensee to export goods produced or 
services related to licensing contract to a country/territory where the licensor neither 
holds the respective industrial property rights nor has the exclusive right to import such 
goods;  
(3) Terms that compel the licensee to purchase raw materials, components or equipment 
from the licensor or a third party designated by the licensor exceeding the purpose of 
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ensuring the quality of goods produced or services provided by the licensee;  
(4) Terms that deprive the right of the licensee to file complaint or lawsuit against the 
validation of the related IP rights of the licensor
861
. 
Any clauses in the contract falling into the above categories shall be ex-officio 
invalid
862
. In essence, these provisions are similar to the Chinese regime which also 
prohibits contracts that illegally monopolize technologies, hinder technical 
progress or infringe upon technological products of others
863
. 
As for horizontal agreements, similar to the case of China, the VCL also has no 
specific regulation for horizontal issues related to IPRs, namely patent pool and cross 
licensing, which raise important questions about the relationship between IP and 
competition law. The most relevant provisions that may be found in the VCL are 
provisions on exemptions. Technically, undertakings participating in a horizontal 
agreement related to IP utility may refer to one of these exemptions, for example, 
they may rely on the business efficiency ground, to defense themselves before the 
competition agencies. Yet, so far there has not been any case to prove this 
speculation. Moreover, the VCL shares another similarity with the AML that it has 
not directly addressed refusals to license IPRs.  
In terms of competition and IP law enforcement agencies in Vietnam, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MOIT) is the government body in charge of the competition law 
enforcement. Under the Ministry, the VCAD fulfills investigations on anti 
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competition practices, then report to the VCC for reviewing and deciding remedies. 
Meanwhile, IP law is enforced by three other ministries. Ministry of Science and 
Technology takes responsibility of industrial property protection, Ministry of Culture, 
Sport and Tourism handles copyright matters and plant varieties issues belong to 
Ministry of Agriculture. In addition, the law also authorizes other entities to deal with 
IP infringement, including police, custom, market inspector and court. The most 
important point is that the role of the competition agency in dealing with competition 
aspects of all these procedures is still unclear. 
Lastly, although Article 7(2) of the Law on Intellectual Property Rights 2005 sets out 
the principle that ‘the exercise of intellectual property rights shall not infringe upon 
interests of the state, the public or legitimate rights and interests of other 
organizations, individuals and shall not violate other applicable provisions of relevant 
law’, there is no clear link between the IP Law 2005 with the VCL. The fact that the 
intersections between competition law and IP law have not been dealt with in 
Vietnam may be attributed to the law making tradition of the country in which 
drafting work are separately assigned to various ministries who are in charge of 
specific matters yet there is lack of connection and cooperation among them. It has 
been proposed that IP Law and Competition Law need to be harmonized to make use 
of their intersections for economic efficiency, and these intersections can be dealt 




4.9. Procedural Matters and Remedies  
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4.9.1. Administrative enforcement and penalties 
Investigation into parties who are suspected of breaching the VCL may be 
commenced either at the initiative of the VCAD or on receipt of a complaint dossier 
from a complainant. Investigation cannot be initiated by the VCC, which becomes 
involved in competition cases only when a case is passed to it by the VCAD. 
The two primary forms of sanction are ‘warning’ and fines865, two additional 
penalties are revocation of business certificates and confiscation of materials used for 
the commission of violations
866
. Decree No.120 states that these additional penalties 
may be imposed, ‘depending on the nature and seriousness of a breach’867.  
In the case of breaches of the provisions on restrictive agreements, abuses of 
dominant positions or monopoly, and concentration, a fine of up to ten (10) per cent 
of the turnover of the breaching parties in the fiscal year preceding that of violation 
will be imposed. Similar to Chinese regime, neither the VCL nor the implementing 
decrees explicitly limits such penalties to sales revenue derived from business 
operations in Vietnam or from the relevant market. In determining the level of 
penalty, the following factors are to be considered: (1) the level of restraint of 
competition caused by the practice in breach; (2) the amount of loss caused by the 
practice in breach caused; (3)  the capability of the entity in breach to restrain 
competition; (4) the period of time during which the practice in breach occurred; (5) 
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Parties may also agree to voluntarily terminate alleged infringements. Where they do 
so the presumption appears to be that proceedings will be terminated at that point as 
long as the Head of VCAD proposes a stay of the case, or where the complainant has 
voluntarily withdrawn their complaint. In both cases the VCL states that the party 




Other ‘measures remedying consequences’ include: (1) restructure of an enterprise 
which abuses its dominant market position; (2) division or separation of enterprises 
which merged or consolidated; compulsory re-sale of that part of an enterprise which 
was acquired; (3) public rectification; (4) removal of illegal terms and conditions 
from a contract or business transaction; and (5) other measures necessary to remedy 
the effects of the restraint on competition caused by the practice in breach
870
. 
Remedies for concentrations that have been unlawfully entered into are provided in 
the Decree No.120 on Dealing with Breaches. The Decree provides that in addition to 
the imposition of penalties (mainly fines), the merging parties may be subject to 
compulsory demerger from the merged enterprise and the merged enterprise may be 
subject to compulsory split in order to restore the former status quo
871
. Similarly, 
where assets have been acquired such that an illegal concentration has occurred, the 
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acquiring enterprise may be compulsorily required to re-sell the assets it acquired
872
. 
Unfortunately, the Decree is silent on the procedure to be applied, and on the 
approach to be taken in circumstances where it is difficult or impossible to force a 
divestiture. 
Leniency Policy 
It has been well known among competition agencies around the world that leniency 
policies play a very important role in discovering and handling anti-competitive 
agreements. Thus, it is really a pitfall of the VCL since there is a lack of clear and 
comprehensive provisions on leniency programs for cartel members who voluntarily 
report about the cartel and provide evidence. Decree No.116 does set out a list of 
extenuating circumstances to be taken into account when penalties are assessed 
including ‘voluntary testimony of the conduct in breach prior to its discovery by the 
competent body’ and ‘the offender has voluntarily provided evidence or information 
relating to the breach to the competent body which was previously unknown to such 
body’873. However, in essence, ‘[t]his is not truly a leniency program… since there is 
no provision on the number of parties to be granted leniency policy, the extent to 
which the first notifying party will be exempted from penalties, confidentiality 
protection mechanism and schedule and procedure for granting leniency’874. Further, 
competition agencies can only apply these extenuating circumstances ex post and 
‘potential whistle-blowers have no means of determining ex ante the rewards of 
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coming forward’875. It is hoped that VCAD will soon correct this pitfall by 
introducing a leniency program through a separate guideline.  
4.9.2. Administrative and judicial review of the competition agencies’ enforcement 
Under the Vietnamese regime, there is a right to appeal against decisions taken by the 
VCC by applying for an administrative review
876
 and bringing an administrative 
action (i.e. challenging the decision in the administrative court)
877
. Thus, aggrieved 
parties are required to apply for administrative reconsideration by the VCC before 
initiating an administrative lawsuit against the VCC’s administrative review decision. 
The time limitation for such an administrative action is 30 (thirty) days after the 
aggrieved parties received the VCC’s administrative review decision878. Where an 
administrative decision is found to be unlawful, there exists in Vietnam a right to 
claim damages in accordance with the Law on State’ Compensation Liabilities and 
Civil Procedure Code 2005
879
. The procedures for administrative and judicial review 
in general are respectively governed by the Law on Administrative Review and Law 
on Administrative Litigation 2010. 
4.9.3. Private actions and damages 
Private actions against business operators  
In contrast to China, Vietnam does not allow private actions. Article 58 of the VCL 
only states that aggrieved parties have the right to lodge a complaint to the VCAD 
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against the infringing parties
880. It’s notable that Article 71 of the VCL makes 
provision in respect of ‘persons with interests and obligations related to competition 
cases’, who may file independent claims or participate in competition cases on the 
side of either complainants or those under investigation. These persons have the same 
rights in the proceedings as those persons on whose ‘side’ they enter the case. 
In terms of damages, Article 117(3) contains within it a provision which requires 
those who have caused ‘damage to the interests of the State, [or the] legitimate rights 
and interests of other organizations or individuals’ to pay compensation according to 
the provisions of the Law. Article 6 of Decree No.120 reinforces this rule, stating 
that: 
[a]ny organization or individual breaching the laws on competition, thereby causing loss 
to the interests of the State or to the lawful rights and interests of other organizations and 
individuals, must pay compensation for such loss.  
This means the VCC cannot itself order damages but injured parties must bring a 
separate action to claim damages. However, actions for damages can only be brought 
following the making of an infringement decision by the VCC
881
. The procedure 
under which actions for compensation may be brought is the general civil procedure 
and the most important governing statute is the Civil Procedure Code 2005. It should 
be noted that the basic principle of damages according to Vietnamese civil law is that 
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damages cannot exceed actual damage, thus multiple damages are not allowed under 
Vietnam’s competition regime.  
Private actions against administrative monopolies 
The VCL is silent on whether private parties can directly challenge abuses of 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition that are prohibited in Article 
6 of the VCL. However, technically, such private actions against administrative 
monopolies are possible under the Law on Administrative Litigation 2010 which 
states that aggrieved parties are allowed to start an administrative action against an 
‘administrative decision’882 and an ‘administrative decision’ is defined as  
a document issued by an administrative agency on a specific issue in administration 
activities which is applied once to one or more specific entities [emphasis added]
883
.  
Thus, similar to the situation in China, it appears that the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court regarding private actions against administrative monopolies is 
very limited and general administrative rules, decisions, or orders are not reviewable 
by courts. Abstract conducts such as a local government orally requiring or issuing a 
notice to require all local State agencies to consume only locally produced goods or to 
use only local contractors etc. may not be actionable. The time limitation for an 
administrative action is 1 (one) year after the aggrieved parties received or knew 
about the relevant administrative decision
884
, which is longer than the limitation 
applied to judicial review of the VCC’s administrative review decision. In terms of 
compensation, where an administrative decision is found to be an abuse of 
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administrative power under the VCL, there exists in Vietnam a right for injured 
parties to claim damages in accordance with the Law on State’ Compensation 
Liabilities and Civil Procedure Code 2005
885
. 
4.9.4. Criminal sanctions  
In contrast to China’s regime, there is no criminal penalty for violations of 
competition law under the Vietnamese regime. The VCL itself does not prescribe 
criminal penalties for anticompetitive practices
886
. Further, one supreme principle of 
Vietnamese criminal law is that ‘only those who commit one or more crimes 
specified in the Criminal Code will have to bear criminal liability’887. The Criminal 
Code, however, has not prescribed any crime that technically can cover an 
anticompetitive practice
888
. Thus, it is safe for the time being to say that 
anticompetitive practices, including hard core cartels, are not subject to criminal 
sanctions in Vietnam. 
4.10. Conclusion  
Similar to the AML and most other competition jurisdictions in the world, Vietnam’s 
competition law has provisions to regulate the three standard types of anticompetitive 
practices namely anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance and 
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. However, there are still important 
divergences that come from Vietnam’s specific historical, economic and political 
conditions: 
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First, the VCL has specific provisions tailored to be appropriate with its market 
conditions – a socialist market economy – including provisions regarding SOEs in 
important economic sectors, trade associations, and prohibitions of administrative 
monopolies (although also similar to the AML, the VCL lacks an effective 
mechanism for competition authorities to sanction or correct those public abusive 
conducts). The inclusion of public anti-competitive practices in competition law is far 
different from competition law in more mature antitrust jurisdictions which are 
normally concerned with anti-competitive private practices, yet it is in line with the 
competition regime in China and some transitional countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe. 
Second, similar to the AML, the language of the VCL on the goals of competition law 
is so ambiguous and flexible (with the reference of ‘State interests’, ‘public interests’, 
other enterprises’ interests etc.) that it gives the State wide discretion in pursuing 
industrial policies when it deems necessary and should be worrisome for the business.  
Third, in terms of substantive rules, similar to China, Vietnam’s competition regime 
seems to be more influenced by the EU’s model than the U.S.’s model (e.g. the VCL 
adopts the EU’s exemption and exception system instead of the US’s per se rule and 
rule of reason approach), which is similar to the case of China’s antimonopoly 
regime. However, Vietnam’s competition law also contains certain features that are 
unique. As Brault puts it, ‘[t]his law contains commonly used concepts in competition 
law, yet it also includes certain elements that make readers surprised’889. For instance, 
in terms of market definition, the VCL has some very important divergence from 
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other jurisdictions’ approach and introduced a unique Vietnamese version of SSNIP 
test, which may result in inaccurate conclusions and has been treated as useless in 
reality. Regarding anticompetitive agreements, the VCL does not make a clear 
distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements and the prohibitions, 
technically, can only be applied to horizontal agreements. Of the so called hard core 
cartels, only bid rigging is prohibited outright, the other hard core cartels such as 
price fixing, market sharing and output limitation are subject to the exemption 
system. It is hard to understand why these “naked” cartels, which are often considered 
as would always or almost always tend to restrict competition, should not be punished 
according to the per se rule, too. The most noteworthy provisions of Vietnam’s 
competition regime are the provisions on abuses of market dominant position. 
Interestingly, the VCL creates two different sets of presumptions and prohibited 
conducts, one applies to enterprises holding MDP and the other applies to 
monopolistic enterprises. While more mature antitrust jurisdiction defines MDP on 
the ground of both price control and power to exclude factors, the VCL bases merely 
on market share to define MDP and the threshold for this purpose is 30%, which is a 
very low threshold as compared to other competition jurisdictions. What is more 
worrisome is that even an enterprise with less than 30% of market share may still be 
considered as holding the MDP. Similar to China, Vietnam also follows the EU’s 
model and adopts the concept of “collective dominance” based on market share 
presumption. However, in contrast to the Chinese regime, the presumptions of 
dominance (either single dominance or collective dominance) based on market share 
are not rebuttable in Vietnam. Regarding prohibited abusive conducts, while other 
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jurisdictions give enterprises a chance to justify their prohibited conducts, Vietnam 
prohibits these conducts per se and no exemption is applicable. It should also be 
noted that similar to China, Vietnam follows the EU’s model (but contrast to the US’s 
model) and prohibits excessive pricing. In terms of merger control, although Vietnam 
uses the concept of “concentration”, the VCL, technically, can only be applied to 
horizontal mergers. There is a compulsory pre-merger notification requirement using 
market share as the threshold for notification, which is more difficult and less 
predictable than China’s turnover threshold. Moreover, Vietnam prohibits 
concentration solely on the ground of market share and even intra-enterprise 
concentration can still be prohibited unless they are exempted. Finally, in contrast to 
China’s merger control, Vietnam does not have conditional approval and does not 
have a separate national security review. The reason for this lack of a national 
security review, perhaps, is while Vietnam had to enact a competition law right 
before its WTO entry, China only enacted its antimonopoly law six years after its 
WTO accession and so had more time to witness the impact of international 
competition on domestic enterprises. In fact, as analyzed in Chapter 1, the most 
important and direct forces that accelerated the adoption of the AML in 2007 was the 
Chinese government’s concerns of the high rate of foreign acquisition of Chinese 
firms (including SOEs), which was not the case in Vietnam. 
Fourth, regarding procedures and remedies, similar to China, Vietnam’s competition 
regime relies heavily on administrative investigations and remedies with very serious 
penalties of up to 10% of the previous fiscal year revenue. However, in contrast to 
Chinese regime, private actions to enforce competition law against business operators 
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are not allowed. Vietnam allows private parties to claim damages, yet multiple 
damages are not accepted. Finally, while antimonopoly practices are potentially 
subject to criminal sanctions in China, it is not the case in Vietnam. 
Overall, China’s competition regime appears to be more comprehensive, more 
sophisticated, and more aligned with mature antitrust jurisdictions than the VCL. For 
instance, Vietnam’s competition law does not have an extra-territorial application as 
in the case of China. Further, the VCL still lacks a great number of important 
doctrines and provisions such as the ‘effects doctrine’, ‘essential facility’, ‘merger 
remedies’, leniency program etc., and there is also no distinction between ‘vertical 
restraint’ and ‘horizontal restraint’, between ‘horizontal mergers’, ‘vertical mergers’ 
and ‘conglomerate mergers’ etc. In fact, during the drafting process, some of the 
weaknesses of the competition bill had been raised but it was argued by the 
administrative authority that ‘Vietnam’s market is not yet developed and the 
complexity of competition practices in Vietnam is not yet very high’890. This, of 
course, is not a convincing excuse, and CUTS have rightly pointed out that ‘at present 
and in the foreseeable future, with this high-speed development, it is very likely that 
markets will be well ahead of competition law’891. 
To understand the reason for the relatively poor quality of the VCL, one has to look 
back at the historical legislative of the VCL (Chapter 2). The VCL was enacted in the 
context when Vietnam made its best effort to entry the WTO as soon as possible, thus 
the poor drafting of the VCL can be attributed to the quick drafting process – only 
three years. While China spent almost thirteen years on discussing and drafting its 
                                                 
890
 CUTS, supra note 715, p.6. 
891
 CUTS, ibid.  
  237 
AML, Vietnam couldn’t afford that time period. The result was a Competition Law 
with various weaknesses and loopholes
892
. 
                                                 
892
 As Brault puts it, ‘the VCL seems to be appropriate for the very first stage of an economy which 
wants to go in the direction of a ‘market’ economy but has not been able to move its feet from the 
past’, see Brault, supra note 735. 
  238 
SECTION III – CHALLENGES IN ENFORCING COMPETITION LAW IN 
CHINA AND VIETNAM  
Chapter 5 – Challenges in Enforcing the Anti-Monopoly Law in China 
5.1. The Lack of a Unified, Independent and Competent Competition Agency  
The structure of the antimonopoly enforcement agencies 
The AML provides for a two-layered enforcement system. The first layer is the 
Antimonopoly Commission (AMC), which is responsible for ‘organizing, 
coordinating and guiding antimonopoly work’893 (i.e. taking the central role in 
organizing the application of the AML). Below that, the second layer is the 
Antimonopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs), which are responsible for the day-
to-day activities involved in enforcing the AML
894
.  
More specifically, the AMC is an advisory and coordinating organ and is under the 
control of the State Council
895
. The functions of the AMC include: (1) studying and 
drafting related competition policies; (2) organizing the investigation and assessment 
of overall competition situations in the market, and issuing assessment reports; (3) 
constituting and issuing anti-monopoly guidelines; (4) coordinating anti-monopoly 
administrative law enforcement; and (5) other functions as assigned by the State 
Council
896
. The State Council stipulates composition and working rules of the 
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AMC
897
. The composition of the AMC was introduced by the State Council in 2008. 
Accordingly, the AMC is composed of representatives of various Ministries and 
sectors
898
. The working rules of the AMC were also approved by the State Council on 
13 September 2008.  
Authority for actual enforcement of specific cases is shared among three agencies of 
the central government. The Antimonopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) conducts merger review. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), a powerful macroeconomic planning body, has jurisdiction 
over price-related violations of the rules against monopoly agreements and abuse of 
dominance
899
. The State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) has 
authority over non-price related violations of the same provisions. It expanded its 
previous program for administering the 1993 AUCL to include AML enforcement 
under a new Antimonopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau
900
. 
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Additionally, where necessary the AMEAs may assign enforcement duties to 
corresponding bodies within the provincial, regional, or municipal people's 
governments
901
. In other words, though provincial governments have no anti-
monopoly enforcement responsibilities of their own, such responsibilities may be 
delegated to them (it should be noted, however, that the AMEAs cannot delegate 
enforcement power to authorities below the provincial level)
902
. On the one hand, this 
provision has been criticised as giving rise to the possibility of a fragmented 
enforcement mechanism. As explained by Wang, due to the fact that the AMEAs at 
the central level is not a unified agency, the AMEAs’ local branches will be those 
relevant departments at the provincial level having a vertical relationship with 
MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC
903
. This fragmented structure would aggravate the 
difficulty of ensuring consistent and unified application of the AML
904
. On the other 
hand, this arrangement may be a realistic one since the workload might be too heavy 
if all monopoly cases had to be handled by central AMEAs given China’s immense 
size, and the lack of resources available to the AMEAs
905
. 
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Overall, this institutional arrangement has been widely criticized for the risks of 
inefficient and inconsistent enforcement of the law
906
. In reality, the leniency program 
is an area where inconsistency is already evident in the implementing rules of the 
SAIC and NDRC
907
. Firstly, distinguishing 'price-related' and 'non-price' violations 
may prove impossible
908
. Where a single course of anti-competitive conduct 
combines pricing practices with other non-price measures, it is unclear whether and 
how the SAIC and NDRC will coordinate their investigations
909
. Further, and more 
importantly, due to their different roles in the Chinese government and 
responsibilities for different portfolios of non-competition matters and policies, the 
three AMEAs may embrace different views about the proper goals of competition 
policy and consequently take divergent views in AML enforcement actions involving 
the same or similar conduct
910
. More specifically, it has been observed that 
‘…of the three AMEAs, MOFCOM appears to be the most sensitive to widely accepted 
competition policy goals such as promoting efficiency and consumer welfare. NDRC is 
                                                 
906
 E.g., Wang Xiaoye, ‘Challenges in Enforcing Chinese Antimonopoly Law’, (2008) 1:1 American 
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(‘Having three parallel competition law enforcement agencies would not only be inefficient, but it may 
also create conflict and friction between the three agencies’); Huang, supra note 9, p.126 (‘turf battles 
between the enforcement agencies will be inevitable, and efficient enforcement of the AML will be 
sacrificed’); Furse, supra note 5, at 2-1.08 (‘The institutional structure within which the AML is to be 
applied is somewhat murky. … and it is likely that tensions will arise in balancing the various 
objectives of the Law within this structure’); Harris, supra note 8, p.171 (‘this approach may cause 
interagency conflicts while creating inconsistencies and inefficiencies in policy development; 
administrative practices; and enforcement procedures, standards and decisions’); Harris, Wang, Zhang, 
Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, pp.265-266 (‘this two-tier, multiple enforcer model adds to the 
complexities of AML enforcement and creates the risk of inconsistent application of the law... Such 
inconsistencies may undermine the objective of creating a unified antitrust law and successfully 
advocating for the establishment of a “competition culture” broadly embraced by the Chinese 
businesses and consumers’). 
907
 See Chapter 3 for more analysis. 
908
 Bush, supra note 469. 
909
 Bush, ibid. 
910
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.265; Bush, ibid. (‘the SAIC and the 
NDRC may embrace divergent approaches to defining markets, gauging market power and weighing 
the interests of consumers and competitors when applying the many public-interest exceptions of the 
AML’). 
  242 
viewed as more sympathetic to industrial policy and economic central planning, while 
SAIC is perceived as more protective of smaller, mainly domestic entities, particularly as 
against foreign competitors, in part because of its close relationships with local Chinese 
businesses and industries’911.  
Having multiple, conflicting views of competition law will likely result in less 
authority and independence for any and all of the agencies because no enforcer may 
have the legal authority to override any decision by an alternative enforcer’s decision 
not to enforce the AML against a specific wrongdoer
912
. Nevertheless, it has been 
reported that, in order to solve the ambiguities and potential overlaps of jurisdiction, 
MOFCOM, SAIC, and NDRC have agreed to a principle of “whoever initiates a case 
first must investigate”913. 
The current structure of AML enforcement agencies as a political compromise 
As commented by Zheng, despite the accomplishments of the AML, there are certain 
things that the AML has not changed and one of which is China’s tripartite antitrust 
enforcement structure that predated the AML
914
. In fact, the question of “who is the 
antimonopoly enforcement agency?” is widely believed to be among the key ones that 
led to the prolongation of the AML’s drafting process915. At the time of drafting the 
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AML, China has several departments that separately handle antimonopoly issues 
namely MOFCOM, SAIC and NDRC
916
.  During the AML drafting process, it was 
suggested that ‘the future authority ought to be a uniform, independent, professional, 
and authoritative agency’917 and various proposed options include alternatives such as 
allocating enforcement authority among the three incumbent agencies, granting 
MOFCOM sole authority to enforce all aspects of the law, or creating a new 
independent governmental body under the State Council
918
. However, at that point of 
time, a centralized and independent agency was highly unlikely to occur since ‘the 
current administration has promised not to create any new agencies in the rest of its 
term’919. Further, and more importantly, ‘even though the benefits of a unified, 
independent AMEA make it a good policy choice, existing government agencies have 
strong and divergent interests’920. This legislative compromise, therefore, may have 
been necessary, because it helped promote the promulgation of the AML and avoid an 
immediate fight with three existing agencies
921
. In the end, ‘after heated debate, the 
legislature eventually adopted a dual mode for AML enforcement and oversight: the 
State Council will create anti-monopoly enforcement agencies, and then an anti-
                                                 
916
 MOFCOM was responsible for the establishment of a unified, open, and orderly market competition 
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monopoly commission on top of them’922 to coordinate enforcement efforts and 
formulate policy anticipating the risks of inconsistent enforcement and bureaucratic 
deadlock
923
. As such, establishment of the AMC is imperative as compensation for 
the absence of a unified anti-monopoly enforcement agency in China
924
. Although 
this institutional arrangement has failed to establish a unified AML enforcement 
agency in China, it may still ‘leave space for functional adjustment and further 
organizational restructuring in the future’925. 
The lack of independence of AMEAs 
As explained by Geradin, ‘the difficulty with antitrust rules, of course, is that they are 
drafted in broad terms and thus leave a great deal of discretionary power to the 
enforcing authorities’ thus, ‘the danger of political and business-related interferences 
is particularly grave’926. This requirement of an independent enforcement agency is 
even more important in the context of China given that the task of the AML is to fight 
not only dominant SOEs but also government’s acts of abusing administrative powers 
to restrict competition
927
. Unfortunately, China’s current enforcement framework is 
far from satisfying such a precondition for an effective AML enforcement:  
‘The AMEAs are located at a level in the administrative hierarchy lower than that of 
a ministry. Such a lowly status will render the AMEAs incapable of investigating 
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dominant undertakings and tackling sector-specific restrictive behavior, such as those 




Indeed, the AMEAs are not the only agencies that could impact on competition in 
China. Numerous incumbent monopolists exist in the sectors of telecommunications, 
post, railway, electricity, banking, and many others and each sector has been 
supervised by an industrial regulator based on a law or regulation
929
. After the 
separation of the government and the enterprises, the original industry governing 
authority naturally becomes the industry supervisory body, e.g., the Civil Aviation 
Administration, the State Postal Services Administration, and the Ministry of 
Railway, etc. Nevertheless, it is often the case that these supervisory bodies have 
various kinds of relationships with the supervised enterprises and, therefore, cannot 
really supervise these companies independently
930
. Unfortunately, the adopted AML 
fails to include any explanation of the relationship between the AMEAs and other 
regulators
931
. This means there would be a problem of coordination between the 
industry supervision department and the antitrust enforcement department
932
 and the 
jurisdiction of the AMEAs over the anticompetitive conduct in the regulated sectors 
might bring about difficult political issues
933
. In the Internet industry, for instance, the 
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Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the authority responsible 
for the administration of the Internet industry, may also have the privilege or intention 
to handle competition issues raised in the Internet industry
934
.  The recent Interim 
Rules for Supervision and Management of Internet Information Service Market (Draft 
for Comment) promulgated by MIIT contains similar regulations as the AUCL and 
the AML
935
. Unless this problem is resolved by granting the AMEAs clear and 
decisive jurisdiction over the anticompetitive conduct of regulated industries, ‘the 
resulting uncertainty may keep a large sector of the market outside of the effective 
scope of the AML’936. Powerful sector-specific regulators may seriously challenge 
the AML’s effectiveness and authority937. Hence, the enactment of the AML is just 
the beginning of Chinese anti-monopoly legislation, not to be taken as the finishing 
touch to such a prolonged, conflict-driven, and interest-oriented process
938
. 
Some commentators have pointed out that the creation of the AMC directly under the 
State Council appears partially to resolve the concern that anti-monopoly departments 
within each existing AMEA might be too low in the Chinese administrative hierarchy 
to investigate or take decisions against other government agencies abusing their 
powers to restrict competition or against large SOEs in key industries, all of which 
have significant influence in political and economic life in China
939
. However, the 
AMC comprises heads of several sectoral regulators or other government ministries 
as commissioners, including the heads of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
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Technology (MIIT), the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), SIPO, and the regulators of the banking, securities, insurance 
and electricity industries. ‘The opinions of those non-AMEA agencies thus may be 
reflected in the development of competition policy through the AMC’940 and there is 
no guarantee that competition policy should prevail the industrial policies that are 
implemented by them. At best, these non-antitrust regulators’ approach to how 
antitrust enforcement should be applied is a complete unknown at this stage
941
. 
Further, in a ‘socialist rule of law’ and one-ruling party country like China, all State 
institutions including the AMC and AMEAs are not free from political interference. 
As Chen has pointed out, what is currently advocated in China is not rule of law but 
socialist rule of law, thus, embracing the rule of law does not mean giving up or 
diminishing the leadership of the CCP
942
. In theory, the principle of the leadership of 
the Party is proclaimed in all important official discourse relating to law
943
. In 
practice, the principle of the leadership of the Party is also institutionalized in the 
authority of Party committees and Party secretaries at different levels of the state 
hierarchy and in non-governmental but state-sponsored institutions
944
. As pointed out 
by Shen, membership of the CCP has grown from 50 million in 1921 to more than 80 
million in 2011
945
. The party’s constitution stipulated that it should establish 
grassroots units throughout China and it is through these ubiquitous units that the 
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CCP has penetrated into every corner of society and maintains effective organization 
of the country and Chinese society
946
. Consequently, no State agency, including the 
AMC and the AMEAs, is free from political interference and when there are conflicts 
between competition policy and industrial policies, competition policy may have to 
give way to the industrial policies that are being pursued by the CCP
947
. 
The current lack of expertise of AMEAs 
As Former US FTC Commissioner Kovacic puts it, ‘[o]ne should never forget the 
human dimension of reform and a new law will only be successful if it is to be 
implemented by enforcers with capabilities and experience’948. ‘Much of the AML’s 
ambiguity stems directly from the inclusion of abstract foreign antitrust doctrines’949 
and given that China is a very new antitrust jurisdiction, ‘[i]t is not realistic for the 
international antitrust community to expect that Chinese antitrust can immediately 
implement nuanced analysis of complex concepts, such as market definition, ease of 
entry, and efficiencies’950.  
The AMC is composed of the principals of relevant departments and organs of the 
State Council and certain experts but the majority of the departments and 
organizations of the State Council have experience in implementing only industrial 
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policy and are generally not expert in competition law
951
. Similarly, the AMEAs are 
also constrained by a lack of sufficiently trained staff. Even though the AMEAs have 
been involved in administering a fragmented range of laws incorporating 
antimonopoly elements which predate the AML such as the Price Law and the 
AUCL, enforcement of these pre-AML laws has been limited and in many respects 
incohesive, neither the NDRC nor the SAIC brought well developed investigation and 
enforcement methodology to their AML-related roles
952
. While the SAIC is 
understood to have around 1,000 competition enforcement staff at all levels, only a 
small fraction of these are highly trained and involved in coordinating efforts at the 
national level
953
. At the NDRC, the staffing situation is understood to be even more 
problematic. Thus, in the short to medium term, resourcing limitations are likely to 
cause SAIC and NDRC to be very selective in choosing investigation targets
954
. 
However, each of the AMEAs is continuing to hold regular seminars and training 
sessions to improve the capabilities of staff with AML-related responsibilities. 
Additionally, the SAIC and NDRC are taking steps to facilitate better case 
management by, and coordination with, their subordinate offices at provincial levels 
to some key enforcement tasks have been delegated
955
. Of the three AMEAs, 
MOFCOM appears to be best equipped agency and has a number of staff economists 
available to assist with merger review. Anecdotal reports indicate that, at least, in 
some particularly complex proposed transactions, MOFCOM has retained outside 
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economists to assist with its investigations (the use of third party expertise)
956
. So far, 
while some divergence between MOFCOM’s decisions and the review practices of 
other major regimes continue, there has been growing transparency of the regime as 
well as evidence of increasingly sophisticated review process and methodology
957
. 
Admittedly, the ‘lack of expertise’ problem is faced by all newly established antitrust 
jurisdictions, not only by a socialist country like China, and will be resolved 
overtime. One pragmatic way to solve the problem is to enhance international 
cooperation with other competition agencies in the world
958
. Another pragmatic way 
to solve the problem of competence is to increase the transparency of procedures, 
which will help increase the quality of the decision making
959
. Unfortunately, Asian 
countries in general and China in particular ‘do not have a tradition of discussion and 
disagreement with private parties in the context of public decision making’960. Thus, 
‘the different relationship between government and private enterprise, and 
particularly the absence of a history of judicial review, will make Chinese antitrust 
very different’961. 
                                                 
956
 Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & Evrard, supra note 119, p.154. 
957
 Ha, Hickin & O’Brien, supra note 571. 
958
 It is comforting to know that the Chinese AMEAs have signed three Anti-trust Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOUs) with their counterparts in other jurisdictions.  The SAIC and NDRC signed 
two MOUs on competition law with the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in November 2010 and 
January 2011. NDRC, MOFCOM and SAIC signed an MOU with their US counterparts, the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) on July 27, 2011, see Susan Ning 
& Ding Liang, ‘China: The PRC Antimonopoly Enforcement Agencies and the US Antitrust Agencies 
signed Antitrust MOU’, available at http://www.mondaq.com on 01 August 2011. 
959
 Geradin, supra note 926, p.210 (‘Lack of transparency in the investigative and decision making 
processes may negatively affect the quality of the decision making as the quality of a decision is often 
linked to the ability of parties to make their views known’). 
960
 Geradin, ibid., p.201 (‘Asian countries in general do not have a tradition of discussion and 
disagreement with private parties in the context of public decision making, hence the dialogue that 
typically takes place between investigated firms and antitrust authorities in US or EU countries, is, in 
Asian countries, largely absent’.  
961
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5.2 The Lack of an Independent and Competent Judicial System 
Structure of the Chinese judicial system 
The judicial power in China is exercised by the People’s Courts962. The Chinese court 
system is a centralized one, with a four-tier hierarchy. The Supreme People’s Court is 
at the top of this hierarchy, below which are Provincial High Courts, then 
Intermediate People’s Courts, and finally Primary People’s Courts963.  
Primary People’s Courts are established at the district and county levels and in 
smaller municipalities. They serve as courts of first instance for most matters
964
. 
Intermediate People’s Courts are established at the prefectural level, in municipalities 
directly under the provincial governments, and within municipalities directly under 
the central government (the major cities of Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing)
965
. They serve as courts of first instance for most proceedings involving 
foreign parties and for complex cases
966
, and as appellate courts for cases first heard 
in the basic people’s courts967. Provincial High Courts are the highest courts at the 
provincial level, in autonomous regions and in the four municipalities under the 
central government
968
. They serve as appellate courts for cases first heard in the 
intermediate people’s courts969. They also may serve as first instance courts for 
disputes that are of particular importance or that meet higher jurisdictional thresholds. 
                                                                                                                                           
other as equals who often have long working relationships. It is the ultimate requirement to justify 
enforcement decisions to a neutral, honest and independent judge that makes this possible’). 
962
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963
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Finally, the Supreme People’s Court is the highest court in China970. It supervises the 
administration of justice by all other courts and serves as the appellate court for cases 
heard in the higher people’s courts971. The SPC also has the authority to interpret the 
law under delegation from the National People’s Congress972. 
A typical case is heard by a collegiate bench of three judges although for some simple 
or small cases the bench may consist of a single judge
973
. An appeal may only be 
made once up the hierarchy
974
, thus if a case originates in the Intermediate People’s 
Courts, an appeal can only be made to the Provincial High Courts. It is also 
noteworthy that China’s civil law system does not recognize the principle of stare 
decisis
975
 and judgments tend to be brief, with few reasons given for the decision 
taken, thus it may be difficult, if not impossible, for prospective litigants to assess 
their likely success based on past cases
976
.  
The jurisdiction on handling with antimonopoly cases has been assigned to the IP 
courts. On July 31, 2008, China announced that its specialized IP courts have 
jurisdiction over anti-monopoly law cases. IP courts in China are expected to be 
better equipped in dealing with complex economic concepts under competition law 
than China’s general judiciary977. Further, this arrangement also arguably provides a 
                                                 
970
 Article 29 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts. 
971
 Article 29 & 31 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts. 
972
 Article 32 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts. 
973
 Article 10 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts. 
974
 Article 12 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts 
975
 However, in practice opinions of the SPC on points of law are highly persuasive, including upon the 
SPC itself. Further, the people’s court may refer questions of law to the courts above them, whose 
application of the law must be followed by the lower courts, see Harris, Wang, Zhang, Cohen & 
Evrard, supra note 119, p.306. 
976
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-5.18. 
977
 ‘China’s First Anti-monopoly Law Takes Effect’, Xinhua Net, Aug. 1, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/01/content_8901182.htm 
  253 
convenient avenue to deal with possible conflicts between IP law and the AML
978
. 
The SPC has also set up a special antimonopoly bench within the IP Division
979
. This 
special bench is equipped with certain powers, and a few judges are specifically 
responsible for trying and studying antimonopoly cases
980




Why is the Chinese judiciary not independent from political interference? 
Observers frequently assert that the Chinese courts lack independence and 
impartiality
982
. Indeed, although the Chinese Constitution and the Organic Law of the 
Courts state that the People's Courts shall exercise their judicial power 
independently
983
, ‘in practice there is not much institutional guarantee of judicial 
independence’984 due to the following reasons. 
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First, in terms of ideology, China does not recognize the doctrine of separation of 
powers and in China, ‘the judiciary is not intended to be an institution that checks and 
balances the other branches of the government; instead, the judiciary, along with 
everyone else, is expected to ‘follow the leadership’ of the Communist Party and the 
governments at all levels’985.  
The court in China remains subordinate to the People’s Congress at each level of 
government
986. Thus, the Supreme People’s Court is responsible to and reports to the 
National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee while local People’s Courts 
are responsible to and report to local people’s congresses and their standing 
committees. In the Chinese system, courts do not create norms on their own, and their 
primary function is to apply laws made by the law-making body
987
. Although the 
Supreme Court may to some extent actually create norms through judicial 
interpretation, all courts must, in theory or in institution design, uphold the principle 
of supremacy of the representative and deliberative organs, and refrain from judicial 
examination of laws or regional rules and regulations
988
. This logic extends to an 
explicit ruling that courts are unable to carry on judicial examination of 
administrative regulations and administration in the abstract that formulates the rules 
and decisions
989
. Moreover, the legal obligations of other government entities to 
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enforce or obey court decisions are not adequately established, and court decisions 
are often ignored as a result
990
.  
More importantly, the courts are expressly subject to Party leadership and are called 
upon to realize the requirements of the “three supremes” – the supremacy of the 
Party’s cause, the supremacy of the interests of the people, and the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the law
991
. In 2006, China launched a campaign called “socialist rule 
of law theory” to emphasize to Chinese judges the need to follow the leadership of 
the Party – distinguishing “rule of law” from “socialist rule of law”, with the latter 
emphasizing the importance for the legal system of following the Party’s 
leadership
992
. The leading Party official who announced the campaign also explained 
that it is needed to prevent the “negative influence of Western rule of law theory” on 
the courts
993
. In reality, local judges remain very much subject to the influence and 
control of Party officials and "complex" cases are still often assigned to adjudication 
committees that are answerable to central government officials
994
. It should also be 
noted that there is no law regulating the power or operation of the Party. Unlike acts 
of administrative organs which can be challenged under the Law of Administrative 
                                                                                                                                           
universal decisions, and the legality and constitutionality of instructions, and may lead to the relevant 
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Litigation, acts of Party organs and officials and rules or policies made by them are 
not justiciable before the courts
995
.  
Second, in terms of institutions, all levels of courts must be responsible to and be 
supervised by National People’s Congress of corresponding level, expressed in 
periodic personnel appointments and dismissals by the representative and deliberative 
organs, and regular work reports and acceptance of interpellation by the chief Judge 
to the National People’s Congress996. Thus, judges are appointed and removed by the 
people’s congresses997, further, judges' salaries and other benefits in local courts are 
provided by the local governments, leading to influence by local governments over 
judges' decisions
998
. It has been reported that local courts often make decisions based 
on the influence of local government or Party officials or other well-connected 
individuals and it is not uncommon for officials to approach judges to inquire about a 
pending case and to express their view on the case
999
. Further, local administrative 
organs and party officials often influence judges to decide in favor of the party that 
contributes significant revenue to the local economy
1000
.  
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To conclude, in an authoritarian system like China, the courts are politically weak and 
depend upon legislative and Party support
1001
. Chinese courts continue to play a 
complementary role to political-administrative mechanisms in dispute resolution and 
an even more limited role in the making of key policies1002. Outside agencies – 
including higher courts as well as the local and central Party apparatus - frequently 
influence rulings behind the scenes
1003. Thus, as cautioned by Lubman, ‘to study 
Chinese law, we should carefully avoid a “court-centered” perspective’1004. 
According to a recent review of China’s legal development, courts have ‘never 
become important, in an absolute sense, in the resolution of economic disputes in 
China’, and after a dozen years of reform since the mid-1990s, courts may have 
become ‘even less important relative to other institutions [of dispute resolution]’ 
although they have nevertheless increasingly used for rights-based litigation
1005
. Of 
course, blanket denunciations of the lack of meaningful judicial independence fail to 
capture a much more complex reality that the courts handle over eight million cases a 
year and judicial independence is not an issue in many cases, nor is the source, 
likelihood or impact of interference the same across cases
1006
. Nevertheless, as in 
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other authoritarian regimes, there are likely to be limits on judicial independence in 
China, most notably in political cases that are perceived to challenge the ruling 
regime’s grip on power1007.  
Now that China’s economy has become more and more market-based, ‘if courts are to 
play the role in market competition that they ought, they must maintain strict 
neutrality and have final decision-making powers’1008. Further, as a WTO member, 
China also needs to strengthen the rule of law and independence of its judicial 
system. GATT transparency requirements are likely to mandate more expansive 
reforms, possibly including the removal of Party committees and Party-led 
adjudication committees from judicial decision making – in practice as well as in 
formality
1009. However, ‘[i]n the new leadership there are no signs, as yet, that anyone 
has a particularly strong idea about how, for instance, to deepen the rule of law in the 
country by allowing genuinely independent courts’1010. Although notions of checks 
on and supervision of the exercise of power have been incorporated into official 
discourse in contemporary China, issues like “separation of powers” and “multi-party 
elections” are still within the “forbidden zone” of discourse1011. In the report of the 
NPC Standing Committee presented to the annual session of the National People’s 
Congress in March 2009, Wu Bangguo, who is ranked second in the CCP Politburo 
Standing Committee Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, emphatically 
declared that China ‘would definitely not adopt a Western-style political system, and 
would definitely not practice multi-party politics, “separation of powers” or 
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“bicameralism”’ and made a solemn ‘six nos’ declaration1012. ‘The now infamous “six 
nos” are no multiple party system, no diversity in ideology, no checks and balances, 
no two-chamber parliament, no federal republic and no privatisation’1013. 
Perhaps as a result of this lack of independence, since the AML went into effect, 
although private citizens of China have been quite aggressive in seeking remedies 
against what they perceive as monopolies banned by the AML
1014
, the courts have 
been a bit reluctant to take up antimonopoly cases and many antimonopoly cases 
were dismissed by the courts
1015
. It is also predicted that courts may be reluctant to 
hear cases involving SOEs or foreign multinationals, or involving particularly 
complex issues, before more authoritative guidance is provided on the appropriate 
handling of such cases
1016
. 
The lack of expertise to deal with antimonopoly cases 
As explained by Fu, proactive judging is the key to civil justice in China
1017
. While 
Chinese judges dominate the process because of pre-trial investigation involvement, 
the parties become passive participants and have to place great reliance on the 
competence and integrity of judges
1018
. Unfortunately, although much progress has 
been made in the development of the Chinese judiciary in the last three decades and 
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there has been a steady and significant rise in the judges’ average level of education 
and professional training over the years
1019
, law enforcement in China is still 
hampered by the limited experience of China’s courts (which traditionally have been 
devoted to criminal matters) with civil law proceedings, and the limited training of 
judges and other judicial personnel
1020
. Until recently, a large portion of Chinese 
judges were selected from retired military officers and they generally have no formal 
legal training or experience
1021
. Thus, ‘it remains doubtful whether Chinese judges - 
most of whom are not trained in economics or experienced in business - will be 
competent to handle antitrust cases brought under the AML’1022. Prospects for 
adjudication of private anti-monopoly claims have raised many concerns from both 
international and Chinese commentators
1023
. In fact, there was considerable debate 
during the drafting of the Law as to whether it should grant third party rights directly 
enforceable in the civil courts, with some commentators arguing that the judicial 
architecture did not have the necessary expertise to deal with such cases
1024
. Some 
commentators have proposed the establishment of special competition court or special 
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competition divisions of a few courts in major cities throughout China to ‘help ensure 
that enforcement of China’s new competition law will conform to internationally 
accepted norms of competition law and economic theory and will develop throughout 
the country in a consistent and uniform manner’1025. 
Arguably, the lack of expertise of the court can be solved to some extent by the 
assistance of the litigants’ lawyers and outside experts during the litigation process. 
Unfortunately, because AML litigation practice still is relatively new in China, in 
most cases well-established, officially sanctioned economic experts and economic 
institutions may not yet exist to provide reliable economic analysis for AML 
cases
1026
. Moreover, even though the number of lawyers in China has increased very 
fast during the last two decades, this number is still modest as compared to the 
number of judges and public prosecutors
1027
. Finally, Chinese lawyers may also lack 
experience with antitrust law. 
Given that the AML is the China’s first comprehensive competition law, Chinese 
judges themselves recognize that they have limited experience in dealing with 
antitrust issues, although this is likely to change rapidly as the judiciary dedicates 
substantial study and resources to handling AML matters
1028
. For example, a Chinese 
judge, Judge Kong Xiangjun, admitted that 
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‘The Anti-Monopoly Law is relatively hard to operate because it is very subject-specific 
and many provisions of the law are abstract general principles, with room for 
misunderstanding. Also, it is difficult to determine antitrust violations. For instance, the 
market is concerned with a monopoly, that is, a monopolizing act or action is normally 
found within the relevant market. This is strongly professionally-oriented and sometimes 
requires many economic analyses’1029. 
In recognition of the competence problem, the SPC issued a notice on 31 July 2008 
(Circular on carefully studying and implementing the Antimonopoly Law) exhorting 
People's Courts at all levels to study the new AML and stressing the complicated 
blend of legal and economic issues in competition cases
1030
. Further, because the SPC 
considers the AML to involve complicated legal and economic issues, it has 
requested that the power courts report large or important AML cases to the courts 
above them
1031
. It is comforting to know that the jurisdiction over the AML private 
actions has been assigned to China’s IP courts where the judges are perceived to the 
best candidates for training as specialist competition judges within a reasonable 
period
1032. China’s IP courts were established in 1993 and recruited most of their 
judges from among China's law school graduates, whereas many judges in other 
courts had no legal training and some were army veterans
1033
. In addition, IP judges 
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In many ways, the Chinese courts have a broader antimonopoly enforcement mandate 
than the AMEAs: the courts are able to address all manner of the AML and other 
antitrust issues, albeit not necessarily in the same proceeding
1035
. Thus, Chinese 
courts are likely to play an important role in the development of Chinese 
antimonopoly law
1036. However, despite China’s recent efforts to strengthen the role 
of the judicial system
1037
, there are still setbacks in the process (especially the lack of 
independence and competence of the courts) which make it very unlikely that the 
Chinese court will play an important role in the earlier years of the AML
1038
. So far, 
the courts have been hesitant to accept cases under the statute — taking on only 43 
civil complaints through the end of 2010 without yielding any significant victories for 
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plaintiffs
1039
. Further, the lack of competence of the Chinese judiciary has resulted in 
several misreadings1040 or erroneous application of the law
1041
.  
5.3. Enforcement of the AML against Administrative Monopolies 
The AML’s weak remedy for administrative monopolies 
As analyzed in Chapter 1, the primary mission and also the most salient feature of the 
AML is to correct governmental distortion rather than limit private restrictive 
practices
1042
. The AML, unfortunately, provides no effective institutional tool to 
confront anticompetitive governmental restraints, both at the central and local levels. 
Article 51 of the AML provides that administrative monopolies are to be ‘corrected 
by superior government agencies’ with the antimonopoly enforcement agency serving 
a role of ‘providing suggestions to superior government agencies as to punishment in 
accordance with law’. Similarly, Article 50 of the AML, the lone provision that grants 
private right of action under the AML, states that “undertakings that are engaged in 
monopolistic conducts and cause damages to other parties assume civil liabilities in 
accordance with law.” The term “undertakings” (jing ying zhe), or more precisely 
“business operators,” apparently does not include government agencies. ‘So, 
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essentially, the AML in one breath condemns administrative monopolies as illegal, 
and then in the next throws the ball right back to the court of China’s political 
bureaucracy to deal with the problem’1043. This weak remedy makes the 
administrative monopoly chapter of the AML more aspirational than practical
1044
. 
There are at least two reasons why relying on superior agencies to supervise and 
investigate their subordinate agencies’ restrictive behaviors is not effective. First, 
‘any administrative restriction on competition usually reflects treatment in favour of 
the SOEs’ which ‘makes it difficult for a superior agency to keep a neutral attitude in 
a dispute between its inferior agency and the non-SOEs or competitors from another 
region’1045. The second reason lies in the ability of the governmental agencies to deal 
with the restrictions on competition, since ‘the so-called “higher-level agency” could 
be any agency, it is not likely that it would have an experienced understanding of 
competition law and policy’, not to mention that ‘having numerous agencies 
determine what should be the competition policy of the State may yield conflicting 
goals that could be difficult to resolve’1046.  
Relying on the central government to curb anticompetitive restraints by local 
governments will also be ineffective. Professor Zheng also opined that  
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‘the AML’s ban on administrative monopolies may not or even will not succeed precisely 
because it relies on China’s central government as the enforcer. For decades, China’s 
central government has been trying to rein in administrative monopolies, particularly 
“regional blockades”, but to little avail’1047.  
For example, with the enactment of the Law on Administrative Licensing, the 
downsizing reform to reduce the items of administrative licenses and to streamline 
and simplify their approval procedures started in 2003
1048
. But the reform has been 
poor-to-mixed implementation at local government levels due to barriers to policy 
coordination and monitoring
1049. These barriers ‘enable local public officials to hide 
their activities from their principals’ scrutiny and ignore those central directives 
which conflict with local agendas’1050. As a matter of fact, China’s central 
government has many problems controlling local governments
1051
.  It seems to be the 
ultimate paradox that a bureaucratic system built on authoritarian control cannot 
effectively enforce its administrative orders, but that has been the case in China for 
almost as long as history has been recorded
1052
. Zheng Ge also commented that “rule 
of law” in China to a significant extent means rule by administrative regulations and 
rules
1053
. ‘Given the speed and magnitude of administrative legislation, it is 
predictable that inconsistencies are prevalent in China’s legal system’ and 
‘transparency is still compromised by inconsistencies between superior legislation 
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and sub-laws, especially at the local level’1054. Zheng further explained that ‘the 
relationship between China’s central and local governments should be best viewed as 
a symbiotic one, with both relying on each other to maintain their collective 
legitimacy’1055. This is the reason why pre-AML laws had already addressed 
administrative monopolies, but local protectionism remained rampant
1056
. With the 
enactment of the AML, the situation may not much improve. As Williams puts it, 
“[m]ere legislative commands from far-away Beijing are unlikely to be an effective 
remedy for this aspect of the problem, given that China does not have the rule of law 
and in any case the local authorities control the People’s Courts”1057. 
Finally, anticompetitive restraints by the central government are also unlikely to be 
caught by the AML. Professor Zheng explained that the dynamics in the relationship 
between China’s central and local governments also exists as to the relationship 
between China’s central government and its own lower-level agencies, only to a 
lesser extent and called this ‘Chinese-style checks and balances’1058. ‘As a matter of 
fact, China’s central government has many problems controlling its own lower-level 
agencies’1059. Thus, the enforcement of the AML’s provisions on administrative 
monopolies will inevitably be subject to the debate and compromise of various 
sectoral interests as well as the compromise between competition policy and other 
industrial policies. It is also notable that the focus of Chapter Five of the AML 
                                                 
1054
 Zheng, supra note 61, p.118.  
1055
 Zheng, supra note 58. 
1056
 Merah & Meng, supra note 26, pp.300-402. 
1057
 Williams, supra note 1, p.123; Pate, supra note 73, p.207 (‘[t]he tradition of strong local 
administrative monopolies is likely to mean that efforts to apply Western notions of competition and 
free movement of goods, capital, and labor will meet fierce resistance in practice’). 
1058
 Zheng, supra note 58. 
1059
 Zheng, ibid. 
  268 
appears to be more on regional blockage by local governments than on actions by the 
regulatory agencies of the central government to protect SOEs from competition
1060
. 
In this context, it is very likely that Chapter V of the AML will follow the beaten path 
of administrative monopolies provisions in pre-AML laws. As observed by Wang, 
‘[i]t is well-known that during the over 10 years after the promulgation of the AUCL, we 
seldom heard which ‘superior administrative authority’ had investigated and punished 
any abuse by ‘inferior administrative authority’ to restrict competition, although everyone 
knows administrative monopoly is the most harmful and pernicious conducts that harm 
the market competition in China’1061.  
With the enactment of the AML, ‘it is likely that some administrative monopolies will 
be challenged by the Anti-Monopoly Authority’, yet ‘absent clear authority or policy 
guidelines or recourse to a higher authority, such enforcement may be futile’1062. As 
such, ‘without an effective prohibition of administrative monopoly, the law will have 
limited effect in today’s China’1063. 
Why administrative litigation against administrative monopolies will be ineffective? 
In the absence an effective remedy for administrative monopolies by the AML, the 
Administrative Litigation Law provides an alternative cause of action, however, this 
is also not an attractive option
1064
.  
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The enactment of the Law on Administrative Litigation in 1989 was considered as a 
milestone since for the first time in the legal history of the PRC, the law enables 
citizens to take the government to court and enables courts to strike down government 
actions
1065
. Judicial review of administrative actions in China, however, is not 
generally perceived to be an effective redress against the misuse of administrative 
power
1066
 and critics have claimed that it will be difficult for one branch of 
government in China to address the anticompetitive actions of another branch
1067
. 
Among the problems with judicial review of administrative actions most cited by 
commentators are the narrow scope and convoluted procedures of the review, and the 
persistent bias in favor of government agencies.  
First, given the relative positions of the administration and the courts in China’s 
constitutional and political structure, it would be unsurprising if administrative 
litigation played a limited role in checking administrative power after China chose its 
                                                                                                                                           
monopolies in China. Furthermore, even if the courts were perfectly willing and able to render 
independent judgments in suits against administrative monopolies, having the judgments enforced 
would be an even more difficult task’).  
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current model of administrative justice
1068
. To prevent local organs or power and 
administrative organs interfering with impartial handling of cases by administrative 
trial agencies, further reforms will also be carried on of relevant court institutions, 
especially reversing the existing pattern of regional courts at all levels being 
restrained in such aspects as system, personnel and finance, etc. by regional National 
People’s Congresses and governments at the same level1069.  
Further, the jurisdiction of administrative litigation in China is very limited. Article 2 
of the Administrative Litigation Law states: 
‘Any citizen, legal person or other organization whose legitimate rights and interests have 
been infringed by a specific administrative action by an administrative agency or its 
personnel, shall have the right to initiate an action in a people’s court in accordance with 
this Law’ [emphasis added]. 
Article 5 of the Administrative Litigation Law, however, draws a distinction between 
“specific administrative acts”, which are reviewable by courts, and general 
administrative rules, decisions, or orders, which are not. Thus, abstract administrative 
conduct, such as a local government issuing a notice requiring all beer distributors in 
a city only to sell a specific local brand, may not be actionable
1070
. Further, courts can 




As observed by Fu, in relative terms, Chinese courts perform better in ordinary 
disputes among parties with relative equal status than in complex disputes with 
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parties with unequal status
1072
. One recent example is the Beijing court’s dismissal of 
the AQSIQ case on statute-of-limitations basis, which lacks support in the 
Administrative Litigation Law. Zheng believed that the reason given for the dismissal 
is little more than a pretext for avoiding taking up the suit
1073
. Commercial disputes, 
which are commonly called “civil and economic disputes” in Chinese judicial 
terminology, are more likely to be brought to courts for a solution than administrative 
disputes
1074
. According to a recent survey based on GPS sampling in China, 63 per 
cent of 7,714 respondents chose not to take action when they had disputes with 
administrative organs
1075. The high “no action” rate in administrative disputes can be 
attributed to lack of relevant knowledge, submissiveness to authority, lack of 
financial resources, and a sense of inefficacy in dealing with government agencies
1076
. 
For those 37 per cent of respondents who chose to act, only 5 per cent of 
complainants bring their disputes to court
1077
. Thus, many observers remain deeply 
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So far, commentators have specifically questioned the likely effectiveness of the 
AML’s provisions aimed at eliminating public restraints on competition1079. Right at 
the time of drafting the AML, there has been argument that ‘even though 
administrative monopoly still exists in China, the nature of such practices is 
essentially the misuse of administrative powers, thus, this problem cannot be solved 
by the AML alone, but rather depends on further reforms of the economic system and 
the administrative system and on further changes in government functions’1080. The 
question now is if administrative monopoly cannot be solved by the AML, why was 
Chapter V still inserted in the AML? Huang called this “a second best option” and 
explained that ‘for China, the process of reform can take a long time, longer than 
competition could afford, therefore, a second best option would be to adopt some 
technical restraints against certain State powers within the AML framework, which 
might be an unsatisfactory but realistic approach’1081. Further, the AML’s provisions 
on administrative monopoly will also ‘facilitate competition advocacy and 
                                                                                                                                           
an effective redress against the misuse of administrative power. This in part reflects the positions of the 
courts, which are not perceived as an entity independent of the State”). 
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competition culture and therefore will promote awareness of antimonopoly spirit 
among officials at all levels’1082.  
5.4 Enforcement of the AML against State-owned Enterprises 
5.4.1. A de facto exemption of SOEs from the AML application?  
An important mission of the AML is to curb abuses of monopolistic and dominant 
SOEs and to promote competition in the State economy sector
1083
. Now that the AML 
has been enacted, one question that arises is whether the AML will be enforced 
against SOEs. Reportedly, SOEs were a major force in delaying enactment of the 
AML and during the drafting of the AML, there was speculation that the law would 
not cover SOEs at all
1084
. As analyzed in Chapter 3, the language of the AML on this 
issue is very ambiguous due to the fact that when the AML was enacted, there was 
still not a consensus on the need to have a formal antitrust law to deal with domestic 
competition issues in China
1085
. On the one hand, the NDRC’s recent announcement 
in November 2011 that it was investigating China Telecom and China Unicom for 
alleged abuse of dominant position in the broadband market shows that the AML is 
indeed applicable to SOEs
1086
. On the other hand, it is very likely that SOEs 
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(especially the largest SOEs at the central level) will be automatically "carved out" 
from the application of the AML for most of the time. There are various reasons why 
Chinese enforcement agencies may take a more lenient view on SOEs in the 
application of the AML. The most important reasons include China’s ‘socialist 
market economy’ ideology, the ‘National Champions’ policy, and the strong political 
influence of SOEs in China. 
The ‘socialist market economy’ ideology and the leading role of SOEs 
Firstly, we should never forget that what China is pursuing is not a pure market 
economy, but a ‘socialist market economy’ and SOEs is a primary characteristic of a 
socialist economic system. ‘As China is switching gradually to the market economy 
while keeping the political structure intact, the Chinese government has to walk a fine 
line between the creation of a dynamic private sector and the maintenance of a 
socialist country’1087. One of the most challenging aspects of this path is ‘introducing 
competition without compromising the dominance of SOEs in strategic sectors’1088. 
Thus, in China’s socialist market economy, while the private and State sectors 
coexist, SOEs are expected to play the leading role. The Constitution of China makes 
it clear that  
‘The state economy is the sector of socialist economy under ownership by the whole 
people; it is the leading force in the national economy. The state ensures the 
consolidation and growth of the state economy’ [emphasis added]1089.  
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Moreover, at the same time that China was drafting the AML, China also made it a 
stated goal to maintain the dominant role of SOEs in certain sectors. On December 
18, 2006, SASAC
1090
 announced that seven "strategic" industries, including national 
defense, electrical power generation and grids, petroleum and petrochemicals, 
telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and waterway transportation, will be 
controlled by SOEs
1091
. The government aims to increase State capital in those seven 
industries and seeks to maintain "absolute control" of them by SOEs
1092
. ‘Non-state 
actors are not able to break the monopoly of state enterprises in these sectors’1093. In 
other important industries (but less important than the seven strategic industries), 
including automobiles, steel, and technology, the government will seek to maintain 
"somewhat strong influence" by State capital on the leading companies
1094
.  
Thus, China seems to have two contradictory objectives for SOEs. On the one hand, it 
wants to rein in the monopolistic power of SOEs through the adoption of the AML 
and other reforms; on the other hand, it wants to retain the absolute control of SOEs 
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in certain important sectors
1095
. As a result, how to reconcile these two objectives in 




In practice, corporate governance reform focused on SOEs has become a key priority 
in China since 1999
1097
 following two strategies: “grasp the large and release the 
small”, as well as producing “national champions”1098. The strategy of “grasp the 
large, release the small” was announced in 1997 by the central government as the 
guiding principle for SOE reform
1099
. After various experiments at local level, this 
strategy has been interpreted as privatizing all but the largest SOEs, primarily the 
central SOEs directly overseen by SASAC, numbering 136 as of July 2009
1100
. Thus, 
while the central SOEs are the subject of the “grasp the large” scheme whereby the 
state owner retains control of these firms, the local SOEs are the major concern under 
the “release the small” scheme aimed at introducing foreign and private capital into 
the ownership structures of these firms, which usually involves deeper ownership 
diversification or fuller privatization
1101
. Currently, although China has privatized 
millions of SOEs and allowed a private sector gradually to emerge, the State retains a 
controlling stake in many strategic sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, 
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transportation, railways, postal services, tobacco production, water, gas, urban public 
transportation
1102
. It was reported that eighty percent of the assets controlled by SOEs 
in 2006 were concentrated in those "strategic sectors”1103. ‘SOEs still represent – by 
virtue of their size, the strategic importance of their industries, and their leading 
market positions – a substantial proportion of Chinese companies’1104. For instance, 
SOEs reportedly contribute 60 per cent of China’s GDP in 201201105.  
In short, ‘China has never had the intention of disposing of SOEs, the crown jewels of 
the socialist market economy’1106. In contrast, the role of SOEs in China has always 
been retained, and even strengthened in certain strategic sectors, by the government. 
As commented by one author, 
‘In the seemingly never-ending process of state enterprises reform, the key question for 
the next decade is not, as foreigners like to think, “When will the Chinese government 
come to its sense and give up control of the economy?” Rather it is, “How will the 
government continue to exercise its control of the economy?’1107.  
In practice, as analyzed in Chapter 1, the Party is deeply involved in personnel and 
major economic decisions in major SOEs through its Organization Departments. By 
exercising their power to hire and fire the executives of largest SOEs, these political 
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As the country’s largest owner of economic assets and resources, ‘the Chinese state 
has always remained an important player in economic activities and has engaged in 
direct competition with non-state actors (not necessarily always in the commanding 
heights sectors)’1109.  ‘The Chinese state, thus, assumes dual roles as both a powerful 
regulator and a powerful participant in the market’1110. Commentators believe that 
‘such dual roles have created practical incompatibilities in circumstances where 
economic efficiency and political and ideological entrenchments run counter to each 
other and lead to tensions and conflicts’1111, and this is detrimental to the 
development of China's market economy
1112
. Thus, coming back to the question of 
whether the government will apply the AML to SOEs, which is a primary 
characteristic of a communist economic system, the answer is that this is very 
unlikely1113.  
‘National Champions’ policy  
Beside the ideology of a ‘socialist market economy’, one aspect of China’s industrial 
policy that creates tensions with the fundamental purpose of competition policy is the 
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‘National Champions’ policy through which it wishes to create national champions 
that would be globally competitive. Liu explained that ‘China believes strongly in this 
policy and thinks it is only fair for China to catch up with the world in this way’1114.  
Since the 1980s, Chinese government has sought to develop large enterprises and 
enterprise groups as ‘national champions’ to compete in international markets with 
multinationals from more advanced economies
1115
. As a result, there has been, over 
the last decade, the emergence of a large number of ‘enterprise groups’1116. From 
1986, some large enterprise groups were accorded special status in the state economic 
plan (likened sometimes to the treatment of ‘off budget’ items) which allowed them 
direct dialogue with the central government. Other preferential policies granted to 
these groups include import-export rights, business promotion-related foreign travel 
rights, and rights of independent planning (unrestricted by line ministry or locality 
plans)
1117. The American Chamber of Commerce even stated recently that ‘the US 
should focus less on China’s currency practices and more on the threat to US 
companies posed by Beijing’s support for state-owned enterprises’1118. According to 
them, support includes ‘regulatory and other barriers to promote “domestic 
champions” in high-tech areas such as electric cars, green energy and high-speed 
rail’1119. 
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As mentioned above, SOE reform in China has followed two strategies: grasp the 
large and release the small, as well as producing national champions. Essential to 
achieving the objective of “grasp the large”, SASAC has been implementing the 
“national champions” policy1120. One of the primary policy measures announced by 
SASAC for the restructuring of SOEs is to ‘push for mergers and acquisitions among 
large SOEs’ to form thirty to fifty large "internationally competitive" SOEs in those 
industries by 2010
1121. ‘This policy has coincided with the sustained, and indeed 
renewed, control of the state over strategic industries and assets (the “commanding 
heights”) in the national economy’1122. In reality, ‘the consolidation of SOEs, which 
is still going on, has already resulted in the formation of a group of behemoth 
SOEs’1123. In 2010, thirty-eight of China’s 500 largest SOEs appeared in the Fortune 
Global 500, with three of them appearing on the top ten list
1124
. 
Of course, China is not the only country in the world that carry out policies favoring 
the creation and support of national champions, but, as explained by Zheng, ‘perhaps 
nowhere than in China has the creation and support of national champions been made 
such a centerpiece of industrial policy for so many sectors’1125. Further, China’s 
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‘national champions’ policy has state ownership as the goal, which is different from 
that in other countries such as Japan’s Keiretsu or Korea’s Chaebol models etc1126. 
The adoption of the AML’s merger control provisions, however, did not reverse 
China’s emphasis on national champions in its industrial policy. In fact, during the 
drafting process of the AML, a relatively popular opinion among legislators and 
scholars was that  
‘China was still at the primary stage of the market economy and market economy was 
still not apparent. Especially the average size of the enterprises was still too small and the 
horizontal alliance of enterprises or enterprise groups had just begun to develop. 
Adopting an antimonopoly law to restrict the merger of enterprises at this stage would 
inevitably have a negative effect on the industrial policy of the state’1127. 
In the end, to strike a balance between competition policy and the need to support and 
develop “national champions” to compete globally, Article 5 of the AML was 
inserted and states the basic principle that ‘business operators may, through fair 
competition [and] voluntary alliance, concentrate themselves according to law, 
expand the scope of business operations and enhance market competitiveness’. 
Several authors suspected that this article was inserted into the AML upon the 
pressure that came from SOEs to allow them to grow stronger and compete more 
effectively with foreign rivals
1128
. Indeed, officials of the State Council commented, 
when merger turnover thresholds were published in August 2008, that it was 
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necessary for Chinese industrial policy for ‘enterprises to be stronger and bigger’ and 
that moves that facilitated this goal would be encouraged
1129
.  
As such, ‘[t]here appear to be tensions, if not outright conflicts, between the AML’s 
merger control provisions and China’s goal of forging “extra-large companies” in 
various industries through government-guided mergers and acquisitions’1130. It is still 
not clear whether the prohibitions in Article 7 will be vigorously enforced and 
commentators suspect that ‘China may be tempted to be lax on SOEs in order to 
promote the growth and consolidation of SOEs in key sectors’1131. In practice, as 
observed by Wang, ‘law and policy makers tend to overestimate the positive effect of 
concentration on industrial policy, while they tend to underestimate its negative effect 
on competition policy’1132. For instance, the exemption from the AML of natural 
monopolies and other industries controlled by the state-owned economy has been 
promoted by SASAC and big SOEs such as the State Grid Corporation of China
1133
. 
So ‘one way for China to get around the tensions’, as explained by Zheng, is not to 
enforce the AML against the largest SOEs ‘since the largest companies in industries 
targeted by China’s industrial policy tend to be all SOEs’1134. 
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The complex political relationship between SOEs and State agencies in China 
Another fundamental problem with the enforcement of the AML against SOEs is that 
SOEs in China are extremely politically influential and are often backed up by line 
Ministries or local governments
1135
. In reality, the large SOEs owned or controlled by 
the central government still remain the untouchable property of the state, because 
they have the broadest impact on the autonomy and employment
1136
. Further, ‘China 
lacks a "competition culture" that might discourage other administrative agencies and 
local governments from creating exemptions from the antitrust laws to protect 
favored SOEs, sometimes referred to as "local champions"
1137
. This issue is 
particularly problematic at the central level:  
‘For historical reasons, many, if not all, of the SOEs in monopolized sectors are proteges 
of certain ministries. Taking on those SOEs would essentially mean taking on the 
ministries behind them. In enforcing the AML against those SOEs, the Anti-Monopoly 
Enforcement Agency must not be influenced by other ministries and must possess the 
authority necessary to carry out its duties’1138. 
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To effectively enforce the AML against SOEs, especially the largest SOEs at the 
central level, the AMEAs must be independent from political intervention from other 
State agencies. Unfortunately, as analyzed above, AMEAs’ lowly status in the 
administrative hierarchy means that they lack the required independence to 
implement their task.  In other words, within the current enforcement framework, it 
will be very difficult for the AMEAs to subject SOEs to the AML’s discipline1139.  
A de facto exemption of SOEs from the AML application  
Taking into account all of the challenges that come from the ‘socialism’ ideology, 
industrial policy, and the complex political relationship between SOEs and State 
agencies in China, there is a risk that Chinese government would continue shielding 
the remaining SOEs from the reach of antitrust law
1140
. As the OECD has warned  
‘The inclusion of multiple objectives … increases the risks of conflicts and inconsistent 
application of competition policy. The interests of different stakeholders may severely 
constrain the independence of competition policy authorities, lead to political 
intervention and compromise, and adversely affect one of the major benefits of the 
competitive process, namely economic efficiency’1141.  
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This anticipation particularly holds true in the context of China where the government 
still exercise the ‘rule by law’ instead of the ‘rule of law’1142 and ‘laws and 
regulations are intended to be instruments of policy enforcement’1143. As a result, 
Chinese laws in general are replete with vague passages to free the hand of political 
leaders to modify the policy foundations for these measures and to permit local 




Regarding the enforcement of the AML, since the AML is driven by multiple forces, 
‘its implementation will almost certainly be directed toward various different 
goals’1145. Conveniently, ‘[t]he final text leaves ample room for Chinese antitrust 
either to converge with prevailing practices of well-established antitrust jurisdictions 
or to serve other strategic or industrial policy goals’1146. For instance, in earlier drafts 
of the AML, the AMEAs were required to publish decisions. In the final version of 
the AML, however, the language was changed from "must publish" to "may publish” 
1147. It was commented that ‘[t]his retreat from transparency and consistency may 
reflect the likelihood that the AMEAs may take into account non-competition factors, 
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such as the public interest and the health of the national economy, in deciding 
competition cases’1148. The concern that “public interest” exceptions might be 
exploited to block pro-competitive conduct or to excuse gravely anticompetitive 
behavior is even more important taking into account that ‘officials more removed 
from the drafting efforts [of the AML…] tend to view competition policy as a 
complement or instrument of industrial policy’1149. In this complex picture, SOEs is 
the most frequently cited area in which State interests may intersect with the pro-
competitive thrust of the AML
1150. As explained by Wang, ‘because of its vagueness 
and flexibility, public interests as a concept has been incorporated into many Chinese 
laws, normally implying restraint on economic freedom’ and ‘in practice, SOEs are 
more likely to request such an exemption’ 1151. Thus, as is often the case in China, 
‘[t]here is, of course, the potential that the government may sweep ordinary disputes 
under the carpet and then use political sensitivity as an excuse to justify indifference 
or repression’1152. 
Consistent with all of these pessimistic observations, so far the Chinese government 
has indeed shown a reluctance to enforce the AML against SOEs1153. In the area of 
horizontal agreements, for example, blatant violations by the largest SOEs of the 
AML’s prohibition of price-fixing and market allocation are widely reported by the 
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Chinese media but ignored by the antimonopoly enforcement agencies
1154
. Similarly, 
the AML’s prohibitions on abuses of market dominant position hardly have been used 
against SOEs, which are most likely to hold such a position. As explained by Owen et 
al, 99 per cent of private enterprises in China are small or medium size, thus, the 
largest enterprises in China are mostly SOEs
1155
. SAIC and NDRC have, until 
recently, seemed content to issue caution letters and informal warnings to domestic 
business operators in many other areas of the economy engaging in antimonopoly 
practices (particularly where these enterprises are state-owned), and they appear to 
have made slow progress in investigating the many complaints understood to have 
been made against large domestic enterprises
1156. Zheng opined that ‘there could be 
many other reasons for SAIC’s and NDRC’s passivity in their enforcement against 
abuse-of-dominance conducts, but scarcity of the conducts is certainly not one of 
them’1157. ‘China has no shortage of highly publicized abuse-of-dominance 
violations, committed primarily by its largest SOEs’1158. Further, in stark contrast to 
SAIC’s and NDRC’s inactivity, the Chinese public has been very aggressive in 
pursuing private lawsuits in Chinese courts against alleged abuse-of-dominance 
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violations
1159
. It has been suspected that ‘the two agencies’ inactivity is part of a 
larger pattern of not enforcing the AML against the largest SOEs’1160. For instance, 
coming back to the above-mentioned China Telecom and China Unicom’s alleged 
abuse of dominant position, these cases were quietly settled later between NDRC and 
China Telecom and China Uniform without any fines being imposed on the two large 
SOEs, which has raised queries and even distrust of the public
1161
. Finally, the area of 
the AML where evidence of a de facto exemption for the largest SOEs is more 
definitive is merger review. So far, all of the mergers for which MOFCOM has made 
its merger decisions publicly available involve foreign investors. As observed by 
Zheng, since the AML went into effect in August 2008, there have been fifteen 
mergers involving China’s largest SOEs that are supervised by SASAC, yet, the press 
releases issued by SASAC for all of these mergers only mentioned that the mergers 




In brief, as observed by Zheng, ‘whether or not the AML creates a de jure exemption 
for dominant SOEs, all evidence indicates that the AML is simply not being enforced 
against such SOEs as a practical matter’1163. 
5.4.2. The AML as a protectionist tool against foreign companies? 
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One uniquely challenge to China, as pointed out by many commentators, is the 
possibility of inconsistent enforcement of the AML against foreign companies and in 
favor of SOEs
1164
. As analyzed above, Chinese private enterprises are mostly of small 
and medium size
1165
 and SOEs appear to be shielded from antitrust law, thus, the 
AML will primarily target foreign companies. Even before the enactment of the 
AML, China has shown a hostile attitude toward foreign firms
1166
 and the most direct 
and important factor that accelerated the enactment of the AML in 2007 is the 
perceived need to prevent China’s market from being dominated by foreign firms in 
the face of international competition (Chapter 1). In fact, pending enactment of the 
draft AML including its merger control rules, China has already implemented rules 
governing acquisitions by foreign companies. Liu has commented that ‘[c]learly, 
industrial policy plays a role in this discriminatory application of merger control’ and 
‘[f]oreign firms are justifiably concerned, as a Government competition report 
recently criticized Microsoft, Kodak, Tetra Pak and others as monopolies’1167. 
Specifically, Chinese leaders fear that ‘[f]oreign conglomerates with technical 
expertise, efficient - management and ample capital possess a formidable power 
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sufficient to crush many of China's fledgling industries’1168. The enacted AML, 
especially its merger review, offers various tools for Chinese government to 
implement its protectionist policy. First, as remarked by Zheng, ‘the factors 
considered in merger reviews in China are apparently broader and less predictable 
than those considered in Western countries’1169. Second, the National Security 
Review procedure in merger control leaves great discretion on the hands of Chinese 
government agencies and may potentially constitute a serious obstacle for foreign 
companies doing business in China. To make matters worse, MOFCOM’s under-
developed procedure of due process, for example, relying on back-to-back 
discussions rather than on an adversary process, the lack of transparency in the 
decision-making process, unsatisfactory information disclosure, and so forth
1170
 
makes the whole process even more unpredictable. 
Thus, ever since MOFCOM began to enforce merger control under the new 
competition policy regime, scholars and practitioners have been concerned that the 
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review of merger cases will be influenced by industrial policy considerations
1171
. In 
practice, this concern has been proved to be true by the recent merger cases published 
by MOFCOM. So far, almost all of the transactions blocked or conditionally 
approved by MOFCOM involve foreign investors
1172
 and the element of nationalism 
is also evidenced in many of these cases. For instance, the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan 
decision in 2008 has been subject to numerous criticism
1173
 on the ground that ‘the 
driving motivation behind the decision was one of industrial policy, rather than 
competition policy, and it has been suggested elsewhere that the decision was clearly 
protectionist’1174. Another example is the InBev/Anheuser-Busch case in 2008, in 
which although finding no anti-competitive effects, MOFCOM nevertheless attached 
a requirement that any future acquisition of an interest in domestic breweries must be 
notified to MOFCOM, regardless of value
1175
. In contrast, MOFCOM has so far 
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1174
 Furse, supra note 5, at 2-4.25 (explaining that within China there was substantial comment on the 
merger before the decision was made, and it was clear that public opinion was against the merger: 
Huiyan Juice is a household name in China, and notwithstanding the fact that the company was not 
Chinese – being listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange – there was widespread adverse comment as 
to the prospect of it being taken over by an American corporation); see also Ha, Hai & O’Brien, supra 
note 565 (‘the [Coca Cola] decision has raised suspicions that the review result was most significantly 
impacted by concern over the potential loss of control over a well-known Chinese brand to a foreign 
company’); Zhang & Zhang, supra note 608, p.495 (‘many observers critiqued that the proposed 
merger of Coca-Cola and Huiyuan was blocked due largely to nationalism’). 
1175
 See also ‘InBev ruling sparks fears for M&A in China’, Financial Times on 30 November 2008. 
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Law enforcement in general has always been a challenge in China
1177
 and it is very 
likely that the enforcement of the AML will follow that beaten track. In fact, most 
commentators are pessimistic about the law’s chances of effecting positive change in 
China’s economy1178. As analyzed in Chapter 1, the primary missions of the AML are 
                                                 
1176
 One recent conditional clearance decision relates to the proposed joint venture between GE (China) 
Co., Ltd. and China SOPE China Shenhua Coal to Liquid and Chemical Co., Ltd. (the latter being a 
China SOE), see Gerry P. O’Brien, ‘China Merger Control — Progress And Prognostications’, Legal 
Update on 10 June 2012, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/181088/Trade+Regulation+Practices/China+Merger+Control+Progress+an
d+Prognostications (last visited 10 September 2012). 
1177
 Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 9, p.259 (‘An important consideration in drafting any law in any 
country is how the law is to be enforced. All the more so in China, where enforcement of a law in 
many cases is a larger issue than the law itself’); see also OECD, supra note 89, p.51 (‘Weak 
enforcement of improved legal and regulatory frameworks has been a recurrent theme of China’s 
economic reforms, ranging from enforcement of contracts, commercial codes, competition law, and 
environment codes). 
1178
 See e.g., Berry, supra note 1113 (‘[U]nless Beijing experiences major philosophical changes, 
China’s attempts at regulating monopoly will be unsuccessful’); Williams, supra note 1, pp.219–220 
(describing China as weak with respect to several legal infrastructure precriteria associated with 
successful competition law and hypothesizing that the AML may have been the wrong policy choice); 
Jung & Hao, supra note 82, p.108 (“[T]he design and future enforcement [of the then-draft AML will 
be] inevitably constrained by China’s incomplete economic reform and weak legal institutions.”); 
Owen, Sun & Zheng, supra note 109, p.133 (doubting that the law can have its intended effects 
because the “legal system in China has been created mainly to serve political purposes” rather than to 
serve as a guarantor of private rights to compete); Bing Song, ‘Competition Policy in a Transitional 
Economy: The Case of China’, (1995) 31 Stanford Journal of International Law 387, p.388 (“China 
needs many improvements in . . . formal legal structure and in the political realm of executive 
enforcement of the laws before a functioning antitrust policy can take shape.”); Harris, supra note 8, 
p.172 (noting “serious grounds for concern” with the draft AML in considering a prior draft that did 
not include provisions dealing with administrative monopolies); Pate, supra note 73, pp.195-196 
(anticipating that the process of antitrust enforcement in all its forms in China will be ‘very different 
from what we are used to in areas with longer antitrust histories’ and ‘even when the vocabulary words 
sound similar, achieving an antitrust meeting of the minds between East and West can be elusive’); 
Zheng, supra note 1125 (‘[i]t is true that China has enacted its antitrust law in the same style as the 
antitrust law of the United States, but it remains to be seen how the spirit—or even the letters—of 
antitrust law will be implemented in a country whose broader political and cultural frameworks are not 
exactly compatible with the spirit of antitrust law’). It should be noted, however, that there are still 
optimistic views on the likelihood of success of the AML, see Merah & Meng, supra note 26, p383, 
429 (‘even though China does lack some prerequisites to effective antitrust enforcement in the 
traditional sense, China’s new antitrust law may yield a surprising level of success… the AML has 
been constructed to deal with government restraints, especially widespread local protectionism, in a 
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to confront administrative monopolies and abuses by the largest SOEs, which have 
been widely reported by the Chinese media
1179
, thus, for the AML to have a real 
impact on market behavior in China, there must exist independent and competent 
enforcement authorities
1180. Unfortunately, a close look at China’s current 
institutional arrangement reveals that both the enforcement agencies and judiciary 
system lack the political and institutional independence as well as the expertise 
required to deal with complex antimonopoly cases. Chinese competition agencies also 
face a unique challenge due to a separation of power over anti-competitive practices 
between three different agencies. As such, traditional antitrust law enforcement 
through either public or private means in China will likely face serious legal 
infrastructural challenges. Further, the failure of the AML to provide an effective 
remedy against anticompetitive state restraints and the complex political environment 
in China, both at the central and local levels would mean that administrative 
monopolies will be out of the reach of the AML. Finally, the CCP’s ‘socialist market 
economy’ ideology with SOEs playing the leading role, the SOEs’ strong political 
influence as well as the ‘National Champions’ policy and protectionist policy that are 
being pursued by the Chinese government may have a negative impact on the 
Party/State’s political will to enforce the AML against SOEs. Consequently, in 
reality, ‘[n]otwithstanding the recent rise in publicized enforcement of antitrust-
related laws in China, the scope and level of enforcement clearly remains limited by 
                                                                                                                                           
large transitional economy, thus, there is a real possibility that the AML may provide China with an 
internal free trade agreement that, while not perfect, can address several serious existing competition 
problems’). 
1179
 See Chapter 1 for more analysis. 
1180
 Wang, supra note 906, p.8 (explaining that the establishment of an effective enforcement authority 
is a critical precondition of highest importance for an effective enforcement of the law); Bush, supra 
note 408, p.1 (‘As with most Chinese laws, the AML’s impact depends less on the text itself than on 
the resources, motives, and clout of the enforcement authorities’). 
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reference to the size of China’s economy and in comparison to many mature antitrust 
systems’1181. Further, there appears to be ‘dual-track’ of the AML enforcement with 
one track relying on the AML to promote competition in private and foreign-invested 
sectors and the other track relying on government-initiated market liberalization 
measures to promote competition in SOE-dominated sectors
1182
. For the AML to be 
vigorously enforced, China needs to correct all of these challenges by undergoing a 
substantive change in the political ideology where the State will play a more limited 
role in controlling economic activities and will divest the state of most of the SOEs. 
However, such a radical shift seems to be not politically feasible in the current 
Chinese political climate. Moreover, since the most direct and important motivation 
for China to adopt the AML was to protect its national interest in the face of 
international competition, it is very likely that China’s antimonopoly law will be 




                                                 
1181
 Ha, Hai & O’Brien, supra note 565. 
1182
 Zheng, supra note 1154; see also Berry, supra note 1113, p.152 (‘Just as it is foreseeable that 
Beijing will use the Chinese AML to restrain multinationals, it is equally foreseeable that Beijing will 
be disinclined to use the AML as a tool for reforming SOEs, particularly where reformation could lead 
to unemployment. Such selective enforcement may allow certain large firms to earn and cultivate favor 
with the government and thus escape regulation’).  
1183
 Thus, a word of caution is that ‘as a practical matter, the enforcement of the AML in specific 
instances will likely vary with the industry, region, and political clout of the parties involved’ and ‘the 
context may prove more decisive than the text of the law’, see Bush, supra note 436, p.50. 
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Chapter 6 – Challenges in Enforcing Competition Law in Vietnam 
6.1. The Lack of an Independent and Competent Competition Agency  
The structure of the Vietnamese competition agencies 
To implement the VCL, two enforcement agencies were established, one is the 
Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD) with investigation powers 
and the other is the Vietnam Competition Council (VCC) with adjudicatory powers. 
VCAD was established in 2003 within the Ministry of Trade
1184
 and was directly 
involved in drafting the VCL. The fact that a competition agency was created before 
the law was enacted is very unusual compared to other competition jurisdictions. 
Pham commented that this was ‘a Machiavellian step, which contributed significantly 
to the success of the Ministry in getting control over competition issues into their own 
hands and not into the hands of any new state agencies’1185. Currently, VCAD is 
under the administration of the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI)
1186
.  
One year after the VCL took effect, the VCC was established in 2006 by a 
Government Decree
1187
. This is an independent agency chaired by a Vice-Minister of 
Trade and Industry and composed of 11 high ranking officials from different 
ministries, representing the interests of different industries of the State
1188
. Members 
                                                 
1184
 Named as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) now after the merger of the two ministries. 
1185
 Pham, supra note 264, p.560. 
1186
 The power and structure of this agency is now set out in Decree No.06/2006 of the Government on 
the Establishment, Functions, Duties and Structure of the Vietnam Competition Administration 
Department on 09 January 2006, available at 
http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=16897 
1187
 Decree No.05/2006 of the Government on the Establishment, Functions, Duties and Structure of 
the Vietnam Competition Council on 09 January 2006, available at 
http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=16898 
1188
 The current VCC members are representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
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of the VCC are appointed, and may be dismissed, by the Prime Minister on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Industry and Trade. Appointments are for five 
year terms and there is no statutory limitation on the number of consecutive 
appointments that any one member may hold. The primary role of the VCC is to 
address complaints relating to breaches of the VCL based on the results of the 
VCAD’s investigation. The VCC does not have the power to initiate investigations. 
Each specific competition-restriction case shall be handled by the Competition Case 
Handling Council which comprises of at least 5 members of the VCC selected by the 
VCC Chairman. 
The lack of independence of the competition agencies 
As explained by Varady, ‘[g]iven the specific tasks of competition authorities in a 
transitional economy including to stand up against the Government’s interference 
with competition, a position more detached from the government appears more 
suitable’1189. However, Vietnam’s current arrangement of the competition authorities 
allows the Government to directly intervene in the handling of a competition case 
whenever necessary, especially when SOEs are involved. This is one of the reasons 
why enforcement of the VCL has been fairly poor until now and will still be 
challenging in the future1190.  
                                                                                                                                           
Development, Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Planning and Investment etc. and were appointed 
under Decision No.843/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on 12 June 2006. 
1189
 See Varady, supra note 44. 
1190
 See Pham, supra note 844 (‘If the Government is really concerned with protecting competition, i.e. 
protecting consumers and motivation for economic development, the power of the VCAD and the 
VCC, including the power to investigate, to hold inquiries, and to give judgment, must be enhanced. 
Unfortunately, this has not been paid attention to’). 
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Regarding the VCAD, there are at least two important reasons why this agency does 
not have the necessary independence to carry out its task. 
First, MTI not only directly manages a good number of SOEs, but also makes many 
other macro-economic policies
1191
. This Ministry is the supervising of many SOEs, 
some of them are monopolistic or dominant enterprises
1192
. Further, the Ministry is 
not only responsible for protecting competition but also responsible for State 
management of import and export, price regulation, and bidding etc. Thus, 
‘establishing a competition agency under this Ministry will not only decrease the 
reliability of this agency, but also creates the potential adverse effect on the 
relationship between competition policy and other trade policies’1193. 
Second, similar to the situation in China, there is a complex political relationship 
between the VCAD and other sectoral regulators (normally line Ministries). In 
Vietnam, each sector and industry is not only subject to competition law but also to 
its sectoral regulations. The problem is that these regulations may conflict with 
competition law provisions. For example, in a recent seminar organized by the VCAD 
and the Swiss Competition Commission, the Head of the Competition Policy Board 
of VCAD confirmed that there is an overlap of regulations, powers to handle 
violations and sanctions that are regulated in both the VCL and other sectoral laws. 
Many legal documents deal with the unfair competition in communications, medicine 
and intellectual property rights, which impose different fines for the same types of 
                                                 
1191
 CUTS, supra note 715, p.6. 
1192
 For instance, EVN (the only electricity supplier in Vietnam) and Petrolimex (the biggest oil and 
petrol importer and supplier) are under the management and supervision of MTI. 
1193
 CUTS, supra note 715, p.6. 
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violations
1194. Consequently, ‘although the VCL was passed in 2004 and took effect 
one year later, firms, as competitors, are still confused about which institutions they 
should go to when they have competition-related issues’1195. Thus, the vice head of 
the VCAD stated that cooperation between the government's competition authorities 
and regulatory bodies needs to be promoted to ensure a healthy competitive business 
environment in Vietnam
1196
. In fact, this problem should be put in Vietnam’s general 
regulatory picture. ‘Despite progress toward a clearer legislative framework for state 
activities, conditions in Vietnam are still characterised by complexity, overlaps, and 
inconsistency’1197 and there is a problem of “legislation inflation” or a “regulatory 
labyrinth” with overlapping regulation1198. Thus, Vietnamese legal experts and 
scholars often call Vietnam’s legal system as a “jungle of law”1199. The consequence 
of this inconsistent regulatory “labyrinth” is that ‘there is then plenty of room (and an 
excuse) for inaction, personal interpretation, arbitrariness, and corruption’1200. Since 
many civil servants find it difficult to understand the meaning of laws and 
regulations
1201
 and since their responsibilities are rarely clearly defined, they often 
choose to do nothing or wait for their superiors to decide
1202
. The operations of 
VCAD in such a context do not seem to be very different. Further, similar to the fact 
                                                 
1194





 Ibid.  
1197
 Salomon & Vu, supra note 273, p.140. 
1198
 Salomon & Vu, ibid., p.141. 
1199
 E.g., the Chairman of VCCI commented that hasty legal borrowing has left Vietnam with a ‘jungle 
of law’, see ‘Interview with Mr Vu Tien Loc – Chairman of VCCI’, Vietnam Economy on 25 
September 2007 (in Vietnamese). 
1200
 Salomon & Vu, supra note 273, p.141. 
1201
 Salomon & Vu, ibid., p.143. 
1202
 ‘The “Syndrome” of Sending to the Prime Minister’, Vietnamnet, on 28 March 2007, available at 
www.vietnamnet.vn/chinhtri/2007/03/678207  
  299 
that the MTI ‘owns’ a good number of SOEs, other line Ministries also have their 
own enterprises to protect. Thus, as explained by Pham,  
‘locating the competition agency within the Ministry of Trade would mean subjugating 
this agency’s power in disciplining the conducts of giant SOEs in Vietnam, which are 
owned by different line ministries and have powerful relationships within the 
government… favoritism was thought to be inevitable in such a scenario’1203.   
In fact, during the drafting process of the VCL, it was widely proposed by scholars 
that a competition agency should be of ministry-level or should belong to the 
National Assembly
1204
. Unfortunately, in the end, the Ministry of Trade succeeded in 
convincing the National Assembly to place VCAD under their control. Article 7 of 
the enacted competition law reserves to the Government the function of performing 
‘uniform State management over competition’, and gives the lead role to MTI. 
Although various reasons were given for this arrangement
1205
, the profound reason for 
this approach, as commented by Pham, is that 
‘…the government in Vietnam still wants to retain control over the economy at the end of 
the day, not just as a facilitator who creates the ground but as a player as well. This 
essentially means restraining the power of the competition authorities within the realm of 
                                                 
1203
 Pham, supra note 264, p.559. This prediction has been confirmed by a VCAD official in his study, 
see Trinh Anh Tuan, ‘Legal Nature and Basic Requirements for Competition Agency – Lessons for 
Vietnam’, VCAD Conference Paper, organised in Hanoi on 15 May 2009 (in Vietnamese).  
1204
 E.g., CUTS, supra note 715, p.6 (‘The establishment of a competition agency which is independent 
and powerful, at least similarly to other ministries, is a prerequisite to the feasibility and effectiveness 
of the implementation process in the future’). 
1205
 This has been explained by (i) there is no need to establish a new ministry in the context of 
Vietnam where administrative reforms are being carried out; (ii) the Ministry of Trade is currently the 
administrative body with the best expertise in competition issues; and (iii) many other countries also 
have their competition agencies below ministry-level, see CUTS, supra note 715, p.6. 
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administrative fiats. Subjugating control over competition issues in the Trade Ministry 
would very conveniently serve this end’1206. 
Three years later, the VCC was created and comprises of representatives of various 
Ministries. With the current position and composition, this agency is also within the 
realm of the Government and is vulnerable to the influence of different interests. 
Thus, how competition policy is going to be implemented depends on the debate and 
compromise among these different interests. One VCAD official once admitted that 
the two competition law enforcement agencies in Vietnam, i.e. VCAD and VCC, 
need a protection from interference and influence by sectoral interest groups
1207
. 
Further, and this is perhaps one unique problem in Vietnam, the division of 
investigation power and adjudicatory power between VCAD and VCC in Vietnam 
has made the VCC merely a “shadow” of VCAD1208. According to Article 58 of the 
VCL, aggrieved parties can only lodge a complaint against the infringing parties to 
the VCAD, which will investigate and submit the results to the VCC. As such, the 
VCC cannot themselves initiate investigation on competition cases. Since the VCC 
are not involved in the investigation process, VCC members cannot thoroughly 
understand the relevant case. Although parties can make presentations to the VCC 
during the hearing
1209
, ‘in reality, the VCC are totally dependent on the VCAD’s 
                                                 
1206
 Pham, supra note 264, p.560. 
1207
 Bui, supra note 248, p.34. 
1208
 Truong Hong Quang, ‘Competition Agencies in Vietnam: Shortcomings and Recommendations’, 




 Article 104 of the VCL. 
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investigation results’1210. This is ‘a very important shortcoming of Vietnam’s two-
competition-agency model’1211.  
The current weak position of competition agencies may be the reason why 
Vietnamese enterprises have shown a strong preference in knocking at the “red 
door”1212 (i.e., sectoral regulator) instead of asking for the competition agency’s 
intervention when they are damaged by anti-competitive behaviours. For instance, in 
the Vinapco case (see Chapter 4), right after Vinapco suspended the fuel supply to 
Jetstar on 1 April 2008, the first thing that Jetstar did was to require the Civil 
Aviation Administration Agency under the Ministry of Transport to intervene. The 
result of this wise step was that fuel supply was resumed later on the same day by an 
administrative decision. Knocking at VCAD’s door was perhaps the last thing on 
their mind. The tendency of Vietnamese enterprises to go directly to the “red door” 
has been shown in other disputes as well
1213
. This practice largely differs from the 
enforcement of the AML in China where private parties are more willing to ask for 
the AMEAs’ action. Presumably, this difference comes from the fact that while the 
two competition agencies are perceived to have a weak position in Vietnam, the 
Chinese AMEAs are themselves powerful industrial regulators. Thus, the AMEAs are 
perceived to be more able to deal with antimonopoly cases. This practice also shows 
that Vietnam’s business environment still bears, to a certain extent, the stamp of a 
                                                 
1210
 Truong, supra note 1208. 
1211
 Dinh Thi My Loan (ed), ‘Building State Agency on Competition, Antidumping, Anti-subsidy and 
Safeguards in International Trade - International Experience and Lessons for Vietnam’, (Vietnam 
Competition Administration Department , Hanoi: 2006), p.104 (in Vietnamese). 
1212
 This is the term used by a famous Vietnamese law professor, Dr. Pham Duy Nghia, Faculty of Law 
– Hanoi National University, in ‘Looking for ‘the Hand of Steel’ for ‘Clean’ Competition’, (in 
Vietnamese), available at http://vietnamese-law-
consultancy.com/vietnamese/content/browse.php?action=shownews&category=&id=71&topicid=506 
1213
 For example, in the well-known dispute between VNPT and Viettel in 2005, these two competitors 
went directly to the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications for resolution instead of VCAD. 
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centrally planned economy where using ministerial intervention is perceived as more 
efficient than using other institutions including the competition agencies. Beresford 
has observed that ‘while the Vietnamese state has established a number of regulatory 
agencies, particularly under the influence of Western donors, these either do not 
necessarily regulate the most important elements of the Vietnamese economic 
systems or else their objectives remain contested in practice’1214. Citing the VCAD as 
an example, he explained that ‘this agency operates in an environment where the 
concept of the “level playing field” which they are supposed to implement is not 
universally accepted’1215. 
Finally, in any event, Vietnamese competition agencies cannot avoid the political 
interference from the Party. Despite the VCP’s declarations of “administrative 
reform” and “building a law-based state” based on the principle of separating the 
party and the state administration since the 1990s
1216
, according to many Vietnamese 
leaders the roles of the state and the Party are still unclear
1217
. As observed by 
Gillespie, ‘[a]lthough Vietnam has the institutional trappings of a constitutional state, 
‘party leadership’ guides, directs and occasionally displaces the state’1218. Indeed, 
Article 4 of Vietnam’s Constitution 1992 (amended in 2001) clearly asserts that “the 
VCP is the leading force of the State and the society”. Similarly, the Overall Program 
                                                 
1214
 Melanie Beresford, ‘The Development of Commercial Regulation in Vietnam’s Market Economy’, 
in John Gillespie & Albert H. Y. Chen (eds), ‘Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of 
Asian Communist Regimes’ (Routledge, London/New York: 2010), p.254. 
1215
 Beresford, ibid. 
1216
 The well-know slogan in Vietnam is “Dang lanh dao, Nha nuoc quan ly, nhan dan lam chu” (the 
party leads, the State manages, and the people are the master). 
1217
 See, e.g., Do Quoc Sam, ‘Coming back to Administrative Reform’ (2008) 7:15 The Communist 
Review (“…over the last decades, for many reasons, the activities of leading (of the Party) and 
administration (of the State) have overlapped or have been incompatible… The division of missions, 
responsibilities, and competencies has not been clear and consistent, and has not been much 
institutionalized”). 
1218
 Gillespie, supra note 212, p.130. 
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on State Administrative Reform in the 2001-2010 period indicated that the main goal 
of the Vietnamese authorities is to  
“successfully build a democratic, clean, strong, professional, modern, effective, and 
efficient public administration system which operates in line with the principle of the 
socialist law-based State under the leadership of the Party” [emphasis added]1219. 
As a result, ‘Party leaders in Vietnam still openly intervene in politically sensitive 
areas (although direct day-to-day party involvement in state operations is increasingly 
uncommon)’1220 and ‘very often administrative decisions are based on Party 
resolutions, which in practice are more important than law’1221. Another reason for 
the supremacy of political directives is that ‘most civil servants are Party members 
and they (and even those who are not Party members) are required to follow the Party 
directives’1222. Article 4 of the Law on Public Servants places the work of state 
employees under the ‘uniform leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam’ while 
Article 6 requires state employees - a broad designation that includes executive, 
judicial, and legislative officials, and even university academics – to ‘strictly abide by 
the Party’s lines and policies, and the State’s policy and law’. Thus, in a “regulatory 
labyrinth” with vague and overlapping regulations, State officials turn to “policy 
regimes” that are formulated by the “Party-affairs sections” within state institutions 
for guidance in interpreting state law
1223
. The VCL itself also leaves the door for 
political influence on the management of competition policy, for instance, certain 
                                                 
1219
 Decision 136/2001/QD-TTg on 17 September 2001. 
1220
 Gillespie, supra note 212, p.130. 
1221
 Salomon & Vu, supra note 273, p.144. 
1222
 Salomon & Vu, ibid. 
1223
 John Gillespie, ‘The Juridification of State Regulation in Vietnam’, in John Gillespie & Albert H. 
Y. Chen (eds), ‘Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes’ 
(Routledge, London/New York: 2010), p.84. 
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decisions, including those related to exemptions, are reserved to the Minister of 
Industry and Trade or to the Prime Minister rather than the competition agencies. 
Further, one of the requisite qualifications of members of the VCC is ‘having the 
sense of protecting socialist legality’1224.  
Thus, similar to the situation in China, it is not hard to understand why competition 
policy may have to submit to such policies of the VCP as ‘socialism-oriented market 
economy’ with the State sector as the leading force of the economy or “National 
Champions” policy (see analysis below). 
The current lack of expertise of the competition agencies 
Having competent competition agencies with expertise in competition law and policy 
is extremely important for effective and correct implementation of competition law. 
As commented by Tran and Hoang, one of the reasons why the VCL, which took 
effect in 2005, has not been effectively implemented is because ‘[p]rovisions of the 
VCL as well as its guidelines are relatively complicated and hard to understand even 
for those with expertise’1225. In fact, this is not only a challenge in enforcement of 
competition law alone but commercial law in general. As explained by Pham, in 
Vietnam, ‘laws are enacted and amended very quickly to adapt to the fast-changing 
market, whereas legal doctrines, jurisprudence and legal education seem to be lagging 
behind’1226. Given that competition law and policy is still a new and highly 
sophisticated area in Vietnam, it is not difficult to understand why Vietnamese 
                                                 
1224
 Article 55 (1) of the VCL (other qualifications include: being ethical, honest and ‘impartial’, 
having a Bachelor degree in law or economics/finance and having at least 9 years of working 
experience in law or economics/finance).  
1225
 Tran & Hoang, supra note 846, p32. 
1226
 Pham, supra note 360. 
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competition officials are still in the process of capacity building and get used to the 
operations of the market economy and such complicated concepts as ‘the relevant 
market’1227. Thus, similar to the situation in China, time is needed for Vietnamese 
competition agencies to improve their knowledge and skills and feel confident 
enough to use the usual tools in more mature antitrust jurisdictions to fulfill their 
tasks.  
As of 2011, there are about 99 officials working for VCAD including both lawyers 
and economists
1228
. All VCAD officials have bachelor degrees or above
1229
. 
Moreover, a number of committees exist within the VCAD to support and develop its 
work, including committees responsible for competition investigations, competition 
supervision and management, and international cooperation
1230
. Recently, VCAD has 
appointed 28 investigators
1231. Yet, ‘the expertise of VCAD in competition law and 
policy is still limited’1232. One VCAD official has recommended that the two 
competition law enforcement agencies in Vietnam, i.e. VCAD and VCC, ‘still need 
human resources with appropriate capacity and diligence’1233.  
                                                 
1227
 E.g., Nguyen, supra note 748 (observing that ‘Vietnam has never had any experience in defining 
the relevant market for the purpose of applying competition law. In the past, we were only used to 
defining the market in terms of sector, industry or region in order to make and carry out the State’s 
socio-economic development plans’). 
1228
 Lawyers account for 26% and economists account for 58% of the staff, see Vu Ba Phu, ‘Vietnam 
Competition Law: Legislation and Enforcement’, Presentation at Global Competition Review 2012 
Conference, Singapore, on 2-3 March 2012. 
1229
 70% of VCAD officials have Bachelor degrees, 28% have Master degrees and 2% have PhD 
degrees, see Vu, ibid. 
1230
 Trinh, supra note 1203, p.10. 
1231
 Unofficial interviews with VCAD officials. According to Article 52 of the VCL, the requisite 
qualifications for an investigator are having a Bachelor degree of law or economics/finance and having 
at least 5 years of working experience in law or economics/finance. 
1232
 Truong, supra note 1208. 
1233
 Bui, supra note 248, p.34. 
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Further, implementing competition policy is not the only duty of VCAD. In addition 
to enforcing the VCL, VCAD has to enforce the law on consumer protection and 
three other ordinances on anti-dumping, safeguard measures, and subsidy and 
countervailing measures. In effect, this has resulted in an overload for VCAD 
officials which are already limited in number
1234
. 
6.2. The Lack of an Independent and Competent Judicial System  
Structure of the Vietnamese judicial system 
The judicial power in Vietnam is exercised by the People’s Courts. There is a three-
tier hierarchy of Vietnamese People’s Courts; located at the district, provincial, and 
central levels
1235
. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is at the top of this hierarchy, 
below which are Provincial People’s Courts, and then District People’s Courts. 
District People’s Courts serve as courts of first instance for most matters1236. 
Provincial People’s Courts serve as appellate courts for cases first heard in the 
District People’s Courts and serve as first instance courts for disputes that are of 
particular importance or that meet higher jurisdictional thresholds
1237
. Finally, the 
SPC is the highest court in Vietnam. It supervises the administration of justice by all 
other courts, serves as the appellate court for cases heard in the Provincial People’s 
Courts and is responsible for cassational review functions
 1238
. It is noteworthy that at 
the provincial and central level, the People’s Courts are divided into chambers for 
specific jurisdictions (including economic, civil, criminal, administrative and labour 
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courts)
1239
. Vietnam exercises the so-called “two-level adjudication regime” but an 
appeal may only be made once up the hierarchy
 1240. Although Vietnam’s civil law 
system does not recognize the principle of stare decisis, the SPC has the authority to 
give guidance to lower courts to promote unified law application
1241
, and such 
guidance is traditionally respected by lower courts
1242
. Finally, similar to China, 
judgments in Vietnam tend to be brief, with few reasons given for the decision taken.  
Why is the Vietnamese judiciary not independent from political interference? 
First, in an ideological sense, the Vietnamese judiciary is not an independent branch 
that ‘checks and balances’ the power of other branches in the State system. Similar to 
China, Vietnam maintains legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms but does not 
admit a separation of powers. Article 2 of the Constitution 1992 clearly states that 
‘the State power is unified’ and mandates a system of delegation of people’s power to 
the National Assembly, which is charged with supervision of the other arms of the 
state, including the judiciary and the executive
1243
. In other words, the Vietnamese 
court system is and has always been formally subordinate to the National 
Assembly
1244
. The National Assembly remains the source of law in Vietnam. While 
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the courts have the power to “declare” the law, they do not have the power to “make” 
law. The real reason for rejecting the notion of “checks and balances”, as explained 
by Nguyen, is that ‘as with Chinese political leaders, the VCP aims to retain its 
political monopoly and is reluctant to import foreign principles that challenge its core 
socialist principles’1245. Vietnam is still heavily influenced by the doctrine of 
‘socialist legality’ that borrowed from the Soviet sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost 
(socialist legality) doctrine
1246
. ‘The connection between law and class was explained 
by Vietnamese leaders that law is part of the ‘superstructure’, which reflects the ‘will 
of the ruling class’ (y chi cua giai cap thong tri) and as the executive of the ruling 
class, the Party determined the content of law’1247. Thus, ‘law is a tool of the state, 
rather than a basis to assert the rights of citizens (especially against the state) or to 
seek judicial review of administrative action’1248. Taylor found that  
‘the ‘independent’ judiciary, an ideal imported from the West, will not develop in places 
with no tradition of separation of powers and no economic or ideological incentives for 
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powerful elites to cede authority to the courts… No surprise, then, many… years on, that 
Vietnam’s courts are not independent, technically competent or efficient’1249.  
Second, similar to all the other State agencies, the judicial system is subject to the 
unified leadership of the Party, which opens the door for political interference. As 
Nicholson puts it, ‘[i]n Vietnam, the Party “leads”, the state “manages” and mass 
organizations “represent”, all simultaneously sitting apart and dependent’1250. It is 
indeed very difficult to separate the Vietnamese judiciary from the Party. Article 4 of 
the Constitution has generally confirmed that “the Communist Party of Vietnam is the 
force leading the state and the society”. The subsequent Resolution 8 (2002) on 
Forthcoming Principal Jucidiary Tasks, Resolution 48, 49 (2005) on legal and judicial 
reform with an orientation toward 2020, Law on Organisation of the People’s Court 
(2002), Ordinance on Judges and Jurors (2002) also restated the Party’s leadership 
role, yet at the same time stipulated that courts ought to judge cases independently. 
Thus, there is a tension between the Party’s leadership of the state and the 
independence of the courts. Salomon and Vu pointed out that ‘this dualist thinking, 
mixing “rule of law” and “rule of the party” in Vietnam generates considerable 
confusion within the system’1251. Gillespie also found that the dividing line between 
leadership and interference (or intervention) remains unclear
1252
. Nicholson, however, 
reconciles these contradictory positions by suggesting that ‘although in principle 
courts are expected to follow law, in practice open-ended legislative drafting gives 
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the Party numerous opportunities to direct judicial outcomes by influencing the 
interpretation of law’1253. 
In addition to asserting its leadership role in various political and legal documents, the 
Party also relies on its members to give effect to its policy choices. According to the 
Party’s discipline, personnel owe duties both to the Party and to the law1254. 
Coincidently, in courts, 90 per cent of judges are Party members
1255. Thus, ‘in broad 
organizational term, the Party-state relationship is highly integrated’1256. Further, ‘it 
remains the case that the Party vets all judicial appointments and this is done in 
several ways, the effect of which is to ensure that the Party, at both the local and 
central level, continues to be decisive in the recruitment of judges’1257. At present, 
judges’ terms remain five year, if a judge seeks reappointment, he/she must submit a 
fresh application
1258
. While judges at the central are appointed by the President and 
local judges are appointed by the Chief Justice, they must be supported by the so-
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called Judge Selection Councils at the central and local level respectively
1259
. This 
practice has been much criticized by commentators since judges who have been 
viewed favorably by the central and local branches of the Party will receive the 
needed supporting documentation and those who have displeased Party organizations 
cannot expect to be supported
1260. As commented by Nicholson, ‘Vietnamese judges 
live and work in a politically charged culture where the local Party cell of their 
employment controls their reemployment prospects’1261. Finally, each court not only 
has a Party cell, but also has a police cell whose role is to report on the behaviour of 
cadres to higher authorities
1262
. 
As a result, by retaining the strong leadership role of the Party-state, ‘the courts 
remain intrinsically political, and not legal, institutions’1263. The dominance of the 
Party becomes clear in two crucial aspects of court work. First, the Party, through the 
local People’s Committee, is usually instrumental in determining whether a case will 
be pursued
1264
. Second, the Party is often intimately involved with the determination 
of at least certain cases
1265
. Thus, legal norms become fragile when confronted by the 
authoritarian party-state. Nguyen commented that ‘while in theory “a trial judge and 
people’s assessors are independent and subject only to the law” (Art 130 Constitution 
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1992), reality is quite different’1266. In many cases, hearings have been a kind of 
performance of a “play” in which all knew the outcome of the final act1267.  
The current lack of expertise to deal with competition cases 
Although there have been certain progresses in judiciary reform over the last two to 
three decades such as the trend towards professionalization in the judiciary and 
among lawyers, the increasing demand for legal services, the rising number of court 
cases, and the growth of legal education and training etc.
1268
, there are still 
shortcomings in the judicial system and one of the most serious issues now in 
Vietnam is the limited qualifications of the judges, especially at the district and 
provincial level. For example, a recent survey found that 54 per cent of those 
interviewed ‘think that judges at provincial and district courts are not qualified 
enough to understand cases thoroughly, have an unscientific and undisciplined 
working manner, and usually shout at or disregard concerned persons [parties]’1269. 
First, despite recent reforms announcing that all judges must have a Bachelor of Law 
degree, the paucity of judges with this qualification makes it impossible to 
institute
1270
. The recent reforms have been further undermined with the introduction 
of Resolution 131 (November 3, 2002), which has the primary purpose of waiving the 
requirement that judges have law degrees. Resolution 131 replicates an earlier 
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Resolution that introduced the concept of a “legal knowledge debt” (Resolution 
37/1993)
1271. ‘In effect, a candidate can seek appointment on an undertaking that 
he/she will subsequently obtain a law degree’1272. Since the introduction of “legal 
knowledge debt” in 1993, judges have generally taken legal training after their 
appointment, but not necessary bachelor of laws degrees
1273
. Reports suggest that 
until the end of 2007, about 200 judges at the provincial or district level still “owed” 
the LL.B degree
1274
. For those who have such a degree, especially in the remote areas 
in the north or central of Vietnam, the majority of them have the so called ‘in-service’ 
LL.B degrees, which resulted in their lack of knowledge and skills in their daily 
work
1275
. Two recent surveys have also revealed that judges are uncertain about how 
to apply the law and have low levels of legal education
1276
. The same survey also 
links in-service training with judgements that are successfully appealed or annulled, 
finding that those judgements that are “corrected or annulled” are more likely to 
originate with judges who have had in-service training
1277
.  
Further, several reports have highlighted the limited access of judges to legal 
materials and, in some cases, the law as well as the Internet
1278
. There is also limited 
access to the SPC’s Official Gazette, which aims to disseminate court policy and case 
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notes, and reference materials
1279
. Finally, Vietnamese judges have also complained 
about the current small number of judges and the increasing workload that they have 
to deal with
1280. More importantly, due to the heavy workload, judges haven’t spent 
enough time to upgrade their knowledge, the number of judges holding master or 
doctoral degrees is very small
1281
. 
As a result, many judges complained about the inconsistency in application of the 
law, more specifically, although there is only one rule, its interpretation can still vary 
even among judges in the Supreme Court
1282
. Further, assessment of evidence is also 
inconsistent among different courts, dependent on the subjective viewpoint of each 
judiciary panel in each case due to lack of clear rules on evidence assessment
1283
. One 
way to avoid this problem, as Vietnamese courts often do is the practice of 
‘judgement approval’ (widely known in Vietnam as ‘duyet an’) in complex cases. 
There is a reality that lower courts often seek opinions of higher court on specific 
judgements in advance even though this practice is not prescribed in law. Thus, it is 
not hard to understand why litigation is considered as an inefficient way for dispute 
resolution and courts are rarely the choice of private parties
1284
.   
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In short, Vietnamese courts in general face the great problem of competent personnel. 
It is even a bigger challenge for courts to enforce competition law, which is 
considered as a relatively new and sophisticated area in Vietnam. In contrast to 
VCAD’s officers who are frequently trained and exposed to foreign competition law 
and policy during both the drafting and day-to-day enforcement process, Vietnamese 
judges do not have such an opportunity. As explained by Gillespie,  
‘Since courts function differently from other state bureaucracies, judges have been 
comparatively isolated from foreign-influenced interpretive communities. Courtroom 
discourse and foreign donor-funded training courses are among the few arenas where 
judges are exposed to detailed explanations about how imported rights laws function in 
market economies’1285.  
To make matters worse, the task of reviewing the competition agencies’ decisions 
have been assigned to the Administrative courts instead of the Economic courts
1286
, 
which are perceived to have a better understanding of business life. In fact, during the 
drafting process of the VCL, some scholars have proposed that the Economic courts 
should be chosen instead of the Administrative courts to solve competition law 
disputes since the content of a competition decision contains more economics 
elements than administration elements
1287
. Unfortunately, since the competition 
agencies’ decisions are characterised as administrative decisions, they are subject to 
judicial review by Administrative courts. Thus, there is a valid concern about the 
quality of judicial review of competition cases. Arguably, lawyers can play an 
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important role in understanding transplanted laws and improving the quality of 
judgments
1288
. The Party Resolution No.48 (2005) on Perfecting the Socialist 
Oriented Economy and Law–based State, thus, urged judges to take legal arguments 
into account when writing decisions. Bui and Gillespie commented that this 
requirement, ‘if rigorously implemented, may go some way toward convincing judges 
to take the initiative in reconciling imported commercial legislative framework with 
local conditions’1289. However, this is an area that still needs improvement because so 
far, lawyers in Vietnam have played a rather weak role in the adjudication process 
and there is little room for aggressive advocacy
1290. Lawyers’ arguments have not 
received attention and are often only briefly noted in the judgments
1291
. Further, the 
publication of judgements for public comments should also be enhanced. ‘Despite 
extensive Vietnamese agitation to promote the publication of judgements and various 
donors actively working for and supporting court publication projects, publication of 
court decision is still scant’1292. Nicholson commented that ‘the drive for publication 
is tempered by real practical constraints since most judges are still poorly educated, 
resistant to change, and loath to come under public scrutiny, particularly by an 
increasingly talented legal profession’1293. 
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6.3. Enforcement of the VCL against Abuses of Administrative Monopolies  
The VCL provides no remedy for administrative monopolies 
As analyzed in Chapter 4, the VCL prescribes no specific remedy for abuses of 
administrative monopoly to restrict or distort competition and Decree No.06/2006 
only mentions that VCAD has the power to identify and put forward suggestions to 
the relevant State agency on documents that are inconsistent with the VCL’s 
provisions, and it is up to the relevant agency to pay attention to this suggestion or 
not. Thus, the role of Vietnamese competition agencies in this aspect is similar to 
their counterparts in China. Essentially, competition laws in both countries prohibit 
administrative monopolies without providing any specific remedy for them.  
In addition to VCAD’s power to make suggestion, aggrieved parties may apply to an 
administrative agency of higher level in accordance with the normal administrative 
review procedure governed by the Law on Complaints and Denunciations 1998 
(amended in 2004, 2005) for the decision to be amended or annulled. Where an 
administrative decision is found to be an abuse of administrative power under the 
VCL, there exists in Vietnam a right for injured parties to claim damages in 




In reality, similar to the situation in China, relying on an administrative agency of 
higher level is not an effective way to deal with administrative monopolies in 
Vietnam.  
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First, relying on higher level agency of the same province or region will not earn 
much result because local governments have a strong interest in the well-being of 
enterprises under their jurisdiction. Local governments themselves are the owners of 
certain local SOEs.  Even when a local enterprise is not State-owned, local 
governments still have a strong interest in matters such as revenue and employment, 
and the specific work targets of local officials. ‘This kind of local interest in the 
fortunes of local business makes them important protectors of “their” firms’1295.  
Second, relying on the central government to curb abuses of administrative power to 
restrict competition by local governments will also be ineffective.  ‘Administrative 
localism comes from a profound historical political culture balancing weak 
centralization and great autonomy of local authorities when it comes to daily 
politics’1296. It has been pointed out in a number of historical and cultural studies that 
each village in Vietnam self-regulates in terms of economics, politics and culture
1297
. 
‘Every village has its own rules or charter which villagers prefer to follow, rather than 
laws originating from central government’1298. Thus, “the King’s laws have to resign 
to the village’s rules” (phep vua thua le lang). Similar to China, ‘the relationship 
between the central and local governments in Vietnam is based on the modus vivendi 
as well as a “political contract” that ‘we do not care how you manage your 
province/district/village, as long as you produce economic growth without political 
instability’, which has weakened central state authority and undermines the 
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accountability of official rules’1299. However, it will not be easy to eliminate this 
thousands-of-year political tradition and localism has been clearly defined as ‘one of 
the main characteristics of the contemporary Vietnamese political system’1300. Thus, 
‘a decade after the Enterprise Law was enacted, the central government is still 
struggling to convince local officials to give private entrepreneurs the autonomy to 
make investment decisions within the parameters set by law’1301. Recently, the 
Ministry of Justice discovered that nearly 4.000 legal documents promulgated by 
State agencies, mostly by provincial authorities, in 2011 alone were “illegal” and that 
the percentage of “illegal” documents has not decreased during the last five years1302. 
One leading Vietnamese economist has therefore opined that in practice, there are 
now 63 separate economies within the national economy
1303
. 
Third, central State agencies will also be out of reach of the competition law. 
Salomon and Vu explained that localism does not only relate to ‘geographic 
localism’- the concept is broader, as it can also refer to ‘institutional localism’ and 
‘organizational localism’1304. As analysed in Chapter 2, the central government, 
especially the line ministries are often involved in anticompetitive restraints, normally 
in favour of SOEs, by raising the entry barriers against private enterprises and giving 
exemptions and special privileges to SOEs. This is the reason why during the drafting 
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process of the VCL, it was argued that actually, ‘for many non-state businesses, equal 
access to market quotas and bank loans is more important for their survival than an 
antitrust law’1305. However, administrative monopolies at the central level are even 
harder to prevent than at the local one. The profound reason, as explained by Dowdle, 
is that 
‘In both China and Vietnam, the political appeal of administrative law systems seems to 
lie primarily in its anticipated capacity to compel lower-level governmental and party 
actors to obey central-level, elite dictates. While international advocates see public law as 
a means for restraining central, elite behaviour as well as local behaviour, domestic elites 
appear to be more interested in constraining local behaviour without necessarily 
constraining their own capacities to act’1306. 
Further, similar to the political relationship between central and local governments, 
there are complexities in the relationship among central State agencies as well. As 
Neilson puts it, ‘law reform in Vietnam, at the end of the day, arises from highly 
internalized seemingly-endless rounds of debate, compromises and tradeoffs amongst 
stakeholder Ministries, regional interests and in some cases, the Party’1307. In reality, 
‘many sub-laws issued by executive agencies reinterpret the meaning of superior 
legislation and some are inconsistent with the state’s own policy objectives’1308. Thus, 
the fight against anticompetitive restraints by central government will also depend on 
the debate and compromise among various Ministries’ interests and the compromise 
between competition policy and other industrial policies. One recent example that has 
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attracted much attention in Vietnam is the practice of applying “ceiling interest rates” 
to deposits, which in effect has worked in favor of State-owned banks
1309
, since 2005. 
On 22 December 2005, under the auspice of the State Bank of Vietnam
1310
, the 
Vietnam Association of Banks together with State-owned banks and 19 joint-stock 
banks arrived at an agreement to according to which the 19 joint-stock banks would 
decrease their interest rates for VND deposit so that their interest rates for VND 
deposit would not be higher than 0,05% of their State-owned counterparts’ interest 
rates. Moreover, the State-owned banks agreed to keep their interest rates below 
0,58%/month (for 6-month period deposits) and below 0,63%/month (for 12-month 
deposits)
1311
. Regarding the role of the State Bank of Vietnam in this case, it was 
pointed out that ‘the State Bank of Vietnam shouldn’t have interfered in business 
activities of State-owned banks by requiring them to reach anticompetitive 
agreements, regardless of the reason behind such requirement, since such a 
requirement would violate not only banking law and the State’s policy of building a 
market economy, but also competition law’1312. Since then different “ceiling interest 
rates” have been continuously prescribed in the State Bank’s official decisions to 
protect “fair” competition in this area. This practice has encountered strong 
opposition from the public since it is against the market’s principles, yet, so far, the 
competition agencies have played no role in blowing the whistle toward this 
intervention.  
                                                 
1309
 Since State-owned banks are backed by the government, it is widely believed that they will never 
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 Nguyen, supra note 323, p.64. 
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‘In essence, similar to China, Vietnam has undertaken rule by law, rather than rule of 
law, reforms’1313. The role of the law reform in general was to consolidate and 
legitimize state authority over the ‘multi-component commodity economy’1314. 
Indeed, the popular phrase that is widely used in Vietnamese business legal 
documents is “State management of economic activities”. This “statist approach” to 
economic legislation provides continuing evidence of a concern to draft laws ‘to 
consolidate and entrench state power rather than to … limit the use of public 
power’1315. As a result, ‘ruling cadres may distort rules and decisions in order to 
protect themselves or advance their interests in power or wealth or other advantage, 
though they generally do so only in important cases or at the margin’1316. Thus, 
despite many years of legal and administrative reforms to create a more equal 
business environment, administrative monopolies are still rampant in the economy 
and ‘well-placed officials could use their positions and knowledge for commercial 
advantage while forestalling competition from others’1317. For instance, even though 
Vietnam has carried out reforms in administration procedure, especially in the area of 
enterprise registration
1318
, a glooming reality is that numerous business licenses still 
exist and make entry barrier for private enterprises very high in Vietnam. According 
to VCCI, as of March 2010, there are 315 different types of business licenses in the 
                                                 
1313
 Goodpaster, supra note 335, p.135. 
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economy
1319
. An enterprise would need 4.14 business licenses on average to start 
business and 14.56 per cent of Vietnamese enterprises have opined that it is very 
difficult to obtain these licenses
1320
. This reality is coincident with the problem of 
corruption in Vietnam. Until recently, Vietnam is still one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world
1321
. A former high-ranking official has remarked that the anti-
corruption campaign in Vietnam has been done without much progress and the 
corrupted people normally hold high positions
1322
. 
Why administrative litigation against administrative monopolies will be ineffective? 
Although the VCL is silent on whether private parties can directly challenge 
prohibited administrative monopolies, technically, such private actions are possible 
under the Law on Administrative Litigation 2010 which states that aggrieved parties 
are allowed to start an administrative action against an administrative decision
1323
. As 
a result of international integration, especially after the determination to join the 
WTO, Vietnam has established a mechanism for judicial review of administrative 
decisions
1324
. In Vietnam, administrative courts were established in 1996 within the 
SPC and in a number of Provincial People’s Courts. District courts do not have an 
administrative court, but generally at least one judge in each of these courts 
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 Article 103(1), Law on Administrative Litigation 2010. 
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specializes in administrative matters. The procedural rules for judicial review of 
administrative cases are now provided in the Law on Administrative Litigation 2010. 
The administrative court may annul the original administrative decision may make a 
decision on giving compensation to the plaintiff for losses incurred as a result of the 
faulty administrative act or decision
1325
. 
In theory, judicial review would contribute to increased transparency and 
accountability in administration, thus potentially helps decrease abuses of 
administrative power
1326
. In reality, however, it is very unlikely that Vietnamese 
courts will play an important role in fighting against anticompetitive abuses of power 
by administrative agencies. The most important reasons are the limited jurisdiction 
and the lack of independence of Vietnamese administrative courts. 
Similar to the situation in China, it appears that the jurisdiction of Vietnamese 
administrative court regarding private actions against administrative monopolies is 
very limited. The jurisdiction of administrative courts is restricted to the legality (not 
the reasonableness) of administrative decisions
1327. Further, an ‘administrative 
decision’ is defined as  
a document issued by an administrative agency on a specific issue in administration 
activities which is applied once to one or more specific entities [emphasis added]
1328
.  
                                                 
1325
 Article 163(2), Law on Administrative Litigation 2010. 
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Thus, people still cannot complain about laws or other legal documents per se. In 
other words, general administrative rules, decisions, or orders are not reviewable by 
courts
1329
. Thus, abstract conducts such as a local government issuing a notice to 
require all local State agencies to consume only locally produced goods or to use only 
local contractors etc. may not be actionable. 
Further, as analyzed above, Vietnamese judges lack the institutional and political 
independence in handling with cases in general. This problem is most serious in 
abuses of administrative power cases for various reasons. First, judges are dependent 
on Party organs and State agencies of the same State level for their reappointment. 
For example, local judges are appointed by the Chief Justice, yet they must be 
supported by the Judge Selection Councils at the local level
1330
, which are to be 
chaired by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Provincial People’s Council and 
comprise such members as a high-ranking official of Provincial Department of 
Internal Affairs
1331
. Second, judges are pressurized by “sensitive relationship” with 
other State agencies at the same level, thus, ‘when a court is situated in a specific 
district or province, it is very difficult not to consider the opinions of local leaders 
even if these opinions are illegal’1332. Finally, and conveniently, ‘Vietnamese law is 
characterised as full of vagueness and overlapping and judges are still motivated to 
resolve cases by “reason and sentiment in carrying out the law” (ly va tinh trong viec 
chap hanh phap luat), which opens the gate for consideration of special interests and 
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inconsistent application of law’1333.  In reality, ‘it was not uncommon for judges to 
defer to the executive or administrative agencies and seek their advice on the 
interpretation of a law’1334. In this context, it is extremely hard for judges to challenge 
anticompetitive administrative decisions of local governments. 
As such, while on paper the framework regulating the settlement of complaints and 
denunciations by the judiciary has greatly improved, ‘their efficiency has been 
challenged in both theory (as there is no independence and narrow jurisdiction) and in 
practice (as there is implication that other institutions are more effective in settling 
disputes such as the Party’s organs and government)’1335. Consequently, after 15 
years of the first introduction of the Administrative courts in 2006, Vietnamese 
people are still reluctant to challenge administrative acts and decisions before the 
courts. The general perception of Vietnamese people regarding this type of litigation 
is “the ant suing the potato” (‘con kien kien cu khoai’) and the number of disputes 
handled by Vietnamese administrative courts remains very low
1336
. In practice, 
several authors have observed that while most people in China choose not to take 
further action when they have disputes with administrative organs, litigation has been 
used even less in Vietnam
1337
.  
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Vietnam will certainly go in the direction of continued judicial reforms to create a 
procedural ‘rule of law’ that protects commercial legal rights from administrative 
action through the process of improving the independence and competence of 
Administrative courts. However, ‘structural changes to judicial practice cannot be 
achieved quickly’1338. First, ‘such reforms will be obstructed by judges’ training and 
habit of framing outcomes that reconcile litigants’ claims to the state benefit and send 
ideologically correct educational messages to the people’1339. Further, ‘such reforms 
will inevitable be resisted by interest groups such as State and large privately owned 
companies who rely on government connections for trading privileges and capital and 
will be worse off under a “rule of law” regime that gives their competitors access to 
state institutions (especially courts) that protect private commercial rights’1340. 
Finally, and even more troubling, ‘a procedural “rule of law” that protects 
commercial legal rights from administrative action might undermine the ability of 
party leaders to use prerogative powers to ameliorate the damaging impact of 
international economic integration’1341.  
6.4. Enforcement of the VCL against State-owned Enterprises 
6.4.1. A de facto exemption of SOEs from the VCL application? 
As analyzed in Chapter 2, one of the sacred missions of the VCL is to prevent abuses 
of monopolistic and dominant SOEs and to promote competition in the State 
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economy sector. In contrast to the ambiguous provision of the AML, the VCL makes 
it very clear that SOEs are well within the scope of the VCL application except for 
State monopolies and enterprises engaged in production or supply of public utility 
products or services
1342
. However, similar to the situation in China, it is very likely 
that SOEs (especially the largest SOEs at the central level) will escape the scrutiny of 
competition law for most of the time due to various reasons including Vietnam’s 
‘socialism-oriented market economy’ ideology, the ‘National Champions’ policy, and 
the strong political influence of SOEs in political life in Vietnam.  
The ‘socialism-oriented market economy’ ideology and the leading role of SOEs 
As one Vietnamese author puts it, ‘[t]he major unique feature of a socialist-oriented 
market may be the domination of the SOEs in the economy and the government 
intervention to balance the market forces’1343. Beyond the characteristics stated 
above, the ideal “socialist orientation” remains unclear in details1344. Thus, similar to 
the situation in China, despite market-oriented reforms, the Vietnamese government 
has by no means decided to get out of the business of state ownership. The leading 
role of SOEs in the economy has been consistently confirmed throughout various 
Party’s declarations and the State’s legal documents. Article 19 of Vietnamese 
Constitution 1992 (amended in 2001) states that: 
The State economy shall be consolidated and developed, especially in key sectors and 
industries, and shall play the leading role… [emphasis added] 
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As such, on the one hand, the Party/State allows the development of a multi-sectoral 
economy, on the other hand, the State will retain control over the national economy 
by maintaining SOEs as the leading force. Pham called this ‘the dilemma of the 
reform process in Vietnam which is to balance the development of a market economy 
with the rigidities of communist ideology and State control’1345.  
In fact, since the very first stage of Doi Moi, the Vietnamese government has focused 
on reforming SOEs so that they could be able to operate successfully in a market 
environment. Similar to China, SOEs reforms in Vietnam has also followed the 
strategy of “grasp the large and release the small”. One important policy to “release 
the small” is equitization of SOEs, which was adopted as early as 1991. In Vietnam, 
the term “equitization” is used and should be distinguished from “privatization” since 
the State still retain partial or even controlling shares in the equitized enterprises and 
only sells some of the shares to private interests. At first the equitization process in 
Vietnam was very slow. One key problem lay in the suspicion of directors and 
workers that equitization would result in loss of control and/or loss of jobs
1346
. Only 
when the latter problem was partly solved by the prevalence of “insider equitization” 
(managers and workers taking the majority of shares) and by the state retaining a 
controlling interest was the reform able to proceed
1347
. While in 2001, there were 
5.655 SOEs in Vietnam, during the past decade, 4.000 SOEs have been equitized
1348
, 
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mostly at the smaller end of the SOE scale
1349
. Apart from speeding up the 
equitization process, the government has issued regulations on the dissolution of 
enterprises through auctions, transference, sales, bids, and rents of small SOEs
1350
. 
However, as the size of SOE undergoing equitization has risen, a larger proportion 
has been kept under state control
1351
.  
Pursuant to the Party’s State-ownership ideology, in reality, SOEs, a leftover of the 
former centrally planned regime, still account for a big proportion of Vietnamese 
economy. According to the Committee on Enterprise Renovation, as of 1 July 2010, 
the State still owns 100 per cent capital in 1.206 SOEs, 900 of which have been 
transferred into limited liability companies with one member (which is the 
government), the other 300 enterprises will be either equitized
1352
 or transferred into 
limited liability companies with one member
1353
. Overall, the typical feature of the 
Vietnam’s economy is a large number of SMEs with little capital and a few SOEs 
holding the majority of capital
1354
. Among Top 500 biggest enterprises of Vietnam, 
by 2009, only 28.9% of them are private enterprises and it should also be noted that 
most of these private enterprises’ growth was due to the cooperation with equitized 
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SOEs
1355
. Although markets have become more open and entry barriers have been 
significantly lower, the State economy sector still account for 33.17% of GDP
1356
. 
More importantly, SOEs are now holding market dominant position in almost all 
important sectors, which are defined by the State as “strategic” sectors, such as 




Clark has pointed out that ‘[r]egulation of the market seems to work best when the 
government has a certain distance from market participants, and is not also a 
competitor and an owner, yet we do not seem to see that distance in Vietnam’1358. 
Indeed, SOEs in Vietnam are defined as enterprises in which the State owns more 
than 50 per cent of capital
1359
. The State as the owner of the SOEs is represented by 
various State agencies such as the Government, the Prime Minister, sectoral 
Ministries, provincial People’s Committees, Ministry of Finance, SCIC etc.1360. These 
State representatives will have the power to decide the most important issues in 
business activities of the SOEs such as organization and personnel issues, business 
strategies and plans, and important investment projects etc. as well as to supervise 
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and monitor these SOEs
1361
. In other words, there is still no separation between State 
administration and direct corporate governance.  
As such, after the end of central planning, ‘the only remaining element of the earlier 
definition of socialism in Vietnam was the government’s determination to maintain 
state enterprise domination of the economy’s commanding heights’1362. This is the 
main reason leading to the paradox that the Vietnamese government not only creates 
and protects private business but also hinders them
1363
. As explained by a VCAD 
officer, in Vietnam, the concept of “competition” must be understood in two ways: 
first, it means competition between domestic enterprises and their foreign competitors 
in both domestic and export markets, regarding this type of competition, the 
Government tends to support domestic enterprises by using different measures; 
second, it means competition between the SOEs and the non-SOEs in both upstream 
and downstream markets and as a matter of course, significant advantages and 
privileges are given to the State sector
1364
. The State ownership ideology also implies 
that ‘the government will continue to provide support for SOEs as a central plank of 
the “socialist market economy”’1365.  
‘National Champions’ policy  
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Similar to China, SOE reforms in Vietnam has also followed the ‘National 
Champions’ policy1366. To avoid what was widely perceived as a potential legitimacy 
problem
1367
, as well as to deal with the concern that domestic enterprises will not be 
able to compete in both domestic and regional markets as trade barriers disappeared 
under the AFTA and WTO commitments
1368
, the Vietnamese government has 
attempted to replicate the Korean chaebol model since the 1990s. Numerous State-
owned general corporations (GCs) and economic groups (ECs) have been created by 
administrative decisions of the Prime Minister. Decision number 90/Ttg and 91/Ttg 
issued in March 1994, combined to significantly reduce the number of SOEs and to 
group many of them into large corporations
1369
. As a result, more than eighty GCs 
were created
1370
. The GCs comprise all key SOEs in strategic sectors such as 
transport, coal, oil, and gas, chemical, steel, cement, power generation, 
telecommunications, aviation, and essential agricultural products like coffee, rubber 
and rice
1371
. Since 1997, SOEs in Vietnam have been categorized into two groups
1372
. 
The first group,  comprised those SOEs defined as making an operating profit, were 
given autonomy in all fields of operation, including competing with other economic 
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sectors and selling at prices set by the market
1373
. The second group comprised those 
SOEs defined as being significant for national security (including industries such as 
electricity, mining, cement, civil aviation, railways, telecommunications and postal 
services)
1374
. Their activities still to this day lie under the direct control of the 
Government and they receive government subsidies as in the past
1375
. The 
categorization of SOEs into these two groups shows that the government wanted to 
ensure its hold on power during the reform process by keeping absolute control over 
all its key industries
1376
. Since 2002, a new corporate form of SOEs was introduced 
and the Government has conversed several of very large GCs into “economic 
groups”, including dominant SOEs within their respective industries (insurance, 
minerals telecommunications, shipping, and textiles and garments). Under this new 
structure, the State transfers all investment capital to a parent-child corporation
1377
. 
The parent company is wholly state-owned and is in charge of the capital while the 
subsidiaries can include different ownership types
1378
. Such groups must have capital 
of over $650 million and their scope of operations must be international
1379. ‘By 
creating State-owned groups, the Government expects that these groups will repeat 
the success in East Asian countries, especially in Korea, to become ‘motive force’ of 
the national economy and highly competitive in international markets’1380. In recent 
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years, the market dominant positions of State-owned economic groups have even 
been reinforced, especially in the face of disadvantageous conditions in the global 
market after the 2008-2009 crisis
1381
. Specifically, the Government has issued a legal 
document on the establishment of State-owned economic groups in late 2009 which 
confirms the goal of establishment of State-owned economic groups to accumulate 
capital and to achieve economies of scale in key industries and sectors, to improve the 
competitiveness of the country in international economic integration process, and to 
create the impetus for the growth of other sectors and industries in the economy
1382
. 
Key industries and sectors are defined to include post and telecommunications, 
information technology, shipping, electricity, oil and petrol, coal and minerals, textile, 
rubber, fertilizer and chemicals, real estate, machinery and finance etc.
1383
. As such, 
‘Vietnam appears to implement ‘state guidance’ of the market, primarily through 
domination of the “commanding heights” by SOEs, similar to the model of alliance 
capitalism of North East Asian economies’1384. 
According to data from the Ministry of Finance, as of 2011, there are now 96 State-
owned general corporations and 12 economic groups
1385
. Recently, as a result of a 
national conference on ‘10 years of restructure, renovation and development of SOEs 
in the period of 2001-2010’, it was announced that by 2020 there will be 17 economic 
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groups and general corporations in which the State holds 100 per cent capital and 
about 200 monopolistic SOEs
1386
. 
The “National Champions” policy has raised severe concern about a potential conflict 
between competition policy which aims at preventing or regulating market power on 
the one hand and industrial policy which aims at creating market power for SOEs in 
certain sectors on the other hand. For instance, one VCAD official opined that: 
‘This policy may be a two-edged weapon which can result in inefficiency in resource 
allocation… The process in which governments give privileges to a number of ‘leading’ 
enterprises in one sector is equivalent to a process of creating oligopolies or, even worse, 
monopolies. Naturally, enterprises in an oligopolistic or monopolistic market will always 
behave in a bad way to distort competition and harm smaller enterprises as well as the 
whole economy’1387. 
In a recent research paper, another VCAD official also recommended that Vietnamese 
government should consider the potential cost of their ‘National Champions’ policy 
since these newly-established economic groups will not only be able to distort 
competition but they can also influence the governments’ economic decisions due to 
their close relationship with their governing ministries
1388
.  Neilson pointed out that, 
right at the time of the VCL’s drafting, ‘[t]he expectation of a new competitive 
capacity of GCs appears to have been recalibrated since the GC industry sectors often 
                                                 
1386
 ‘Equitization of Petro Vietnam, TKV, EVN, VNPT, Vinashin Before 2020’, Vn Economy on 08 
December 2011, available at http://vneconomy.vn/20111208092355129P0C5/co-phan-hoa-petro-
vietnam-tkv-evn-vnpt-vinashin-truoc-2020.htm. 
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coincide identically with the business sectors that are expected to be exempted, in 
whole or in part, from the competition law’1389. 
The side-effect of the ‘National Champions’ policy, presumably, is that any possible 
anti-competitive behaviour of these national champions will be down played and 
escape the scrutiny of the VCL. It is very difficult, for example, to enforce the VCL’s 
provisions on abuse of market dominance against SOEs because ‘once market power 
is just a product of the State and serves the State’s purposes, the plan to establish a 
countercheck can hardly be seriously implemented because public power will always 
be behind market power’1390. It is even harder to enforce the VCL’s merger control 
toward SOEs’ economic concentrations since these concentrations, however 
anticompetitive they are, are initiated by the State. As explained by Nguyen, the 
establishment of State economic groups in Vietnam is rarely a result of voluntary 
cooperation among different SOEs, but frequently a result of administrative decisions 
which are compulsory for relevant SOEs and may create anticompetitive 
concentrations and unfair competition practices
1391
. 
In fact, at a recent Asian Competition Forum conference, a former high-ranking 
official questioned if anti-monopoly laws would reduce local companies’ 
competitiveness on international markets, and suggested a “softened” approach to 
help local companies sharpen their edge
1392. He raised a question that ‘without big 
economic groups, how can Vietnam compete internationally?’ and added that the 
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fundamental challenge for Vietnam was to reconcile its competition law with its 
“development” needs1393.  
The complex political relationship between SOEs and State agencies in Vietnam 
Gillespie has commented that ‘weak anti-monopoly provisions in the VCL suggest 
that foreign pressure groups lost the struggle with the Ministry of Trade to limit the 
market domination of politically connected SOEs’1394. In fact, dominant and 
monopolistic SOEs in Vietnam can be characterized as powerful, having close 
relationship with the government and enjoying special treatment and privileges
1395
.  
SOEs in Vietnam are still “owned” either by provincial People’s Committees or by 
the line ministries that were also their regulators (bo chu quan)
1396
. Due to the close 
institutional and personal connections with these supervising State agencies, ‘the 
voice and power of current corporations are extremely strong’1397. This is especially 
so at the central level since the largest SOEs tend to be central SOEs. Some authors 
opine that in such a context, any rational policy will be opposed by groups who only 
want to protect their own interests in the name of “protecting national interests”1398. A 
former Prime Minister once stated that Vietnamese SOEs have a tradition of relying 
on the State’s protection and it is difficult for them to abandon this old habit1399. 
Perhaps this is the reason why so far SOE reforms in Vietnam have been very slow. A 




 Gillespie, supra note 212, p.259. 
1395
 Le Phu Cuong, ‘Monopoly Situation in Vietnam’, available at 
http://www.competitionlaw.cn/upload/05070113295626.pdf.  
1396
 For example, Vietnam Airlines is supervised by the Ministry of Transportation, Bao Viet is 
supervised by the Ministry of Finance, EVN and Petrolimex are supervised by MTI etc. 
1397
 Harvard Kennedy School, supra note 266, p.15. 
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former Vice Minister of Posts and Telecommunication of Vietnam, for instance, 
pointed out that opening the industries that are now monopolized or dominated by 
SOEs face difficulties because of the will of the industry regulators and vested 
interests
1400
. He also stated that the process of equitization of SOEs is too slow and 
the importance of SOEs is over-emphasized, the market is being distorted by 




‘As long as administrative management function and corporate governance function 
has not been separated, SOEs will still enjoy strong protection by their line ministries 
who play the role of policy makers and enforcers as well as business managers’1402. 
Thus, as observed by Beresford,  
‘Throughout most of the transition period, the institutional reforms put SOE directors in a 
“carrot without stick” situation, i.e., they had every incentive to make special pleading for 
protection and other privileges in the Vietnamese market, but the government has little 
power or influence over what they actually did. Market discipline was largely absent, but 
government discipline was not implemented either’1403.  
One notable example is the recent debate between the MTI and Ministry of Finance 
over the price of oil and petrol supplied by Petrolimex, a dominant importer and 
supplier of oil and petrol in Vietnam with 60% of market share
1404
. While the 
Ministry of Finance criticized Petrolimex for charging unfairly high price  for oil and 
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 ‘State Economy and Lessons from the Telecommunication Industry’, Vietnam Economy on 6 




 Pham, supra note 260, p.57. 
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 Beresford, supra note 1214, p.264. 
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petrol, the MTI, the supervising Ministry of Petrolimex, appeared to “protect” their 
enterprise and argued that this price is actually low and Petrolimex is doing business 
at a loss due to political and social duties assigned to them by the State
1405
. 
Interestingly, no agency has been able to prove whether Petrolimex is doing business 
at a loss or not due to a lack of reliable business data. In the end, both agencies 
seemed to reach a consensus by issuing a public notice with such a vague message 
that from now on both Ministries would cooperate and the price of oil and petrol will 
be managed in accordance with market mechanism
1406
. 
In fact, similar to China, Vietnam has taken some steps toward separating the State’s 
dual role as both a regulator and a participant in the market has been made in 
Vietnam. The State Capital Investment Corporation (SCIC) performing the functions 
of state owner began operations in 2006, which can ‘hopefully [remove] the clear 
conflict of interest that previously existed when the line ministries were both owners 
and regulators of SOEs’1407. It appears, however, that the General Corporations or 
Economic Groups will be moved under the SCIC only when, and if, they are 
equitized
1408. The problem is that under the “grasp the large and release the small” 
strategy, most of the biggest SOEs at the central level have not been equitized and are 
still under the supervision of the line Ministries or even the Prime Minister
1409
. 
Further, SCIC itself is a below-Ministry-level under the supervision of Ministry of 
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 Beresford, supra note 1214, p.264. 
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Finance which also directly manages various SOEs. Thus, whether SCIC will play 
any role in SOE reforms remains to be seen
1410
. 
The head of the Competition Law’s Drafting Working Group has commented to the 
effect that an antitrust law only has relevance when the State ceases to intervene in 
business life
1411.  As long as the State still plays the role of “the mother” of SOEs, 
inequality and anti-market decisions such as not allowing SOEs to go bankrupt will 
continue
1412
. Applying competition law to SOEs, especially those at the central level, 
will face great challenges from sectoral Ministries. As explained by Le Dang Doanh, 
an outstanding economist in Vietnam, ‘the fight against monopolies in Vietnam is 
much more complicated than in other countries since those monopolies gained their 
monopolistic positions not from a competitive process but rather from government 
support’1413. Hence, even though the VCL has created a legal ground to fight against 
abuses of monopolistic and dominant positions, ‘to what extent this fight occurs will 
depend on whether administrative agencies really want to “tamper with” those 
enterprises that they have so far supported’1414.  
A de facto exemption of SOEs from the VCL application 
From the above analysis, there appears to be a tension between provisions of 
competition law with the Party’s ideology and policy toward SOEs as well as the 
strong political influence of these entities. As Gillespie puts it, 
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‘How the VCP is going to reconcile state ownership ideology with economic efficiency 
and personal interests? Unquestionably, official announcements issued by party and state 
organs command the most authority in Vietnam’1415.  
Indeed, in Vietnam, ‘where law and politics are “interwoven” politics dominates’1416. 
Thus, while the VCL has provisions on a great number of anticompetitive practices, 
‘[i]n reality, many anticompetitive practices which may be strictly sanctioned in other 
antitrust regimes have not been officially investigated and sanctioned’1417. 
For example, on the front against cartels, so far only one case has been handled
1418
 
even though it is widely perceived that collusion among SOEs is a very popular 
situation in Vietnam
1419
. One example of blatant price-fixing that involved SOEs but 
escaped punishment by the VCL is the Steel case in 2008, three years after the VCL 
took effect. This is also the first price-fixing agreement under investigation by the 
VCAD. In this case, as a result of a CEO Conference organized by the Vietnam Steel 
Association (VSA) in Hanoi on 7 October 2008, the VSA adopted a resolution to 
require its members to fix their selling price at 13,7-14 million VND/ton
1420
. The 
reason for this agreement was that due to a sudden decrease in steel price in 2008, at 
least four steel producers had to close down their factories and it was afraid that firms 
would exit the market if prices continued to fall. The Association Chairman was 
quoted as saying: ‘we clearly understand that we will violate the Competition Law 
and also the Law on Pricing if we join hands to hurt consumers, and we are not 
                                                 
1415
 Gillespie, supra note 1223, p.82. 
1416
 Gillespie & Nicholson, supra note 3, p.7. 
1417
 Bui, supra note 248, p.31. 
1418
 See Chapter 4 for analysis of the Insurance case 2008. 
1419
 E.g., see Harvard Kennedy School, supra note 266, p.17. 
1420
 ‘VCAD Started Investigating the Vietnam Steel Association’, The Saigon Times on 17 October 
2008, available at <http://atpvietnam.com/vn/thongtinnganh/20962/index.aspx> (in Vietnamese). 
  343 
allowed to do so. However, the laws should not be applied here’1421. Surprisingly, this 
case was closed at the investigation period without any punishment on the ground that 
all the relevant enterprises voluntarily withdrew from their agreement twelve days 
later! There are also various reports in the media about enterprises “shake hand” in 
buying various agricultural products to the detriment of farmers
1422
, yet so far there 
has been no investigation conducted by competition agencies and these cartels appear 
to have escaped the scrutiny of the VCL. 
On the prohibition of abuses of market dominant positions, it should be born in mind 
that the current dominant and monopolistic positions in Vietnam are mainly held by 
SOEs, especially State-owned general corporations and economic groups. Most 
private companies in Vietnam are still small and unlikely to be caught by the VCL’s 
provisions on abuses of market dominant position
1423
. It is suspected that abuses of 
MDP by SOEs are rampant in the economy
1424




Similarly, mergers between SOEs have appeared to be “irrelevant” to the VCL. 
Recently, Vietnamese media have reported about the mergers between Vietnam 
Airlines and Jetstar Pacific Airline (proposed by the Ministry of Transportation), as 




 E.g., ‘Rice Price Decrease: Farmers Suspect Enterprises “Shake Hands”’, The Saigon Times on 29 
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well as the potential merger between Vinaphone and Mobiphone (proposed by the 
Ministry of Information and Telecommunications). These mergers have raised great 
concern from the public for fear of detriment to competition. For instance, Mr Vo Tri 
Thanh, Vice Head of CIEM, opined that at present Vinaphone, Mobiphone and 
Viettel are the three biggest mobile phone service in Vietnam, the merger between 
Vinaphone and Mobiphone will result in a provider with 60% market share, which is 
detrimental to competition and consumers’ interests1426. The merger between Vietnam 
Airlines and Jetstar Pacific Airlines (JPA) has received even more serious criticism. 
Under the proposal of the Ministry of Transportation, the 70% State capital in JPA, 
currently supervised by SCIC, will be transferred to Vietnam Airlines
1427
. With 
Vietnam Airlines holding 80% market share and JPA holding 17% market share in a 
domestic air transportation market with 5 carriers, the merger will result in a carrier 
(Vietnam Airlines) with nearly 100% market share
1428
. Some author commented that 
this merger will be a ‘back to front’ reform in the air transportation market1429. 
Unfortunately, in the end the merger between Vietnam Airlines and Jetstar Pacific 
Airlines was approved. On 16 January 2012, the Vietnam’s Prime Minister released 
Decision No.95 which stated that all SCIC’s shares in Jetstar Pacific would be 
transferred to Vietnam Airlines
1430
. The point is, from what is written by the media, 
the competition agencies appear to play no role in these mergers. They seem to be 
simply “forgotten”. 
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6.4.2. The VCL as a protectionist tool against foreign companies? 
Till date, Vietnam has signed over 122 trade agreements with various global 
economies. With the deeper integration into international trade, there has been a 
growing concern about national sovereignty and economic security due to the current 
limited competitiveness of domestic enterprises
1431
. Nguyen Tan Dung, a Politburo 
member, and now the Prime Minister, has cautioned that harmonization and 
globalization will erode national sovereignty
1432
. ‘Foreign competition may 
compromise the leading role of SOEs as ‘an important managerial force and macro 
instrument for the state to orient and regulate the economy’1433. Several Vietnamese 
scholars also opined that the erosion of national sovereignty outweighs the putative 
benefits of international trade and investment
1434
. Over the past few years these 
concerns have been even more emphasized due to the trade deficit suffered by 
Vietnam
1435
. Thus, potentially, the VCL could be used as a tool to protect domestic 
enterprises in the face of international competition. However, in practice, this trend 
has not been shown very clearly, which is in contrast to what has occurred in China. 
Chinese competition agencies have not hesitated to use the AML to protect what they 
consider as “national security”. There are three possible reasons why nationalism in 
Vietnam has not been as strong as in China. First, China is a bigger market and it 
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implemented the opening policy a long time before Vietnam did, thus China has 
witnessed greater impact of international competition on its domestic market. Second, 
as a matter of history1436 and culture1437, the nationalism psyche is much stronger in 
China than in Vietnam. As remarked by Williams,  
‘The sense of difference between Chinese and all others is very striking; nationalism 
and ethnic identity are synonyms, in fact, if not in law. Separate treatment of 
“foreigners” is deeply ingrained in the Chinese government machine, formally in 
terms of separate legal rules for nationals and foreigners and informally in terms of 
treatment by organs of the state’1438. 
In contrast, this psyche is not so strong in Vietnamese people, which call themselves 
as the Viet population living in the south (Nam) of China. Finally, and most 
importantly, as a much more powerful player in international trade, no surprise then 
China appears to be more willing to carry out “protectionist” policies1439 than their 
Vietnamese counterparts. In short, while foreign companies have a valid concern that 
competition law will be used as a protectionist tool in China, so far, this has not been 
the case in Vietnam. 
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6.5. Conclusion 
From the poor enforcement of commercial law in general in Vietnam over the past 
two decades of reform
1440
, it is not difficult to foresee a similar gloomy future for the 
VCL. As warned by Pham, ‘[t]ranslating and transplanting foreign laws into Vietnam 
is only the very first start, what is more important is to find the appropriate 
institutions in Vietnam’s society to implement those laws’1441. Unfortunately, a close 
look at both the competition agencies and the court system in Vietnam reveals that 
both institutions still lack the necessary institutional and political independence as 
well as the expertise to carry out their tasks, especially in complex or politically 
sensitive cases. Interestingly, similar to China, Vietnam also lacks a unified 
competition agency, yet unlike China’s tripartite antimonopoly enforcement system, 
Vietnamese competition agencies face a unique challenge due to the separation 
between investigation power and adjudication power between two different agencies. 
Further, the failure of the VCL to provide an effective remedy against anticompetitive 
state restraints as well as the complex political environment in Vietnam, both at the 
central and local levels, would also mean that the VCL’s prohibitions of 
administrative monopolies may not yield many successes in the near future. Finally, 
with the Party’s ideology of ‘socialism-oriented market economy’ and the leading 
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role of SOEs, the policy of “National Champions”, as well as the SOEs’ strong 
political influence in the system, it is very likely that SOEs will be given a de facto 
exemption from the VCL application for most of the time. The only comforting factor 
of Vietnam’s competition regime, as compared to China, is that the pattern of using 
competition law as a protectionist tool against foreign companies has not been proved 
in Vietnam. 
To address all of the above-mentioned obstacles to advance a more vigorous 
competitive environment, Vietnam needs a strong political will to change its current 
politico-economic structure in which the State will play a more limited role in 
controlling economic activities and will privatize most of the SOEs1442. Unfortunately, 
such a radical change will be politically difficult as explained by an outstanding 
Vietnamese economist, ‘at present there have emerged privileged interest groups 
obstructing, in the name of socio-political stability, any necessary reform’1443. Thus, it 
is very likely that the VCL will continue to have very little impact on Vietnam’s 
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CONCLUSION 
“[U]nlike market economies… transitional economies face the task of creating, not 
simply maintaining, competitive markets. The fact that transitional and market 
economies differ in their approach to antitrust does not justify the maintenance of less 
stringent antitrust rules or less vigorous antitrust enforcement in economies in 
transition. On the contrary, economic conditions in those countries call for a more 
vigorous enforcement of antitrust policy. Unfortunately, the leadership in such states 
often lacks the political will, or the political capital, to effectuate necessary 
changes”1445. 
     (Bing Song, 1995) 
Communist Party leadership, no separation of powers between the Party and the 
State, a weak rule of law, the complex political relationship between the central 
government and local ones, and most importantly, the State ownership ideology and 
the Party’s desire to retain control over the national economy have made competition 
law enactment and enforcement in China and Vietnam largely similar to each other 
but significantly different from other “normal” market economies. In particular, 
during the conducting of this critical research, the following conclusions have been 
drawn: 
First, competition law in both China and Vietnam were enacted due to various forces, 
both internal and external. The major reasons included (i) the two countries’ 
transition from a planned economy into a market economy, (ii) the need to solve 
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monopolistic problems in China’s and Vietnam’s domestic markets, (iii) the need for 
the rule of law, and (iv) the needs that come from both countries’ opening up to the 
outside world. However, there is one significant difference in the development of 
competition law between these two countries: the most important and direct driving 
force behind the AML’s promulgation was China’s desire to protect its national 
interests (or ‘economic security’) in the face of international competition as a result of 
its policy of opening up its economy to international competition. In other words, 
enacting the AML was an active and deliberate move of China rather than a mere 
reaction to foreign pressures. In contrast, the impact of external conditions, especially 
the foreign pressures during Vietnam’s WTO entry negotiation process, on legal 
reforms in general and the adoption of competition law in particular appeared to be 
the most direct and vigorous force. Enacting a comprehensive competition law was 
the last step to be done by the Vietnamese government for Vietnam to fully qualify 
for being a member of WTO. This difference was understandable because of the 
difference in international stature of China and Vietnam. China is a large country and 
a standing member of the United Nations Security Council. So China has a special 
standing in the life of the international community. In contrast, smaller than China, 
Vietnam cannot have a similar international influence. Thus, while Vietnam had to 
enact a competition law right before its WTO entry, China only enacted its 
antimonopoly law six years after its WTO accession and so had more time to witness 
the impact of international competition on domestic enterprises and to consult more 
widely. This finding is important in the sense that it may help explain the difference 
in the drafting and enforcing competition law in these two countries. For instance, it 
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helps explain why China has a more comprehensive, more sophisticated 
antimonopoly law with better drafting quality than Vietnam. It also helps explain why 
China has established a separate national security review in parallel with merger 
review while Vietnam has not. Finally, it helps clarify why so far China has been 
more willing to carry out ‘protectionist’ policy in merger control cases than their 
Vietnamese counterpart.  
Second, the contemporary competition laws in both countries, to a large extent, have 
been constructed by legal transplantation and both countries have relied more on the 
EC model than the US model
1446
. There are various possible reasons why the EU 
model has been preferred in these two countries. The first reason is the civil law 
traditions in both countries. The lack of a well-developed judicial review system in 
China and Vietnam makes it very difficult to adopt the US antitrust system
1447
. 
Second, since the Constitutions in both countries proclaim that they pursue a socialist 
market economy, they ‘cannot adopt the objective of US antitrust law, which many 
courts and scholars believe has “economic efficiency” as its exclusive goal’1448. 
Third, both countries still face the problem of a fragmented internal market for goods 
and services, which is similar to ‘the problem identified in the EU fifty years ago’1449. 
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, competition law of the EC model provides 
‘sufficiently broad and open-textured language to allow wide discretionary 
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significantly limit "dominant" firms in pricing their products or services etc. 
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 See also Jung & Hao, supra note 82, p.124. 
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enforcement and creative, but possibly prejudicial, interpretation’1450. All of these 
reasons make the EC model a more appropriate choice for China and Vietnam. 
Generally speaking, the approach of competition law in China and Vietnam toward 
anticompetitive practices largely converges with competition law in other ‘normal’ 
market economies with provisions to regulate the three standard types of 
anticompetitive practices namely anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance 
and anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. However, there are still important 
divergences that come from these countries’ ‘socialist’ economic and political 
systems:  
(1) While competition law in mature antitrust jurisdictions are normally concerned 
with anti-competitive private practices, China and Vietnam found it particularly 
necessary to address public and private restraints in tandem. As a result of gradual 
and incremental approach to reforms in China and Vietnam, excessive State 
intervention still widely exists and is by far the top threat to competition in both 
countries. Thus, the primary mission of competition law in these countries is to 
correct governmental distortion rather than limit private restrictive practices. In other 
words, competition law ‘is not merely designed to restore competition but also to take 
affirmative actions to "create" competition’1451. This feature distinguishes 
competition law of China and Vietnam from competition laws in most other 
jurisdictions. Thus, competition law in both countries has specific provisions dealing 
with administrative monopolies, SOEs and trade associations (which are often 
emanations of and work closely with the State). These are considered to have caused 
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most of competition problems in socialist market economies like China and Vietnam. 
Unfortunately, despite prohibiting administrative monopolies, both the AML and the 
VCL fail to provide an effective mechanism for competition regulators to sanctions or 
correct those conducts. Interestingly, the inclusion of public anti-competitive 
practices in competition law is also in line with the competition regime in many 
transitional countries in Eastern and Central Europe. 
(2) Competition law in both countries contains various ambiguous goals (such as 
‘socialist market economy’, ‘fair competition’ and ‘public interest’ in the AML, and 
‘the State’s interests’, ‘public interests’, and ‘other enterprises’ interests’ in the VCL), 
which have raised a lot of concerns due to their potential conflicts with ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘consumer welfare’, which should be the main goals of competition policy. 
Moreover, the language of both the AML and the VCL on this issue is vague and 
flexible enough to give the Party/State wide discretion in pursuing industrial policies 
when it deems necessary and should be worrisome for the business.  
(3) In terms of substantive rules, competition laws in both countries contain some 
idiosyncrasies that are unique: 
In terms of China’s competition rules, the AML’s “collective dominance” 
presumption, although rebuttable, has raised much concern that a firm with 11 per 
cent of market share would be found to be dominant
1452
. Another remarkable feature 
of the AML is the provision on refusal to deal, which seems to require firms to 
provide valid reasons for refusing to trade with a third party and appears to be 
inconsistent with both U.S and EU law. Regarding merger control, the concept of 
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“concentration” in the AML is still not very clear and China’s practice of widely 
application of both structural remedies and behavioural remedies is quite different 
from international practice. Finally, and notably, China has a separate national 
security review in parallel with merger review – which has attracted must attention 
from international observers. It has been feared that China’s national security review 
may be used as a potential tool for protectionist policy.  
Vietnam’s competition regime also ‘includes certain elements that make readers 
surprised’1453. For instance, in terms of market definition, the VCL introduced a 
unique Vietnamese version of SSNIP test, which may result in inaccurate conclusions 
and has been treated as useless by Vietnam’s competition agencies in reality. 
Regarding anticompetitive agreements, the VCL does not make a clear distinction 
between horizontal and vertical agreements and the prohibitions, technically, can only 
be applied to horizontal agreements. Of the so called hard core cartels, only bid 
rigging is prohibited outright (or per se in U.S. terms) while other hard core cartels 
such as price fixing, market sharing and output limitation are subject to the exemption 
system. The most noteworthy provisions of Vietnam’s competition regime are the 
provisions on abuses of market dominant position. Interestingly, the VCL creates two 
different sets of presumptions and prohibited conducts, one applies to enterprises 
holding dominant position and the other applies to monopolistic enterprises. While 
more mature antitrust jurisdiction and China defines MDP on the grounds of both 
price control and power to exclude, the VCL bases merely on market share to define 
MDP and the threshold for this purpose is 30%, which is a very low threshold as 
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compared to other competition jurisdictions. What is more worrisome is that even an 
enterprise with less than 30% of market share may still be considered as holding the 
MDP. Although both China and Vietnam follow the EU’s model and adopts the 
concept of “collective dominance” based on market share presumption, the 
presumptions of dominance (either single dominance or collective dominance) based 
on market share are not rebuttable in Vietnam, which is in contrast to the Chinese 
regime. Regarding prohibited abusive conducts, while other jurisdictions give 
enterprises a chance to justify their prohibited conducts, Vietnam prohibits these 
conducts per se and no exemption is applicable. In terms of merger control, although 
Vietnam uses the concept of “concentration”, the VCL, technically, can only be 
applied to horizontal mergers. There is a compulsory pre-merger notification 
requirement using market share as threshold for notification, which is more difficult 
and less predictable than China’s turnover threshold. Moreover, Vietnam prohibits 
concentration solely on the ground of market share and even intra-enterprise 
concentration can still be prohibited unless they are exempted. Finally, in contrast to 
China’s merger control, Vietnam does not have conditional approval and does not 
have a separate national security review.  
(4) Regarding procedures and remedies, competition regime in both countries rely 
heavily on administrative investigations and remedies with very serious penalties of 
up to 10% of the previous fiscal year revenue. Another remarkable feature is the lack 
of a leniency program in Vietnam and the existence of two different leniency 
programs granted by two different agencies in China, with great uncertainty and 
considerable discretion reserved for the Chinese competition regulators in 
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implementing them. Moreover, while private actions to enforce competition law 
against business operators are allowed in China, they are not allowed in Vietnam. 
Both countries entitle actions to claim damages (although only follow-on actions are 
allowed in Vietnam) yet, multiple damages are not accepted. Finally, while 
antimonopoly practices are potentially subject to criminal sanctions in China – which 
should be worrisome since it is still unclear whether such criminal sanctions will be 
limited to hard-core cartels as in other jurisdictions, this is not the case in Vietnam. 
Overall, China’s competition regime appears to be better drafted, more detailed and 
more aligned with mature antitrust jurisdictions than the VCL
1454
. To understand the 
reason for the poorer quality of the VCL, one has to look back at the historical 
legislative of the VCL. While China spent almost thirteen years consulting, 
discussing and drafting its AML, Vietnam enacted the VCL quickly due to its desire 
to enter the WTO as soon as possible. Thus, the motivation for enactment, foreign 
pressures, the lack of expertise and the quick drafting process (only three years) 
resulted in a Vietnamese competition law with a very formalistic approach with a 
number of weaknesses and loopholes.  
Third, both countries face enormous obstacles in enforcing their competition laws. As 
analyzed in Chapter 1 and 2, the primary missions of competition law in China and 
Vietnam are to confront administrative monopolies and abuses by the largest SOEs, 
which have been widely reported by the media, thus, for competition law to have a 
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real impact on market behavior in these countries, there must exist independent and 
competent enforcement authorities. Unfortunately, a close look at both the 
competition agencies and the court system in China and Vietnam reveals that these 
institutions in both countries still lack the necessary institutional and political 
independence as well as the expertise to carry out their tasks, especially in complex or 
politically sensitive cases. Further, Chinese competition agencies also face a unique 
challenge due to a separation of power over anti-competitive practices between three 
different agencies. As such, traditional antitrust law enforcement through either 
public or private means in China will likely face serious legal infrastructural 
challenges. Similar to China, Vietnam also lacks a unified competition agency, yet 
unlike China’s tripartite antimonopoly enforcement system, Vietnamese competition 
agencies face a unique challenge due to the separation between investigation and 
adjudication powers between two different agencies. Further, the failure of the AML 
and the VCL to provide an effective remedy against anticompetitive state restraints as 
well as the complex political environment in China and Vietnam, both at the central 
and local levels, would mean that the prohibition of administrative monopolies may 
not yield many successes in both countries in the near future. Similarly, with the 
CCP’s and VCP’s ideology of a ‘socialist market economy’ and the leading role of 
SOEs, the policy of “National Champions”, as well as the SOEs’ strong political 
influence in the system, it is very likely that SOEs in both countries will be given a de 
facto exemption from competition law application for most of the time. Finally, and 
interestingly, while there appears to emerge a pattern of using competition law as a 
protectionist tool against foreign companies in China, this has not been the case in 
  358 
Vietnam. This difference comes from the reality that Vietnam is a more minor player 
in international stage than China and has less international political and economic 
leverage, no doubt Vietnam has been less willing to carry out ‘protectionist’ policies 
than its Chinese counterpart.  
As a result of the above mentioned institutional, administrative, ideological, political 
and operational challenges in China and Vietnam, so far, there has not been much 
enforcement of competition law in either country. This is not the result of lack of 
anticompetitive practices in the economy and the media in both countries is full of 
reports about potential violations
1455
. The fundamental root cause of all of these 
obstacles should be the ‘socialist market economy’ model that is being pursued by 
both countries. As explained by Clark, 
‘An analysis of regulation in states like China and Vietnam needs to look not only at 
what they do, but at what they do not do – sometimes because the resources simply 
are not available, but sometimes because for political reasons they will not be made 
available’1456. 
For competition law to play a more vigorous role in the efficient functioning of 
markets in China and Vietnam, these countries need a strong political will to make  a 
substantive change in their political ideology so that the State plays a progressively 
more limited role in the ownership and control of most of the economy. 
Unfortunately, as analyzed in Chapter 5 and 6, such a radical change is clearly not 
part of the current Party policy. The ruling Communist Parties in both countries seem 
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to have no genuine commitment to a real transition to a market-based economy. Thus, 
it is very likely that competition law will continue to have very little impact on 
market conditions in these countries in the foreseeable future. Moreover, particularly 
in the case of China, there is even an undesirable trend towards using competition law 
as a tool to carry out protectionist policies.  
On the other hand, little enforcement is not necessarily a bad thing for these countries. 
Geradin once warned about the dangerous tendency of newly created antitrust 
authorities to focus on outputs rather than quality
1457
. Kallay also highlighted the 
importance of vigilance against over-enforcement of competition law and the need of 
nascent antitrust enforcers ‘to take care not to over-enforce it in a manner that may 
disadvantage their consumers and, ultimately, their economy’1458. Williams even 
pointed out, in the context of China, the danger of selective enforcement of 
competition law to ‘disadvantage incoming foreign firms and protect domestic 
national champions, principally state enterprises’, thus, worsen competition 
conditions1459. Bearing these dangers in mind, little enforcement of competition law 
might paradoxically be better for these countries.  
Overall, even though the enactment of competition law is not going to effect many 
positive changes in China’s and Vietnam’s economy, the promulgation of 
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competition law is clearly not a wasted effort because it helps promote the 
establishment of the market economic system in both countries
 1460
. As pointed out by 
Chong and Calderon, there is both a push and a pull aspect: ‘[a]though institutional 
quality causes economic growth, it also seems to be the case that economic growth 
causes institutional quality’1461. In the end, the need for economic growth will 
certainly keep these countries continue down the path to establish an effective 
competition policy, though in a gradualist and incremental manner. Reforms in both 
countries will also be motivated by external force: now that both countries have 
become WTO members, they will be observed by other WTO nations to see whether 
they apply the principles of freedom, equality, antidiscrimination, and building a 
competitive environment. The enactment of competition law in China and Vietnam, 
thus, should be regarded as a milestone that demonstrates both the achievement of 
economic reforms and the path toward market mechanisms and competition in these 
countries./. 
-----THE END ----- 
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ANNEX 1  
COMPETITION LAW OF VIETNAM

 
Pursuant to the 1992 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which was 
amended and supplemented under Resolution No. 51/2001/QH10 of December 25, 
2001 of the 10th National Assembly, the 10th session; 
This Law provides for competition. 
Chapter I - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1. Scope of regulation 
This Law provides for competition-restricting acts, unfair competition acts, order and 
procedures for settling competition cases, measures to handle violations of 
competition legislation. 
Article 2. Subjects of application 
This Law shall apply to: 
1. Business organizations and individuals (hereinafter referred collectively to as 
enterprises), including also enterprises producing, supplying products, providing 
public-utility services, enterprises operating in the State-monopolized sectors and 
domains, and foreign enterprises operating in Vietnam. 
2. Professional associations operating in Vietnam. 
Article 3. Interpretation of terms 
In this Law the following terms are construed as follows: 
1. Relevant market means relevant market of products and relevant geographical 
market. 
Relevant market of products means a market of goods, services which are 
interchangeable in terms of characteristics, use purposes and prices. 
Relevant geographical market means a specific geographical area in which exist 
goods, services which are interchangeable under similar conditions of competition, 
and which is considerably differentiated from neighboring areas. 
                                                 

 Unofficial translation by the  Ministry of Justice of Vietnam’s, available at 
<http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=7327>  
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2. Professional associations include commodity line associations and trade 
associations. 
3. Competition restriction acts mean acts performed by enterprises to reduce, distort 
and prevent competition on the market, including acts of competition restriction 
agreement, abusing the dominant position on the market, abusing the monopoly 
position and economic concentration. 
4. Unfair competition acts mean competition acts performed by enterprises in the 
process of doing business, which run counter to common standards of business ethics 
and cause damage or can cause damage to the State’s interests, legitimate rights and 
interests of other enterprises or consumers. 
5. An enterprise’s market share of a certain kind of goods or service means the 
percentage between sale turnover of this enterprise and aggregate turnover of all 
enterprises dealing in such kind of goods or service on the relevant market or the 
percentage between purchase turnover of this enterprise and aggregate purchase 
turnover of all enterprises dealing in such kind of goods or service on the relevant 
market on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis. 
6. Combined market share means aggregate market share on the relevant market of 
enterprises participating in the competition restriction agreement or economic 
concentration. 
7. Total cost of production of goods or services consists of: 
a/ Cost of production of products or services; purchasing price of goods; 
b/ Cost of circulation to bring goods, services to consumers. 
8. Competition case means a case showing signs of violation of the provisions of this 
Law, which is investigated and handled by a competent state agency according to law 
provisions. 
9. Competition procedures mean activities carried out by agencies, organizations and 
individuals according to the order and procedures for settling and handling 
competition cases prescribed by this Law. 
10. Business secret means information that fully meets the following conditions: 
a/ Being other than common knowledge; 
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b/ Being applicable to business and, once used, placing the holder of such information 
at an advantage over the non-holder or non-user of such information; 
c/ Being kept confidential by the owner by applying necessary measures to keep such 
information from disclosure and easy access. 
11. Multi-level sale means an approach of marketing to retail goods, which meets the 
following conditions: 
a/ The marketing to retail goods is conducted through a multi-level and multi-branch 
network of participants in the multi-level sale; 
b/ Goods are marketed by participants in the multi-level sale directly to consumers at 
the customers’ homes, working places or other places other than regular retail places 
of the enterprises or participants; 
c/ Participants in the multi-level sale enjoy commissions, bonuses or other economic 
benefits from the sale results of their own and of lower-level multi-level sale 
participants within the network which is organized by themselves and approved by 
the multi-level sale enterprises. 
Article 4. Right to business competition 
1. Enterprises enjoy freedom to competition within the legal framework. The State 
protects the lawful right to business competition. 
2. Competition must be implemented on the principles of honesty, non-infringement 
upon the interests of the State, public interests, legitimate rights and interests of 
enterprises, consumers and compliance with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 5. Application of this Law, other relevant laws and international 
agreements 
1. Where there is any disparity between the provisions of this Law and those of other 
laws on competition restriction acts or unfair competition acts, the provisions of this 
Law shall apply. 
2. Where international agreements which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has 
signed or acceded to contain provisions different from those of this Law, the 
provisions of such international agreements shall apply. 
Article 6. Acts that State management agencies are prohibited from performing 
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State management agencies are prohibited from performing the following acts to 
prevent competition on the market: 
1. To force enterprises, organizations or individuals to buy, sell goods, provide 
services to enterprises which are designated by these agencies, except for goods and 
services in the State-monopolized domains or in emergency cases prescribed by law; 
2. To discriminate between enterprises; 
3. To force professional associations or enterprises to align with one another with a 
view to precluding, restricting or preventing other enterprises from competing on the 
market; 
4. Other acts that prevent lawful business activities of enterprises. 
Article 7. State management responsibilities for competition 
1. The Government performs uniform State management over competition. 
2. The Trade Ministry shall be responsible to the Government for performing the 
State management over competition. 
3. Ministries, ministerial-level agencies, provincial/municipal People’s Committees 
shall, within the scope of their respective tasks and powers, have to coordinate with 
the Trade Ministry in performing the State management over competition. 
Chapter II - CONTROL OF COMPETITION RESTRICTION ACTS 
Section 1 - COMPETITION RESTRICTION AGREEMENTS 
Article 8. Competition restriction agreements 
Competition restriction agreements include: 
1. Agreements on directly or indirectly fixing goods or service prices; 
2. Agreements on distributing outlets, sources of supply of goods, provision of 
services; 
3. Agreements on restricting or controlling produced, purchased or sold quantities or 
volumes of goods or services; 
4. Agreements on restricting technical and technological development, restricting 
investments; 
5. Agreement on imposing on other enterprises conditions on signing of goods or 
services purchase or sale contracts or forcing other enterprises to accept obligations 
which have no direct connection with the subject of such contracts; 
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6. Agreements on preventing, restraining, disallowing other enterprises to enter the 
market or develop business; 
7. Agreements on abolishing from the market enterprises other than the parties of the 
agreements; 
8. Conniving to enable one or all of the parties of the agreement to win bids for 
supply of goods or provision of services. 
Article 9. Prohibited competition restriction agreements 
1. Competition restriction agreements prescribed in Clauses 6, 7 and 8 of this Law are 
prohibited. 
2. Competition restriction agreements prescribed in Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Article 8 
of this Law the parties of which have combined market share of 30% or more on the 
relevant market are prohibited. 
Article 10. Cases of exemption with regard to prohibited competition restriction 
agreements 
1. Competition restriction agreements defined in Clause 2, Article 9 of this Law shall 
enjoy exemption for a definite term if they meet one of the following conditions in 
order to reduce costs to benefit consumers: 
a/ Rationalizing the organizational structure, business model, raising business 
efficiency; 
b/ Promoting technical and technological advances, raising goods and service quality; 
c/ Promoting the uniform application of quality standards and technical norms of 
products of different kinds; 
d/ Harmonizing business, goods delivery and payment conditions, which have no 
connection with prices and price factors; 
e/ Enhancing the competitiveness of small- and medium-sized enterprises; 
f/ Enhancing the competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises on the international 
market. 
2. The order, procedures for granting exemptions and exemption terms shall comply 
with the provisions of Section 4 of this Chapter. 
Section 2 - ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION ON THE MARKET, ABUSE 
OF MONOPOLY POSITION 
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Article 11. Enterprises, groups of enterprises holding the dominant position on 
the market 
1. Enterprises shall be considered to hold the dominant position on the market if they 
have market shares of 30% or more on the relevant market or are capable of 
restricting competition considerably. 
2. Groups of enterprises shall be considered to hold the dominant position on the 
market if they take concerted action to restrict competition and fall into one of the 
following cases: 
a/ Two enterprises having total market share of 50% or more on the relevant market; 
b/ Three enterprises having total market share of 65% or more on the relevant market; 
c/ Four enterprises having total market share of 75% or more on the relevant market; 
Article 12. Enterprises holding the monopoly position 
An enterprise shall be considered to hold the monopoly position if there is no 
enterprise competing on the goods or services dealt in by such enterprise on the 
relevant market. 
Article 13. Prohibited acts of abusing the dominant position on the market 
Enterprises, groups of enterprises holding the dominant position on the market are 
prohibited from performing the following acts: 
1. Selling goods, providing services at prices lower than the aggregate costs in order 
to eliminate competitors. 
2. Imposing irrational buying or selling prices of goods or services or fixing minimum 
re-selling prices causing damage to customers; 
3. Restricting production, distribution of goods, services, limiting markets, preventing 
technical and technological development, causing damage to customers; 
4. Imposing dissimilar commercial conditions in similar transactions in order to create 
inequality in competition; 
5. Imposing conditions on other enterprises to conclude goods or services purchase or 
sale contracts or forcing other enterprises to accept obligations which have no direct 
connection with the subject of such contracts; 
6. Preventing new competitors from entering the market. 
Article 14. Prohibited acts of abusing the monopoly position 
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Enterprises holding the monopoly position are prohibited from performing the 
following acts: 
1. Acts defined in Article 13 of this Law; 
2. Imposing unfavorable conditions on customers; 
3. Abusing the monopoly position to unilaterally modify or cancel the contracts 
already signed without plausible reasons. 
Article 15. Control of enterprises operating in the State monopolized domains, 
enterprises producing, supplying public-utility products, services 
1. The State controls enterprises operating in the State-monopolized domains with the 
following measures: 
a/ Deciding on the buying prices, selling prices of goods, services in the State-
monopolized domains; 
b/ Deciding on the quantities, volumes and scope of market of goods, services in the 
State-monopolized domains. 
2. The State controls enterprises producing and supplying public-utility products, 
services with measures of ordering goods, assigning plans or bidding according to 
prices or charges set by the State. 
3. When undertaking other business activities outside the State-monopolized domains 
and producing, providing public-utility products, services, enterprises shall not be 
subject to the application of the provisions of Clause 1 and Clause 2 of this Article 
but still be subject to the application of other provisions of this Law. 
Section 3 - ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION 
Article 16. Economic concentration 
Economic concentration means acts of enterprises, including: 
1. Merger of enterprises; 
2. Consolidation of enterprises; 
3. Acquisition of enterprises; 
4. Joint venture between enterprises; 
5. Other acts of economic concentration prescribed by law. 
Article 17. Merger, consolidation, acquisition of enterprises and joint venture 
between enterprises 
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1. Merger of enterprises means an act whereby one or several enterprises transfer all 
of its/their property, rights, obligations and legitimate interests to another enterprise, 
and at the same time terminate the existence of the merged enterprise(s). 
2. Consolidation of enterprises means an act whereby two or more enterprises transfer 
all of their property, rights, obligations and legitimate interests to form a new 
enterprise and, at the same time, terminate the existence of the consolidated 
enterprises. 
3. Acquisition of enterprises mean an act whereby an enterprise acquires the whole or 
part of property of another enterprise sufficient to control or dominate all or one of 
the trades of the acquired enterprise. 
4. Joint venture between enterprises means an act whereby two or more enterprises 
jointly contribute part of their property, rights, obligations and legitimate interests to 
the establishment of a new enterprise. 
Article 18. Prohibited cases of economic concentration 
Economic concentration shall be prohibited if the combined market shares of 
enterprises participating in economic concentration account for over 50% on the 
relevant market, except for cases specified in Article 19 of this Law or the case where 
enterprises, after implementing economic concentration, are still of small or medium 
size as prescribed by law. 
Article 19. Cases of exemption from prohibited economic concentration 
Prohibited economic concentration prescribed in Article 18 of this Law may be 
considered for exemption in the following cases: 
1. One or more of the participants in economic concentration is/are in danger of 
dissolution or bankruptcy; 
2. The economic concentration has an effect of expanding export or contributing to 
socio-economic development, technical and technological advance. 
Article 20. Notification of economic concentration 
1. If enterprises participating in economic concentration have combined market 
shares of between 30 and 50% on the relevant market, their lawful representatives 
must notify the competition-managing agency before implementing economic 
concentration. 
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Where combined market shares of enterprises participating in economic concentration 
are lower than 30% on the relevant market or where enterprises, after implementing 
economic concentration, are still of small or medium size as prescribed by law, such 
notification is not required. 
2. Enterprises participating in economic concentration eligible for exemption 
prescribed in Article 19 of this Law shall submit exemption application dossiers 
under the provisions of Section 4 of this Chapter instead of notification of economic 
concentration. 
Article 21. Economic-concentration notification dossiers 
1. An economic-concentration notification dossier shall comprise: 
a/ The written notification of economic concentration, made according to a form set 
by the competition-managing agency; 
b/ Valid copies of the business registration certificates of all enterprises participating 
in economic concentration; 
c/ Financial statements of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise 
participating in economic concentration, with the certification of audit organizations 
according to law provisions; 
d/ The list of dependent units of each enterprise participating in economic 
concentration; 
e/ The list of kinds of goods, services dealt in by each enterprise participating in 
economic concentration and by its dependent units; 
f/ Reports of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise participating in 
economic concentration on their market shares on the relevant market. 
2. Enterprises submitting the economic-concentration notification dossiers shall be 
accountable for the truthfulness of their dossiers. 
Article 22. Acceptance of economic-concentration notification dossiers 
Within seven working days after receiving the economic-concentration notification 
dossiers, the competition-managing agency shall have to notify in writing the dossier-
submitting enterprises of the validity and completeness of their dossiers; where a 
dossier is incomplete, the competition-managing agency shall have to clearly point 
out the contents that have to be supplemented. 
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Article 23. Time limit for reply to economic-concentration notification 
1. Within forty five days after receiving complete economic-concentration 
notification dossiers, the competition-managing agency shall have to reply in writing 
to the dossier-submitting enterprises. Written replies of the competition-managing 
agency must determine whether economic concentration falls into one of the 
following cases: 
a/ Economic concentration does not fall into the prohibited cases; 
b/ Economic concentration is prohibited under the provisions of Article 18 of this 
Law; the prohibition reason must be clearly stated in the written reply. 
2. Where economic concentration involves many complicated circumstances, the 
head of the competition-managing agency may extend the time limit for reply 
specified in Clause 1 of this Article no more than twice, each time for no more than 
thirty days and notify such in writing to the dossier-submitting enterprises no later 
than three working days before the expiration of the time limit for reply, clearly 
stating the extension reason. 
Article 24. Implementation of economic concentration 
Lawful representatives of the enterprises participating in economic concentration 
subject to notification as prescribed in Clause 1, Article 20 of this Law may only 
carry out economic concentration procedures at the competent State agencies 
prescribed by legislation on enterprises after the competition-managing agency 
replies in writing that such economic concentration does not fall into any prohibited 
cases. 
Section 4 -  PROCEDURES FOR EXECUTION OF EXEMPTION CASES 
Article 25. Competence to decide on exemption 
1. The Trade Minister shall consider and decide in writing on the exemption 
prescribed in Article 10 and Clause 1, Article 19 of this Law. 
2. The Prime Minister shall consider and decide in writing on the exemption 
prescribed in Clause 2, Article 19 of this Law. 
Article 26. Subjects submitting exemption application dossiers 
The subjects submitting exemption application dossiers are the parties intending to 
participate in competition restriction agreements or economic concentration. 
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Article 27. Lawful representatives of parties of competition restriction 
agreements or economic concentration 
1. The parties of the competition restriction agreements or economic concentration 
may appoint a representative to carry out the procedures to apply for exemption. The 
appointment of representatives must be made in writing and certified by the involved 
parties. 
2. Rights and obligations of the representative party shall be determined by the 
involved parties; 
3. The parties shall be responsible for acts of the representative party within the scope 
of authorization. 
Article 28. Dossiers of application for exemption for competition restriction 
agreements 
1. A dossier of application for exemption for a competition restriction agreement shall 
comprise: 
a/ The application, made according to the form set by the competition-managing 
agency; 
b/ The valid copies of the business registration certificates of each enterprise 
participating in the competition restriction agreement and the charter of the 
association for cases where the competition restriction agreement is participated by 
such association; 
c/ Financial statements of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise 
participating in the competition restriction agreement, with the certification of audit 
organizations according to law provisions; 
d/ Reports of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise participating in the 
competition restriction agreement on their market shares on the relevant market; 
e/ A report elaborating the satisfaction of the cases eligible for exemption prescribed 
in Article 10 of this Law; 
f/ The written authorization of the representative party by the parties of the 
competition restriction agreement. 
2. The dossier submitters and the parties of the competition restriction agreements 
shall be accountable for the truthfulness of their dossiers. 
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Article 29. Dossiers of application for exemption for economic concentration 
1. A dossier of application for exemption for economic concentration shall comprise: 
a/ The application, made according to the form set by the competition-managing 
agency; 
b/ The valid copies of the business registration certificates of each enterprise 
participating in economic concentration; 
c/ Financial statements of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise joining 
in economic concentration, with the certification of audit organizations according to 
law provisions; 
d/ Reports of the latest two consecutive years of each enterprise participating in 
economic concentration on their market shares on the relevant market; 
e/ A report elaborating the satisfaction of the cases eligible for exemption prescribed 
in Article 19 of this Law; 
f/ The written authorization of the representative party by the parties of economic 
concentration. 
2. The dossier submitters and the parties of economic concentration shall be 
accountable for the truthfulness of their dossiers. 
Article 30. Acceptance of exemption application dossiers 
1. The competition-managing agency shall be responsible for accepting exemption 
application dossiers, putting forward its opinions to the Trade Minister for decision or 
submission to the Prime Minister for decision. 
2. Within seven working days after receiving exemption application dossiers, the 
competition-managing agency shall have to notify in writing the dossier submitters of 
the completeness of their dossiers. Where a dossier is incomplete, the competition-
managing agency must point out the contents that have to be supplemented. 
2. The dossier submitters must pay a fee for evaluation of exemption application 
dossiers according to law provisions. 
Article 31. Requests for supplementation of exemption application dossiers 
The competition-managing agency may request the submitters of exemption 
application dossiers to supplement necessary documents and information related to 
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their intention to implement the competition restriction agreements or economic 
concentration and give additional explanation on unclear matters. 
Article 32. Supply of information by related parties 
1. The competition-managing agency may request related organizations and 
individuals to supply information on competition restriction agreements or economic 
concentration which it is handling. 
2. Within fifteen days after receiving the requests of the competition-managing 
agency, related organizations and individuals shall have to reply in writing to the 
requests. 
Article 33. Withdrawal of exemption applications 
1. If wishing to withdraw their exemption applications, the dossier submitters must 
notify in writing the competition-managing agency thereof. 
2. The competition-managing agency shall not refund the fee for evaluation of 
exemption application dossiers in the case prescribed in Clause 1 of this Article. 
Article 34. Time limit for issuance of decisions 
1. Within sixty days after receiving complete exemption application dossiers, the 
Trade Minister shall issue one of the following decisions: 
a/ Approving the exemption for the parties; 
b/ Disapproving the exemption for the parties. 
2. For cases involving many complicated circumstances, the Trade Minister may 
extend the time limit for issuance of decisions prescribed in Clause 1 of this Article 
no more than twice, each for thirty days at most. 
3. In case of economic concentration falling under the Prime Minister’s competence 
to grant exemption, the time limit for issuance of decisions approving or disapproving 
exemption shall be ninety days as from the date of receipt of complete exemption 
application dossiers; for cases involving many complicated circumstances, the time 
limit for issuance of such decisions shall be one hundred and eighty days. 
4. In case of extension of the time limit for issuance of decisions, the competition-
managing agency shall notify in writing the dossier submitters not later than three 
working days before the expiration of such time limit, clearly stating the reason 
therefore. 
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Article 35. Decisions on grant of exemption 
1. A decision on grant of exemption must contain the following principal details: 
a/ Names and addresses of the parties approved to perform the act; 
b/ The details of the act to be performed; 
c/ The time limit for enjoyment of exemption, conditions and obligations of the 
parties. 
2. The competition-managing agency shall have to publicize the decisions on grant of 
exemption according to the Government’s regulations. 
Article 36. Implementation of competition restriction agreements, economic 
concentration for cases of enjoyment of exemption 
1. The parties of the competition restriction agreements that enjoy exemption may 
implement their competition restriction agreements only after the decisions on grant 
of exemption are issued by the Trade Minister. 
2. Lawful representatives of enterprises participating in economic concentration 
eligible for exemption may carry out procedures for economic concentration only at 
the competent Stage agencies prescribed by enterprise legislation after the decisions 
on grant of exemption are issued by the Prime Minister or the Trade Minister. 
Article 37. Cancellation of decisions on grant of exemption 
1. The agency competent to issue decisions on grant of exemption shall be entitled to 
cancel decisions on grant of exemption. 
2. Decisions on grant of exemption shall be cancelled in the following cases: 
a/ Frauds in the exemption application are detected; 
b/ Enterprises enjoying exemption fail to abide by the conditions and obligations 
within the time limit stated in the decisions on grant of exemption; 
c/ The conditions for grant of exemption no longer exist. 
Article 38. Complaints about decisions related to grant of exemption 
Enterprises which disagree with the decisions on grant or non-grant of exemption or 
decisions canceling the decisions on grant or exemption may lodge complaints 
according to law provisions on complaints and denunciations. 
Chapter III - UNFAIR COMPETITION ACTS 
Article 39. Unfair competition acts 
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Unfair competition acts in this Law include: 
1. Misleading indications; 
2. Infringement upon business secrets; 
3. Constraint in business; 
4. Discrediting other enterprises; 
5. Disturbing business activities of other enterprises; 
6. Advertising for the purpose of unfair competition; 
7. Sale promotion for the purpose of unfair competition; 
8. Discrimination by associations; 
9. Illicit multi-level sale; 
10. Other unfair competition acts according to the criteria determined in Clause 4, 
Article 3 of this Law and prescribed by the Government. 
Article 40. Misleading indications 
1. Enterprises are forbidden to use instructions containing information causing 
confusions about trade names, business mottoes, business logos, packings, 
geographical indications and other elements as prescribed by the Government to 
mislead customers about goods or services for the purpose of competition. 
2. It is forbidden to do business in goods or services using misleading information 
prescribed in Clause 1 of this Article. 
Article 41. Infringement upon business secrets 
Enterprises are forbidden to perform the following acts: 
1. Accessing and collecting information belonging to business secrets by 
counteracting the security measures applied by lawful owners of such business 
secrets; 
2. Disclosing, using information belonging to business secrets without the permission 
of owners of such business secrets; 
3. Breaching security contracts or deceiving or taking advantage of the trust of 
persons having the security duty in order to access, collect or disclose information 
belonging to business secrets of owners of such business secrets; 
4. Accessing, collecting information belonging to business secrets of other persons 
when such persons carry out procedures according to law provisions concerning 
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business, carry out procedures for product circulation, or by counteracting the 
measures applied by State agencies, or using such information for business purposes, 
application for licenses related to business or product circulation. 
Article 42. Constraint in business 
Enterprises are forbidden to constrain customers, business partners of other 
enterprises by performing acts of threatening or forcing them not to enter in 
transactions or to stop transactions with such enterprises. 
Article 43. Discrediting other enterprises 
Enterprises are forbidden to discredit other enterprises by performing acts of directly 
or indirectly issuing untruthful information badly affecting the latter’s reputation, 
financial status and business activities. 
Article 44. Disturbing business activities of other enterprises 
Enterprises are forbidden to disturb lawful business activities of other enterprises by 
performing acts of directly or indirectly preventing, disrupting the latter’s business 
activities. 
Article 45. Advertising for the purpose of unfair competition 
Enterprises are forbidden to carry out the following advertising activities: 
1. Comparing their goods, services directly with those of the same kind of other 
enterprises; 
2. Imitating other advertising products to mislead customers; 
3. Issuing false or misleading information to customers on one of the following 
contents: 
a/ Prices, quantities, quality, utilities, designs, categories, packings, date of 
manufacture, use duration, goods origin, manufacturers, places of manufacture, 
processors, places of processing; 
b/ Usage, mode of servicing, warranty duration; 
c/ Other false or misleading information. 
4. Other advertising activities prohibited by law. 
Article 46. Sale promotion for the purpose of unfair competition 
Enterprises are forbidden to carry out the following sale promotion activities: 
1. Organizing sale promotion with prize frauds; 
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2. Organizing sale promotion which is dishonest or causes confusion about goods, 
services in order to cheat customers; 
3. Discriminating between similar customers at different sale promotion places under 
the same sale promotion program; 
4. Presenting goods free to customers for trial use but requesting customers to use 
their goods in exchange for similar goods manufactured by other enterprises and 
currently used by such customers; 
5. Other sale promotion activities prohibited by law. 
Article 47. Discrimination by associations 
Professional associations are forbidden to perform the following acts: 
1. Refusing to admit enterprises eligible for admission or refusing to allow enterprises 
to withdraw from the associations in a discriminatory way, placing such enterprises at 
a competitive disadvantage; 
2. Irrationally restricting business activities or other business-related activities of 
member enterprises. 
Article 48. Illicit multi-level sale 
Enterprises are forbidden to perform the following acts to gain illicit profits from the 
recruitment of participants into the multi-level sale networks: 
1. Requesting those who wish to participate to pay a deposit, buy an initial volume of 
goods or pay a sum of money for the right to participate in the multi-level sale 
network; 
2. Not to commit to buy back goods at 90% at least of the price at which the goods 
were sold to participants for re-sale; 
3. To give participants commissions, bonuses or other economic benefits which are 
gained mostly from the enticement of other people to participate in the multi-level 
sale network; 
4. Supplying false information on the benefits of the participation in the multi-level 
sale network, false information on the nature and utilities of goods in order to entice 
the participation of other people. 
Chapter IV - COMPETITION-MANAGING AGENCY, COMPETITION 
COUNCIL 
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Section 1 - COMPETITION-MANAGING AGENCY 
Article 49. Competition-managing agency 
1. The Government shall decide to establish, and prescribe the organization and 
apparatus of, the competition-managing agency. 
2. The competition-managing agency shall have the following tasks and powers: 
a/ To control the process of economic concentration according to the provisions of 
this Law; 
b/ Accepting exemption application dossiers; put forward opinions to the Trade 
Minister for decision or submission to the Prime Minister for decision; 
c/ Investigating competition cases related to competition-restricting acts and unfair 
competition acts; 
d/ Handling and sanctioning unfair competition acts; 
e/ Other tasks prescribed by law. 
Article 50. Head of the competition-managing agency 
1. The head of the competition-managing agency shall be appointed or dismissed by 
the Prime Minister at the proposal of the Trade Minister. 
2. The head of the competition-managing agency shall have to organize and direct the 
competition-managing agency to perform the tasks and powers defined in Clause 2, 
Article 49 of this Law. 
Article 51. Investigators of competition cases 
1. Investigators of competition cases (hereinafter called investigators) shall be 
appointed by the Trade Minister at the proposal of the head of the competition-
managing agency. 
2. Investigators shall investigate specific competition cases under decisions of the 
head of the competition-managing agency. 
Article 52. Criteria of investigators 
Persons who fully meet the following criteria may be appointed investigators: 
1. Possessing good ethical qualities, being honest, impartial; 
2. Having the degree of bachelor of law, economics or finance; 
3. Having worked at least five years in one of the domains defined in Clause 2 of this 
Article; 
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4. Having been trained in professional investigation skills. 
Section 2 -COMPETITION COUNCIL 
Article 53. Competition Council 
1. The Competition Council is an agency established by the Government. 
The Competition Council shall be composed of between eleven and fifteen members 
appointed or dismissed by the Prime Minister at the proposal of the Trade Minister. 
2. The Competition Council shall have to organize the handling and settlement of 
complaints about competition cases involving competition-restricting acts under the 
provisions of this Law. 
Article 54. Chairman of the Competition Council 
1. The Competition Council chairman shall be appointed or dismissed by the Prime 
Minister among the Competition Council members at the proposal of the Trade 
Minister. 
2. The Competition Council chairman shall have to organize the operation of the 
Competition Council. 
3. The Competition Council chairman shall decide to set up the Competition Case-
Handling Council composed of at least five members of the Competition Council, one 
of whom shall chair hearings to deal with a specific competition case. 
Article 55. Criteria of Competition Council members 
1. Persons who fully meet the following criteria may be appointed as Competition 
Council members: 
a/ Possessing good ethical qualities, being honest, impartial, and having the sense of 
protecting socialist legality; 
b/ Having the degree of bachelor of law, economics or finance; 
c/ Having worked at least nine years in one of the domains defined at Point b, Clause 
1 of this Article; 
d/ Being capable of fulfilling the assigned tasks. 
2. Competition Council members shall have a five-year term of office and may be re-
appointed. 
Chapter V - INVESTIGATION, HANDLING OF COMPETITION CASES 
Section 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
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Article 56. Principles for competition procedures 
1. The settlement of competition cases involving competition-restricting acts shall 
comply with the provisions of this Law. 
2. The settlement of competition cases involving unfair competition acts shall comply 
with the provisions of this Law and legislation on handling of administrative 
violations. 
3. In the process of carrying out competition procedures, investigators, the head of the 
competition-managing agency and Competition Council members must, within the 
scope of their respective tasks and powers, keep confidential business secrets of 
enterprises, respect legitimate rights and interests of the related organizations and 
individuals. 
Article 57. Language and script used in competition procedures 
The language and script used in competition procedures is Vietnamese. Participants in 
competition procedures shall be entitled to use their native language and script; in this 
case interpretation is required. 
Article 58. Complaints about competition cases 
1. If organizations and individuals deem that their legitimate rights and interests are 
infringed upon by acts in violation of the provisions of this Law (hereinafter referred 
collectively to as complainants), they may lodge complaints with the competition-
managing agency. 
2. The statute of limitations for lodging complaints is two years, as from the date the 
acts involving signs of violation of competition legislation are committed. 
3. Complaint dossiers must comprise the following principal documents: 
a/ The written complaint, made according to a form set by the competition-managing 
agency; 
b/ Evidences on the violation act. 
4. Complainants shall be accountable for the truthfulness of evidences they supply to 
the competition-managing agency. 
Article 59. Acceptance of complaint dossiers 
1. The competition-managing agency shall have to accept complaint dossiers. 
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2. Within seven working days after receiving complaint dossiers, the competition-
managing agency shall have to notify in writing the complainants of the acceptance of 
their dossiers. 
3. Complainants must pay an advance for the cost of handling the competition case 
according to law provisions. 
Article 60. Evidences 
1. Evidences are facts used by investigators and the Competition Case-Handling 
Council as grounds for determining whether or not exist acts of violating the 
provisions of this Law. 
2. Evidences are determined from the following sources: 
a/ Exhibits, which are things used as tools or means for commission of violations, 
money and other things having the effect of proving acts of violating the provisions of 
this Law; 
b/ Testimonies of witnesses, explanations of related organizations and individuals; 
c/ Original documents, copies and translations of original documents which are 
lawfully notarized or authenticated or supplied and certified by competent agencies or 
organizations. 
d/ Expertise conclusions. 
Article 61. Application of administrative preventive measures 
1. The head of the competition-managing agency, the Competition Council chairman 
may apply some administrative preventive measures prescribed by legislation on 
handling of administrative violations in the cases specified in Clause 6, Article 76 and 
Clause 4, Article 79 of this Law. 
The Government shall specify administrative preventive measures that the head of the 
competition-managing agency and the Competition Council chairman may apply. 
2. The following persons may propose the application of administrative preventive 
measures: 
a/ Complainants may make such a proposal to the head of the competition-managing 
agency and the Competition Council chairman; 
b/ Investigators may make such a proposal to the head of the competition-managing 
agency; 
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c/ Presidents of hearings may make such a proposal to the Competition Council 
chairman. 
3. In case of application of administrative preventive measures at the proposals of 
complainants, the complainants shall have to pay a guaranty money according to the 
Government’s regulations. 
In cases of wrong application of administrative preventive measures, causing damage 
to the investigated parties, the complainants must pay compensation therefor. The 
compensation level shall be agreed upon by the complainants and the investigated 
parties; if the two parties cannot reach agreement thereon, they may initiate lawsuits 
at court to claim for damages according to the provisions of civil legislation. 
4. Where the administrative preventive measures are applied at variance of the 
requests of investigators or the hearing presidents, thereby causing damage to the 
investigated parties, the competition-managing agency or the Competition Council 
must pay compensation therefore. The level of compensation shall be agreed upon by 
the investigated parties and the competition-managing agency or the Competition 
Council; if they cannot reach agreement thereon, the investigated parties may initiate 
lawsuits at courts to claim for damages according to the provisions of civil legislation. 
If compensation must be paid, the competition-managing agency or the Competition 
Council must identify the responsibility, also including material responsibility, of the 
proposers and related persons so as to impose proper disciplinary forms on such 
persons and force them to indemnify for the money amounts the competition-
managing agency or the Competition Council has compensated to the investigated 
parties. 
5. The parties subject to the application of administrative preventive measures may 
lodge complaints about the decisions thereon according to the law provisions on 
complaints and denunciations. 
Article 62. Competition case-handling charges 
Competition case-handling charges shall be used for the handling of competition case. 
The Government shall prescribe the levels, collection, payment, management and use 
of such charge in accordance with legislation on charges and fees. 
Article 63. Liability to competition case-handling charges 
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1. The party that is concluded to have violated the provisions of this Law must pay 
competition case-handling charges. 
2. Where the invested party does not violate the provisions of this Law, the 
complainant shall have to pay competition case-handling charges. 
3. Where a competition case is conducted under the provisions of Clause 2, Article 65 
of this Law, if the investigated party does not violate the provisions of this Law, the 
competition-managing agency shall have to pay competition case-handling charges. 
Section 2 - COMPETITION PROCEDURE PARTICIPANTS 
Article 64. Competition procedure participants 
Competition procedure participants include: 
1. The complainant; 





7. Persons with related interests and obligations. 
Article 65. Investigated parties in competition cases 
The investigated parties in competition cases (hereinafter called investigated parties) 
are organizations or individuals that are investigated under decisions of the 
competition-managing agency in the following cases: 
1. Being complained against under the provisions of Article 58 of this Law; 
2. Being detected by the competition-managing agency to be committing or have 
committed acts involving signs of violation of competition legislation within two 
years as from the date such acts were committed. 
Article 66. Rights and obligations of involved parties 
1. The investigated party shall have the following rights: 
a/ To produce documents, things; to know documents and things produced by the 
complainants or the competition-managing agency; 
b/ To participate in hearings; 
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c/ To request the change of investigators, Competition Case-Handling Council 
members if detecting that they fall into one of the cases prescribed in Article 83 of 
this Law; 
d/ To authorize lawyers to participate in competition procedures; 
e/ To request witnesses; 
f/ To propose the competition-managing agency to request expertise; 
g/ To propose the change of competition procedure-conducting persons and 
competition procedure participants under the provisions of this Law. 
2. The complainant shall have the following rights: 
a/ The rights prescribed in Clause 1 of this Law; 
b/ To propose the head of the competition-managing agency or the Competition 
Council chairman to apply administrative preventive measures related to the 
competition cases. 
3. The investigated party and the complainant shall have the following obligations: 
a/ To supply full, truthful, accurate evidences in a timely manner related to their 
proposals or requests; 
b/ To appear in response to the summonses of the competition-managing agency or 
the Competition Case-Handling Council. Where they are summoned but fail to appear 
without plausible reasons, the Competition Case-Handling Council shall proceed with 
handling the cases based on available information; 
c/ To abide by decisions of the competition-managing agency and the Competition 
Case-Handling Council. 
Article 67. Lawyers of the complainants, the investigated parties 
1. Lawyers who fully meet the procedure-participating conditions prescribed by 
legislation on lawyers and are authorized by the complainants or investigated parties 
may participate in competition procedures to protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of the parties which they represent. 
2. When participating in competition procedures, lawyers shall have the following 
rights and obligations: 
a/ To participate in all stages of the process of competition procedures; 
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b/ To verify and collect evidences and supply them in order to protect the legitimate 
rights and interests of the parties which they represent; 
c/ To study documents in the competition case dossiers and to take notes and copy 
necessary documents in such dossiers in order to protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of the parties which they represent; 
d/ To propose on behalf of the parties they represent the change of competition 
procedure-conducting persons and/or competition procedure participants under the 
provisions of this Law; 
e/ To render legal assistance to the parties they represent in order to protect their 
legitimate rights and interests; 
f/ To respect truth and law; not to bribe, force or incite other persons to give false 
testimonies or supply untruthful documents; 
g/ To appear in response to the summonses of the Competition Case-Handling 
Council; 
h/ Not to disclose investigation secrets they know in the process of participating in 
competition procedures; not to use their notes and copies of documents in the 
competition case dossiers for the purpose of infringing upon the State’s interests or 
legitimate rights and interests of organizations and individuals. 
Article 68. Witnesses 
1. Persons who know about circumstances related to the competition cases may be 
summoned by the Competition Case-Handling Council to participate in competition 
procedures in the capacity as witnesses or invited by the competition-managing 
agency in the capacity as witnesses at the requests of the involved parties. Persons 
who have lost their civil act capacity must not act as witnesses. 
2. Witnesses shall have the following rights and obligations: 
a/ To supply all documents, papers and things they have, which are related to the 
settlement of competition cases; give testimony verbally or in writing to the 
competition-managing agency or the Competition Case-Handling Council on all 
circumstances they know, which are related to the settlement of competition cases; 
b/ To participate in hearings and give testimony to the Competition Case-Handling 
Council; 
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c/ To be allowed to take leave when they are summoned by, or give testimony to, the 
competition-managing agency or the Competition Case-Handling Council if they are 
working for State agencies, organizations or enterprises; 
d/ To be paid for travel expenses and enjoy other regimes as prescribed by law; 
e/ To refuse to give testimony if such testimony is related to State secrets, 
professional secrets or personal privacy or badly, disadvantageously affects the 
complainants or investigated parties that are their close relatives; 
f/ To honestly report on circumstances they know, which are related to the settlement 
of competition cases; 
g/ To pay damages and take responsibility before law for their false testimony 
causing damage to the complainants, investigated parties or other persons; 
h/ To appear at the hearings in response to the summonses of the Competition Case-
Handling Council if they must give testimony publicly at the hearings; 
i/ To pledge before the competition-managing agency or the Competition Case-
Handling Council to exercise their rights and fulfill their obligations, except for minor 
witnesses. 
3. Witnesses who refuse to give testimony, give false testimony, supply false 
materials or are absent without plausible reasons when being summoned by the 
Competition Case-Handling Council shall have to bear responsibility according to 
law provisions, except for the case prescribed at Point e, Clause 2 of this Article. 
4. Witnesses shall be protected according to law provisions. 
Article 69. Experts 
1. Experts are those who have necessary knowledge about the matters to be expertised 
at the request of the head of the competition-managing agency or the Competition 
Case-Handling Council or at the request of the involved parties after it is accepted by 
the head of the competition-managing agency or the Competition Case-Handling 
Council according to law provisions. 
2. Experts shall have the following rights and obligations: 
a/ To read documents in the competition case dossiers which are related to the 
expertised subject; to request the expertise-requesting agency to supply materials 
necessary for expertise; 
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b/ To raise questions to the competition procedure participants on matters related to 
the expertised subject; 
c/ To appear in response to the summonses of the expertise-requesting agency, give 
answers on matters related to the expertise as well as expertise conclusions in an 
honest, grounded and objective manner; 
d/ To notify in writing the expertise-requesting agency of the impossibility to 
expertise because the matters requested to be expertised fall beyond their professional 
capability or the supplied documents are not enough or are of no use for expertise; 
e/ To preserve the received documents and return them to the expertise-requesting 
agency together with the expertise conclusions or the notice on the impossibility to 
expertise; 
f/ Not to collect by themselves documents for expertise, not to privately contact other 
competition procedure participants if such contact affects the impartiality of the 
expertise results; not to disclose information they know in the expertising process, not 
to notify the expertise results to other persons, except for the signees of the expertise-
requesting decisions; 
g/ To write their opinions on the written general conclusions if disagreeing with the 
general conclusions in the case of collective expertise; 
h/ To be paid for travel expenses and enjoy other regimes according to law 
provisions. 
3. Experts who refuse to give expertise conclusions without plausible reasons or give 
false expertise conclusions or are absent without plausible reasons when summoned 
by the expertise-requesting agency shall have to bear responsibility according to law 
provisions. 
4. Experts must refuse to participate in competition procedures or be changed in the 
following cases: 
a/ They fall into one of the cases prescribed in Article 83 of this Law; 
b/ They have participated in competition procedures in the capacity as lawyers, 
witnesses or interpreters in the same competition case; 
c/ They have conducted procedures in such competition case in the capacity as 
Competition Case-Handling Council members. 
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Article 70. Interpreters 
1. Interpreters are those who are capable of translating a language other than 
Vietnamese into Vietnamese and vice versa in case where competition procedure 
participants cannot use Vietnamese. Interpreters shall be selected according to the 
agreement of the involved parties and accepted by the Competition Case-Handling 
Council or shall be appointed by the Competition Case-Handling Council. 
2. Interpreters shall have the following rights and obligations: 
a/ To appear in response to the summonses of the Competition Case-Handling 
Council; 
b/ To interpret in an truthful, objective and accurate manner; 
c/ To ask competition procedure-conducting persons and competition procedure 
participants to explain the contents more clearly for interpretation; 
d/ Not to contact other competition procedure participants if such contact may affect 
the truthfulness, objectivity and accuracy of the interpretation; 
e/ To be paid for travel expenses and enjoy other regimes according to law 
provisions; 
f/ To pledge before the Competition Case-Handling Council to exercise their rights 
and fulfill their obligations. 
3. Interpreters who deliberately give false interpretation or are absent without 
plausible reasons when summoned by the Competition Case-Handling Council shall 
have to bear responsibility according to law provisions. 
4. Interpreters must refuse to participate in competition procedures or be changed in 
the following cases: 
a/ They fall into one of the cases prescribed in Article 83 of this Law; 
b/ They have participated in competition procedures in the capacity as lawyers, 
witnesses or experts in the same competition case; 
c/ They have conducted procedures in such competition case in the capacity as 
Competition Case-Handling Council members. 
5. The provisions of this Article also apply to those who understand the signs given 
by dumb or deaf competition procedure participants. 
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Where only the representatives or relatives of dumb or deaf competition procedure 
participants can understand the latter’s signs, they may be accepted by the 
Competition Case-Handling Council to act as interpreters for such dumb or deaf 
persons. 
Article 71. Persons with interests, obligations related to competition case 
1. Persons with related interests, obligations may file independent claims or 
participate in competition procedures on the side of the complainants or investigated 
parties. 
2. Persons with related interests, obligations who file independent claims or 
participate in competition procedures on the side of the complainants or persons with 
interests only shall have the complainant’s rights and obligations prescribed in Article 
66 of this Law. 
3. Persons with related interests, obligations who participate in competition 
procedures on the side of the investigated parties or persons with obligations only 
shall have the investigated party’s rights and obligations prescribed in Article 66 of 
this Law. 
Article 72. Procedures for refusing expertise, interpretation or requesting 
change of experts or interpreters 
1. The refusal of expertise or interpretation or request for change of experts or 
interpreters before the opening of hearings must be made in writing, clearly stating 
the reasons therefor. 
2. The refusal of expertise or interpretation or request for change of experts or 
interpreters during a hearing must be written in the hearing’s minutes. 
Article 73. Deciding on change of experts or interpreters 
1. Before opening a hearing, the change of experts or interpreters shall be decided by 
the Competition Council chairman. 
2. During a hearing, the change of experts or interpreters shall be decided by the 
Competition Case-Handling Council after hearing the opinions of the persons 
requested to be changed and other competition procedure participants. 
If it is necessary to change experts or interpreters, the Competition Case-Handling 
Council shall issue a decision to postpone the hearing. The request for expertise by 
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other experts or the appointment of other interpreters shall comply with the provisions 
of Articles 69 and Article 70 of this Law. 
Section 2 - COMPETITION PROCEDURE-CONDUCTING AGENCIES, 
COMPETITION PROCEDURE-CONDUCTING PERSONS 
Article 74. Competition procedure-conducting agencies 
Competition procedure-conducting agencies include the competition-managing 
agency and the Competition Council. 
Article 75. Competition procedure-conducing persons 
Competition procedure-conducting persons include Competition Council members, 
the head of the competition-managing agency, investigators and the hearing’s clerks. 
Article 76. Tasks and powers of the head of the competition-managing agency 
when conducting competition procedures 
When conducting competition procedures, the head of the competition-managing 
agency shall have the following tasks and powers: 
1. To decide to assign investigators to investigate specific competition cases; 
2. To inspect investigative activities of competition case investigators; 
3. To decide to modify or cancel groundless and illegal decisions issued by 
competition case investigators; 
4. To decide to change competition case investigators; 
5. To decide to request expertise; 
6. To decide to apply, change or cancel administrative preventive measures pending 
the transfer of competition case dossiers to the Competition Council for handling; 
7. To decide to conduct preliminary investigation, stop investigation, conduct official 
investigation of competition cases falling under the competence of the competition-
managing agency; 
8. To invite witnesses at the requests of the involved parties at the investigation stage; 
9. To sign written conclusions on the investigation of competition cases, submitted by 
the assigned investigators; 
10. To transfer competition case dossiers to the Competition Council in cases where 
the competition cases involve competition-restricting acts; 
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11. To settle complaints and denunciations falling under the competence of the 
competition-managing agency. 
Article 77. Powers of investigators when conducting competition procedures 
When conducting competition procedures, investigators shall have the following 
powers: 
1. To request related organizations and individuals to supply necessary information 
and documents concerning competition cases; 
2. To request the investigated parties to supply documents and give explanations 
concerning competition cases; 
3. To propose the head of the competition-managing agency to request expertise; 
4. To propose the head of the competition-managing agency to apply administrative 
preventive measures to competition cases. 
Article 78. Obligations of investigators when conducting competition 
procedures: 
When conducting competition procedures, investigators shall have the following 
obligations: 
1. To hand the investigation decisions of the head of the competition-managing 
agency to the investigated parties; 
2. To keep confidential business secrets of enterprises; 
3. To preserve the supplied documents; 
4. To investigate competition cases assigned by the head of the competition-managing 
agency; 
5. To make investigation reports upon termination of preliminary investigation or 
official investigation of competition cases; 
6. To take responsibility to the head of the competition-managing agency and before 
law for the performance of their tasks and powers. 
Article 79. Tasks and powers of the Competition Council chairman when 
conducting competition procedures 
1. To set up the Competition Case-Handling Council under the provisions of Clause 
3, Article 54 of this Law. 
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2. To decide to change Competition Case- Handling Council members, the hearing’s 
clerks, experts or interpreters before opening a hearing according to the provisions of 
Clause 1 of Article 73, Article 83 and Clause 1 of Article 85 of this Law. 
3. To decide to appoint Competition Case- Handling Council members, the hearing’s 
clerks to replace those who are changed during the hearing according to the 
provisions of Clause 2, Article 85 of this Law. 
4. To decide to apply, change or cancel administrative preventive measures when 
receiving competition case dossiers. 
Article 80. The Competition Case- Handling Council 
1. When settling competition cases, the Competition Case- Handling Council shall 
work independently and only abide by law. 
2. Decisions on handling competition cases shall be adopted by the Competition 
Case- Handling Council by majority vote; where the numbers of votes for and against 
are equal, decisions shall be made according to the side sharing the opinion of the 
hearing’s president. 
Article 81. Tasks and powers of the president of a hearing 
The president of a hearing shall have the following tasks and powers: 
1. To organize the study of competition case dossiers; 
2. On the basis of the decision of the Competition Case- Handling Council, to sign the 
proposal to the Competition Council chairman to apply, change or cancel 
administrative preventive measures; decide to return the competition case dossier to 
the competition-managing agency and request additional investigation; decide to stop 
the settlement of the competition case; 
3. On the basis of the decision of the Competition Case- Handling Council, to sign the 
decision to open the hearing; 
4. To decide to summon participants to the hearing; 
5. To sign and announce the decision on the handling of the competition case and 
other decisions of the Competition Case- Handling Council; 
6. To carry out other activities under his/her competence prescribed by this Law when 
handling the competition case. 
Article 82. Clerks of hearings 
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1. The clerk of a hearing shall have the following tasks and powers: 
a/ To prepare necessary professional jobs before the opening of a hearing; 
b/ To announce the rules of the hearing; 
c/ To report to the Competition Case- Handling Council on the presence or absence of 
those summoned to the hearing; 
d/ To write the minutes of the hearing; 
e/ To perform other jobs assigned by the president of the hearing. 
2. The clerk of a hearing must refuse to conduct competition procedures or be 
changed in the cases prescribed in Article 83 of this Law. 
Article 83. Cases of refusal or change of Competition Case- Handling Council 
members, investigators, the hearing’s clerks, experts, interpreters 
Competition Case-Handling Council members, investigators, the hearing’s clerks, 
experts, interpreters must refuse to perform their tasks or shall be changed in one of 
the following cases: 
1. They are relatives of the complainants or investigated parties; 
2. They are persons with interests, obligations related to the competition cases; 
3. There are other explicit grounds to deem that they shall not be impartial when 
performing their tasks. 
Article 84. Procedures for refusal to conduct competition procedures or request 
for change of Competition Case-Handling Council members, the hearing’s clerks 
1. The refusal to conduct competition procedures or request for change of 
Competition Case-Handling Council members, the hearing’s clerks before the 
opening of the hearings must be made in writing, clearly stating the reasons and 
grounds therefore. 
2. The refusal to conduct competition procedures or request for change of 
Competition Case-Handling Council members, the hearing’s clerks during the 
hearings must be recorded in the hearings’ minutes. 
Article 85. Deciding on change of Competition Case-Handling Council members 
or the hearing’s clerks 
1. Before a hearing is opened, the change of Competition Case-Handling Council 
members, the hearing’s clerk shall be decided by the Competition Council chairman. 
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2. During a hearing, the acceptance of the change of Competition Case-Handling 
Council members or the hearing’s clerk shall be decided by the Competition Case-
Handling Council after hearing the opinions of the refusing persons or the persons 
requested to be changed. The Competition Case-Handling Council shall discuss 
behind closed doors and make decision by majority vote. 
If it is necessary to change Competition Case-Handling Council members or the 
hearing’s clerk, the Competition Case-Handling Council shall issue a decision to 
postpone the hearing. The appointment of Competition Case-Handling Council 
members or a hearing’s clerk to replace those who must be changed shall be decided 
by the Competition Council chairman. 
Section 4 - INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION CASES 
Article 86. Preliminary investigation 
The preliminary investigation of competition cases shall be conducted under 
decisions of the head of the competition-managing agency in the following cases: 
1. Competition case dossiers have been accepted by the competition-managing 
agency; 
2. The competition-managing agency detects signs of violation of the provisions of 
this Law. 
Article 87. Time limit for preliminary investigation 
1. The time limit for preliminary investigation is thirty days as from the date of 
issuance of preliminary investigation decisions. 
2. Within the time limit specified in Clause 1 of this Article, investigators assigned to 
investigate competition cases must complete the preliminary investigation and 
propose the head of the competition-managing agency to issue a decision to stop 
investigation or conduct official investigation. 
Article 88. Decisions to stop investigation, decisions to conduct official 
investigation 
On the basis of the preliminary investigation results and the proposals of 
investigators, the head of the competition-managing agency shall issue one of the 
following decisions: 
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1. To stop investigation if the preliminary investigation results show that there are no 
acts of violation of the provisions of this Law; 
2. To conduct official investigation if the preliminary investigation results show that 
there are acts of violation of the provisions of this Law. 
Article 89. Contents of official investigation 
1. For cases of competition restriction agreement, abuse of the dominant position on 
the market or abuse of the monopoly position, or economic concentration, 
investigation shall covers: 
a/ Identifying the relevant market; 
b/ Verifying the investigated party’s market share on the relevant market; 
c/ Collecting and analyzing evidences on violation acts. 
2. For cases of unfair competition, investigators must identify the grounds to deem 
that the investigated parties have performed or are performing unfair competition 
acts. 
Article 90. Time limit for official investigation 
The time limit for official investigation is prescribed as follows: 
1. For cases of unfair competition, the time limit for official investigation shall be 
ninety days as from the date of issuance of decisions; in case of necessity, this time 
limit may be extended by the head of the competition-managing agency for another 
sixty days at most; 
2. For cases of competition restriction agreement, abuse of the dominant position on 
the market or abuse of the monopoly position, or economic concentration, the time 
limit for official investigation shall be one hundred and eighty days, as from the date 
of issuance of decisions; in case of necessity, this time limit may be extended by the 
head of the competition-managing agency no more than twice, each time for sixty 
days at most; 
3. The extension of the investigation time limit must be notified by investigators to all 
related parties not later than seven working days before the expiration of the 
investigation time limit. 
Article 91. Investigation minutes 
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1. When conducting investigation, investigators must make investigation minutes, 
clearly indicating the investigation time and place, investigators, investigated party, 
investigated contents and complaint and/or claim of the investigated party. 
2. Investigation minutes must be read out by investigators to the investigated party 
before they both sign the minutes. 
3. If the investigated party refuses to sign the minutes, investigators must record such 
in the minutes together with the reason therefore. 
Article 92. Request to invite witnesses in the investigation process 
1. In the process of investigation, the involved parties may request the competition-
managing agency to invite witnesses. The requestors shall be obliged to state the 
reasons for inviting witnesses to the competition-managing agency for decision. 
2. The competition-managing agency’s invitation to a witness must clearly indicate 
the full name and address of the invitee, time and place for giving testimony, the 
parties and subject involved in the case. 
3. Testimonies of witnesses must be recorded in minutes by investigators, which shall 
be read out to the witnesses before they both sign the minutes. 
Article 93. Investigation reports 
1. After the termination of investigation, the head of the competition-managing 
agency must transfer the investigation reports together with the whole competition 
case dossiers related to competition-restricting acts to the Competition Council. 
2. An investigation report shall contain the following principal contents: 
a/ A brief account of the case; 
b/ Verified circumstances and evidences; 
c/ Proposed handling measures. 
Article 94. Transfer of dossiers of competition cases involving criminal signs 
If, through investigation, it is detected that a competition case shows criminal signs, 
investigators must promptly propose the head of the competition-managing agency to 
consider and transfer the relevant dossier to competent State agencies for institution 
of criminal cases. 
Article 95. Return of dossiers in case of availability of grounds for non-
institution of criminal cases 
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Where state agencies with competence to institute criminal cases find that there are 
grounds for non-institution of criminal cases under the provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, they must return the dossiers to the competition-managing agency 
for further investigation according to the procedures prescribed in this Law. The 
investigation time limit prescribed in Article 90 of this Law shall be counted as from 
the date the dossiers are received back. 
Article 96. Additional investigation, time limit for additional investigation 
1. Competition case investigators must conduct additional investigation if it is so 
requested in writing by the Competition Case-Handling Council. 
2. The time limit for additional investigation is sixty days, as from the date of 
issuance of the Competition Case-Handling Council’s written requests for additional 
investigation. 
Article 97. Responsibilities for coordination and support in the investigation 
process 
Local administrations, police agencies, other agencies and organizations shall have to 
coordinate and support the investigation process at the request of the head of the 
competition-managing agency. 
Section 5 - HEARINGS 
Article 98. Competition cases must be considered and handled through hearings 
Competition cases falling under the settling competence of the Competition Council 
must be considered and handled through hearings. 
Article 99. Preparation for opening a hearing 
1. After receiving the investigation report and the complete competition case dossier, 
the Competition Council chairman shall decide to set up a Competition Case-
Handling Council. 
2. Within thirty days after receiving the competition case dossier, the Competition 
Case-Handling Council must issue one of the following decisions: 
a/ To open a hearing; 
b/ To return the dossier for additional investigation; 
c/ To stop settling the competition case. 
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3. Within fifteen days after the date of issuance of the decision to open a hearing, the 
Competition Case-Handling Council must open a hearing. 
4. In case of returning the dossier for additional investigation, within fifteen days 
after the date of receiving back the dossier, the Competition Case-Handling Council 
must issue one of the decisions defined in Clause 2 of this Article. 
Article 100. Return of dossiers for additional investigation 
If finding that the collected evidences are not enough for determining acts of violation 
of the provisions of this Law, the Competition Case-Handling Council shall decide to 
return the dossiers for additional investigation. 
Article 101. Stoppage of settlement of competition cases falling under the settling 
competence of the Competition Council 
1. The Competition Case-Handling Council shall decide to stop settling competition 
cases falling under the settling competence of the Competition Council in the 
following cases: 
a/ The head of the competition-managing agency proposes to stop settling the 
competition case if there are not enough evidences of acts of violation of the 
provisions of this Law and the Competition Case-Handling Council deems such 
proposal justified; 
b/ The investigated party has voluntarily terminated its violation acts, remedied 
consequences and the complainant has voluntarily withdrawn its written complaint; 
c/ The investigated party has voluntarily terminated its violation acts, remedied 
consequences and the head of the competition-managing agency proposes to stop 
settling the competition case, for cases where investigation has been conducted under 
the provisions of Clause 2, Article 65 of this Law. 
2. Decisions to stop settling competition cases must be sent to the investigated parties 
and the complainants (if any) as well as the competition-managing agency. 
Article 102. Decisions to open hearings 
1. A decision to open a hearing must be handed to the parties named therein not later 
than ten days before the date of opening of the hearing. 
2. A decision to open a hearing must contain the following contents: 
a/ The investigated party; 
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b/ The complainant or the competition-managing agency, for cases where 
investigation has been conducted under the provisions of Clause 2, Article 65 of this 
Law; 
c/ Violated articles and/or clauses of this Law; 
d/ Time and place of opening of the hearing; 
e/ The hearing is to be held in public or behind closed doors; 
f/ Full names of Competition Case-Handling Council members; 
g/ Full names of investigators who have investigated the competition case, the 
hearing’s clerk; 
h/ Full names of lawyers; 
i/ Full name of the interpreter; 
j/ Full names of witnesses; 
k/ Full names of experts; 
l/ Persons with related interests and obligations. 
Article 103. Summoning of persons who must appear at the hearings 
On the basis of the decisions to open the hearings, the Competition Case-Handling 
Council shall send summonses to persons who must appear at the hearings not later 
than ten days before the date of opening of the hearings. 
Article 104. Hearings 
1. Hearings shall be held in public. Where the contents of a hearing are related to 
national secrets or business secrets, the hearing shall be held behind closed doors. 
2. Participants to a hearing include: 
a/ Competition Case-Handling Council members, the hearing’s clerk; 
b/ The investigated party; 
c/ The complainant; 
d/ Lawyers; 
e/ Investigators who have investigated the competition case; 
f/ Other persons named in the decision to open the hearing. 
3. After hearing the opinions and arguments presented by the participants to the 
hearings, the Competition Case-Handling Council shall discuss, cast secret votes and 
make decision by majority vote. 
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Section 6 - EFFECT OF COMPETITION CASE-HANDLING DECISIONS 
Article 105. Competition case-handling decisions 
1. A competition case-handling decision shall contain the following principal 
contents: 
a/ A brief account of the case; 
b/ Analysis of the case; 
c/ Conclusion on the handling of the case. 
2. The hearing presidents must sign competition case-handling decisions. 
3. Competition case-handling decisions must be sent to the related parties within 
seven working date after the date of its signing. 
Article 106. Effect of competition case-handling decisions 
Competition case-handling decisions shall come into force thirty days after the date of 
its signing provided that during this period they are not complained about under the 
provisions of Article 107 of this Law. 
Section 7 - SETTLEMENT OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT COMPETITION 
CASE-HANDLING DECISIONS WHICH HAVE NOT YET COME INTO 
FORCE 
Article 107. Complaining about competition case-handling decisions 
1. If the involved parties disagree with part or the whole of the competition case-
handling decisions issued by the Competition Case- Handling Council, they may 
lodge complaints with the Competition Council. 
2. If the involved parties disagree with part or the whole of the competition case-
handling decisions issued by the head of the competition-managing agency, they may 
lodge complaints with the Trade Minister. 
Article 108. Written complaints about competition case-handling decisions 
A written complaint about the competition case-handling decision must contain the 
following principal contents: 
a/ Date of making; 
b/ Name and address of the maker; 
c/ Serial number and date of the complained competition case-handling decision; 
d/ The reason for complaining and the complainant’s claim; 
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e/ The signature and seal (if any) of the complainant. 
2. Written complainants must be addressed to the agencies issuing the competition 
case-handling decisions in question together with supplementary evidences (if any) 
proving that the complaints are grounded and lawful. 
Article 109. Acceptance of written complaints about competition case-handling 
decisions 
Within five working days after receiving the written complainants about the 
competition case-handling decisions, the agencies which have issued such decisions 
must check the validity of the written complaints according to the provisions of 
Article 108 of this Law. 
Article 110. Consequences of complaints about competition case-handling 
decisions 
1. The complained parts of competition case-handling decisions shall not be executed. 
2. Within fifteen days after receiving the written complaints about competition case-
handling decisions, the agency accepting such written complaints shall have to 
consider and transfer them together with the whole competition case dossiers as well 
as their proposals on the written complaints to the Competition Council or the Trade 
Minister according to the provisions of Article 107 of this Law. 
Article 111. Time limit for settling complaints about competition case-handling 
decisions 
Within thirty days after receiving the complaint dossiers, the Competition Council or 
the Trade Minister shall have to settle the complaints according to competence; in 
specially complicated cases, the time limit for settling complaints may be extended 
for another thirteen days at most. 
Article 112. Powers of the Competition Council when settling complaints about 
competition case-handling decisions of the Competition Case- Handling Council 
When considering and settling complaints about competition case-handling decisions 
of the Competition Case- Handling Council, the Competition Council shall have the 
following powers: 
1. To hold up the competition case-handling decisions if deeming that the complaints 
are not sufficiently grounded; 
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2. To amend part or whole of the competition case-handling decisions if such 
decisions are illegal; 
3. To cancel the competition case-handling decisions and transfer the competition 
case dossiers to the Competition Case- Handling Council for resettlement in the 
following cases: 
a/ Evidences have not yet been fully collected and verified; 
b/ The composition of the Competition Case- Handling Council contravenes the 
provisions of this Law or other serious violations of competition procedures were 
committed. 
Article 113. Powers of the Trade Minister when settling complaints about 
competition case-handling decisions of the competition-managing agency 
When considering and settling complaints about competition case-handling decisions 
of the competition-managing agency, the Trade Minister shall have the powers 
defined in Clause 1 and Clause 2, Article 112 of this Law, the power to cancel the 
competition case-handling decisions and request the competition-managing agency to 
resettle the cases according to the procedures prescribed in this Law in cases where 
evidences have not yet been fully collected and verified. 
Article 114. Effect of complaint-settling decisions 
Decisions to settle complaints about competition case-handling decisions shall come 
into force as from the date of signing. 
Article 115. Initiation of lawsuits against complaint-settling decisions 
1. If the involved parties disagree with the decisions to settle complaints about 
competition case-handling decisions, they may initiate administrative lawsuits against 
part or the whole of the contents of such decisions at the competent 
provincial/municipal People’s Courts. 
2. Where the courts accept the written lawsuits against the decisions to settle 
complaints about competition case-handling decisions according to the provisions of 
Clause 1 of this Article, the Trade Minister and the Competition Council chairman 
shall have to direct the transfer of the competition case dossiers to the courts within 
ten working days after receiving the court’s requests. 
Article 116. Consequences of lawsuits 
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Those parts of competition case-handling decisions which are not sued against at 
court shall continue to be executed. 
Section 8 - HANDLING OF VIOLATIONS OF COMPETITION 
LEGISLATION 
Article 117. Forms of sanctioning violations of competition legislation and 
measures to remedy consequences 
1. For each act of violation of competition legislation, violating organizations or 
individuals shall be subject to one of the following principal sanctioning forms: 
a/ Warning; 
b/ Fine. 
2. Depending on the nature and seriousness of their violations, the organizations or 
individuals violating competition legislation may be subject to one of the following 
additional sanctioning forms: 
a/ Revocation of the business registration certificates, deprivation of licenses and 
practicing certificates; 
b/ Confiscation of exhibits and means used for commission of violations of 
competition legislation. 
3. In addition to the sanctioning forms prescribed in Clause 1 and Clause 2 of this 
Article, organizations or individuals violating competition legislation may be subject 
to the application of one or more than one of the following consequence-remedying 
measures: 
a/ To restructure the enterprises having abused their dominant position on the market; 
b/ To divide or split the merged or consolidated enterprises; to force the resale of the 
acquired enterprise parts; 
c/ To make public corrections; 
d/ To remove illegal provisions from the business contracts or transactions; 
e/ Other necessary measures to overcome the competition restriction impacts of the 
violation acts. 
If organizations or individuals violating competition legislation cause damage to the 
interests of the State, legitimate rights and interests of other organizations or 
individuals, they must pay compensation therefore according to law provisions. 
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Article 118. Levels of fine imposed for acts of violating competition legislation 
1. For acts of violating the provisions on competition restriction agreements, abuse of 
dominant position on the market, abuse of monopoly position or economic 
concentration, the agencies with sanctioning competence may impose fines of up to 
10% of total turnover earned by the violating organizations or individuals in the fiscal 
year preceding the year when they commit violation acts. 
2. For acts of violating the provisions on unfair competition and other acts of 
violating the provisions of this Law other than those prescribed in Clause 1 of this 
Article, the agencies with sanctioning competence shall impose fines according to law 
provisions on handling of administrative violations or relevant law provisions. 
3. The Government shall specify the levels of fine imposed for acts of violating the 
provisions of this Law. 
Article 119. Competence to sanction, handle violations of competition legislation 
1. The Competition Case-Handling Council and the Competition Council shall have 
the following powers: 
a/ To issue caution; 
b/ To impose fines according to the provisions of Clause 1, Article 118 of this Law; 
c/ To confiscate exhibits and means used for commission of violations of competition 
legislation; 
d/ To apply the measures prescribed at Points c, d and e, Clause 3, Article 117 of this 
Law; 
e/ To request competent state agencies to revoke business registration certificates, 
deprive of licenses and/or practicing certificates; 
f/ To request competent state agencies to apply the measures prescribed at Points a 
and b, Clause 3, Article 117 of this Law. 
2. The competition-managing agency may apply the measures prescribed at Point a of 
Clause 1, Point b of Clause 2, Point c of Clause 3, Article 117 and Clause 2, Article 
118 of this Law. 
3. Other agencies with sanctioning competence shall sanction intellectual property-
related unfair competition acts according to law provisions on handling of 
administrative violations. 
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Article 120. Handling of violations committed by state officials and employees 
State officials and employees who commit acts of violation of competition legislation 
shall, depending on the nature and seriousness of their violations, be disciplined or 
examined for penal liability; if causing any damage, they must pay compensation 
therefore according to law provisions. 
Article 121. Execution of competition case-handling decisions 
1. After thirty days as from the date the competition case-handling decisions come 
into force, if the parties obliged to comply with such decisions fail to voluntarily 
comply with and do not initiate lawsuits at court according to the provisions of 
Section 7 of this Chapter, the parties in favor of which the competition case-handling 
decisions are executed may request in writing the competent state agencies to 
organize the execution of the competition case-handling decisions falling within the 
scope of their functions, tasks and powers. 
2. Where the competition case-handling decisions are related to the property of the 
parties bound to comply with the decisions, the parties in favor of which the 
competition case-handling decisions are executed may request the civil judgment-
executing agencies in the provinces or centrally run cities where the parties obliged to 
comply with the decisions are headquartered, reside or their property is located to 
organize the execution of the competition case-handling decisions. 
Chapter VI - IMPLEMENTATION PROVISIONS 
Article 122. Implementation effect 
This Law shall take effect as from July 1, 2005. 
Article 123. Implementation guidance 
The Government and the Supreme People’s Court shall detail and guide the 
implementation of this Law. 
This Law was passed on December 3, 2004 by the 11th National Assembly of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam at its the 6th session. 
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ANNEX 2 
CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW  
Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People''s 
Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 2007. 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining 
monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing 
economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers and social public 
interest, promoting the healthy development of the socialist market economy. 
Article 2 This Law shall be applicable to monopolistic conducts in economic 
activities within the People''s Republic of China. 
This Law shall apply to the conducts outside the territory of the People''s Republic of 
China if they eliminate or have restrictive effect on competition on the domestic 
market of the PRC. 
Article 3 For the purposes of this Law, "monopolistic conducts" are defined as the 
following: 
(1) monopolistic agreements among business operators; 
(2) abuse of dominant market positions by business operators; and 
(3) concentration of business operators that eliminates or restricts competition or 
might be eliminating or restricting competition. 
Article 4 The State constitutes and carries out competition rules which accord with 
the socialist market economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a unified, open, 
competitive and orderly market system. 
Article 5 Business operators may, through fair competition, voluntary 
alliance，concentrate themselves according to law, expand the scope of business 
operations, and enhance competitiveness. 
Article 6 Any business with a dominant position may not abuse that dominant 
position to eliminate, or restrict competition. 
                                                 

 Unofficial English translation available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm 
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Article 7 With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned economy and 
concerning the lifeline of national economy and national security or the industries 
implementing exclusive operation and sales according to law, the state protects the 
lawful business operations conducted by the business operators therein. The state also 
lawfully regulates and controls their business operations and the prices of their 
commodities and services so as to safeguard the interests of consumers and promote 
technical progresses. 
The business operators as mentioned above shall lawfully operate, be honest and 
faithful, be strictly self-disciplined, accept social supervision, shall not damage the 
interests of consumers by virtue of their dominant or exclusive positions. 
Article 8 No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative 
powers to eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 9 The State Council shall establish the Anti-monopoly Commission, which is 
in charge of organizing, coordinating, guiding anti-monopoly work, performs the 
following functions: 
(1) studying and drafting related competition policies; 
(2) organizing the investigation and assessment of overall competition situations in 
the market, and issuing assessment reports; 
(3) constituting and issuing anti-monopoly guidelines; 
(4) coordinating anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement; and 
(5) other functions as assigned by the State Council. 
The State Council shall stipulate composition and working rules of the Anti-
monopoly Commission. 
Article 10 The anti-monopoly authority designated by the State Council (hereinafter 
referred to as the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) shall be in 
charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council) may, when needed, authorize 
the corresponding authorities in the people''s governments of the provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government to take 
charge of anti-monopoly law enforcement in accordance with this Law. 
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Article 11 A trade association shall intensify industrial self-discipline, guide business 
operators to lawfully compete, safeguard the competition order in the market. 
Article 12 For the purposes of this Law, 
"business operator" refers to a natural person, legal person, or any other organization 
that is in the engagement of commodities production or operation or service 
provision, and 
"relevant market" refers to the commodity scope or territorial scope within which the 
business operators compete against each other during a certain period of time for 
specific commodities or services (hereinafter generally referred to as "commodities"). 
Chapter II Monopoly Agreement 
Article 13 Any of the following monopoly agreements among the competing 
business operators shall be prohibited: 
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities; 
(2) limiting the output or sales of commodities; 
(3) dividing the sales market or the raw material procurement market; 
(4) restricting the purchase of new technology or new facilities or the development of 
new technology or new products; 
(5) making boycott transactions; or 
(6) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 
For the purposes of this Law, "monopoly agreements" refer to agreements, decisions 
or other concerted actions which eliminate or restrict competition. 
Article 14 Any of the following agreements among business operators and their 
trading parties are prohibited: 
(1) fixing the price of commodities for resale to a third party; 
(2) restricting the minimum price of commodities for resale to a third party; or 
(3) other monopoly agreements as determined by the Anti-monopoly Authority under 
the State Council. 
Article 15 An agreement among business operators shall be exempted from 
application of articles 13 and 14 if it can be proven to be in any of the following 
circumstances: 
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(1) for the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing new 
products; 
(2) for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, 
unifying product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor 
division; 
(3) for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the 
competitiveness of small and medium-sized business operators; 
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving energy, protecting 
the environment and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(5) for the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously 
excessive production during economic recessions; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign trade or 
foreign economic cooperation; or 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Where a monopoly agreement is in any of the circumstances stipulated in Items 1 
through 5 and is exempt from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the business operators 
must additionally prove that the agreement can enable consumers to share the 
interests derived from the agreement, and will not severely restrict the competition in 
relevant market. 
Article 16 Any trade association may not organize the business operators in its own 
industry to implement the monopolistic conduct as prohibited by this Chapter. 
Chapter III Abuse of Market Dominance 
Article 17 A business operator with a dominant market position shall not abuse its 
dominant market position to conduct following acts: 
(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices or buying commodities at unfairly low 
prices; 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without any justifiable cause; 
(3) refusing to trade with a trading party without any justifiable cause; 
(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively with itself or trade exclusively with a 
designated business operator(s) without any justifiable cause; 
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(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable trading conditions at the time of trading 
without any justifiable cause; 
(6) applying dissimilar prices or other transaction terms to counterparties with equal 
standing; 
(7) other conducts determined as abuse of a dominant position by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council 
For the purposes of this Law, "dominant market position" refers to a market position 
held by a business operator having the capacity to control the price, quantity or other 
trading conditions of commodities in relevant market, or to hinder or affect any other 
business operator to enter the relevant market. 
Article 18 The dominant market status shall be determined according to the following 
factors: 
(1) the market share of a business operator in relevant market, and the competition 
situation of the relevant market; 
(2) the capacity of a business operator to control the sales markets or the raw material 
procurement market; 
(3) the financial and technical conditions of the business operator; 
(4) the degree of dependence of other business operators upon of the business 
operator in transactions; 
(5) the degree of difficulty for other business operators to enter the relevant market; 
and 
(6) other factors related to determine a dominant market position of the said business 
operator. 
Article 19 Where a business operator is under any of the following circumstances, it 
may be assumed to be have a dominant market position: 
(1) the relevant market share of a business operator accounts for1/2 or above in the 
relevant market; 
(2) the joint relevant market share of two business operators accounts for 2/3 or 
above; or 
(3) the joint relevant market share of three business operators accounts for 3/4 or 
above. 
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A business operator with a market share of less than 1/10 shall not be presumed as 
having a dominant market position even if they fall within the scope of second or 
third item. 
Where a business operator who has been presumed to have a dominant market 
position can otherwise prove that they do not have a dominant market, it shall not be 
determined as having a dominant market position. 
Chapter IV Concentration of Business operators 
Article 20 A concentration refers to the following circumstances: 
(1) the merger of business operators; 
(2) acquiring control over other business operators by virtue of acquiring their 
equities or assets; or 
(3) acquiring control over other business operators or possibility of exercising 
decisive influence on other business operators by virtue of contact or any other 
means. 
Article 21 Where a concentration reaches the threshold of declaration stipulated by 
the State Council, a declaration must be lodged in advance with the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council, or otherwise the concentration shall not be 
implemented. 
Article 22 Where a concentration is under any of the following circumstances, it may 
not be declared to the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council: 
(1) one business operator who is a party to the concentration has the power to 
exercise more than half the voting rights of every other business operator, whether of 
the equity or the assets; or 
(2) one business operator who is not a party to the concentration has the power to 
exercise more than half the voting rights of every business operator concerned, 
whether of the equity or the assets. 
Article 23 A business operator shall, when lodge a concentration declaration with the 
Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, submit the following documents 
and materials: 
(1) a declaration paper; 
(2) explanations on the effect of the concentration on the relevant market competition; 
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(3) the agreement of concentration; 
(4) the financial reports and accounting reports of the proceeding accounting year of 
the business operator; and 
(5) other documents and materials as stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority 
under the State Council. 
Such items shall be embodied in the declaration paper as the name, domicile and 
business scopes of the business operators involved in the concentration as well as the 
date of the scheduled concentration and other items as stipulated by the Anti-
monopoly Authority under the State Council. 
Article 24 Where the documents or materials submitted by a business operator are 
incomplete, it shall submit the rest of the documents and materials within the time 
limit stipulated by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council; otherwise, 
the declaration shall be deemed as not filed. 
Article 25 The Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall conduct a 
preliminary review of the declared concentration of business operators, make a 
decision whether to conduct further review and notify the business operators in 
written form within 30 days upon receipt of the documents and materials submitted 
by the business operators pursuant to Article 23 of this Law. Before such a decision 
made by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council, the concentration may 
be not implemented. 
Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides not to conduct 
further review or fails to make a decision at expiry of the stipulated period, the 
concentration may be implemented. 
Article 26 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to 
conduct further review, they shall, within 90 days from the date of decision, complete 
the review, make a decision on whether to prohibit the concentration, and notify the 
business operators concerned of the decision in written form. A decision of 
prohibition shall be attached with reasons therefor. Within the review period the 
concentration may not be implemented. 
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Under any of the following circumstances, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the 
State Council may notify the business operators in written form that the time limit as 
stipulated in the preceding paragraph may be extended to no more than 60 days: 
(1) the business operators concerned agree to extend the time limit; 
(2) the documents or materials submitted are inaccurate and need further verification; 
(3) things have significantly changed after declaration. 
If the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council fails to make a decision at 
expiry of the period, the concentration may be implemented. 
Article 27 In the case of the examination on the concentration of business operators, 
it shall consider the relevant elements as follows: 
(1) the market share of the business operators involved in the relevant market and the 
controlling power thereof over that market, 
(2) the degree of market concentration in the relevant market, 
(3) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the market access and 
technological progress, 
(4) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the consumers and 
other business operators, 
(5) the influence of the concentration of business operators on the national economic 
development, and 
(6) other elements that may have an effect on the market competition and shall be 
taken into account as regarded by the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State 
Council. 
Article 28 Where a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a 
decision to prohibit the concentration. However, if the business operators concerned 
can prove that the concentration will bring more positive impact than negative impact 
on competition, or the concentration is pursuant to public interests, the Anti-
monopoly Authority under the State Council may decide not to prohibit the 
concentration. 
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Article 29 Where the concentration is not prohibited, the Anti-monopoly Authority 
under the State Council may decide to attach restrictive conditions for reducing the 
negative impact of such concentration on competition. 
Article 30 Where the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council decides to 
prohibit a concentration or attaches restrictive conditions on concentration, it shall 
publicize such decisions to the general public in a timely manner. 
Article 31 Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic enterprise or 
participate in concentration by other means, if state security is involved, besides the 
examination on the concentration in accordance with this Law, the examination on 
national security shall also be conducted in accordance with the relevant State 
provisions. 
Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition 
Article 32 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power, restrict or restrict in a disguised form entities and individuals to operate, 
purchase or use the commodities provided by business operators designated by it. 
Article 33 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or an 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not have any of the 
following conducts by abusing its administrative power to block free circulation of 
commodities between regions: 
(1) imposing discriminative charge items, discriminative charge standards or 
discriminative prices upon commodities from outside the locality, 
(2) imposing such technical requirements and inspection standards upon commodities 
from outside the locality as different from those upon local commodities of the same 
classification, or taking such discriminative technical measures as repeated 
inspections or repeated certifications to commodities from outside the locality, so as 
to restrict them to enter local market, 
(3) exerting administrative licensing specially on commodities from outside the 
locality so as to restrict them to enter local market, 
  426 
(4) setting barriers or taking other measures so as to hamper commodities from 
outside the locality from entering the local market or local commodities from moving 
outside the local region, or 
(5) other conducts for the purpose of hampering commodities from free circulation 
between regions. 
Article 34 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the locality to participate in 
local tendering and bidding activities by such means as imposing discriminative 
qualification requirements or assessment standards or releasing information in an 
unlawful manner. 
Article 35 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power to reject or restrict business operators from outside the locality to invest or set 
up branches in the locality by imposing unequal treatment thereupon compared to that 
upon local business operators. 
Article 36 Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative 
power to force business operators to engage in the monopolistic conducts as 
prescribed in this Law. 
Article 37 Any administrative organ may not abuse its administrative power to set 
down such provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition. 
Chapter VI Investigation into the Suspicious Monopolistic Conducts 
Article 38 The anti-monopoly authority shall make investigations into suspicious 
monopolistic conducts in accordance with law. 
Any entity or individual may report suspicious monopolistic conducts to the anti-
monopoly authority. The anti-monopoly authority shall keep the informer 
confidential. 
Where an informer makes the reporting in written form and provides relevant facts 
and evidences, the anti-monopoly authority shall make necessary investigation. 
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Article 39 The anti-monopoly authority may take any of the following measures in 
investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts: 
(1) conducting the inspection by getting into the business premises of business 
operators under investigation or by getting into any other relevant place, 
(2) inquiring of the business operators under investigation, interested parties, or other 
relevant entities or individuals, and requiring them to explain the relevant conditions, 
(3) consulting and duplicating the relevant documents, agreements, account books, 
business correspondences and electronic data, etc. of the business operators under 
investigation, interested parties and other relevant entities or individuals, 
(4) seizing and detaining relevant evidence, and 
(5) inquiring about the business operators'' bank accounts under investigation. 
Before the measures as prescribed in the preceding paragraph are approved, a written 
report shall be submitted to the chief person(s)-in-charge of the anti-monopoly 
authority. 
Article 40 When inspecting suspicious monopolistic conducts, there shall be at least 
two law enforcers, and they shall show their law enforcement certificates. 
When inquiring about and investigating suspicious monopolistic conducts, law 
enforcers shall make notes thereon, which shall bear the signatures of the persons 
under inquiry or investigation. 
Article 41 The anti-monopoly authority and functionaries thereof shall be obliged to 
keep confidential the trade secrets they have access to during the course of the law 
enforcement. 
Article 42 Business operators, interested parties and other relevant entities and 
individuals under investigation shall show cooperation with the anti-monopoly 
authority in performing its functions, and may not reject or hamper the investigation 
by the anti-monopoly authority. 
Article 43 Business operators, interested parties under investigation have the right to 
voice their opinions. The anti-monopoly authority shall verify the facts, reasons and 
evidences provided by the business operators, interested parties under investigation. 
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Article 44 Where the anti-monopoly authority deems that a monopolistic conduct is 
constituted after investigating and verifying a suspicious monopolistic conduct, it 
shall make a decision on how to deal with the monopolistic conduct, and publicize it. 
Article 45 As regards a suspicious monopolistic conduct that the anti-monopoly 
authority is investigating, if the business operators under investigation promise to 
eliminate the impact of the conduct by taking specific measures within the time limit 
prescribed by the anti-monopoly authority, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to 
suspend the investigation. The decision on suspending the investigation shall specify 
the specific measures as promised by the business operators under investigation. 
Where the anti-monopoly authority decides to suspend the investigation, it shall 
supervise the implementation of the promise by the relevant business operators. If the 
business operators keep their promise, the anti-monopoly authority may decide to 
terminate the investigation. 
However, the anti-monopoly authority shall resume the investigation, where 
(1) the business operators fail to implement the promise, 
(2) significant changes have taken place to the facts based on which the decision on 
suspending the investigation was made; or 
(3) the decision on suspending the investigation was made based on incomplete or 
inaccurate information provided by the business operators. 
Chapter VII Legal Liabilities 
Article 46 Where business operators reach an monopoly agreement and perform it in 
violation of this Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order them to cease doing so, 
and shall confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of the sales 
revenue in the previous year. Where the reached monopoly agreement has not been 
performed, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be imposed. 
Where any business operator voluntarily reports the conditions on reaching the 
monopoly agreement and provides important evidences to the anti-monopoly 
authority, it may be imposed a mitigated punishment or exemption from punishment 
as the case may be. 
Where a guild help the achievement of a monopoly agreement by business operators 
in its own industry in violation of this Law, a fine of less than 500,000 yuan shall be 
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imposed thereupon by the anti-monopoly authority; in case of serious circumstances, 
the social group registration authority may deregister the guild. 
Article 47 Where any business operator abuses its dominant market status in 
violation of this Law, it shall be ordered to cease doing so. The anti-monopoly 
authority shall confiscate its illegal gains and impose thereupon a fine of 1% up to 
10% of the sales revenue in the previous year. 
Article 48 Where any business operator implements concentration in violation of this 
Law, the anti-monopoly authority shall order it to cease doing so, to dispose of shares 
or assets, transfer the business or take other necessary measures to restore the market 
situation before the concentration within a time limit, and may impose a fine of less 
than 500,000 yuan. 
Article 49 The specific amount of the fines as prescribed in Articles 46 through 48 
shall be determined in consideration of such factors as the nature, extent and duration 
of the violations. 
Article 50 Where any loss was caused by a business operator''s monopolistic 
conducts to other entities and individuals, the business operator shall assume the civil 
liabilities. 
Article 51 Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power 
to eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to 
make correction and impose punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge 
and other directly liable persons. The anti-monopoly authority may put forward 
suggestions on handling according to law to the relevant superior authority. 
Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the handling 
the organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer 
public affairs who abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, 
such provisions shall prevail. 
Article 52 As regards the inspection and investigation by the anti-monopoly 
authority, if business operators refuse to provide related materials and information, 
provide fraudulent materials or information, conceal, destroy or remove evidence, or 
refuse or obstruct investigation in other ways, the anti-monopoly authority shall order 
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them to make rectification, impose a fine of less than 20,000 yuan on individuals, and 
a fine of less than 200,000 yuan on entities; and in case of serious circumstances, the 
anti-monopoly authority may impose a fine of 20,000 yuan up to 100,000 yuan on 
individuals, and a fine of 200,000 yuan up to one million yuan on entities; where a 
crime is constituted, the relevant business operators shall assume criminal liabilities. 
Article 53 Where any party concerned objects to the decision made by the anti-
monopoly authority in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 of this Law, it may first 
apply for an administrative reconsideration; if it objects to the reconsideration 
decision, it may lodge an administrative lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Where any party concerned is dissatisfied with any decision made by the anti-
monopoly authority other than the decisions prescribed in the preceding paragraph, it 
may lodge an application for administrative reconsideration or initiate an 
administrative lawsuit in accordance with law. 
Article 54 Where any functionary of the anti-monopoly authority abuses his/her 
power, neglects his/her duty, seeks private benefits, or discloses trade secrets he/she 
has access to during the process of law enforcement, and a crime is constituted, 
he/she shall be subject to the criminal liability; where no crime is constituted, he/she 
shall be imposed upon a disciplinary sanction. 
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions 
Article 55 This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise 
their intellectual property rights under laws and relevant administrative regulations on 
intellectual property rights; however, business operators'' conduct to eliminate or 
restrict market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be 
governed by this Law. 
Article 56 This Law does not govern the ally or concerted actions of agricultural 
producers and rural economic organizations in the economic activities such as 
production, processing, sales, transportation and storage of agricultural products. 
Article 57 This Law shall enter into force as of August 1, 2008. 
 
